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Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/

[signature] /N. Fedorenko/

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97103; translated by Danny Rozas with Kathryn Weathersby.]

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COMMENTARIES

Comparing Russian

and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History

By Chen Jian

These documents from the Russian Presidential Archives provide significant new insights into the making and development of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 19491950. They usefully complement the account contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong's Russian language interpreter, who has been one of the main sources of our knowledge about the relationship between Beijing and Moscow during the early Cold War period. (See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Together with Historical Giants: Shi Zhe's Memoirs] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992).) As the translator of Shi Zhe's memoirs, I am deeply impressed by the richness of the information in these documents. I am also surprised, in spite of some discrepancies, by the extent to which Russian and Chinese materials (including Shi Zhe's memoirs and other sources) are in accord. I will therefore focus my comments on comparing Chinese and Russian sources on the same events as reflected in these documents.

Let me start with the meeting between Mao and Stalin on 16 December 1949. The Russian minutes of the meeting are highly compatible with, but more detailed than, Mao Zedong's own summary of the meeting in his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on 18 December. Mao's telegram reads as follows:

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th, and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved include the prospect of peace,

the treaty, loans, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works.

(2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid of fighting a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions.

(3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Chinese-Soviet treaty. If we are to abolish the old treaty and to sign a new treaty, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed, and the United States will have an excuse to take away the Kurile Islands. Therefore, on the question of the Soviet Union's thirty-year lease of Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I expressed [the view] that too early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troops from Lushun] will create unfavorable conditions for us. He replied that the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, the public opinion in China believes that as the old treaty was signed by the Guomindang, it has lost its standing with the Guomindang's downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised, and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now.

(4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I will consider it. I hope that the commercial, loan and aviation agreements will be signed at the same time, and Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss

how to solve the treaty problem and offer its opinions.

(See Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), pp. 1718.)

As far as the meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin on 22 January 1950 is concerned, the Russian minutes are also compatible with the information provided by Shi Zhe's memoirs. Shi Zhe relates that Mao Zedong and Stalin discussed the principles underlying the new Chinese-Soviet treaty at this meeting. Mao emphasized that the treaty should serve to increase the political, military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, while at the same time paying special attention to the prevention of a reemergence of Japanese militarism. On the China Eastern Railway issue, Shi Zhe recalls that Mao agreed not to change its joint administration structure, but proposed that its administrative head be Chinese and that China's investment in it should be increased from parity to fifty-one percent. However, the Soviets desired to retain a 50:50 ratio between Chinese and Soviet investments. On the issue of Port Arthur (Luda), Mao and Stalin agreed to establish a deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops to begin after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. On the issue of Dairen (Dalian), Stalin claimed that the Soviets had no intention to retain rights there and that the Chinese should feel free to manage the city. Shi Zhe also mentioned that Mao and Stalin discussed issues concerning Sinkiang (Xinjiang) and Manchuria, but some "unpleasant feelings" emerged on the Chinese side because the Chinese leaders believed that these issues were their internal affairs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, pp. 445-446.) One finds a similar record of the discussion of these issues in the Russian minutes.

Shi Zhe also covers in his memoirs Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union in August and September 1952, describing in detail Zhou's meetings with Stalin on 20 August and 3 September. Shi Zhe recalls that at the first meeting Zhou Enlai explained to Stalin the Chinese leadership's assessment of the international situation in general and the Korean War situation in

particular. The two leaders also discussed the agenda of Zhou's visit, which included the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China's first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological support to China in establishing rubber tree plantations in southern China, and the construction of a railway from Ji'nin, a city on the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. The two leaders then had a long discussion on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai told Stalin that China would be willing to end the war on acceptable conditions but would not yield to unreasonable American terms. In Mao's view, Zhou informed Stalin, if the Communists could demonstrate a more enduring patience than the Americans, the enemy would sooner or later make additional concessions. Zhou particularly emphasized that it was Mao's belief that a firm Communist stand in the armistice negotiations might prolong the war in Korea but would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in Mao's opinion, the conflict in Korea had exposed the weakness of the United States, and delayed the coming of a new world war. Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did have difficulties in continuing war operations under the current conditions, especially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superiority in artillery pieces over the Communist forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement with Mao Zedong's assessment of the situation, offering to increase Soviet military equipment delivery to China so that the Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery fire power against the Americans. Stalin also advised that the ChineseNorth Korean side should take three steps in dealing with the Americans on the prisoner issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean prisoners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest holding a comparable proportion of the enemy's prisoners in exchange. The purpose of this suggestion was to force the Americans to change their position. Second, if the first design failed to work, the ChineseNorth Korean side could propose a ceasefire to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. Third, if the second proposal was unacceptable to the Americans, the Chinese-North Korean side could make the following proposal: if some prisoners did not want to be returned, they might be temporarily maintained by a neutral third country, and then, after their intentions were ascertained, they would either be released or returned. In

order to strengthen the Chinese-North Korean position at the negotiating table, Stalin agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artillery regiments to Korea. However, he warned the Chinese not to send their air force across the 38th parallel. He believed that the Americans were not in a position to continue a prolonged war in Korea. If the ChineseNorth Korean side remained patient in negotiations while at the same time maintaining a powerful position on the battlefield, the Americans would sooner or later yield to one of the aforementioned three Communist designs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, pp. 510-511, 520-522.)

Again, if one compares Shi Zhe's description of the meeting with the Russian minutes, they are compatible even in some small details. For example, in both records, Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield.

Yet these Russian documents do raise questions about existing Chinese sources in several aspects. While these Russian documents are declassified by the Presidential Archives in their original format, existing Chinese sources are usually released on a selective basis, and published in compilaselective basis, and published in compilations rather than made available in their original form to scholars working in archives. As a result, serious omissions exist in the Chinese sources. In the Russian minutes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the two leaders discussed the differences between Chinese and North Korean leaders over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi Zhe's memoirs, although he implied that problems existed between Beijing and Pyongyang, he does not explain what the problems were and why and how they emerged. Further, the accuracy of the information provided by memoirs is subject to the limits of human memory. In the case of Shi Zhe's memoirs, even with his marvelous memory of historical events (enhanced by his experience of writing "confessions" several hundred times during the Cultural Revolution and assisted by his privileged access to archival sources), ambiguities exist and mistakes occur. For example, comparing Shi Zhe's account of Mao Zedong's meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both the Russian records and Mao's own telegram summarizing the meeting, one finds it too general and ambiguous in some places.

Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi, the Chinese Communist Party's second most important person, visited the Soviet Union from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu's visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to original Russian documents will certainly help scholars to establish a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the historical past.

But even the original Russian documents could also contain important omissions. In describing Mao Zedong's first meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949, for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls that when Stalin asked Mao about the goals he hoped to achieve through the visit, Mao replied, according to Shi Zhe, that "For this trip we hope to bring about something that not only looks nice but also tastes delicious." (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.) Indeed, this was the single most important message Mao tried to deliver to Stalin at their first meeting. The Russian minutes, however, do not include this statement. Why not? A possible answer could lie in the cultural differences between Chinese and Russian interpreters. In Shi Zhe's memoirs, he mentioned that Mao made the statement at the beginning of the meeting, and that the Soviets did not quite understand Mao's meaning. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a Soviet Politburo member, even laughed at Mao's expression. Is it possible that N.T. Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes, missed the importance Mao attached to this statement and treated it only as a part of "greetings" or an insignificant "discussion of general topics"? (See the first paragraph of the Russian minutes.)

This discrepancy or omission reminds scholars that the post-Cold War access to previously unavailable Communist documentary sources do not offer automatic answers to all remaining scholarly questions. They provide us with new research opportunities, but they also require us to be more careful in treating our sources and more creative in establishing our perspectives. In this sense, this is a new point of departure in the study of the Cold War history.

* *

From Consensus to Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance

A Palpable Deterioration

by Vojtech Mastny

The two sets of documents about highlevel Sino-Soviet conversations, separated in time by less than three years, illustrate the palpable deterioration of relations between the two communist powers under the strain under the strain of the Korean war. Yet the nature of the deterioration, as well as its extent-not to mention the personalities of the principles— appear quite different from these contemporary Russian records than they do from the retrospective Chinese accounts which have so far been the main source of information on the subject and which project the later Sino-Soviet rift into a period when a fundamental conflict of interest was neither present nor anticipated.

Even with the allowance made for a tendency of the Russian note taker to embellish the atmosphere prevailing at the meetings, there cannot be a doubt that Mao Zedong on his first visit to Moscow treated Stalin as the supreme authority of world communism, with a reverence that was not merely pretended but rooted in a perception of common interests, to which the Chinese leader repeatedly and cogently alluded. The same perception determined Stalin's uncharacteristically considerate, even generous, attitude toward his junior partner, so much in contrast with the condescension he usually displayed in dealing with his eastern European lieutenants. The Russian documents hardly bear out the self-serving Chinese descriptions of his stinginess and boorishness, an image that Mao himself-no doubt retrospectively embarrassed by the extent of subordination he had once been willing to accept in regard to Moscowlater tried to disseminate.

Of course not everything was sweet and smooth between the two ruthless and devious dictators; still, their ability to dispose of potentially contentious issues was remarkable. Of these, none was more important than the question of whether the treaty Moscow had concluded with China's previous government should remain in effect or be replaced by a new one. During the month that elapsed between his two meetings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, and on both occasions Mao readily followed suit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin considered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta

agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet territorial acquisitions in the Far East, by January 22 he was ready to send Yalta "to hell" and dispense with the treaty on the ostensible grounds that it had merely been a

temporary temporary expedient required by the war against Japan. He proved amenable to Mao's insistence that the new pact must be stronger, including the obligation for the two signatories to consult with each other on all important international matters.

This proposed provision is one of the few possible hints in the record at the impending communist aggression in Korea, whose preparation also provides the most compelling reason for Stalin's reversal on the Sino-Soviet treaty. During their December meeting, the two chieftains still gave no inkling of plotting the Korean adventure, despite North Korea's Kim Il Sung's persistent entreaties to obtain Moscow's support for his plan for a forcible reunification of the country. If in December they knew of the plan but did not yet consider it topical, the thrust of their January conversation suggests that by then they had begun changing their minds. Their assessment, in view of recent U.S. public statements and behavior implying a diminished likelihood of effective American opposition, offers the most plausible explanation of the change.

Besides the decision to proceed toward a tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject of the January conversation most relevant to the prospective North Korean action was the presence of Soviet forces at the naval base of Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unanimous in their view that the forces should remain there as a deterrent to any possible American military move against China, Stalin and Mao anticipate keeping the place under Soviet control until the conclusion of what they look forward to as a satisfactory peace settlement with Japan; in the final agreement signed three weeks later, the transfer to Chinese sovereignty was to be fixed to take place in two years' time. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the only reason why they could possibly expect to achieve a Japanese peace treaty to their liking was the crushing effect that a successful unification of Korea by the communists, presumably within that particular time span, would have on the United States.

* * *

By the time Zhou Enlai came to Moscow in August 1952, the Korean gamble had

failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of Stalin's reneging on his promise to provide Soviet air cover for the Chinese intervention force, and the botched war had reached a stalemate. Its burden was weighing ever more heavily on the Chinese and North Koreans, though not on Stalin, who could relish the sight of the United States being pinned down on the Far Eastern battlefieldunless, to be sure, Washington would decide to expand hostilities in trying to force a decision.

The kind of underlying consensus permeating Stalin's conversations with Mao is no longer evident in the record of his talks with Zhou. These are businesslike talks, where bargaining takes place, though within the limits of propriety, and conflict of interest matters, even if it is not allowed to come into the open. Considering Stalin's rapidly deteriorating physical and mental condition, he still shows an impressive command of economic and military facts; only in the later sessions does his reasoning get muddled when he tackles the larger questions of diplomacy and war. For his part, Zhou lives up to his reputation of a cool and deft negotiator, never losing sight of what he wants to accomplish, his deliberate obfuscations notwithstanding.

Zhou's dual aim was the achievement of an armistice in Korea as quickly as possible while maximizing Soviet economic and military assistance to his ravaged country. Yet he never states these goals so clearly and sometimes even seems to be contradicting them. He affirms China's refusal to entertain any concessions to the Americans. Indeed, the two conversation partners outdo each other in their professions of intransigence toward the "imperialists" although not all that they say is to be taken at face value.

Stalin lectures the Chinese visitor-as if both did not know better about the supposed military flabbiness of the Americans and their inability to subdue even little Korea. He expresses his expectation that eventually the United States would be compelled to end the war on terms agreeable to the communists; accordingly, as a deterrent to any American attempt to expand the war, he complies with the Chinese request to keep Soviet forces in Port Arthur beyond the previously agreed time limit. It is difficult to tell whether Stalin's expectation was another example of his frequent wishful think

ing, rooted in the ideologically motivated belief that sooner or later "objective" forces would compel the capitalist enemies to behave that way he wanted them to behave. It is also possible, and not mutually exclusive, that he was making a disingenuous argument to persuade the Chinese to go on fighting, thus perpetuating their dependence on him while keeping the United States engaged. He is certainly not helpful in advancing any practical proposals to induce an armistice, insisting instead on demands that he knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side.

Playing a weak hand as a demandeur, Zhou has the difficult task of convincing the Soviet ruler to provide enough material assistance for both the prosecution of the war and China's economic development while dissuading him from blocking a compromise that alone could lead to the termination of hostilities. By dwelling on China's determination to fight on for several more years, if necessary, rather than to make any concessions, Zhou secures Stalin's promises of huge military and economic assistance. He makes good use of the Soviet leader's fascination with turning China into the “arsenal of Asia" and his support for the Chinese conquest of Tibet, though he sidetracks Stalin's unsolicited advice to expel the Portuguese "scum" from the enclave of Macau. At the same time, they both agree not to provoke the Americans by acceding to the North Korean request for the bombing of South Korea-an escalation Stalin refuses to authorize with the priceless explanation that the air force belongs to the state and could therefore not be used by the Chinese "volunteers."

Zhou Enlai fares less well in trying to break the deadlock in the armistice negotiations caused by the disputes about the disposition of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated. While professing China's insistence on the complete repatriation of all prisoners, he nevertheless outlines to Stalin his plan for the transfer of the unwilling ones to a neutral country, such as India; noting the inconsistency, Stalin demurs. Nor does Zhou succeed any better with his alternative proposal that the armistice be concluded first and the question of the captives be settled later. The inconclusive outcome of the discussion about this key issue was a victory for Stalin, which Zhou papers over by gratefully accepting his "instructions," which the Soviet leader pre

tends are merely "suggestions."

Not even Zhou's diplomatic skills sufficed to overcome the disparity of power between China and its Soviet protector. When later in 1952 he publicly signaled Chinese interest in the option of transferring the prisoners to India, the Soviet delegation at the United Nations preventively torpedoed the idea. The Korean War was eventually ended in July 1953 by applying Zhou Enlai's other formula-but only after Stalin's death in March removed the major obstacle on the road to an armistice.

* * *

Unwrapping the Stalin-Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight

by Odd Arne Westad

The records of the 1949/50 Stalin-Mao conversations-the only face-to-face meeting between the two dictators have topped the secret documents wish-list of many a Cold War historian. As often happens in such cases, when the parcel is finally unwrapped the contents prove to be somewhat disappointing. Gone is the high drama of various memoirs, according to which the monologues of the two giants circled each other but never touched, each too preoccupied with his own agenda to address the concerns of the other. On the contrary, these conversations are rather businesslike, not unlike discussions recorded when the head of the new subsidiary is visiting the company president.

But the transcripts help us to set the record straight. They show the Soviet leader in the role of the cautious statesman, whose experience in international relations and the building of socialism enabled him to dispense "advice" to his Chinese friends. On foreign affairs, Stalin told the Chinese not to engage the United States or other imperialists in armed conflict, not on Taiwan nor anywhere else. The reference here goes back to Stalin's unfortunate remarks to Chinese communist emissary Liu Shaoqi the previous summer on the Chinese taking up "the leading position" in making revolution in the East. When Mao took Stalin on his word, and in October-November 1949 had presented plans for a Chinese intervention in Indochina, he had had his fingers slapped by the vozhd (supreme leader). While in Mos

cow, Mao and Zhou Enlai guarded themselves well against bringing up regional problems unless invited to do so by their hosts.

The most interesting part of the conversations concerns Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin initially turned down Mao's wish for a new treaty between the two countries, and instead proposed limited changes to the 1945 treaty, using U.S. and British complicity at Yalta in wrestling Soviet concessions from Jiang Jieshi's [Chiang Kai-shek's] regime as his main reason to leave the main part of that treaty intact. Only after Mao's long and idle wait in Moscow over the New Year holidays and the Chairman's increasingly desperate conversations thereafter with various Soviet officials-Molotov, Vyshinski, Mikoyan, and ambassador Roshchin-did Stalin relent.

The January 22 conversation, held just after Zhou Enlai had arrived in Moscow and talks on a new treaty had started, showed Stalin at his magnanimous best. "To hell with" the Yalta treaty, Stalin said. He was willing to restore to China some of the concessions Chiang had given him five years earlier, even if the imperialists undoubtedly would protest such an altruistic act on Stalin's behalf. (It would have been interesting to know how this absurd line of argument struck the Chinese on that winter's night 45 years ago.) We can still only guess about Stalin's real motives. A wish to keep the advantageous provisions of the 1945 treaty? Very likely. An unwillingness to proclaim the Sino-Soviet alliance to the world (and especially to the United States)? Quite possibly, although Stalin's fears of a confrontation with the Americans seem to have been at an ebb that winter.

The rest of the conversation really formed the start of the detailed negotiations of a new treaty which Zhou Enlai and Andrei Vyshinski continued and which ended in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and other agreements signed on February 14. Throughout these negotiations the Soviets held to a hard bargain, insisting on getting new advantages in return for their economic and military assistance and their relinquishing of old prerogatives. The Soviet negotiating strategy both offended and puzzled the Chinese-on the one hand they were treated like “a vassal, not an ally," on the other hand they just could not make economic sense of many of the Soviet demands. What really hurt Mao and his col

leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang, Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchuria: in Mao's image six years later these areas were "turned into spheres of influence of the USSR." (See Mao's conversation with Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.)

The centerpiece of Stalin's conversations with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in the summer of 1952 is the search for an armistice in Korea, a solution which at this stage both allies wanted, but which was held up by Stalin's ceaseless maneuvering on the issue. The Soviet leader most likely wanted the Chinese to go firmly on record in requesting a ceasefire (possibly to be arranged by Moscow) and to back away from their position from the previous summer, when Stalin had wanted an end to the war and Mao had turned him down. In his conversations with Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao's previous position, while underlining that the Chinese and the North Koreans should not undertake further offensives and could postpone the contentious POW issues until after an armistice had been signed. But neither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to the other that they were looking for a way out of the war against the United States and its allies.

* * * * *

"To hell with Yalta!”— Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo

by Vladislav Zubok

The two transcripts of conversations during the Stalin-Mao talks in December 1949-February 1950 provide a unique insight into Stalin's doubts and second thoughts about the creation of the SinoSoviet alliance. Although the groundwork for holding the summit meeting had been laid during an exchange of secret high-level missions over the previous year (Anastas Mikoyan's visit to China in February 1949 and Liu Shaoqi's trip to Moscow in JulyAugust), there were still unresolved issues and obstacles on the path to the new alliance. One issue was the matter of Soviet interests in Northeast China. Another was the invisible presence of the Americans at the Sino-Soviet negotiating table and the possible consequences of the alliance for vital Soviet broad interests, not only in the

Far East. Many other issues involving Chinese and Soviet interests were also on the table.

But the delicate and complicated question of establishing a personal relationship between Stalin and Mao also mattered greatly, and the tacit struggle between the two great revolutionary personalities is as important in understanding the talks between them in Moscow as their substance. At first, Stalin seems to have succeeded in impressing Mao with his posture as world leader and magnanimous emperor. Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter, recalls that at the welcoming banquet Stalin seemed strongly interested in developing a new relationship with China. "The victory of the Chinese revolution will change the balance of the whole world," he quoted Stalin as saying. "More weight will be added to the side of international revolution."1 According to the official Soviet record of the 16 December 1949 conversation, Mao asked what was the likelihood that a peaceful "breathing spell" would last for the next 3-5 years.

Stalin seemed to sound even more optimistic than the previous July, when Liu Shaoqi had asked a similar question. There was no immediate threat to China, he said, because "Japan has yet to stand up on its feet and is thus not ready for war; America, though it screams war, is actually afraid of war more than anything; Europe is afraid of war; essentially, there is nobody to fight with China...." In the most significant breach with the framework of Yalta, Stalin suggested that "peace depends" on the alliance between the two communist powers. "If we continue to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even longer."

Shi Zhe recalls that the conversation became uneasy, because Mao avoided speaking about the terms of a future Sino-Soviet treaty, waiting for Soviet initiative. Mao presented a different version to the USSR ambassador to the PRC, Pavel Yudin, six years later: "During my first meeting with Stalin I submitted a proposal to conclude a [new] state treaty, but Stalin evaded a response. Subsequently, Stalin avoided any meetings with me."2 The official Soviet record of the meeting provides a much more vivid picture of this episode.3

When Mao asked about the treaty, Stalin immediately presented him with three options: to announce the preservation of the 1945 treaty, to announce "impending

changes" to the treaty, or (without announcement) to proceed with changes "right now.” In other words, Stalin had flatly reneged on his commitment-relayed to Mao via Mikoyan the previous February4—to discard what the Chinese regarded as an “unequal" treaty. Stalin reminded Mao that the 1945 treaty "was concluded between the USSR and China as a result of the Yalta Agreement which provided for the main points of the treaty (the question of the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was concluded, so to speak, with the consent of America and England. Keeping in mind this circumstance, we, within our inner circle, have decided not to modify any of the points of this treaty for now, since a change in even one point could give America and England the legal grounds to put forward a proposal to raise questions about modifying also the treaty's provisions concerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, etc."

Why this sudden change of mind? One plausible explanation is that the cautious Soviet leader still wanted to know more about the American reaction to the creation of the People's Republic of China and to the Sino-Soviet talks. While the Truman Administration and the U.S. Congress coped with the "loss of China" and nervously monitored the news from Moscow, Stalin preferred to wait. However, his last argument shows that there were not only immediate concerns at play. Even in late 1949, after the Cold War had unmistakably broken out, Stalin still found it pyschologically difficult to part decisively with the Yalta agreements, which had represented a cornerstone of Soviet diplomacy. He understood that the issue of new Soviet borders in the Far East and the existence of Soviet outposts in Manchuria constituted one facet of an indivisible foreign policy package, linked to the peace treaty with Japan. To destroy this package, which was the crowning achievement of Stalin as a statesman and a foundation of the USSR's international legitimacy, was not an easy thing to do. For decades after Stalin's death, Soviet leaders from Molotov and Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Gromyko considered themselves duty-bound to safeguard and confirm "the results of Yalta" which signified international recognition and acceptance of Soviet legitimacy and the boundaries of its "external empire."

The Soviet leader must have known

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