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Vietnam, he asked the party to "guard against a Korea-style war created by American imperialists," and warned of the danger of "Khrushchev and his associates dragging us into the trap of war." Wang proposed that in order to adjust and restore the economy and win time to tide over difficulties, China should adopt a policy of peace and conciliation in foreign affairs, and that in the area of foreign aid China should not do what it cannot afford.17 But Mao rejected Wang's proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a "revisionist" foreign policy of "three appeasements and one reduction" (appeasement of imperialism, revisionism, and international reactionaries, and reduction of assistance to national liberation movements).1

18

The outcome of the debate had major implications for China's policy toward Vietnam. If Wang's moderate suggestions had been adopted, it would have meant a limited Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had switched to a militant line, choosing confrontation with the United States. This turn to the left in foreign policy accorded with Mao's reemphasis on class struggle and radical politics in Chinese domestic affairs in 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With the rejection of Wang's proposal, an opportunity to avert the later Sino-American hostility over Indochina was missed.

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to discuss with Chinese leaders the serious situation created by the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the possibility of an American attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satisfied Ho's demand by agreeing to give the DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns that could equip 230 infantry battalions. These weapons would be used to support guerrilla warfare in the South. 19 In March 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts how China might support Hanoi if the United States attacked North Vietnam.20 Two months later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho Chi Minh: "We are standing by your side, and if war broke out, you can regard China as your rear."21 Clearly Beijing was making a major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. Toward the end of the year, Chinese and

North Vietnamese officials discussed Beijing's assistance in constructing defense works and naval bases in the northeastern part of the DRV.22 According to a Chinese source, in 1963 China and the DRV made an agreement under which Beijing would send combat troops into North Vietnam if American soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Parallel to attack the North. The Chinese soldiers would stay and fight in the North to free the North Vietnamese troops to march to the South.23 But the precise date and details of this agreement remain unclear.

In sum, between 1954 and 1963 China was closely involved in the development of Hanoi's policy. The CCP urged Ho Chi Minh to concentrate on consolidating the DRV and to combine political and military struggles in the South. Although before 1962 Beijing policy makers were not eager to see a rapid intensification of the revolutionary war in South Vietnam, neither did they discourage their comrades in Hanoi from increasing military operations there. Between 1956 and 1963, China provided the DRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces of artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02 million artillery shells, 15,000 wire transmitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18 million sets of uniforms. The total value of China's assistance to Hanoi during this period amounted to 320 million yuan.24 1962 was a crucial year in the evolution of China's attitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning the cautious approach, Mao opted for confrontation with the United States and decided to commit China's resources to Hanoi. Beijing's massive supply of weapons to the DRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to intensify guerrilla warfare in the South, triggersify guerrilla warfare in the South, triggering greater U.S. intervention. By the end of ing greater U.S. intervention. By the end of 1963, Chinese leaders had become very nervous about American intentions in Vietnam but were ready to provide full support for the DRV in confronting the United States.

China's Reaction to U.S. Escalation

In the first half of 1964, the attention of U.S. officials was shifting increasingly from South Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trend reflected mounting concern over the infiltration of men and supplies from the North and a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that allowed Hanoi to encourage the insurgency without punishment. In addition to expand

ing covert operations in North Vietnam, including intelligence overflights, the dropping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN 34A commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast, the Johnson Administration also conveyed to Pham Van Dong through a Canadian diplomat on June 17 the message that the United States was ready to exert increasingly heavy military pressure on the DRV to force it to reduce or terminate its encouragement of guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader refused to yield to the American pressure, declaring that Hanoi would not stop its support for the struggle of liberation in the South.25

Mao watched these developments closely. Anticipating new trouble, the chairman told General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff of the (North) Vietnamese People's Army, in June: "Our two parties and two countries must cooperate and fight the enemy together. Your business is my business and my business is your business. In other words, our two sides must deal with the enemy together without conditions.”26 Between July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCP delegation to Hanoi, where he discussed. with leaders from the DRV and Pathet Lao the situations in South Vietnam and Laos.27 Although the details of these talks are unknown, clearly the three Communist parties were stepping up their coordination to confront the increasing threat from the United States.

Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing sent a cable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking them to "investigate the situation, work out countermeasures, and be prepared to fight."28 In the meantime, Beijing instructed the Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions and the air force and naval units stationed in south and south-west China to assume a state of combat-readiness. Four air divisions and one anti-aircraft division were dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam and put on a heightened alert status.29 In August, China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15 and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to train North Vietnamese pilots, and started to construct new airfields in areas adjacent to the Vietnamese border which would serve as sanctuary and repair and maintenance facilities for Hanoi's jet fighters.30 By moving new air force units to the border area and

building new airfields there, Beijing intended to deter further U.S. expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against the DRV. Between August and September 1964, the PLA also sent an inspection team to the DRV to investigate the situation in case China later needed to dispatch support troops to Vietnam.31

The first months of 1965 witnessed a significant escalation of the American war in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. aircraft struck North Vietnamese military installations just across the 17th Parallel, ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American barracks near Pleiku and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson Administration stopped claiming that its air attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for specific Communist assaults in South Vietnam and began a continuous air bombing campaign against the DRV. On March 8, two battalions of Marines armed with tanks and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.32

Worried about the increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to convey to President Johnson a four-point message:

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States. (2) The Chinese mean what they say. In other words, if any country in Asia, Africa, or elsewhere meets with aggression by the imperialists headed by the United States, the Chinese government and people will definitely give it support and assistance. Should such just action bring on American aggression against China, we will unhesitatingly rise in resistance and fight to the end. (3) China is prepared. Should the United States impose a war on China, it can be said with certainty that, once in China, the United States will not be able to pull out, however many men it may send over and whatever weapons it may use, nuclear weapons included. (4) Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. If the American madmen bombard China without constraints, China will not sit there waiting to die. If they come from the sky, we will fight back on the ground. Bombing

means war. The war can not have boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to finish the war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.33

This was the most serious warning issued by the Chinese government to the United States, and given the caution exercised by President Johnson in carrying out the "Rolling Thunder" operations against the DRV, it was one that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the Korean War, when the Truman Administration's failure to heed Beijing warning against crossing the 38th parallel led to a bloody confrontation between the United States and China.

The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April to ask China to increase its aid and send troops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chinese leaders that Hanoi needed "volunteer pilots, volunteer soldiers as well as other necessary personnel, including road and bridge engineers." The Vietnamese envoys expected Chinese volunteer pilots to perform four functions: to limit U.S. bombing to the south of the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi, to protect several major transportation lines, and to boost morale.34 On behalf of the Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to the Vietnamese visitors on April 8 that "it is the obligation of the Chinese people and party" to support the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. "Our principle is," Liu continued, "that we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever we have. If you do not invite us, we will not go to your place. We will send whatever part [of our troops] that you request. You have the complete initiative."35

In April, China signed several agreements with the DRV concerning the dispatch of Chinese support troops to North Vietnam.36 Between April 21 and 22, Giap discussed with Luo Ruiqing and First Deputy Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrangements for sending Chinese troops.37 In May, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao in Changsha, the chairman's home province, where he asked Mao to help the DRV repair and build twelve roads in the area north of Hanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho's request and instructed Zhou Enlai to see to the matter.38

In discussions with Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu, Zhou said: "According to Pham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bombing has reduced supplies to South Vietnam through sea shipment and road transportation. While trying to resume sea transportation, the DRV is also expanding the corridor in Lower Laos and roads in the South. Their troops would go to the South to build roads. Therefore they need our support to construct roads in the North." Zhou decided that the Chinese military should be responsible for road repair and construction in North Vietnam. Yang suggested that since assistance to the DRV involved many military and government departments, a special leadership group should be created to coordinate the work of various agencies. Approving the proposal, Zhou immediately announced the establishment of the "Central Committee and State Council Aid Vietnam Group" with Yang and Li Tianyou (Deputy Chief of Staff) as Director and Vice Director.39 This episode demonstrates Zhou's characteristic effectiveness in organization and efficiency in administration.

In early June, Van Tien Dung held discussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing to flesh out the general Chinese plan to assist Vietnam. According to their agreement, if the war remained in the current conditions, the DRV would fight the war by itself and China would provide various kinds of support as the Vietnamese needed. If the United States used its navy and air force to support a South Vietnamese attack on the North, China would also provide naval and air force support to the DRV. If U.S. ground forces were directly used to attack the North, China would use its land forces as strategic reserves for the DRV and conduct military operations whenever necessary. As to the forms of Sino-Vietnamese air force cooperation, Dung and Luo agreed that China could send volunteer pilots to Vietnam to operate Vietnamese aircraft, station both pilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or fly aircraft from bases in China to join combat in Vietnam and only land on Vietnamese bases temporarily for refueling. The third option was known as the "Andong model" (a reference to the pattern of Chinese air force operations during the Korean War). In terms of the methods of employing PRC ground troops, the two military leaders agreed that the Chinese forces would either help to strengthen the defensive position of the DRV

troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese counter offensive or launch an offensive themselves to disrupt the enemy's deployment and win the strategic initiative.40

But despite Liu Shaoqi's April promise to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing's agreement with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the Vietnamese "White Paper" of 1979, the Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 notified its Vietnamese counterpart that "the time was not appropriate” to send Chinese pilots to Vietnam.41 The PRC's limited air force capacity may have caused Beijing to have second thoughts, perhaps reinforcing Beijing's desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Whatever the reasons for China's decision, the failure to satisfy Hanoi's demand must have greatly disappointed the Vietnamese since the control of the air was so crucial for the DRV's effort to protect itself from the ferocious U.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributed to North Vietnam's decision in 1965 to rely more on the Soviet Union for air defense.

Beginning in June 1965, China sent ground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and logistical units into North Vietnam to help Hanoi. The total number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam between June 1965 and March 1973 amounted to over 320,000.42 To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam, China created a secret coastal transportation line to ship goods to several islands off Central Vietnam for transit to the South. A secret harbor on China's Hainan Island was constructed to serve this transportation route. Beijing also operated a costly transportation line through Cambodia to send weapons, munitions, food, and medical supplies into South Vietnam.43 When the last Chinese troops withdrew from Vietnam in August 1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and 4,200 had been wounded.44

The new materials from China indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during the Vietnam War and risked war with the United States in helping the Vietnamese. As Allen S. Whiting has perceptively observed, the deployment of Chinese troops in Vietnam was not carried out under maximum security against detection by Washington. The Chinese troops wore regular uniforms and did not disguise themselves as civilians. The Chinese presence was intentionally commu

nicated to U.S. intelligence through aerial photography and electronic intercepts. This evidence, along with the large base complex that China built at Yen Bai in northwest Vietnam, provided credible and successful deterrence against an American invasion of North Vietnam.45

The specter of a Chinese intervention in a manner similar to the Korean War was a major factor in shaping President Johnson's gradual approach to the Vietnam War. Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese intervention by keeping the level of military vention by keeping the level of military actions against North Vietnam controlled, exact, and below the threshold that would provoke direct Chinese entry. This Chinainduced U.S. strategy of gradual escalation was a great help for Hanoi, for it gave the Vietnamese communists time to adjust to U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to frustrate American moves. As John Garver has aptly put it, “By helping to induce Washington to adopt this particular strategy, Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi's eventual victory over the United States."46

Explaining PRC Support for the DRV

Mao's decision to aid Hanoi was closely linked to his perception of U.S. threats to China's security, his commitment to national liberation movements, his criticism of Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his domestic need to transform the Chinese state and society. These four factors were mutually related and reinforcing.

Sense of Insecurity:

Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried about the increasing American involvement in Vietnam and perceived the United States as posing a serious threat to China's security. For him, support for North Vietnam was a way of countering the U.S. strategy of containment of China. The Communist success in South Vietnam would prevent the United States from moving closer to the Chinese southern border.

On several occasions in 1964, Mao talked about U.S. threats to China and the need for China to prepare for war. During a Central Committee conference held between May 15 and June 17, the chairman contended that "so long as imperialism exists, the danger of war is there. We are not the the danger of war is there. We are not the chief of staff for imperialism and have no idea when it will launch a war. It is the conventional weapon, not the atomic bomb,

that will determine the final victory of the war."47 At first Mao did not expect that the United States would attack North Vietnam directly.48 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident came as a surprise to him. In the wake of the incident, Mao pointed out on October 22 that China must base its plans on war and make active preparations for an early, large-scale, and nuclear war.49

To deal with what he perceived as U.S. military threats, Mao took several domestic measures in 1964, the most important of which was the launching of the massive Third Front project. This program called for heavy investment in the remote provinces of southwestern and western China and envisioned the creation of a huge self-sustaining industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event China became involved in war. The project had a strong military orientation and was directly triggered by the U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.50

On 25 April 1964, the War Department of the PLA General Staff drafted a report for Yang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemy surprise attack on China's economic construction. The report listed four areas vulnerable to such an attack: (1) China's industry was over-concentrated. About 60 percent of the civil machinery industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry were concentrated in 14 major cities with over one million people. (2) Too many people lived in cities. According to the 1962 census, in addition to 14 cities of above one million, 20 cities had a population between 500,000 and one million. Most of these cities were located in the coastal areas and very vulnerable to air strikes. No effective mechanisms existed at the moment to organize anti-air works, evacuate urban populations, continue production, and eliminate the damages of an air strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and harbors were situated near big and mediumsize cities and could easily be destroyed when the enemy attacked the cities. No measures had been taken to protect these transportation points against an enemy attack. In the early stage of war, they could become paralyzed. (4) All of China's reservoirs had a limited capacity to release water in an emergency. Among the country's 232 large reservoirs, 52 were located near major transportation lines and 17 close to important cities. In conclusion, the report made it

clear that "the problems mentioned above are directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war." It asked the State Council "to organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and effective measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack."51

Yang Chengwu presented the report to Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and Yang on August 12 with the following comment: "It is an excellent report. It should be carefully studied and gradually implemented." Mao urged the newly established State Council Special Committee in charge of the Third Front to begin its work immediately.52 Mao's approval of the report marked the beginning of the Third Front project to relocate China's industrial resources to the interior. It is important to note the timing of Mao's reaction to the reportright after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam had confirmed Mao's worst suspicions about American intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun became Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Directors of the Special Committee. On August 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed proposal on how to implement the Third Front ideas.53 In the meantime, the CCP Secretariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made two speeches at the meetings on August 17 and 20. He asserted that China should be on guard against an aggressive war launched by imperialism. At present, factories were concentrated around big cities and coastal regions, a situation deleterious to war preparation. Factories should be broken into two parts. One part should be relocated to interior areas as early as possible. Every province should establish its own strategic rear base. Departments of industry and transportation should move, so should schools, science academies, and Beijing University. The three railroad lines between Chengdu and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed as quickly as possible. If there were a shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails on other lines could be dismantled. To implement Mao's instructions, the meetings decided to concentrate China's financial, material, and human resources on the construction of the Third Front.54

While emphasizing the "big Third Front" plan on the national level, Mao also ordered provinces to proceed with their "small Third Front" projects. The chairman wanted each province to develop its own light armament industry capable of producing rifles, machine guns, canons, and munitions.55 The Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the strategic contingency of war preparation. In the modified plan, a total of three billion yuan was appropriated for small Third Front projects. This was a substantial figure, but less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for the big Third Front in this period.56 In sum, the Third Front was a major strategic action designed to provide an alternative industrial base that would enable China to continue production in the event of an attack on its large urban centers.

In addition to his apprehension about a strike on China's urban and coastal areas, Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy paratroop assault forces deep inside China. In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 April 1965, Mao called their attention to such a danger. He ordered them to prepare for the landing of enemy paratroopers in every interior region. The enemy might use paratroops, Mao contended, "to disrupt our rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal assault. The number of paratroops may not be many. It may involve one or two divisions in each region, or it may involve a smaller unit. In all interior regions, we should build caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, hills should be created to construct defense works. We should be on guard against enemy paratroops deep inside our country and prevent the enemy from marching unstopped into China."57

It appears that Mao's attitudes toward the United States hardened between January and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed confidence that Washington would not expand the war to North Vietnam because Secretary of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told Snow that there would be no war between China and the United States if Washington did not send troops to attack China.58 Two days later, the CCP Central Military Commission issued a "Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea," in which it instructed the military not to attack American airplanes

that intruded into Chinese airspace in order to avoid a direct military clash with the United States.59

In April, however, Mao rescinded the "Six Point Directive." Between April 8 and 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China's airspace over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, suggesting that the order not to attack invading U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air force command take control of the naval air units stationed on Hainan Island. Approving both of Yang's requests, Mao said that China "should resolutely strike American aircraft that overfly Hainan Island."60 It is quite possible that the further U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam in the intervening months caused Mao to abandon his earlier restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft.

It is important to point out that the entire Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the strategic threat from the United States very seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing its population for war. Although it seemed that the United States had not made up its mind to expand the war to China, the Chinese premier continued, war had its own law of development, usually in a way contrary to the wishes of people. Therefore China had to be prepared.61 Zhou's remarks indicated that he was familiar with a common pattern in warfare: accidents and miscalculations rather than deliberate planning often lead to war between reluctant opponents.

In an address to a Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated:

If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed.... If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade.... We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and it is easy for us to strike them. We should develop as early as possible new tech

nology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. The enemy's strength is in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other, we should realize that the enemy lacks justification in sending troops.... This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.62

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that "so long as we have made good preparations on every front, the enemy may not dare to come. We must defend our offshore islands. With these islands in our hands, the enemy will find it difficult to land. If the enemy should launch an attack, we will lure them inside China and then wipe them out completely.”63

Scholars have argued over Beijing's reaction to the threat posed by U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Much of this argument focuses on the hypothesis of a "strategic debate" in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this "debate" exist, but most contend that Luo was more sensitive to American actions in Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that Luo demanded greater military preparations to deal with the threat, including accepting the Soviet proposal of a "united front.”64

However, there is nothing in the recently available Chinese materials to confirm the existence of the "strategic debate" in 1965.65 The often cited evidence to support the hypothesis of a strategic debate is the two articles supposedly written by Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of the commemoration of V-J day in September 1965.66 In fact, the same writing group organized by Luo Ruiqing in the General Staff was responsible for the preparation of both articles. The final version of the "People's War" article also incorporated opinions from the writing team led by Kang Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National Guest House, Kang's team was famous for writing the nine polemics against Soviet

revisionism). Although the article included some of Lin Biao's previous statements, Lin himself was not involved in its writing. When Luo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructions about the composition of the article, the Defense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai and other standing Politburo members read the piece before its publication.67 The article was approved by the Chinese leadership as a whole and was merely published in Lin Biao's name. Luo Ruiqing was purged in December 1965 primarily because of his dispute with Lin Biao over domestic military organization rather than over foreign policy issues.68 Luo did not oppose Mao on Vietnam policy. In fact he carried out loyally every Vietnam-related order issued by the chairman. Mao completely dominated the decision making. The origins of the "People's War" article point to the danger of relying on public pronouncements to gauge relying on public pronouncements to gauge inner-party calculations and cast doubts on the utility of the faction model in explaining the utility of the faction model in explaining Chinese foreign policy making.69

Commitment to National Liberation Movements:

The second factor that shaped Mao's decision to support the DRV was his desire to form a broad international united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union. To Mao, national liberation movements in the Third World were the most important potential allies in the coalition that he wanted to establish. In the early 1960s, the chairman developed the concept of "Two Intermediate Zones.” The first zone referred to developed countries, including capitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The second zone referred to underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two zones existed between the two superpowers. Mao believed that countries in these two zones had contradictions with the United States and the Soviet Union and that China should make friends with them to create an international united front against Washington and Moscow.70

Mao initially developed the idea of the "intermediate zone” during the early years of the Cold War. In a discussion with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader first broached the idea. He claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union were "separated by a vast zone including many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial coun

tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” and that it was difficult for "the U.S. reactionaries to attack the Soviet Union before they could subjugate these countries."71 In the late 1940s and throughout the greater part of the 1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the Soviet Union to balance against the perceived American threat. But beginning in the late 1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences, Mao came to revise his characterization of the international situation. He saw China confronting two opponents: the United States and the Soviet Union. To oppose these two foes and break China's international isolation, Mao proposed the formation of an international united front.

Operating from the principle of making friends with countries in the “Two Intermediate Zones," Mao promoted such antiAmerican tendencies as French President De Gaulle's break with the United States in the first zone and championed national liberation movements in the second zone. For Mao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a part of a broader movement across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which together represented a challenge to imperialism as a whole. China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique, to the "progressive" Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the leftist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, and to the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.72 Toward the former socialist camp dominated by the Soviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania to persuade other East European countries to separate from Moscow.73

During this increasingly radical period of Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled out three anti-imperialist heroes for emulation by Third World liberation movements: Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Algerian nationalist leader. In a speech to a delegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June 1964, Mao remarked: "We oppose war, but we support the anti-imperialist war waged by oppressed peoples. We support the revolutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We also support the anti-U.S.-imperialist war conducted by the South Vietnamese people."74 In another address to a group of visitors from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Mao again mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle.75

Envisioning China as a spokesman for the Third World independence cause, Mao believed that the Chinese revolutionary ex

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