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from previous months of contacts and corre- vene.” At the same time, Stalin encouraged Beijing: “Comrade Stalin has agreed to Comspondence that it would be hard for the the Chinese to “frighten the imperialists a rade Zhou Enlai's arrival here and to the Chinese, and Mao in particular, to retain the bit” by probing the positions of the British signing of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of old treaty which Stalin had concluded with and French in Hong Kong, Burma, and Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreethe Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, he Indochina, i.e. in the South and far from the ments on credit, trade, civil aviation, and tried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Mao Soviet security perimeter. that it would be possible to preserve the Eventually, in their initial conversation, In Mao's estimate, the crucial factor existing treaty only “formally," while chang- both leaders decided to drop the issue of the was that Great Britain and India recognized ing it “in effect,” that is, “formally maintain treaty, and moved to discuss other issues. the PRC in January. In fact, a more imporing the Soviet Union's right to station its When Mao inquired whether Zhou Enlai tant development was the conclusion of the troops in Port Arthur while, at the request of should travel to Moscow concerning the Truman Administration's reassessment of the Chinese government, actually withdraw- treaty, Stalin replied benignly and crypti- its Far Eastern strategy. Washington deing the Soviet Armed forces currently sta- cally that this was a question that “you cided to keep a hands-off policy toward tioned there.” (He quickly added, however, should decide for yourselves. Zhou may be
Taiwan and to focus instead on the defense that if the Chinese desired the Soviet troops needed in regard to other matters.” The of its essential interests in other Pacific areas to remain, they could do so “by request of the ambiguity of this response, perhaps aggra- it deemed critical, particularly Japan and Chinese government” for the next 2, 5, 10, or vated by translation, may well have contrib- Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Maeven 20 years.) Stalin also expressed will- uted to Mao's impression that Stalin did not laya, and Indonesia. The new American ingness to alter some points concerning the want to discuss a new treaty. The meeting policy was enshrined secretly on 30 Decemownership and exploitation of the Chinese- ended without any specific proposals from ber 1949 in a classified document, NSC-48/ Changchun railroad.
either side, and in the coming weeks Stalin 2, announced by Truman in a press conferStalin's new position must have struck and Mao engaged in a tacit war of nerves. ence on 5 January 1950, and spelled out Mao like a bolt of lightning (the final proof, Some other factors intervened as well, par- publicly a week later by Secretary of State though, will come only in the Chinese ticularly a report from Soviet advisor I.V. Dean G. Acheson in his “defense perimeter” leader's correspondence surrounding the Kovalev (who had been a Stalin emissary to speech at the National Press Club. 8 One meeting). But Mao did not explicitly object. Mao) stating that Mao was neither a real may speculate that Stalin learned about the Instead, he humbly admitted that during the “Marxist” nor strong enough to resist pres- essence of this new policy before these offidiscussions in Beijing of a future Sino-So- sure from “the right-wing of the [Chinese] cial pronouncements, from various leaks viet treaty the Chinese Communist Party national bourgeoisie, which has pro-Ameri- and intelligence sources in Washington and (CCP) leadership had “not taken into ac- can inclinations."5
London. It is even possible that, as with his count the American and English positions For whatever reason, Stalin decided to reversal of the initial Soviet response to the regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act let Mao cool down (and cool his heels), and Marshall Plan in the spring of 1947,9 an in a way that is best for the common cause, ” to gain more time himself to gauge the intelligence coup might have been a pivotal Mao said, according to the Soviet record. international response to their meeting, and factor in prompting Stalin to reassess his Far “This question merits further consideration. suggested resuming talks only on 2 January .
Eastern strategy. However, it is already becoming clear that 1950, more than two weeks later. Before From Stalin's perspective, all this apthe treaty should not be modified at the calling Mao, however, Stalin sent Molotov peared as a new American doctrine for the present time.” Mao also admitted that So- and Mikoyan for a reconnaissance to his Far East, a crucial change in the internaviet control over Port Arthur (Lushun) and Blizhnita dacha where Mao was quartered. tional situation which seemed to signify a the Chinese-Changchun railroad “corre- Molotov recalled that “Stalin hadn't received U.S. retreat from the Asian mainland and sponds to the interests of China.'
him [Mao] for some days after he arrived. implicit acceptance of the Sino-Soviet alliNo language, however, could conceal Stalin told me, 'Go and see what sort of ance as a new geopolitical fait accompli. the divergent priorities of the two leaders. fellow he is.”” Molotov returned and alleg- Stalin might also have suspected that he no When Mao indirectly asked the Soviet leader edly reported that it would be a good idea to longer had anything to lose if he openly “to send volunteer pilots or secret military receive Mao for another meeting. “He was rejected a now-outmoded “spirit of Yalta.” detachments to speed up the conquest of a clever man, a peasant leader, a kind of On the other hand, Stalin knew from many Formosa (Taiwan),” Stalin promised only Chinese Pugachev [a Russian peasant revo- sources (Kovalev among them) that other “to consider” such assistance and advised lutionary). He was far from a Marxist, of members of the CCP leadership, such as Mao to “organize an uprising” on the GMD- course....”6 The concerns about Mao's po- Zhou Enlai, had been enthusiastic about the controlled island as a possible alternative to litical and ideological face played, however, prospect of balancing Soviet influence in a military assault. Stalin was careful not to a secondary role in Stalin's change of mind- China with an American presence. By stickindicate that he wished to curb the national- the international situation was far more im- ing to the old treaty, Stalin could only play ist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries, portant. Finally, as Molotov informed Mao
into the hands of the British and of Acheson, yet in essence that was what his words im- on January 2, Stalin decided to jettison the who eagerly sought to discover an opening plied. Again and again, Stalin repeated that old Sino-Soviet treaty and with it his com- through which to drive a wedge between the “most important” thing was to avoid mitment to the Yalta arrangements in the Far Stalin and his most promising and signifigiving the Americans a "pretext to inter- East. Mao jubilantly reported the news to cant potential ally in the Far East.
,10 Soviet ac
Interestingly, Stalin did not tell his sub- treaties, we must go all the way. It is true benefitted the USSR) in times of upheaval. ordinates about this turnabout in his attitude that for us this entails certain inconve- It also made the CCP leadership feel more toward signing a new treaty. On January 6, niences, and we will have to struggle secure in its international isolation. At the Mao met with Soviet Foreign Minister against the Americans. But we are al- same time, the treaty created a new revoluAndrei Vyshinsky, in the presence of ready reconciled to that.
tionary-imperial synergy in the Far East. Kovalev, the Chinese ambassador in Mos- Mao Zedong: With regard to this matter, The Chinese communists, backed by Moscow, and interpreters Nikolai Fedorenko we are only concerned by the fact that it cow, wanted to complete the reunification of and Shi Zhe, to discuss joint Sino-Soviet
could lead to undesirable consequences the country and to carry the banner of revotactics at the United Nations, where the for the USSR.
lution further, to Burma and Indochina. For Nationalists continued to occupy China's
Stalin the alliance marked the end of the seat on the Security Council. When Mao Stalin sought to convince Mao that the status quo strategy of Yalta and the opening mentioned the necessity of a new treaty, Soviet Union would risk a conflict with the of a second Cold War against the United Vyshinsky repeated the official line that any United States for the sake of its new Asian States in the Far East. Notwithstanding the change in the 1945 treaty “could be used by ally. Yet, he wanted to extract from the fact that in both countries hundreds of milthe Americans and the British as a pretext Chinese a proper price for this willingness, lions of people yearned for peace and reconfor revision of those parts of the treaty, primarily in the form of recognition of Soviet struction, the new alliance in reality sigwhose change would hurt the interests of the security interests in Manchuria. This time nalled military mobilization and confrontaSoviet Union and China. This is undesir- Stalin did not miscalculate. Mao now ac- tion—as events in Korea would soon demable and must not happen.”
cepted Stalin's proposal, put forth at the first onstrate. tions at the United Nations, however, had meeting, that the Soviet Union would retain already begun to reflect Stalin's new line: its legal rights in Port Arthur, at least until a
1. Shi Zhe's account is quoted in Chen Jian, China's
Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sinothe alliance with communist China against peace treaty with Japan was signed. The
American Confrontation (New York: Columbia Unithe U.S.-led coalition of capitalist states. Chinese leader also agreed to keep the Dairen versity Press, 1994), 79-80. At the second official meeting with port closed to the Americans.
2. P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao,” Mao (now accompanied by Zhou Enlai, The Chinese attempted to bargain when
Problemi Dalnego Vostok [Problems of the Far East] 5
(1994), 105-106. who had arrived in Moscow two days be- it came to Soviet rights to control the Chinese
3. This difference was previously noted in Sergei N. fore), on 22 January 1950, Stalin sounded Changchun railroad, the main strategic ar- Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain like a changed man. “We believe that these tery between the USSR and Liaotung (the Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 85-86, as one of agreements [of 1945] need to be changed, Port Arthur peninsula). But Stalin and
the authors, Sergei Goncharov, had seen the minutes of although earlier we had thought that they Molotov defended those rights tooth and
the Stalin-Mao talks, which were then still classified, in could be left intact,” he said. “The existing nail. nail. During the talks on the ministerial
the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow. agreements, including the treaty, should be level, the Soviet side succeeded in imposing 4. In an undated cable sent to Stalin during the 31 changed, because war against Japan figures on the PRC several secret agreements. The
January-7 February 1949 talks with Mao, apparently
near the end of the discussions, Mikoyan reported that at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war Additional Agreement to the treaty stipu
he had told the Chinese leader that the Soviet governis over and Japan has been crushed, the lated that “on the territory of the Far Eastern ment had decided “to repeal this unequal [nespravedlivii] situation has been altered, and now the treaty region and the Central Asian republics, as treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soon has become an anachronism.” The most well as on the territory of Manchuria and
as the peace [treaty] with Japan will be concluded. But
if the Chinese communist party ... would find expedient salient feature of the discussion was the Xinjiang,” both the USSR and the PRC
an immediate withdrawal of [Soviet] troops (from Port omnipresence of the Japanese threat and a “would not provide to foreigners the rights Arthur), then the USSR was ready to do so. As to the
“ virtual absence of discussion of the United for concessions, and would not tolerate ac- accord on the Chinese-Changchun railroad, we [the States and the new American policy; nor did tivities of industrial, financial, trade and other
Soviet] do not consider this treaty unequal, since this
railroad had been built primarily with Russian means. anybody then raise Acheson's speech of enterprises, communities and organizations,
Perhaps ... in this treaty the principle of equal rights is January 12. Only later, during the discus- with the participation, directly or indirectly, not fully observed, but we are ready to consider this sion of the specific provisions of the new of the [financial] capital of the third countries question and decide it with the Chinese comrades in a treaty, did the following exchange occur:
or the citizens of those countries.”:11
fraternal manner." See Archive of the President, Rus
sian Federation (APRF), f. 39, op. 1, d. 39, 11. 78-79, as Chinese also signed a “Protocol on the unim
quoted in Andrei Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take peded transportation of Soviet troops and Mikoyana v Kitai” [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to into account the interests of both sides, military property on the Chinese Changchun China), Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 3 (1995), 94-105, China and the Soviet Union. railroad in case of the threat of war in the Far
quotation on p. 100; see also Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia
missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai,” Problemy Dalnego Stalin: True. We believe that the agree- East.” This secret agreement allowed the
Vostoka 2 (1995), 97-111. ment concerning Port Arthur is not eq- Soviets to transport troops and military equip- 5. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partuitable. ment and supplies quickly, without paying ners, 91, 247-249.
6. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: ConMao Zedong: But changing this agree- any tariffs to the Chinese and without any
versations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: ment goes against the decisions of the Chinese customs control. 12
Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 81; for the original Russian see Yalta Conference?!
The Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 14 Felix Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovim [One hunStalin: True, it does—and to hell with February 1950, satisfied Stalin's search for dred and forty conversations with Molotov) (Moscow: it! If we make a decision to revise the preservation of the status quo (where it
TERRA, 1991), 114.
7. See the text of Mao's cable to Beijing of 2 January not received any answer from these governments We are waiting for your answer.
answer. Obviously, the government's proposal Filippov (Stalin] 8. Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners,
had been inspired by the Americans. The aim of 98, 101; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power:
this proposal is to present the Nanjing govern- [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
ment as the advocate of the termination of war Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 951992), 336-337. and a peaceful settlement, while the Communist
96.] 9. On the importance of espionage data in the reversal party of China would be presented as the advoof Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan, see Mikhail cate of the continuation of war, if it would directly M. Narinsky, “The Soviet Union and the Marshall
reject peace negotiations with Nanjing. Plan,” in Cold War International History Project Work
We think we will give the following answer: ing Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
the Soviet government was and continues to be in Stalin to Mao Zedong, 11 January 1949 International Center for Scholars, 1994), 45-46.
favour of the termination of war and the establish10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka 302, 11. 4-6, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federa
ment of peace in China, but before agreeing to As you can see from what you have already tion (AVPRF), Moscow, cited in B. Kulik, “Kitaiskaiia mediation it would like to know whether the other received, our draft of your reply to the Narodnaiia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949- side—the Chinese Communist party—agrees to Guomindang proposal is aimed at the undermin1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF)" accept Soviet mediation. Therefore the USSR ing of the peace negotiations. Clearly, the [“The Chinese People's Republic in the founding pe- wishes that the other side—the Chinese Commu- Guomindang would not agree to peace negotiariod (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of
nist party—would be informed of the peace ac- tions without foreign powers' mediation, espethe Russian Federation”), Problemi Danego Vostoka 6
tion by the Chinese government, and that the cially that of the USA. It is also clear that the (1994), 77. 11. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 235, papka 18,1. 134; also
other side would be asked for its agreement to the Guomindang will not agree to negotiate without in SSSR-KNR (1949-1983): Dokumenti i materiali
mediation by the USSR. That is how we are the participation of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai[Documents and materials on USSR-PRC relations, planning to answer and we ask you to inform us shek) and other war criminals. We assume therepart one (1949-1983)] (Moscow: Historico-Documen- whether you agree to this. If you do not, give your fore that the Guomindang would reject peace tary Department and Far Eastern Department, Ministry advice for a more expedient answer.
negotiations on CCP terms. The result will be of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1985), 31-32; see also We also think that your answer, in case you that the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations and Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 121.
will be asked for it, should be something like this: it will be impossible to accuse it of being eager to 12. SSSR-KNR (1949-1983), p. 35.
continue the civil war. The Guomindang, howThe Chinese Communist party has al- ever, will receive the blame for breaking the WESTAD
ways been a supporter of peace in China, peace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of the continued from page 7
because the civil war in China had not Guomindang and the USA will be frustrated, and
been started by it, but by the Nanjing you will be able to continue your victorious war a divided China. The visit of Soviet Polit- government, which should bear all re- of liberation.
sponsibility for the consequences of the buro member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCP
We are waiting for your answer.
war. The Chinese Communist party is headquarters later that winter did not do
in favour of talks with the Guomindang, Filippov (Stalin) much to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed,
but without the participation of those Mao on several occasions during the dec
war criminals who provoked the civil [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.] ades to come referred to this episode as an war in China. The Chinese Communist example of Soviet duplicity.
party is in favour of the direct negotiaThe documents were translated from tions with the Guomindang, without any Russian by Maxim Korobochkin; see also foreign mediators. The Chinese Com
Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949 S.L. Tikhvinskii, "Iz Prezidenta RF: “
munist party especially finds it imposPerepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v
sible to accept the mediation by a for- Comrade Filippov,
eign power which takes part in the civil yanvare 1949 g.", Novaya i noveisha istoriya
war against the Chinese Popular Libera
I received your telegram of January 10. 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.
tion forces with its armed forces and
1. We think that the government of the navy, because such a power cannot be USSR should give the following answer to the *
regarded as neutral and impartial in the note by the Nanjing government proposing that liquidation of the war in China.
the USSR accepts mediation in the termination of Stalin to Mao Zedong, 10 January 1949
the civil war in China: We think that your answer should be ap
The government of the USSR has Comrade Mao Zedong.
proximately like this. If you do not agree, let us always wished, and still wishes, to see know of your opinion.
China as a peaceful, democratic and On January 9 we received a note from the
As for your visit to Moscow, we think that in united country. But it is for the people Nanjing government, proposing that the Soviet
the view of the abovementioned circumstances of China itself to choose the way to government act as a mediator between the Nanjing
you should, unfortunately, postpone your trip achieve peace, unity and democracy in government and the Chinese Communist party again for some time, because your visit to Mos- China. The government of the USSR, [CCP] in the termination of war and the conclu
cow in this situation would be used by the en- relying on the principle of noninterfersion of peace. A similar proposal was sent
emies to discredit the Chinese Communist party ence in the other countries' internal simultaneously to the governments of the USA, as a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which, affairs, cannot accept mediation beBritain and France. The Nanjing government has
certainly, could bring no benefit to the Commu- tween the two sides in the civil war in nist party of China or to the USSR.
2. We think that although the USA, England, and France, and especially the USA, are very willing to take part in mediation to terminate the war in China and thus achieve their goal—to preserve the Guomindang regime—the governments of these countries, especially the US government, have already lost their prestige among the Chinese public, and as the victory of the PLA nationwide and the downfall of the Guomindang regime is already in sight—it seems questionable whether they still wish to continue their assistance to the Nanjing government and thus further offend the PLA.
Only the USSR has a very high prestige among the Chinese people, so if the USSR in its reply to the note by the Nanjing government will take the position outlined in your telegram of January 10, it would make the USA, England and France assume that participating in mediation is an appropriate thing, and give the Guomindang a pretext for scolding us as warlike elements.
And the broad popular masses, which are displeased with the Guomindang and hope for an early victory of the PLA, would find themselves in despair.
If therefore it is possible for the USSR, in view of overall international relations, to make its reply along the lines which we are proposing, we would wish very much that you approve of our proposals. By doing so, you will help us enormously.
party and its troops, and that would lead to the We are deeply concerned by the fact that this political death of the Guomindang leaders and the deception will have a large influence on the people total disintegration of the Guomindang army. and make us start another political detour, i.e. to Second, because they know that the Communist refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the party will not make peace with the Guomindang, Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liquicoalition government. Our principal objective is dation of the Guomindang and its troops. to make the Americans and the Guomindang put So what does Nanjing want after all? It all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces wants not peace with the Communist party, but an until the last moment.
armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities We have recently published a list of war to use the armistice as a respite to restore order criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the an order to arrest these war criminals.
USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace deliver a blow on the People's Liberation forces, proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, blaming the Communist party for the breakdown too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum of negotiations. Their minimal wish is to prevent up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see the total defeat of the Guomindang forces by the how the Chinese people and international opinion Communist party. would react to the Guomindang's deceptive nego- This is the basis of the current deception tiations.
policy of Nanjing and the USA. But now we are inclined towards rejecting 3. How can one respond to this maneuver by the peace deception by the Guomindang with full Nanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible. righteousness, because now, as the balance of First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposals class forces in China has already changed irre- openly and directly, thus declaring the necessity versibly and the international opinion is also of the continuation of civil war. But what would unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA that mean? That means, first, that you had put will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and your principal ace on the table and surrendered a start the offensive towards Nanjing.
very important weapon—the banner of peaceIt looks like we do not have to make one more into the hands of the Guomindang. It means, political detour. In the present situation this second, that you are helping your enemies in maneuver would be damaging rather than benefi- China and outside China to accuse the Commucial.
nist party as the advocate of continuing the civil 4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on war, and to praise the Guomindang as the desuch an important issue. If you do not agree with fender of peace. It means, third, that you are my opinion as expressed here or would introduce giving the USA an opportunity to brainwash corrections, please let me know.
public opinion in Europe and America on the
lines that no peace is possible with the CommuMao Zedong
nist party, because it does not want peace, and that the only way to achieve peace in China is to organize an armed intervention by foreign pow
ers like the intervention which had taken place in Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949 Russia for four years from 1918 to 1921.
We think that a direct and overt answer is To Comrade Mao Zedong.
good when you are dealing with honest people,
but when you have to deal with political swinWe received your long telegram on the dlers, like the Nanjing people, a direct and overt Nanjing peace proposal.
answer can become dangerous. 1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing But a different answer is also possible. i.e.: government's peace proposal did not exist at all, a) to accept the desirability of a peace settlement if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was in China; b) to conduct negotiations without nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreable, foreign mediators, as China is a sovereign coun
, because it can bring some trouble to our common try and has no need for foreign mediators; c) to cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does conduct negotiations between the Communist exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on party and the Guomindang as a party, not with the this fact, we have to accept it.
Nanjing government, (which is] bearing the blame 2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by for starting the civil war and thus has lost the Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a confidence of the people; d) as soon as the parties policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does come to an agreement on the problems of peace not really want peace with the Communist party, and of the government of China, the hostilities as the peace with the Communist party would would be terminated. mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its Can the Guomindang accept these condiprincipal policy of liquidation of the Communist tions? We think it cannot. But if the Guomindang
3. One should think thoroughly whether it is possible to let people from the Nanjing government, including war criminals, take part in peace negotiations with us. As of now we are inclined toward the following position: the unconditional surrender of the Nanjing government is necessary to give the people of China a real peace as soon as possible.
By starting the war, the Nanjing government committed a great crime—it has lost the confidence of the nation. To reach an early termination of war and a peace settlement the Nanjing government should surrender its powers to the people. It has no reason for procrastinating.
We think that if we now would start peace negotiations with people like Zhang Zhizhong or Shao Lizi and enter into a coalition government with these people, that would be the exact fulfillment of the US government's wishes.
And that would bring much dissent among the people of China, the democratic parties and popular organizations and even within the CCP, and would be very damaging for our current position of having all virtue on our side.
Starting from July 1946 we have been cautiously paying attention to the deceptive character of the negotiations which the US government and the Guomindang would inevitably start after the military defeat of the latter, and to the degree of influence which this deception has on the
will not accept these conditions, the people will realize, that the Guomindang and not the Communist party is to blame for the continuation of civil war. The banner of peace in this case rests in the hands of the Communist party. This issue is especially important now, when a lot of people in China are tired of the civil war and are ready to support the advocates of peace.
But let us assume the impossible and imagine that the Guomindang had accepted these terms. What should the Communist Party's plans of actions be like?
First, it would be necessary to refrain from terminating the hostilities and then to create the central coalition government organs in such a way that approximately three fifths of seats in the Consultative Council and two thirds of the posts in the government would be retained by the Communists, and the other seats and posts would be distributed between other democratic parties and the Guomindang.
Second, it is necessary that the posts of the prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if possible, that of the president, be occupied by Communists.
Third, the Consultative Council should declare this coalition government the only government of China, and any other government, pretending to be the government of China, should be declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded.
And, finally, the coalition government should order both your troops and the Guomindang troops to swear allegiance to the coalition government and that hostilities against the troops which had given the oath would be terminated immediately, while they would be continued against the troops which had refused to give the oath.
It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would agree to these measures, but if they would not, it would be also detrimental for them, because they would be totally isolated, and these measures would be carried out without them.
4. This is our understanding of the issue and our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to present our advice clearly enough in our previous telegram.
We ask you to regard our advice as advice only, which does not impose any obligations on you and which you can accept or turn down. You can be sure that your rejection of our advice will not influence our relations and we will remain your friends as we have ever been.
5. As for our answer to the Nanjing mediation proposal, it will be in the spirit of your proposals.
6. We still insist that you postpone temporarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in China is essential now. If you want we can immediately send an authoritative member of the Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to negotiate on issues of interest to you.
[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.) The Official Statement on the Soviet
Government's Answer to the Note by the
On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministry Comrade Filippov,
presented a memorandum to the Soviet Embassy
in China, containing an appeal by the Chinese 1. I was glad to receive your supplementary government to the Soviet government to act as a telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the mediator in the peace negotiations between the breakdown of large scale negotiations with the Chinese government and the Chinese CommuGuomindang [GMD), the continuation of the nist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was inrevolutionary war to the end) we agree with you formed, the Chinese government had sent a simicompletely.
lar appeal to the governments of the United States Today we published eight conditions under of America, Great Britain and France. which we (would) agree to enter into peace nego- On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Minister tiations with the Guomindang. These conditions of the USSR cmrd. Vyshinsky A. Ya. received are put forward against the five reactionary con- the Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. Fu ditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace Bing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Soviet proposal of January 1.
government, which points out that the Soviet Several days ago already the Americans government, always loyal to the principle of nonsounded out our opinion—whether we would interference in the internal affairs of other counwish to conduct peace negotiations with the tries, does not regard it expedient to accept the Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So mediation mentioned in the memorandum. this sole condition-negotiating without war The answer of the Soviet government notes criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine that the restoration of China's integrity as a demothe intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotia- cratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chitions.
nese people itself and that this integrity could be 2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP probably best achieved by the direct radio station.]
negotiatiations between the internal forces of 3. Since the publication of the Guomindang's China, without foreign interference. peace proposals there has been much fuss in the GMD-controlled areas and the population is en [Source: Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-57. Colmasse demanding peace from the Guomindang, lection of documents (Moscow, 1959), p. 209.] reproaching the Guomindang that its peace conditions are too severe.
CARTER-BREZHNEV CONFERENCE The agitation and propaganda organs of the
HELD ON SOVIET INTERVENTION Guomindang are hastily explaining why the
IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979 Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status and its army. We think that this disorder in the Guomindang-controlled regions will be increas- On 17-20 September 1995, in Lysebu, ing further.
Norway, the Norwegian Nobel Institute hosted
an oral history conference on the 1979 Soviet Mao Zedong
intervention in Afghanistan. The gathering,
which included scholars and former Soviet [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.] and American officials, was a continuation of
the Carter-Brezhnev Project (see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1994), p. 140) to explore the
collapse of superpower detente in the late Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949 1970s and its possible implications for Rus
sian-American relations. The principal orgaTo Comrade Mao Zedong.
nizer of the Project is Dr. James G. Blight,
Center for Foreign Policy Development, ThoWe have just received your last short tele- mas J. Watson Institute for International Studgram, which shows that we now have unanimous ies, Brown University. Efforts to obtain deopinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace pro
classified documentation from U.S., Russian, posal and that the Communist party of China has and other sources has been led by the National already started its “peace” campaign. Thus, the Security Archive and CWIHP. A report on the matter is now closed.
results of the conference, including transla
tions of newly-available East-bloc documents Filippov [Stalin]
on Afghanistan, will appear in the next issue
of the CWIHP Bulletin. (Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, p. 118.]