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from Moscow. In 1935, when the Soviet significant contribution to reconnecting this To What Extent Were the Chinese Com- Union was threatened by rising fascism in CCP-Moscow tie. munists Involved in Soviet-Dominated Com- Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent? munist International Espionage in China in Moscow's order to adopt a policy of a “United Despite vigorous denials by Smedley herthe 20th Century? Recent memoirs in Chi- Front” (Popular Front) with the Nationalists self, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivonese, notably by Chen Hansheng and Shi in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion cally that Smedley was no less than an agent Zhe,2 suggest that the Chinese Communists in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen were deeply involved. In the 1930s and by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late Au- MacKinnon has only established that 1940s, for example, as the Shi Zhe memoirs gust 1939, the United Front policy collapsed Smedley was Sorge's mistress in Shanghai.) reveal, both the NKVD and GRU of the in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most Further, we also know from Chen's memUSSR and the Department of International closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, oirs that Smedley was involved in every Res. (OMS) of the Comintern ran a large spy hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major major step of the Sorge group's espionage training school in Yanan; Chinese Commu- victory against the West and the partition of activities. In fact, it was Smedley herself nist spies penetrated deep into the National- Poland as necessary for the communist who recruited Chen into Sorge's Tokyo opists’ (GMD) wartime intelligence organiza- cause.6 In January 1940, Mao Zedong pro- erations (p.58). Recent Comintern archives tions for Moscow.3 Chen Hansheng's story claimed that “the center of the Anti-Soviet also confirm Smedley's identity as a further illustrates this Moscow-Yanan tie. movement is no longer Nazi Germany, but Comintern agent. Chen was recruited by the Russians as a among the so-called democratic countries.”7 Was Owen Lattimore A Communist Spy? Comintern intelligence agent in 1926. One The modus vivendi of communism and fas- Lattimore topped Senator Joseph McCarthy's year later, the warlord Zhang Zuolin raided cism in late 1939 created such intense fric- list of alleged communist spies in the early the Soviet Embassy in Beijing which was tion between the Chinese Nationalists, who 1950s. McCarthy accused Lattimore of not being used as an intelligence base. This raid had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war only having manufactured a Far East policy exposed a large international espionage with the Japanese imperial army in China, leading to the loss of China to the commuscheme controlled by Moscow.4 Chen and the Chinese Communists, who were nists, but also of being a “top Soviet agent.”10 Hansheng then fled to Moscow and returned following Stalin's rapprochement with Ger- Chen's memoirs provide surprising insights to China in 1928 to become a member of the many, whose ally was Japan, that in early on this matter from the perspective of a well-known Richard Sorge Spy Ring, then 1940, an army of communist troops was communist intelligence agent. After Chen based in Shanghai. When Sorge was reas- ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern fled from Tokyo to Moscow in 1935 to signed by Moscow to Tokyo, Chen went Anhui, an event which essentially ended the prevent the Sorge Ring's operations from along and worked closely with Ozaki Hozumi superficial United Front. Yet when Hitler exposure, Owen Lattimore, then the editor and others of the ring until 1935, when the attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, of the New York-based journal Pacific Afunexpected arrest of a messenger from Mos- Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular fairs, the mouthpiece of the Institute of Pacow almost exposed Chen’s real identity. Front: all member parties of the Comintern, cific Relations (IPR), asked the Soviet Union,

, Chen sensed the danger and fled to Moscow both in Europe and in Asia, were now or- a member nation of IPR, for an assistant again (pp.61-62). For much of his early life, dered to fight fascism. Unfortunately, in (p.63). In 1936, Moscow recommended he was directly controlled by Moscow, and China this did not mean the re-establishment Chen Hansheng to Lattimore, who readily highly active in international intelligence. of the former United Front against the Japa- accepted the nomination. Chen then went to Chen's identity as a Comintern agent was so nese, because the Soviet Union had already New York, this time under the direct control important and secret that Richard Sorge, signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with of Kang Sheng, who was also in Moscow, to during his marathon interrogation in Tokyo Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the work with Lattimore from 1936 until 1939, by the Japanese police, never gave out Chen's Japanese, remained the CCP's main enemy. when Chen was reassigned by Kang Sheng real name to the Japanese.5

In fact, a stunning recent discovery at to a Hong Kong-based operation. What Was the True Relationship Be- the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a However, Chen states in his memoirs tween the Soviets and the Chinese Commu- secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of that Lattimore was kept in the dark as to his nists during WWII? Some historians have WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme true identity as a Communist agent directly minimized the extent and importance of the worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. dispatched from Moscow (p.64). Lattimore's relationship between the Chinese Commu- On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese scholarly activities were only to be used as a nist Party and the Soviet Union during World diplomats reached a secret deal that stipu- cover for Chen. Further, Kang Sheng speWar II. Chen Hansheng's memoirs and lated, “The USSR will abandon its active cifically instructed Chen that while in New other recently available documents from vari- support for Chiang (Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] York, his position at the IPR should only be ous sources fundamentally challenge this and will repress the Chinese Communist used as a means of getting a salary; and that interpretation.

Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Chen's real task was to help Rao Shushi, a Instead, these new publications show Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chi- Comintern and CCP chief also in New York, that from the very beginning the CCP was nese Communist Party will retain as a base organize underground activities (p.65). intrinsically connected with the international the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces Therefore, Chen's memoirs seem to clear communist movement centered in Moscow. (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia).”8

Lattimore from any complicity associated Every major step of the CCP followed orders Chen Hansheng's memoirs has made a with Chen Hansheng's secret operations in


New York.

Was Solomon Adler A Communist? Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for the U.S. Treasury Department in China during WWII, was also prominent on McCarthy's communist list. In the 1950s, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet apparatus in Washington, further identified Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence.11 Adler at the time denied Bentley's accusation. Surprisingly, in Chen's memoirs, as well as in some other recent Chinese documents, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a bona fide communist intelligence official. 12 According to these sources, Adler moved to Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and has since worked in various capacities in CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the External Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, the department that handles such well-known figures as Larry Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and committed suicide in jail in 1986.

Were the Chinese Communists Part of the International Communist Movement or Merely Agrarian Reformersin the 1930s and 1940s? Chen Hansheng's memoirs provides much new information about the Chinese Communist Party's extensive international connections. Besides the Sorge and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief communist intelligence officer in Hong Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, running acover organization funnelling huge amounts of funds—$20 million in two and a half years—from outside China to Yanan, mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japanese-made weapons from the “Puppet” troops in North China, with considerable Japanese acquiescence.13 When wanted in 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for pro-Soviet activities in Guilin (China), Chen was rescued by the British and airlifted to India where he was miraculously put on the payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University in Maryland, Chen became Beijing's secret liaison with the Communist Party of the U.S.A.(CPUSA) (p.81).14 After the CCP took over mainland China, Chen was summoned back from America to Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has remained a major figure in his own business for much of the rest of his life.

When Intellect And Intelligence Join, China (Berkeley, California, 1994).
What Happens? Chen is a seasoned intelli-

4. For an example of one Western country's exploita

tion of this raid in uncovering communist spy rings in gence officer with high academic accom

England, see Anthony Cave Brown's biography of plishment as an economic historian. While

Stewart Menzies, “C,” published in Britain as Secret his erudition has provided him with excellent Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of covers for intelligence operations, it was also

British Intelligence, 1939-52.

5. Stephen MacKinnon, “Richard Sorge, Agnes to become a source of his own demise. Chi

Smedley, and the Mysterious Mr. ‘Wang’ in Shanghai, nese intellectuals are frequently willing to 1930-1932," conference paper for the American Hisserve the state, to be its ears and eyes, yet in

torical Association, Cincinnati, 29 December 1988.

6. Niu Jun, From Yenan to the World (cong yanan the end the state often turns against the intel

zouxiang shijie] (Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1992), lectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng's

64-65; also Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, life thus becomes a classic example of this vol. 2. (Beijing: People's Press, 1961), 597-599. supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 7. Interview with Edgar Snow, in Freta Utley, Odyssey and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge

of A Liberal: Memoirs (Washington, D.C.: Washington

National Press, 1970), 213. of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet

8. Bruce A. Elleman, “The 1940 Soviet-Japanese SeUnion by Stalin. Many of his Soviet com- cret Agreement and Its Impact on the Soviet-Iranian rades, some of them highly respected schol- Supply Route" (Working Paper Series in International

Studies, I-95-5, Hoover Institution, on War, Revoluars, including the former Soviet Ambassador

tion, and Peace), 1-3 to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in

9. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh China in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Comand foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessi- munism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995),


mism about the Soviet purge, “I could not

10. Senate floor speech by McCarthy, in Ralph de understand what was going on then. Yet it

Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats (New York: was beyond my imagination that some thirty Arlington House Press, 1967), 185. years later, this horrible drama would be re- 11. Text of testimony by Bentley, in Toledano, Spies, played in China and I myself would be a

Dupes, and Diplomats, 132-133.

12. See Adler's photo in Chen's memoirs, and Selected target of the persecution” (p.64). During the

Shanghai Culture and History Materials (Shanghai Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the wenshi ziliao xuanji]43 (April 1983), Shanghai People's Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to Press.

13. For more details on this, see Maochen Yu, American 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His

Intelligence: OSS in China. wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By

14. Many top leaders of the CPUSA, including Earl 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the

Browder and Eugene Dennis, had served as Comintern “thought reform" Cadre School in remote agents in China. See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret Hunan province, he had become almost com

World of American Communism 8, 12. pletely blind.


Maochen Yu, who teaches history at the U.S. Naval Academy, is completing for publication a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation on the OSS in China during World War II.

1. The most revealing case was the rehabilitation of Pan Hannian in 1982, after which a large amount of materials on Pan's role as a Comintern intelligence chief in China and CCP spymaster during WWII became available for scholars. For more details, see the article by this author, “OSS in China: New Information About An Old Role," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Spring 1994, pp.94-95 2. Shi Zhe, Alongside the Great Men in History: Memoirs of Shi Zhe [zai lishi juren shengbian:shizhe huiyi lu] Beijing: Central Documents Press (zhongyang wenxian chupan she], 1991. Shi Zhe served as an OGPU (NKVD since 1934) agent for nine years in the Soviet Union until he was dispatched from Moscow to Yenan in 1940. He subsequently worked as Mao's intelligence aid in charge of encoding and decoding the heavy secret communications between Mao and Stalin during WWII, and as a Chinese-Russian interpreter. Shi Zhe also was Kang Sheng's deputy at the Social Affairs Department (SAD) and the chief liaison in Yenan between the NKVD team and the SAD. 3. Yan Baohang and others' aggressive intelligence penetration into the GMD, see the doctoral dissertation by this author entitled American Intelligence: OSS in




THE 1980-1981 POLISH CRISIS: Yakov Grishin's narrative, is often problem- and the debate is likely to continue for many THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS atic. Robert Zuzowski's volume provides years to come. cogent insights into the origins and func

Zuzowski devotes less attention than by Mark Kramer tions of the Workers' Defense Committee

Bernhard to Laba's thesis, and as a result his (KOR) and Grishin's monograph has a few

book leaves some key questions unresolved. Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and bright moments, but neither book offers as For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that Opposition in Poland: The Workers' De- much as one might hope.

when the decisive moment came in midfense Committee KOR(Westport, CT: Zuzowski's study of the origins, activi- 1980, top KOR members were skeptical Praeger, 1992). ties, and consequences of KOR is enriched

about the prospects for achieving a genuby citations from a wide range of open and inely independent trade union. (Some KOR Ya. Ya. Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v underground publications. Of necessity, his

officials even hoped that striking workers Pol'she, 1980-1981 gg (Kazan: Izdatel’stvo book relies extensively on (and overlaps would not press too hard for this goal, lest it Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1993). with) Jan Jozef Lipski's acclaimed two

become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.) volume history of the Workers' Defense

This is difficult to square with the author's Many books about the rise of Solidarity Committee, which was first published in contention that “KOR significantly contribin Poland and the subsequent martial-law 1983. Zuzowski's analysis, however, has uted to the formation of Solidarity and to its crackdown have been published in the West, three advantages over Lipski's book. First, performance, shaping the union's program, but nearly all of them appeared in the early as one would expect, Zuzowski is more

structure, and strategy (p. 169). Nor does to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly detached and critical than Lipski, whose

Zuzowski explain why so many workers since the collapse of Communism in Eastern perspective as one of the co-founders and

who had probably never heard of KOR and Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 leading members of KOR was unavoidably

never seen its publications were neverthePolish crisis has largely subsided. Although reflected in his lengthy account. Second, less ready to demand a wide array of fundaa few laudable books about the origins of Zuzowski's book extends chronologically mental political changes. It may well be, as Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba well beyond Lipski's, which ended with

both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that (The Roots of Solidarity), Lawrence C. KOR’s formal dissolution in September KOR decisively changed the broader milieu Goodwyn (Breaking the Barrier), and 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and Michael H. Bernhard (The Origins of De- of KOR to derive broader conclusions about

that this helped Polish workers eschew viomocratization in Poland), were published in the nature and methods of political dissent in lence and sustain an organized protest movethe early 1990s, the large majority of West- highly authoritarian societies. His discus

ment. But it is not clear that the evidence ern scholars no longer seem interested in sion of the term “intelligentsia” and his produced by Zuzowski is enough to contrareexamining the dramatic events of 1980- overall analytical framework are not always

vene Laba's basic point. 81. Even in Poland only a handful of ex- persuasive, but his assessment provides a This reservation notwithstanding, the perts, mainly those connected with the par- useful basis for historical and cross-country surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard liamentary Committee for Constitutional comparisons.

provide, combined with Laba's earlier book, Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a Hence, the overlap with Lipski's book

are about as far as one can go with nonreassessment of the 18-month confrontation does not really detract from Political Dis- archival sources. Both authors have done an that followed the emergence of Solidarity in sent and Opposition in Poland. A more

admirable job of poring over KOR's publithe summer of 1980. The dearth of academic serious problem arises, however, from the cations and other dissident works as well as interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is overlap with a recent book by Michael relevant secondary sources. Both have only now, when the archives in Poland, Bernhard (cited above), which was pub- brought new analytical perspectives to bear Russia, and other former Communist coun- lished at almost the same time as Zuzowski's

on their topic. Now that Zuzowski's and tries have become accessible and when a monograph. Bernhard's volume, like

Bernhard's books have appeared, other schollarge number of valuable first-hand accounts Zuzowski's, focuses on the origins and po- ars who wish to write about KOR will have of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and litical significance of KOR. Both books

to draw on recently declassified materials in more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980- depict the Workers' Defense Committee as the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other ar81 is finally possible.

a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a chives in Poland (materials not consulted by For that reason alone, the two books leading influence on the opposition move- Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to under review could have made a far-reach- ment in 1980-81. This view of KOR's

add anything of significance to the historical ing contribution. Both were completed after importance has been accepted by many schol- record. several of the former East-bloc archives had ars, but it has been challenged in recent years Zuzowski's failure to make use of newly been opened and after the initial spate of by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Pol- released documentation is regrettable, but memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the ish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, by no means wholly unreasonable. Several Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortu- provided the overwhelming impetus for Soli- features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of nately, neither author has made any use of darity and were themselves responsible for

the present tense to describe things that archival sources. Although both draw on at shaping the union's agenda. Laba's publica- ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he least a few of the new first-hand accounts, tions (including the book cited above) have wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the the use of this new evidence, especially in prompted spirited replies from Bernhard,

continued on page 294


1 September 1995

ered it: several years ago already Professor It will be useful to pose still one quesTo the Editor:

Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of tion. Was the U.S. government decision to

Beria's department in the Soviet press. publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth's I read with great interest “The I do not believe it possible here to dwell well-known treatise “Atomic Energy for Sudoplatov Controversy” in the CWIHP particularly on Sudoplatov's new fantasies,

particularly on Sudoplatov's new fantasies, Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155- contained in his letter to the Bulletin and to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? 158). In its own time I also read Special which repeat his Appendix Eight of the pa- Especially since from the point of view of Tasks with no less interest.

perback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491). informativeness it exceeded by many times I believed earlier and now presume that In such a way as was already, for ex- Bohr's responses to Terletskii's questions. the appearance of the recollections of such ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the

ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the Responding to this principal issue, it is easier a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist reader should very, very critically regard to understand why the attempts to find nonNKVD is an outstanding event, no matter Sudoplatov's “improvisations:" the princi- existent “flaws,” from the point of view of what they are like in terms of quality. In any pal defect of the “recollections” was evident the demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr's case, such recollections better than any- even in a “limited space.” Here the assis- responses, are continuing. And in precisely thing else characterize the era, and the story- tance and co-authorship in the drafting of the same way, it will become clear why the teller. We can only be sorry that the recol- Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as

Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies lections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, of Sudopatov are continuing. do not exist.

and the fact that the flattering foreward to Finally, let's turn to the eloquent acOf course, I cannot read without a smile this book belongs to the pen of the famous knowledgment of the former Soviet intelliPavel Sudoplatov’s “assertion” that in the historian Robert Conquest, are powerless. gence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top development of my career I am obliged Of course, the point of view of the Secret 3 (1994), 27): “Reading Sudoplatov, “through KGB connections." This is a Schecters is interesting, when they assert one ought to remember that in intelligence desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov’s

that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov's activity (possibly like science) there is an a relic of the past, at a time when it is already memoirs continues. On one side are Russian inclination to twist facts, particularly beimpossible, as was done in the Stalinist scientists who fear the downgrading of their cause under the conditions of the totalitarian time, to register innocent people as German, prestige and a threat to the medals they

prestige and a threat to the medals they regime it was easy to do without fear of English, and other "spies,” and to make received for building the atomic bomb” (Spe- consequences. An intelligence officer or short work of them. Now this relapse of the cial Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer

. past is nothing more than an expressive And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they or with Fermi, who would not have had any coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov him- even introduce a list of former intelligence idea to whom they were talking, and then self. And it is evidence of the fact that my operatives and historians who, evidently, do later they could give them a code name and article offended him very much.


not know atomic technology professionally, with dispatch submit the information to his In Special Tasks the episode connected but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, superiors and cast their deed in bronze.” A with Yaacov Terletskii's mission to Niels however, is that in the fact of the matter, the trusting man in the street could be misled by Bohr. My critical article, published in the “battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov” ended the report on the meeting between Terletskii Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only long ago. People understood that only spe- and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that on that episode. Since I am not a specialist cialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a “in every line (of the report) the traditional, in Sudoplatov's professional element, but position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr old-fashioned character of the operation is do have a definite conception of the Soviet gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. revealed,” it was as clear as two times two atomic project and its history, in this letter, Then why did the Schecters, while ig- equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray expressing myself, I will limit myself only noring the opinion of Russian physicists, not the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, to the mission to Niels Bohr.

wish to listen, for example, to one of the Beria would be pleased, and he will report I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov's leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par

leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par- everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). version regarding this mission stands up to ticipant in the American atomic project, Prof. And Kurchatov would not dare to articulate a comparison with the facts (reason for the Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scien- any doubts about the success of the operatrip, significance for the Soviet physicists of tific American together with his co-authors tion, [for] like other scientists, he is subordithe information which was brought; the observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr nate to the system. And just try to squeal shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels

shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is about the organs.” Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the a

refuted by Beria's own account of the ennaked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really counter between his agent and Bohr.” (Sci- Sincerely, did take place remains certain. But even entific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does here Sudoplatov is not the one who discov- he too fear for his awards and prestige? Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow)


To the Editor:

call a “leak” at the suggestion of a highly- social contact with me, I am in a better

placed church official. Simply put, having position than anyone else to say that Yuri In the letter from the well-known KGB invited an opponent of the victim to visit him Smirnov is a professional atomic scientist functionary Pavel A. Sudoplatov, published on some pretext, the police official slips who received his training at Arzamas-16, in the American journal Cold War Interna- him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared who took part in the design and testing of the tional History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Fall letter which refers to payments received 50-megaton nuclear bomb, who completed 1995, pp. 156-158), a suggestion or, rather, from the police department by the individual his doctoral work under the direction of the direct charge, is made against my colleague to be compromised.

well-known scientist D.A. Frankof many years, Yuri Smirnov, all of whose In this and similar situations, the “patri- Kamenetsky. During the period in which he scientific and literary efforts I have wit- otic” attitude of these employees towards worked at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, he nessed, that these efforts were in some way their agencies is touching. They of all people was responsible for a major line of research connected with the KGB. As is usual in such understand that the discovery of an into the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. cases, in place of evidence the letter pro- individual's links to their services lead to Such a list of accomplishments does not vides only murky references to a conversa- compromising him in the public's eyes, and require any embellishments, and any profestion between Sudoplatov and his former that this works. It is not clear whether they sional would be pleased to call it his own. It colleagues on this matter.

consider that such actions strengthen the was entirely natural that Yuri Nikolaevich, Fairly or unfairly, the reputation of the negative image of their agencies. Perhaps, as a possessor of such a rich and varied set of KGB, as well as that of similar agencies in considering its own reputation to be beyond experiences, would turn his sights to the other countries has always been very low. salvage, this is of no concern to them. history of science, and particularly the hisThere has never been a better way to ruin a Knowing Yuri N. Smirnov to be a histo- tory of nuclear explosive technology. These person in the eyes of public opinion and his rian of science, who has objectively evalu- efforts have borne fruit, as is witnessed by close friends than to suggest that he has ated the contribution of our agents in obtain- his string of publications. He is recognized connections with these services.


ing “atomic secrets,” who neither dimin- among historians of modern science, and no An unparalleled expert in the life of ishes nor exaggerates this contribution, attempts by Sudoplatov and his colleagues Russian bureaucrats and behind the scenes Sudoplatov and his colleagues, apparently, to blacken his reputation will stick. dealings, the author Nikolai Leskov, de- decided to “smear” Smirnov as a protective scribed a similar intrigue in his story Admin- measure.

Sincerely, istrative Grace. In this story, a police offi- As a colleague of Yuri Nikolaevich, cial wishing to compromise a provincial who began to work with me 35 years ago and Victor Adamsky public figure organizes what we would now to this day is in constant professional and Arzamas-16


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