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those responsible for it. (Several Politburo members deeply involved in the case, including Kádár's Minister of Internal Affairs, were then-and are still-alive and well. However, the chief prosecutor committed suicide in the 1970s; János Kádár, the main culprit, died minutes before the Court "retried" and rehabilitated his nemesis; and the head of the kangaroo court that had sent Nagy to the gallows in 1958, who remained unrepentant to the end, died in 1991.)

As for Rajnai, by the time we got acquainted in 1991 he had resigned his ambassadorship and retired. He was in semihiding, worried about retribution. A few months after our last conversation in 1992, I received a letter from him in which he asked for my help in getting an American visa. I have since heard that he died abroad, not in the United States, of natural causes. Perhaps so. But in his last years, the memory of Imre Nagy appeared to consume his mind and cripple his will to live.

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The articles by Janos Rainer and Johanna Granville in Issue 5 of the Bulletin make a major contribution to our understanding of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Soviet decisions relating to it. Both articles tend to conclude that the Soviet decision to intervene decisively to suppress the Nagy government was probably made in the period October 26-30. The documents available to date do not answer the question, but I read them as consistent with a conclusion that the Soviet decision was not made until October 30-31-after the Hungarians had disclosed their intention to declare neutrality and leave the Warsaw Pact. Mikoyan and Suslov, in their telegram of October 30, may have been reporting on their assurances to Nagy as implementation of a deception plan, but why then would they say to their Politburo colleagues "If the situation deteriorates further, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety."

If a decision to intervene had been taken
earlier, what was there to "reexamine in its
entirety"? Moreover, the Soviet public dec-
laration of October 30 advanced a liberal
interpretation of Warsaw Pact relationships,
and included an explicit promise to negoti-
ate a possible complete Soviet military with-
drawal from Hungary. That may,
of course,
have been intended only to deceive Hungar-
ian, Western and world opinion. But if so, it
was a costly device-its brutal repudiation
in practice a few days later was a serious
blow to the Soviet Union in the Western
socialist world as well as in Eastern Europe.

I continue to believe what I first wrote in
a RAND paper (P-984) on November 28,
1956 (first published in Problems of Com-
munism in January 1957, and later in my
book Soviet Military Policy): while Soviet
contingent preparations for possible inter-
vention were no doubt underway, it was only
on October 30-31 that the final decision to
intervene was made.

the Bulletin on pp. 30-31. In para. 5 (on p. 31) he cites an alleged conversation by a KGB Hungarian source with some Americans (named but not identified) who were reported to have said that "if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time, the UN troops will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place." Nagy had told Andropov on November 1 that Hungary was not only withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact immediately, but would seek UN and Big Four guarantees of its neutrality. Did the Soviet leaders on October 30-November 1 fear a U.S. intervention, possible under UN auspices circumventing their veto, if they withdrew? Perhaps new documents will clarify that issue.

In closing, I would like also to correct one small error in the translation of one of the documents. A report by Deputy MVD Minister Perevertkin on 24 October 1956, is cited (on p. 22 of the Bulletin) as saying that the Soviet intervention force at that time numbered in all "128 rifle divisions and 39 mechanized divisions"-which would have meant almost the entire Soviet Army! The figures evidently refer to 128 rifle and 39 mechanized companies, not divisions. As correctly noted in the text of Mark Kramer's commentary (on p. 51), the Soviet force in Hungary on October 24 totaled some 31,500 men drawn from five divisions in and near Hungary.

On October 31, when Mikoyan and
Suslov met with Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy,
the latter rejected an offer to withdraw im-
mediately all Soviet troops that had not
earlier been present in the country. More-
over, Tildy told Mikoyan that Hungary would
definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact in any
case-that is, even if the Soviet leaders
accepted their demand to withdraw all So-
viet forces immediately. (This was dis-
closed in a monitored broadcast by [Hungar-
ian Defense Minister] General Pal Maleter Sincerely,
on November 1 or 2.) I believe that that was
the final straw that tipped the decision to
intervene. The new documents, while not
conclusive, are consistent with that interpre-
tation. We can hope that other documents
not yet discovered or published will clarify
this matter.

I do not argue that the thesis I have
outlined briefly above has been confirmed,
but it has not been disconfirmed by the new
evidence available, and in my view the new
material tends to substantiate it. I believe we
should continue to regard the question as an
open one.

Other important developments were also occurring, including the Anglo-French intervention in Suez on October 30 (which, as Vladislav Zubok has pointed out, the Soviet leaders initially interpreted as blessed by the United States). Further attention should also be given to the intriguing comment in KGB Chief Serov's report of October 28, cited in

Raymond L. Garthoff

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FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- "L'URSS, il PCIe l'Italia: 1944-1948," Storia vice

NYT = New York Times

RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
VjZ= Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte
WP = Washington Post
ZfG=Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft

Russia/Former Soviet Union

Interview with Stalin granddaughter Galina Iakovkevnoi Dzhugashvili. (Yuri Dmitriev and Samarii Gurarii, “Syn Stalina” [Stalin's Son], Trud, 31 May 1994, 3.)

1945 letter on postwar strategy from senior Soviet diplomat I.M. Maisky to Stalin from Foreign Ministry archives printed. ("The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Conference of the Three Allied Powers in Yalta," Diplomaticheskii Vestnik 3-4 (February 1995), 78-79.)

December 1945 documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives illuminate Moscow's refusal to join International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Harold James and Marzenna James, "The Origins of the Cold War: Some New Documents," The Historical Journal 37, 3 (1994), 615622.)

Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov announces (2 December 1994) plans to revise estimate of total Soviet deaths during World War II; says 44 Soviet soldiers and officers remain MIA from the 1956 invasion of Hungary, 300 were still missing from the war in Afghanistan, and a Col. Udanov, missing in Ethiopia in 1978, was reported to be alive and working in a Somali stone quarry as late as 1989. (RFE/RL Daily Report 229 (6 December 1994).) Dispute over number of Soviet deaths in World War II reviewed. (Boris Sokolov, "New Estimates of World

Contemporanea 25:6 (December 1994), 929

982.)

Problems of Post-Communism 42:5 (September-October 1995) spotlights new findings from Soviet archives: Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Activities in Europe After World War II," pp. 3-8; Hope M. Harrison, "Soviet-East German Relations After World War II," pp. 9-17; Scott Parrish, "Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan: Opportunity or Threat?" pp. 18-24; and Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Archival Materials, Old American Debates, and the Korean War," pp. 25-32.

Report on persecution and isolation of Russians who returned from WW II German POW camps includes April 1956 recommendation from commission headed by Defense Minister Zhukov to relax measures. (Vladimir Naumov and Alexander Korotkov, "WWII POWS Condemned as Traitors," Moscow News [English] 17 (5-11 May 1995), 11.

Recounting of Soviet policy toward early Cold War flashpoint on basis of Communist Party and Foreign Ministry archives. (N.I. Party and Foreign Ministry archives. (N.I. Egorova, “Iranskii Krisis' 1945-1946 gg. porassekrechennym arkhivym dokumentam" ["The Iran Crisis" 1945-1946 on the Basis of Declassified Archival Documents], Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 3 (1994), 24-42.)

Stalin's postwar policy in Eastern Europe assessed. (Vadim Tarlinskii, "Sud'ba federatsii" [Fate of the Federation], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 December 1993, 4.)

66.)

Inquiry into events surrounding Stalin's death and struggle to succeed him. (Y. Zhukov, "Krelenskiie Laini: Stalin otetranili ot vlasti b 1951 godu?" [Kremlin Secrets: Did Stalin step down from power in 1951?], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 December 1994,

3.)

Beria's letters from prison, 1953. (Istochnik 4 (1994), 3-14.)

Party and state archives inform study of Kremlin power struggles, 1945-62. (Y.N. Zhukov, "The Struggle for Power in the Soviet Leadership from 1945 to 1962," Voprosi Istorii 1 (1996), 23-29.)

Archival evidence yields new view on Beria's role in post-Stalin power struggle. (Boris Starkov, "Koe-chto noven' koe o Berii” [Something New About Beria], Argumenty i Fakty 46 (November 1993), 6.)

Nina Vacil'evna Alekseeva on her relationship with L.P. Beria. (Irina Mastykina, “Ya Byla Ne Liubovnitsei Berii, a Ego Zhertvoi" [I Was Not Beria's Lover, I Was His Victim], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, 25-28 March 1994, 8-9; 8-11 April 1994, 6-7.)

Ex-CPSU official L.N. Efremov discusses memories of Nikita Sergeevich. (Valery Alekseev, "Takoi Raznoi Khrushchev" [The Varied Khrushchev], Pravda, 16 April 1994, 4.)

Son of G.M. Malenkov on father's relationship with N.S. Khrushchev. (Andrei Malenkov, "Malenkov i Khrushchev,” Gudok [Whistle], 16 April 1994, 4; 19 April 1994, 3; 20 April 1994, 3.)

Recollections of Russo-Ukrainian relations under Khrushchev. (Andrei Barkovskii, "Velikodushno, bez vsiakikh kolebanii" [Magnanimous, Without Hesitation], Rabochaia Tribuna, 22 January 1994, 3.)

Dissident perspective on 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. (Viktor Trofimov, "Neordinarnye otnosheniia" [Unusual relations], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 June 1994, 4.)

Cominform reassessed on basis of party archives. (G.M. Adibekov, "An Attempt at the 'Cominternization' of the Cominform,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 4-5 (1994), 51Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 4-5 (1994), 51- Conversations recalled with Prime Minister

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and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1995); A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetnika A.A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L.I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K.U. Chernenko i M.S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994); G.M. Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina: svidetel'stvo ee uchastnika [The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant (Moscow: International Relations, 1995); Vojtiech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 1996).

Nuclear Weapons Issues:

Historian Zhores Medvedev on various aspects of the Soviet atomic program, including the roles of prison labor and the KGB. (Zhores Medvedev, "KGB i Sovetskaia Atomnaia Bomba" [The KGB and the Soviet Atomic Bomb], Smena [Change], 24 August 1994, 4; Medvedev, "Bomba c kleimom LON" [Bomb with the Mark of LON (Camp of Special Significance)], Rabochaia Tribuna, 30 September 1994, 5; 1 October 1994, 3; Medvedev, "The KGB and the Atomic Bomb," Rossiia, 31 January 1995, 6.)

Assessment of role of espionage in Soviet atom bomb. (Vladimir Skomorokhov, "From Where Was It Born, Our Atom?" Delovoi mir [Business World], 22-23-25-28 June 1994.) Interview with Prof. Balentin Belokon' on debate over origins of Soviet atomic bomb. (Oleg Moroz, "Sovetskaia Abomba: Sobstvennoe izobretenie ili plagiat" [The Soviet A-Bomb: Indpendent Invention or Plagiarism], Literaturnaia Gazeta 26 (29 June 1994), 10.) Several secret letters printed in commentary on book by ex-KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov. (Aleksandr Minkin, "Bomba" [Bomb], Moskovskii Komsomol'ets, 29 June 1994, 1.)

Evidence from the archives of D.V. Skobel'tsyn. (Mikhail Rebrov, "Mog li Sovetskii Soiuz pervym sdelat' atomnuiu bombu?" [Could the Soviet Union Have Been the First to Make an Atomic Bomb?] Krasnaia Zvezda, 30 April 1994, 5.)

Interview with Arkadii Brishch on his work on Soviet atom bomb. (Oleg Moroz, "Skopirovna byla ne bomba, a skhema zariada" [It wasn't the Bomb that Was Copied, It Was the Storage System], Literaturnaia Gazeta 36 (7 September 1995), 10.)

pearance of several tons of uranium in 1989. according to German report. (Berlin DDP/ ADN, 21 August 1994, in "Secret Nuclear Depots Reported in FRG, East Europe, in FBIS-WU-94-162 (22 August 1994), 12.)

Publications: Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

New data on atomic bomb project from family archives of Lt.-Gen. Boris L'vovich Bannikov. (Mikhail Rebrov, "Atomnaia bomba: Kak nachinalsia otchet vremeni" Military Issues: [The Atom Bomb: How the Countdown Began], Krasnaia Zvezda, 20 August 1994, 7.)

Interview with I. Zavashin, director of "Avangard" factory at Arzamas-16, formerly secret Soviet nuclear center. (Vladimir Gubarev, "Yuri Zavashin: Pontiatie 'nado' my vpitali s molokom materi" [Yuri Zavashin: The Concept of "Must" We Imbibed with our Mother's Milk], Segodnia, 28 September 1994, 9.)

Description of Soviet Air Force 1956 training maneuver for nuclear war, in which 272 troops were ordered to land at ground zero. (Aleksandr Kyrov, "Dernyi Desant" [Turf Landing], Rossiskaia Gazeta, 26 May 1994, 7.)

Account of secret Soviet 1959 testing of atomic weapons in Pacific. (Mikhail Rebrov, "Otriad osobnogo naznacheniia: Khronika neob 'iavlennoi ekspeditsii"" [An Order of Special Significance: The Story of an Unreported Expedition], Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 May 1994, 6.)

Hidden history and environmental costs of Soviet program of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs) from 1965-88 probed. (Judith Perera, "Revealed: 23 Years of Soviet Nuking," The Daily Telegraph (London), 8 February 1995, 16, in JPRS-TAC-95-001 (14 February 1995), 27-28.)

Environmental impact of nuclear tests on Totskii proving grounds, and increased cancer rates in city of Orenburzh, assessed by Duma representative. (Tamara Zlotnikova, "Zabytyi genotsid" [Forgotten Genocide], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 September 1994,

2.)

Soviet KGB head Kryuchkov noted disap

Dmitrii Volkogonov interviewed on search for missing U.S. military from World War II. (Valerii Rudnev, “Rossiia prodolzhaetiskat"" [Russia Continues to Search], Izvestiia, 28 October 1993, 6.) U.S.-Russian commission frustrated by lack of evidence behind claims captured US pilots were held on USSR territory. ("MIA's from the cold war," Moscow tory. ("MIA's from the cold war," Moscow News [English] 23 (10-16 June 1994), 14.) On 15 September 1952, Russia returns body of U.S. Air Force captain whose RB-29 reconnaissance aircraft was downed over the Kurile Islands on 7 October 1952. (Reuters cited in RFE/RL Daily Report 178 (19 September 1994).) Revelations on plight of Americans shot down over USSR, Vietnam, including case of B-52 crewman Lt.-Col. Robert Standervik. (Komsomolskaya Pravda, in FBIS-SOV-95-040 (1 March 1995).)

Detailed account of postwar Soviet submarine building program. (I. Spasskiy and V. Semenov, "First Soviet Submarine With Turbine Power Plant (Design Project 617)," Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow) 7 (July 1994), 65-69, in JPRS-UMA-94-053 (15 December 1994), 19-23.

Report on early plans for development of Russian "PKO❞ defense system. (Anatolii Dokuchaev, "The Russians Weren't Shooting American Satellites," Krasnaia Zvezda, 30 June 1994, 6.)

Report on 1955 disaster aboard battleship Novorossisk. (Ol'ga Musafirora, "Herazgadannyi vzryv" [Unsolved Explosion], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, 28 October 1993, 3.)

On 1962 Soviet naval campaign in Indonesia. (Andrei Zhdankin, "Do voiny ostavalos' tri chasa" [There Were Three Hours Left Until War], Rossiia, 1-7 June 1994, 1.)

Naval commander on Soviet atomic submarine progream. (Ivan Gulaev, "K-27: Podvodnyi rekord 1964 goda" [K-27: The 1964 Underwater Record], Krasnaia Zvezda, 25 June 1994, 6.)

Investigation into 1970 fire aboard nuclear submarine “K-8.” (Vladimir Shigin, "Tragediia v Biskaiskom Zalive" [Tragedy in the Bay of Biscay], Moskovskaia Pravda, 12 April 1994, 9.)

New data on disaster aboard nuclear submarine PL-574 which claimed 89 lives. ("Taina gibeli PL-574" [The Secret of the Disaster of PL-574], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, 30 December 1993, 7.)

Former vice-admiral recalls 1974 minesweeping operation in Gulf of Suez. (Aleksandr Apollonov, "6.000 chasov na minnykh poliakh" [6,000 Hours on the Minefields], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1994, 6.)

Series on Pacific Ocean battles covered up by Soviet regimes. (Nikolai Burbyga, "Zhertvi heob iavlennykh voin" [Victims of Unannounced Wars], Izvestia, 5 January 1994, 6; 9 February 1994, 8.)

Reports on investigation of wreck of the Soviet atomic submarine "Komsomolets." (Vladimir Svartsevich, "Poligon nashei sovesti" [Proving-Ground of Our Conscience], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 11 August 1994, 5-6; Kirill Dybskii, "Mstislav Keldysh' vernulsia 'so shchitom"" [The "Mstislav Keldysh" Returns "with the Shield"], Segodnia, 17 August 1994, 7.) Interview with Tengiz Borisov, former KOPRON director, on new data concerning "Komsomolets." (Eduard Lunev, "Poslednii parad 'Komsomol'tsa"" [The Last Parade of the "Komsomolets"], Rossiia 25 (6-12 June 1994), 6.)

New data on Soviet ballistic missile development. (Krasnaia Zvezda, 18 June 1994, 6.)

Sino-Soviet Relations:

Correspondence printed between Stalin and Mao from January 1949 reveals disagreement on tactics regarding potential media

tion of Chinese Civil War. (Sergei L. Tikhvinskii, “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g." [From the Presidential Archives of the RF (Russian Federation): Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with Mao Zedong of January 1949], Novaya i noveisha istoriya 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.)

Newly released Soviet documents on Mikoyan's secret visit to Mao and CCP leaders, 31 January-7 February 1949. (Andrei Ledovskii, "Secretnaia missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai" [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to China], Problemi Dalnego Vostoka 2, 3 (1995).)

New Russian evidence on Sino-Soviet relations, 1949-52. (B. Kulik, “Kitaiskaiia Narodnaiia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF" [The Chinese People's Republic in the Founding Period (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation], Problemi Dalnego Vostoka 6 (1994).)

Mao's reactions to Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech, as told to Soviet ambassador in Beijing. (P. Yudin, "Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao," Problemi Dalnego Vostok 5 (1994).

New information on 1971 crash of Lin Biao during flight from China. (Andrei Kosyrev, "Delo Lin Biao': Zagadka Pochti Rasreshena” [“The Lin Biao Affair": The Mystery is Nearly Solved], Moskovskaia Pravda, 24 March 1994, 4; Yuri Dmitriev, "Poslednii polet kitaiskogo marshala" [The Last Flight of the Chinese Marshal], Trud, 9 April 1994; Ivan Iavnok, "Marshal Lin Biao Razbilsia v Mongolii" [Marshal Lin Biao Died in Mongolia], Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 May 1994, 6.)

Interview with Li Iuzhan, Mao's interpreter for meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. (Andrei Kabannikov, “Mao v okruzhenii vragov i tantsovshchits" [Mao, Surrounded by Enemies and Dancers], Komsomolskaia Pravda, 6 January 1994, 14.)

Intelligence/Espionage Issues:

Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB messages seem genuine

and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring, though some key evidence of atomic espionage still lacking. (Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, "Cryptic Answers," The Nation, 14/21 August 1995, 152-53.)

Christine Keeler, call-girl who was key figure in 1963 Profumo spy scandal in England, reportedly admitted for first time to having been a Soviet spy. (British magazine OK, 4 November 1994, quoted in RFE/RL Daily Report 211 (7 November 1994).)

Story behind publication of Yuri Shvets's Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America. (Dmitry Radyshevsky and Nataliya Gevorkyan, "The memoirs of a Soviet intelligence officer have created a big panic," Moscow News [English] 16 (22-28 April 1994), 14.)

Recollections of Andropov from ex-KGB colleagues. (Aleksandr Cherniak, "Andropov-Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi" [Andropov-The Known and Unknown], Pravda, 15 June 1994, 3; Aleksei Grishin, "V ego stikakh bylo mnogo ostrykh slovochek" [In His Poems There Were Many Sharp Words], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 June 1994, 6.)

Interview of Vladimir Barkovskii, who worked with Soviet spies in London, on role of espionage in development of Soviet atomic bombs. (Andrei Vaganov, "Sorok piat' let nazad, 29 avgusta, byla ispytana pervala v CCCR atomnaia bomba" [Forty-Five Years Ago, On August 29, the USSR's First Atom Bomb Was Tested], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 30 August 1993, 1.)

On the controversy over the book by exKGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, and its allegations that prominent Western scientists knowingly provided information to Soviet intelligence. (Vladimir Nadein, "Proval po vsei semi:-Pochemu nashemu velikomu shpionu ne posvolili klevat' v Amerike" [Malfunction of All Systems:-Why Our Great Spy Was Not Allowed to Slander America], Izvestiia, 4 June 1994, 5.) Lavrenti Beria's son Sergo claims on Russian television no 15 July 1994 that J.Robert Oppenheimer secretly visited his father in the USSR in 1939; historians dismiss story as absurd. (RFE/RL Daily Report

136 (20 July 1994).) Russian Academy of Sciences devotes meeting to discussion of book, various comments cited in Literaturnaya gazeta on 27 July 1994. (RFE/ RL Daily Report 145 (2 August 1994).)

Moscow publishers Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniye to release six-volume history of Russian foreign intelligence service, reports Trud on 15 October 1994. (RFE/RL Daily Report 201 (21 October 1994).)

Interview with ex-KGB official Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Nikolay Leonov, author of Seditious Times (1994); comments on Ames case, KGB defectors, etc. (“KGB Lieutenant General Nikolay Leonov: Failure by Ames in the United States was Impossible: He Was Betrayed in Moscow," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 22 December 1994, 6, in FBISSOV-94-248 (27 December 1994), 17-19.)

Interview with Vladimir Stanchenko about Soviet and Russian espionage. (“The Spy Who Returned to the Cold,” Izvestiia, 2 September 1994, 9.)

CIA's record vis-a-vis USSR in Cold War's closing years assessed. (Walter Pincus, "Reagan Buildup at CIA Spawned Current Woes," Washington Post, 29 December 1994.)

KGB watched Russian National Unity Movement leader Aleksey Vedenkin for “keenness on fascist ideas" since 1981, authorities say; other report says Vedenkin probably belonged to KGB. (Moscow RIA, 1 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-046-A (9 March 1995), 3-4; also Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 1 March 1995, 1, as "Article Links Vedenkin to KGB," FBIS-SOV-95-055 (22 March 1995), 20.)

Interview with ex-KGB double agent-defector Oleg Gordievsky on publication of his memoirs; Sunday Times (London) publishes excerpt with names of KGB sources. ("ExSpy Causes Uproar in Britain" and "Times Publishes Names of British KGB Informers," Moscow News [English] 8 (24 February-2 March 1995), 11; see also "KGB: Michael Foot was our agent,” The Sunday Times (London), 19 February 1995.)

New official publication, White Paper on Russian Secret Services (Moscow:

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