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infantry rose up and went on the attack in good spirits. In the first three hours individual units and formations advanced from 3 to 5 kilometers.

The attack of the troops of the People's Army took the enemy completely by surprise.

The enemy put up strong resistance only in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. The enemy began to put up a more organized resistance after 12:00 on the first day.

On the first day of battle the following towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Kaesong, Sinyuri-(map 1:1,000.000 published by the General Staff in 1943).

In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. [People's Army] advanced 12 kilometers.

On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 kilometers.

On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio area and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 partisans.

The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out successfully.

The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining it.

The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the People's Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no losses.

On June 26 troops of the People's Army continued the attack and, with fighting, advanced deep into the territory of South Ko

rea.

During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were completely cleared and units of the 6th division made a forced crossing of the bay and took the populated point in the direction of Kimpo airport.

In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th divisions took the cities of Bunsan and Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the provincial center Siunsen.

On the coast of the Sea of Japan the advance has continued. The port of Tubuiri has been taken.

During the course of the day there has been no communication with the 12th Infan

try Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the mechanized brigade attacking through Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif.

Conclusions regarding the North.

It is necessary to note the following substantial insufficiencies in the operations of the People's Army:

1. With the beginning of military actions and the forward advance of units and formations, staff communication was lost from top to bottom. The general staff of the People's Army already on the first day did not direct the battle, since it did not have firm communication with a single division.

The commanders of units and formations are not trying to establish communications with the senior staff, command posts from combat level and higher change the senior staff without permission, the General Staff still has not established communications with the brigade operating along the eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Division.

2. The command staff of the KPA does not have battle experience, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers they organized the battle command poorly, they use artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose communications.

3. However, our military advisers note great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean People's army and a general aspiration to fulfill their allotted tasks.

4. The political mood among the people of North Korea in relation to the beginning of military operations is characterized by a general enthusiasm, by faith in the government of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the Korean People's Army.

On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an appeal to the Korean people in the name of the government of the DPRK, in which he described the situation that has been created in the country and laid out the tasks for the defeat of the enemy and the unification of Korea.

5. The Command of the Korean People's Army is taking measures to put right the troop communications and the organization of the battle command. To this end the Army Command Post has been moved to the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of the General Staff and the main military adviser, along with a group of officers, will go out to the Command Post.

Conclusions regarding the South.

The first two days of military operations have shown the following:

1. The enemy is putting up resistance and while fighting is retreating deep into the territory of South Korea, mass taking of prisoners from the South Korean army has not been noted.

2. The South Korean puppet authorities have begun to throw in troops from deep in the rear and are trying to halt the advance of the People's Army.

3. In the first day the attack of the People's Army caused confusion in the South. The South Korean authorities and the ambassador of the USA personally in their radio speeches called on the people of South Korea to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean army is broadcasting false reports about the successes of the South Korean army. SHTYKOV

No. 358/sh 26.6.50.

[Source: collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC Time Watch documentary titled "Korea, Russia's Secret War," to be broadcast in the UK and the USA in 1996]

15. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

Ciphered Telegram No. 34691/sh.
Pyongyang. Soviet Ambassador.

1. You do not report anything about what kind of plans the Korean command has. Does it intend to push on? Or has it decided to stop the advance. In our opinion the attack absolutely must continue and the sooner South Korea is liberated the less chance there is for intervention.

2. Communicate also how the Korean leaders regard the attacks on North Korean territory by American planes. Are they not frightened or do they continue to hold firm[?]

Does the Korean government intend to make an open statement of protest against the attacks and the military intervention? In our opinion, this should be done.

4. [sic] We have decided to fulfill fully by July 10 the Koreans' requests for delivery of ammunition and other military equip

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CHINA'S ROAD TO THE KOREAN WAR

by Chen Jian

In October 1950, one year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership sent “Chinese People's Volunteers" (CPV) to Korea to fight against United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border. Although China's intervention saved Kim Il Sung's North Korean Communist regime from imminent collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing leadership's hopes of overwhelming the UN forces. Therefore, when the Korean War ended in July 1953, Korea's political map remained virtually unchanged, while America's military intervention in Korea and China's rushing into a conflict with the United States finally buried any hope for a Sino-American accommodation, and the Cold War in Asia entered a new stage characterized by a total confrontation between the PRC and the United States that would last nearly twenty years.

The newly established Chinese Communist regime faced enormous problems during its first year, including achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a warshattered economy, and finishing reunification of the country. Why then did Mao decide to assist North Korea in fighting a coalition composed of nearly all the Western industrial powers? How was the decision made? What were the immediate and long-range causes leading to Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War? Finally, was there any opportunity that might have prevented the direct confrontation between the PRC and the United States? More than forty years after the end of the Korean War, scholarly answers to these questions are still limited and remarkably inadequate.

In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China's entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of worldwide expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions. The Korean

conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential part of a life-and-death confrontation between the Communists on the one hand and the "free world" on the other.1

The North Korean invasion of the South, as viewed by President Harry Truman—and many later students of the Korean War represented the first step in a general Communist plot to “pass from subversion" to "armed invasion and war” in their scheme of world conquest.2 Correspondingly, Beijing's entrance into the Korean War was regarded as an action subordinate to Moscow's overall Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West widely believed that Beijing's policy was aggressive, violent, and irrational.

In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu,3 which has strongly influenced a whole generation of scholars. Using Western intelligence sources and Chinese journal and newspaper information, Whiting argued that unlike the Soviet Union, Communist China had not directly participated in the planning for the North Korean invasion of the South. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whiting believed, Beijing tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement, and only after the attempts for a political solution failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin necessary military preparations in early September. Whiting emphasized that after the Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing tried through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only after all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas MacArthur and therefore, in the Beijing leadership's view, the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded that Beijing's management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America's threat to China's national security. Lacking access to Chinese archival materials, though, Whiting's study had to focus more on the analysis of the environment in which the Beijing leadership made their decision to go to war than on a close examination of the decision-making process.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more critical perspective on the Sino-American confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam, the

normalization of Sino-American relations, and the declassification of new archival documentation. Building on Whiting's thesis, scholars paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders' concerns for China's national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean War. They generally argued that Beijing did not welcome the Korean War because China faced difficult tasks of economic reconstruction and political consolidation at home and gave priority to liberating Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of these scholars stressed that Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War was simply a reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to the physical security of Chinese territory. And while most scholars believed that the American decision to cross the 38th parallel triggered China's intervention, some speculated that if UN forces had stopped at the parallel China would not have intervened.4 A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to share these assumptions, as can be seen in Chinese publications on the "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" that appeared in the 1980s.5

As a lecturer at Shanghai's East China Normal University in the early 1980s and then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in the United States, I became increasingly interested in the emergence of Sino-American confrontation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In my study I too believed in the standard interpretation of China's reasons for entering the Korean War. Not until 1988-1990, when the work on my dissertation led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I begin to feel doubts. For example, to my surprise, I found that early in August 1950, more than one month before the Inchon landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing leadership had been inclined to send troops to Korea, and China's military and political preparations had begun even a month earlier. I also found that the concerns behind the decision to enter the Korean War went far beyond the defense of the safety of the Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his associates aimed to win a glorious victory by driving the Americans off the Korean peninsula. It was no longer possible to accept the well-established view of Chinese and American historians.

continued on page 85

FYN-SI [Stalin].

No. 362/sh

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov 1.7.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]

16.1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on North Korea

Ciphered telegram No. 405809 From Pyongyang. Sent 2.7.50 04.00. Received 2.7.50 05.47.

Sent to the 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55

By wire.

Extremely Urgent.

To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]

To No. 362.

I report about the political mood of the northerners in connection with the intervention of the Americans.

With the beginning of the successful military operations of the People's Army, and especially after the liberation of the city of Seoul, the mood of the population was characterized by great general political enthusiasm.

The population of the liberated regions in the main greeted the People's Army warmly and in every way cooperated with the measures it took. Organs of power are being created everywhere-people's committees, social-political organizations, they have restored production and trade. At this time even the reactionary elements did not take action against the measures of the government of the DPRK and the People's Army.

The successful attack of the People's Army activated the partisans, at present the partisan movement is developing widely in the rear of the South Korean army.

However, in connection with the widespread American propaganda over the radio, which is directed against the DPRK, and the frequent attacks by American planes on population points, industrial and military sites in North and South Korea, the political mood of the population is somewhat worsening.

Individual attitudes of lack of belief in the final victory have appeared, and in the liberated regions a certain (small) portion of the population is taking a wait and see position.

The leadership of the DPRK and the People's Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, Pak II U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) correctly evaluate the complicated militarypolitical situation in Korea, believe in full victory and are directing all efforts toward a subsequent broad attack on the south of Ko

rea.

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war against the DPRK and in connection with this they are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources for the war.

KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about forming additional infantry, tank, and naval units and formations. They intend to introduce universal military service in the DPRK.

However, some portion of the leading figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties of conducting a war against the Americans with the forces of Korea and in a cautious way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG reported to me these facts, about a conversareported to me these facts, about a conversation of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)

The rightist and centrist figures that are entering the government of the DPRK are

supporting all measures of the government, supporting all measures of the government, but so far are not displaying the necessary direction of activity in the mobilization of their parties in the south of the country.

I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that the government of the USSR has satisfied his request for arms and ammunition.

The general situation in the KNP [Korean People's Republic, apparently a misspelling of DPRK] continues to remain favorable and makes it possible to continue the active offensive of the People's Army. No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV. I.7.50. Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, File of 8th Department.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110]

17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov 17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh. From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05

Received 4.7.50 3:55

Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10 To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin]. Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG.

At the beginning of the conversation KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the front. In his opinion the troops are moving very slowly, especially in the Central direction. The troop crossing was disorganized, although there was a minister in place there. He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the minister's] work.

Further, noting the seriousness of the situation at the front and in the liberated territories and the danger of landings by American troops in the rear or at North Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, he asked me to report to you his request for quick delivery of arms in the following amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh submachine guns, 5,000 PPS [sub-machine guns]; 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy machine guns; 200 82mm mortars; 78 120mm mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti-aircraft guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks.

All these arms are needed for the formation of two divisions, 12 battalions of marines and for the formation of security detachments.

Because of American air attacks on the railroad stations in the region of Kanko, Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an accelerated schedule through Manchuria [along the route of] Andong-SingisiuPyongyang.

He also communicated that they have begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 tank brigades and that these need arms and tanks.

Further in the conversation he asked advice about how better to organize troop command in the complicated situation. Since the People's Army is fighting against American troops, he considers it necessary to strengthen the leadership of the army.

Further he asked advice about how better to organize troop command and what kind of organizational command structure to choose so that the General Staff is brought closer to the troops.

After consulting with General

VASILIEV we proposed the following struc- this measure will yield positive results.

ture:

The staff of the front will move to Seoul in the near future.

I ask your permission:

1. To create two army groups headed by Military Councils composed of: a commander, a member of the Military Council 1. To have two advisers in every army and a chief of staff. group (adviser for the group commander and To place 4-6 units under the command adviser for the artillery commander). of each army group.

2. To create a front headquarters headed by a commander of the front, a chief of staff and a member of the Military Council of the front.

The front headquarters should be created from [the facilities and personnel of] the General Staff.

3. To preserve the Ministry of National Defense, since it already exists only in a reduced form.

The Ministry's task should be the supply of combat troops with everything needed (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as well as the training of reserves, new troop formation and the organization of anti-aircraft defense for the northern part of the republic.

4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme Commander of troops. He agreed with our proposals.

The restructuring will proceed without harm to the military operations on the front.

He then asked our opinion about how best to arrange the disposition of commanding cadres.

From my part I proposed to appoint the following group commanders: Deputy Minister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left flank group, and for the commander of the right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (presently commanding an operational group). To appoint as commander of the front the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Industry, Kim Cha’ek (he knows military affairs, was a partisan and served in the Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man).

To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General Staff.

The Minister of National Defense will remain in his post. He will manage the formation of new units and the organization of anti-landing defense, and also supplying troops with everything needed.

They want this measure to be passed through the military committee on July 4 or 5. I judge that in this complicated situation

2. I ask your permission for the main military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go to Seoul with a group of officers, together with the staff of the front, and to be permanently located there with the staff.

3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the questions touched on.

No. 439/sh. 4.7.50.

SHTYKOV

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114]

18.5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the People's Republic of China [PRC] N.V. Roshchin)

Ciphered telegram No. 3172
Beijing. Soviet Ambassador.
To your No. 1112-1126.
Transmit to Zhou Enlai:

1. We agree with the opinion of the Chinese comrades regarding the mediation of India on the question of the entry of people's China into the membership of the UN.

2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units.

3. Your report about flights of Soviet planes over Manchurian territory is not confirmed. An order was given not to allow such flights.

No. 373/sh 5.7.50

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]

19. 6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678 Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov. To No. 439/sh

1. The arms will be sent through Manchuria, Andong, Singisiu.

2. Concerning the location of the chief military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it more useful for him to be in Pyongyang.

3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we consider that the main thing is not this but to fill out the existing divisions and to increase their strength approximately to 12,000. It is necessary to have attached to the divisions an apparatus for the formation of troops, which would receive the reinforcements, check and train them and after this, transfer them to reinforce the divisions. This is the main thing.

No. 374/sh 6.7.50

FYN-SI [Stalin]

copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116]

20.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26 Received 8.7.50 11:15

Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35. By telegraph.

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].

I received the following letter from KIM IL SUNG addressed to us.

"To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo Comrade Stalin, I.V.

I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.

Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the

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"1. The English have officially appealed Si (Stalin) to Shtykov
to us through their ambassador in Moscow
and declared that they, being bound by the
decision of the Security Council, cannot now
make proposals regarding a peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean question, but if the Ko-
rean People's Democratic Republic with-
draws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this
could hasten a peaceful resolution of the
Korean question.

8th Department of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh
Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.

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We consider such a demand by the English to be impertinent and unacceptable.

We intend to reply that the Korean question has become too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex question can be resolved only by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea in order to hear their opinion.

Communicate your views.

As regards the statement of the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to answer him, since they made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion, in which the Indian government is not involved.

2. It is not known to us whether you have decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision, then we are ready to send you a division of jet fighter planes-124 pieces for covering these troops.

We intend to train Chinese pilots in two to three months with the help of our pilots and then to transfer all equipment to your pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the aviation divisions in Shanghai.

Communicate your opinion."
Telegraph fulfillment.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118]. A copy of the telegram was sent to Shtykov in Pyongyang the same day (APRF, Fond 45, Delo 346, Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the section about the Indian ambassador. [AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, l. 153-154]

23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn

Advise the Koreans immediately to reply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie that the Korean army is strictly adhering to the Geneva convention with regard to prisoners, and [that they should] let the Koreans make a statement in the press exposing the slander of the American press regarding poor treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It would be good for someone among the prisoners to make a statement on the radio that the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is very good.

FYN-SI [Stalin]

No. 4.4781

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov. 13.7.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 148]

24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov)

To the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Comrade Shtykov, T.F.

I ask you to transmit to the Government of the USSR the following:

In connection with the appeal of the English to the Government of the USSR with a demand about the withdrawal of troops of the Korean People's Army to the 38th parallel, the Government of the DPRK considers, as does the Soviet Government, that such a demand of the English is impertinent and unacceptable.

We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Soviet Government that the Korean question [should be] discussed in the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China and with the summoning of representatives of Korea.

The Government of the DPRK [will take measures] quickly to clear the entire territory of Korea of American interventionists.

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK

Kim Il Sung.

14.7.50.

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