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infantry rose up and went on the attack in try Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, The first two days of military operations good spirits. In the first three hours indi- or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the have shown the following: vidual units and formations advanced from 3 mechanized brigade attacking through 1. The enemy is putting up resistance to 5 kilometers.

Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif. and while fighting is retreating deep into the The attack of the troops of the People's Conclusions regarding the North. territory of South Korea, mass taking of Army took the enemy completely by sur- It is necessary to note the following prisoners from the South Korean army has prise.

substantial insufficiencies in the operations not been noted. The enemy put up strong resistance only of the People's Army:

2. The South Korean puppet authorities in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. 1. With the beginning of military actions have begun to throw in troops from deep in The enemy began to put up a more organized and the forward advance of units and forma- the rear and are trying to halt the advance of resistance after 12:00 on the first day. tions, staff communication was lost from top the People's Army.

On the first day of battle the following to bottom. The general staff of the People's 3. In the first day the attack of the People's towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Army already on the first day did not direct Army caused confusion in the South. The Kaesong, Sinyuri—(map 1:1,000.000 pub- the battle, since it did not have firm commu- South Korean authorities and the ambassalished by the General Staff in 1943). nication with a single division.

dor of the USA personally in their radio In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. The commanders of units and forma- speeches called on the people of South Korea [People's Army] advanced 12 kilometers. tions are not trying to establish communica- to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean

On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 tions with the senior staff, command posts army is broadcasting false reports about the kilometers.

from combat level and higher change the successes of the South Korean army. On the very first day the DPRK navy senior staff without permission, the General SHTYKOV made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Staff still has not established communica- No. 358/sh Japan. The first landing party was in the tions with the brigade operating along the 26.6.50. Korio area and consisted of two battalions of eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Divinaval infantry and around a thousand parti- sion.

[Source: collection of Soviet military docusans. The second landing group was in the 2. The command staff of the KPA does ments obtained in 1994 by the British Broadregion of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 par- not have battle experience, after the with- casting Corporation for a BBC Time Watch tisans.

drawal of Soviet military advisers they orga- documentary titled Korea, Russia's Secret The landings took place at 5 hours 25 nized the battle command poorly, they use War,to be broadcast in the UK and the USA minutes and were carried out successfully. artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose in 1996]

The group of partisans took the city of communications. Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining 3. However, our military advisers note 15.1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si it.

great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in The landings were carried out with a People's army and a general aspiration to Pyongyang (Shtykov) battle between warships of the People's Army fulfill their allotted tasks. and ships of the South Korean army. As a 4. The political mood among the people 8th Department of the General Staff of the result of the battle one Southern trawler was of North Korea in relation to the beginning of Armed Forces of the USSR sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet military operations is characterized by a gen- Ciphered Telegram No. 34691/sh. had no losses.

eral enthusiasm, by faith in the government Pyongyang. Soviet Ambassador. On June 26 troops of the People's Army of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the 1. You do not report anything about continued the attack and, with fighting, ad- Korean People's Army.

what kind of plans the Korean command has. vanced deep into the territory of South Ko- On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an Does it intend to push on? Or has it decided

appeal to the Korean people in the name of to stop the advance. In our opinion the attack During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin the government of the DPRK, in which he absolutely mustcontinue and the sooner South peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were com- described the situation that has been created Korea is liberated the less chance there is for pletely cleared and units of the 6th division in the country and laid out the tasks for the intervention. made a forced crossing of the bay and took defeat of the enemy and the unification of 2. Communicate also how the Korean the populated point in the direction of Kimpo Korea.

leaders regard the attacks on North Korean airport.

5. The Command of the Korean People's territory by American planes. Are they not In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th Army is taking measures to put right the frightened or do they continue to hold firm[?] divisions took the cities of Bunsan and troop communications and the organization Does the Korean government intend to Tongducheb and the 2nd division took the of the battle command. To this end the Army make an open statement of protest against the provincial center Siunsen.

Command Post has been moved to the attacks and the military intervention? In our On the coast of the Sea of Japan the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of opinion, this should be done. advance has continued. The port of Tubuiri the General Staff and the main military ad- 4. [sic] We have decided to fulfill fully has been taken.

viser, along with a group of officers, will go by July 10 the Koreans' requests for delivery During the course of the day there has out to the Command Post.

of ammunition and other military equipbeen no communication with the 12th Infan- Conclusions regarding the South. ment. Report about this to KIM IL SUNG.


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conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential normalization of Sino-American relations, THE KOREAN WAR

part of a life-and-death confrontation be- and the declassification of new archival docu

tween the Communists on the one hand and mentation. Building on Whiting's thesis, by Chen Jian the "free world” on the other. 1

scholars paid more attention to Chinese Com

The North Korean invasion of the South, munist Party (CCP) leaders' concerns for In October 1950, one year after the as viewed by President Harry Truman—and China's national security as the decisive establishment of the People's Republic of many later students of the Korean War factor underlying their decision to enter the China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing represented the first step in a general Com- Korean War. They generally argued that leadership sent “Chinese People's Volun- munist plot to “pass from subversion” to Beijing did not welcome the Korean War teers” (CPV) to Korea to fight against United “armed invasion and war” in their scheme of because China faced difficult tasks of ecoNations forces moving rapidly toward the world conquest.2 Correspondingly,Beijing's nomic reconstruction and political consoliChinese-Korean border. Although China's entrance into the Korean War was regarded dation at home and gave priority to liberatintervention saved Kim Il Sung's North as an action subordinate to Moscow's overall ing Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of Korean Communist regime from imminent Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West these scholars stressed that Beijing's decicollapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing widely believed that Beijing's policy was sion to enter the Korean War was simply a leadership’s hopes of overwhelming the UN aggressive, violent, and irrational.

reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to forces. Therefore, when the Korean War In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his the physical security of Chinese territory. ended in July 1953, Korea's political map landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu, 3 And while most scholars believed that the remained virtually unchanged, while which has strongly influenced a whole gen- American decision to cross the 38th parallel America's military intervention in Korea eration of scholars. Using Western intelli- triggered China's intervention, some specuand China's rushing into a conflict with the gence sources and Chinese journal and news- lated that if UN forces had stopped at the United States finally buried any hope for a paper information, Whiting argued that un- parallel China would not have intervened.4 Sino-American accommodation, and the like the Soviet Union, Communist China had A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to Cold War in Asia entered a new stage char- not directly participated in the planning for share these assumptions, as can be seen in acterized by a total confrontation between the North Korean invasion of the South. Chinese publications on the “War to Resist the PRC and the United States that would After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whit- America and Assist Korea” that appeared in last nearly twenty years.

ing believed, Beijing tried to terminate the the 1980s.5 The newly established Chinese Com- conflict through political settlement, and only As a lecturer at Shanghai's East China

a munist regime faced enormous problems after the attempts for a political solution Normal University in the early 1980s and during its first year, including achieving failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in political consolidation, rebuilding a war- necessary military preparations in early Sep- the United States, I became increasingly shattered economy, and finishing reunifica- tember. Whiting emphasized that after the interested in the emergence of Sino-Amerition of the country. Why then did Mao Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing can confrontation in the late 1940s and early decide to assist North Korea in fighting a tried through both public and private chan- 1950s. In my study I too believed in the coalition composed of nearly all the West- nels to prevent UN forces from crossing the standard interpretation of China's reasons ern industrial powers? How was the deci- 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only for entering the Korean War. Not until sion made? What were the immediate and after all warnings had been ignored by Wash- 1988-1990, when the work on my dissertalong-range causes leading to Beijing's deci- ington and General Douglas MacArthur and tion led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I sion to enter the Korean War? Finally, was therefore, in the Beijing leadership’s view, begin to feel doubts. For example, to my there any opportunity that might have pre- the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was surprise, I found that early in August 1950, vented the direct confrontation between the severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded more than one month before the Inchon PRC and the United States? More than forty that Beijing's management of the Korean landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing lead

, years after the end of the Korean War, crisis was based primarily on the Chinese ership had been inclined to send troops to scholarly answers to these questions are still Communist perception of America's threat Korea, and China's military and political limited and remarkably inadequate. to China's national security. Lacking access preparations had begun even a month ear

In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly to Chinese archival materials, though, lier. I also found that the concerns behind the influenced by the intensifying Cold War, Whiting's study had to focus more on the decision to enter the Korean War went far generally viewed China's entrance into the analysis of the environment in which the beyond the defense of the safety of the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordi- Beijing leadership made their decision to go a

Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his associnated Communist plot of worldwide expan- to war than on a close examination of the ates aimed to win a glorious victory by sion, believing that the entire international decision-making process.

driving the Americans off the Korean peninCommunist movement was under the con- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more sula. It was no longer possible to accept the trol of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor critical perspective on the Sino-American well-established view of Chinese and AmeriPyongyang had the freedom to make their confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake can historians. own foreign policy decisions. The Korean of the American debacle in Vietnam, the

continued on page 85


FYN-SI (Stalin).

The leadership of the DPRK and the No. 362/sh

People's Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh.

( Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05 1.7.50

correctly evaluate the complicated military- Received 4.7.50 3:55

political situation in Korea, believe in full Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, victory and are directing all efforts toward a of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10 List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, subsequent broad attack on the south of Ko- To Comrade FYN-SI (Stalin). Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]

Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HONGYONG and PAK HON-YONG. 16.1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov understand the difficulties for Korea elicited At the beginning of the conversation to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on by the entrance of the Americans into the war KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the North Korea

against the DPRK and in connection with front. In his opinion the troops are moving

this they are taking the necessary measures to very slowly, especially in the Central direcCiphered telegram No. 405809

stabilize human and material resources for tion. The troop crossing was disorganized, From Pyongyang. Sent 2.7.50 04.00. the war.

although there was a minister in place there. Received 2.7.50 05.47.

KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the Sent to the 8th Administration of the General forming additional infantry, tank, and naval minister's) work. Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55 units and formations. They intend to intro- Further, noting the seriousness of the By wire.

duce universal military service in the DPRK. situation at the front and in the liberated Extremely Urgent.

However, some portion of the leading territories and the danger of landings by To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]

figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON American troops in the rear or at North To No. 362.

MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, I report about the political mood of the of conducting a war against the Americans he asked me to report to you his request for northerners in connection with the interven- with the forces of Korea and in a cautious quick delivery of arms in the following tion of the Americans.

way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh subWith the beginning of the successful SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on machine guns, 5,000 PPS [sub-machine military operations of the People's Army, this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG guns]; 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy and especially after the liberation of the city reported to me these facts, about a conversa- machine guns; 20082mm mortars; 78 120mm of Seoul, the mood of the population was tion of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 characterized by great general political en- KHI with KIM IL SUNG.)

122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti- aircraft thusiasm.

The rightist and centrist figures that are guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks. The population of the liberated regions entering the government of the DPRK are All these arms are needed for the formain the main greeted the People's Army warmly supporting all measures of the government, tion of two divisions, 12 battalions of maand in every way cooperated with the mea- but so far are not displaying the necessary rines and for the formation of security desures it took. Organs of power are being direction of activity in the mobilization of tachments. created everywhere—people's committees, their parties in the south of the country.

Because of American air attacks on the social-political organizations, they have re- I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that railroad stations in the region of Kanko, stored production and trade. At this time the government of the USSR has satisfied his Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an even the reactionary elements did not take request for arms and ammunition.

accelerated schedule through Manchuria action against the measures of the govern- The general situation in the KNP (Ko- [along the route of] Andong-Singisiu

ment of the DPRK and the People's Army. rean People's Republic, apparently a mis- Pyongyang.

The successful attack of the People's spelling of DPRK] continues to remain fa- He also communicated that they have Army activated the partisans, at present the vorable and makes it possible to continue the begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 partisan movement is developing widely in active offensive of the People's Army. tank brigades and that these need arms and the rear of the South Korean army. No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.

tanks. However, in connection with the wide- 1.7.50.

Further in the conversation he asked spread American propaganda over the radio, Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, advice about how better to organize troop which is directed against the DPRK, and the Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, command in the complicated situation. Since frequent attacks by American planes on popuFile of 8th Department.

the People's Army is fighting against Amerilation points, industrial and military sites in

can troops, he considers it necessary to North and South Korea, the political mood of (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, strengthen the leadership of the army.

(1 the population is somewhat worsening. Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Further he asked advice about how bet

Individual attitudes of lack of belief in 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110] ter to organize troop command and what kind the final victory have appeared, and in the

of organizational command structure to liberated regions a certain (small) portion of 17.4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov choose so that the General Staff is brought the population is taking a wait and see posi- to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il

closer to the troops. tion. Sung and Pak Hon-Yong

After consulting with General


VASILIEV we proposed the following struc- this measure will yield positive results. 19.6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si ture:

The staff of the front will move to Seoul (Stalin) to Shtykov 1. To create two army groups headed by in the near future. Military Councils composed of: a com- I ask your permission:

8th Department of the General Staff of the mander, a member of the Military Council

1. To have two advisers in every army Armed Forces of the USSR and a chief of staff.

group (adviser for the group commander and CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678 To place 4-6 units under the command adviser for the artillery commander). Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov. of each army group.

2. I ask your permission for the main To No. 439/sh 2. To create a front headquarters headed military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go 1. The arms will be sent through Manby a commander of the front, a chief of staff to Seoul with a group of officers, together churia, Andong, Singisiu. and a member of the Military Council of the with the staff of the front, and to be

perma- 2. Concerning the location of the chief front. nently located there with the staff.

military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it The front headquarters should be cre- 3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the more useful for him to be in Pyongyang. ated from [the facilities and personnel of] the questions touched on.

3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and General Staff.


other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 3. To preserve the Ministry of National No. 439/sh.

tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we conDefense, since it already exists only in a 4.7.50.

sider that the main thing is not this but to fill reduced form.

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, out the existing divisions and to increase The Ministry's task should be the sup- Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin.

their strength approximately to 12,000. It is ply of combat troops with everything needed

necessary to have attached to the divisions an (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, apparatus for the formation of troops, which well as the training of reserves, new troop Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis would receive the reinforcements, check and formation and the organization of anti-air- 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114] train them and after this, transfer them to craft defense for the northern part of the

reinforce the divisions. This is the main republic.

18.5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov thing. 4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou

FYN-SI (Stalin) Commander of troops. He agreed with our Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the No. 374/sh proposals.

People's Republic of China [PRC] N.V. 6.7.50 The restructuring will proceed without Roshchin)

copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin harm to the military operations on the front. He then asked our opinion about how Ciphered telegram No. 3172

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, best to arrange the disposition of command- Beijing. Soviet Ambassador.

List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, ing cadres.

To your No. 1112-1126.

Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116] From my part I proposed to appoint the Transmit to Zhou Enlai: following group commanders: Deputy Min- 1. We agree with the opinion of the 20.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov ister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left Chinese comrades regarding the mediation to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from flank group, and for the commander of the of India on the question of the entry of people's Kim Il Sung to Stalin right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of China into the membership of the UN. the General Staff (presently commanding an

2. We consider it correct to concentrate CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh operational group). To appoint as com- immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chi- From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26 mander of the front the Deputy Chairman of nese-Korean border for volunteer actions in Received 8.7.50 11:15 the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of North Korea in case the enemy crosses the Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff Industry, Kim Cha’ek (he knows military 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35. affairs, was a partisan and served in the for these units.

By telegraph. Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very 3. Your report about flights of Soviet

To Comrade FYN-SI (Stalin). strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man). planes over Manchurian territory is not con- I received the following letter from KIM

To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front firmed. An order was given not to allow such IL SUNG addressed to us. Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General flights.

“To the Chairman of the Council of Staff.


Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo ComThe Minister of National Defense will No. 373/sh

rade Stalin, I.V. remain in his post. He will manage the 5.7.50

I ask that you accept the expression of formation of new units and the organization Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluof anti-landing defense, and also supplying ,

able assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, troops with everything needed.

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, continually render to our people in their They want this measure to be passed List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, struggle for independence. through the military committee on July 4 or Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115]

Being confident of


desire to help 5. I judge that in this complicated situation

the Korean people rid themselves of the American imperialists, I am obliged to ap- “1. The English have officially appealed Si (Stalin) to Shtykov peal to you with a request to allow the use of to us through their ambassador in Moscow 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of and declared that they, being bound by the 8th Department of the General Staff of the the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of decision of the Security Council, cannot now Armed Forces of the USSR the 2nd Army Group, since the national mili- make proposals regarding a peaceful settle- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh tary cadres have not yet sufficiently mas- ment of the Korean question, but if the Ko- Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador. tered the art of commanding modern troops. rean People's Democratic Republic with- Advise the Koreans immediately to re

Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chair- draws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this ply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie man of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK. could hasten a peaceful resolution of the that the Korean army is strictly adhering to Pyongyang. 8 July 1950. Korean question.

the Geneva convention with regard to prisThe English ask the Soviet government oners, and [that they should] let the Koreans SHTYKOV to express its opinion.

make a statement in the press exposing the No. 481/sh

We consider such a demand by the En- slander of the American press regarding poor 8.7.50

glish to be impertinent and unacceptable. treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, We intend to reply that the Korean ques- would be good for someone among the prisMikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

tion has become too complicated after the oners to make a statement on the radio that

armed foreign intervention and that such a the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, complex question can be resolved only by very good. Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the Security Council with the participation of

FYN-SI (Stalin] 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151]

the USSR and China and with the summon- No. 4.4781

ing of representatives of Korea in order to Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov. 21.8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov hear their opinion.

13.7.50 (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin Communicate your views. in PRC transmitting message to Mao As regards the statement of the Indian (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Zedong

ambassador, we have decided not to answer List 148]

him, since they made it clear that his stateCIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231 ment is his personal opinion, in which the 24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador. Indian government is not involved.

Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov) Only by telegraph

2. It is not known to us whether you have Sent 18:40 8.7.50

decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on To the Extraordinary and PlenipotenDelivered 8.7.50

the border with Korea. If you have made tiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that such a decision, then we are ready to send Comrade Shtykov, T.F. the Koreans are complaining that there is no you a division of jet fighter planes—124 I ask you to transmit to the Government representative of CHINA in KOREA. A pieces for covering these troops.

of the USSR the following: representative should be sent soon, so that it We intend to train Chinese pilots in two In connection with the appeal of the will be possible to have communications and to three months with the help of our pilots English to the Government of the USSR with resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, and then to transfer all equipment to your a demand about the withdrawal of troops of MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the Korean People's Army to the 38th paralhave communications with KOREA. the aviation divisions in Shanghai.

lel, the Government of the DPRK considers, FILIPPOV [Stalin). Communicate your opinion.”

as does the Soviet Government, that such a No. 379/sh.

Telegraph fulfillment.

demand of the English is impertinent and Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov


unacceptable. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov

We are in full agreement with the opin(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331,

ion of the Soviet Government that the KoList 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, [

rean question [should be] discussed in the Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117]

List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Security Council with the participation of the

Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118). A copy of the USSR and China and with the summoning of 22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, telegram was sent to Shtykov in Pyongyang representatives of Korea. Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao the same day (APRF, Fond 45, Delo 346, The Government of the DPRK [will Zedong (via Roshchin)

Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to take measures] quickly to clear the entire

Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the territory of Korea of American interventionCIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305

section about the Indian ambassador. ists. BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph [AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 11, ll. 153-154]

the DPRK 13.7.50

Kim Il Sung. Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO

14.7.50. ZEDONG the following:

23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn

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