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SPECIAL

TOP PRIORITY

To Your No. 1503.

On the authorization of Filippov, transmit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we agree with the proposed procedure and time period for training Chinese pilots on jet planes.

Telegraph the fulfillment.
VYSHINSKY

25.VII.50

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 90]

26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962
Beijing

To Comrade Kotov
To No. 1726.

Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the reply to his telegram about military advisers. "To Comrade Zhou Enlai.

The Soviet Government has satisfied your request about sending Soviet military advisers-specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the Eastern and Northeastern military districts. 38 advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists in VVS.

As regards the remaining 26 advisers, we consider that there is no special need to send them, since the work of these advisers can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can advise the work of the Chiefs of the opera

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, List 94]

27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021 Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador. Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il Sung. If he demands it in written form-give it to him in written form, but without my signature.

1. The CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] salutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for the great liberational struggle of the Korean people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.

2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be embarrassed by the fact that he does not have solid successes in the war against the interventionists, that the successes are sometimes interrupted by delays in the advance or even by some local set-backs. In such a war continuous successes do not occur. The Russians also did not have continuous successes during the civil war and even more during the war with Germany. The greatest success of the Korean people is that Korea has now become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the movement in Asia for liberation from the imperialist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples will now learn from the Korean People's Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the Americans and to any imperialists. Moreover, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, who are rendering and will render it aid. The position of the Russians during the AngloFrench-American intervention in 1919 was several times worse than the position of the

Korean comrades at the present time.

3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on the front. It is necessary that each attack by the People's Army on any portion of the front begin with a number of decisive blows by attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that the fighter planes defend the troops of the Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, we can throw in additional assault aircraft and fighter aircraft for the Korean air force. FYN-SI [Stalin]

28 August 1950 No. 483/sh

Copy No. 1 To Stalin

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 155-156]

28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From Pyongyang. Sent 31.8.50 11:32
Received 31.8 17:27

Sent to the 8th Department of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35
By telegraph
FYN-SI [Stalin]

To No. 483/sh.

In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL SUNG listened to my communication and asked permission to write down its contents, which I dictated to him.

KIM IL SUNG received your letter very well, thanking you several times, underscoring that it is a very good letter.

Afterwards he asked my agreement to summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong and read him your telegram.

After exchanging opinions with Pak Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about whether he can bring it to the notice of the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Council] of the CC, in connection with which he underscored that this is a very important letter and he needs to communicate its contents since some members of the PolitSoviet are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful to them to know the contents of this letter.

I replied that if he considers this neces

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"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon commission of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor Party of Korea)

city of PYONGYANG

31.8.1950."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162]

30.13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III. From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 13.9. 13:15

Sent to the 8th Department of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22.
By telegraph.
Extremely urgent.
Moscow-Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the [UN] General Assembly, we consider it advisable to recommend to the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to send a statement to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which, on the basis of documents found in the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Korean] government, to show how the clique of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack on the north, to set forth once again the position of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on the question of the illegality of the American intervention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric acts of the American armed forces in Korea and to demand the adoption of measures for the immediate cessation of the American intervention and the withdrawal from Korea of the troops of the foreign interventionists.

In addition to this statement [we advise] to send to the General Assembly and the Security Council photocopies of the documents to which reference will be made in the statement of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

In such case as you agree to this proposal, we ask you to communicate when it would be convenient to send such a statement.

We would consider it advisable also to inform the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about the position which the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly will take on the Korean question. We ask your orders. SHTYKOV

No. 1154/sh.

13 September of this year

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,

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353. Your proposal about the inadvisability of supporting in the General Assembly the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, which is using Japanese in the aggressive war against the Korean people, we consider incorrect. A statement by the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly with a declaration of support for the accusation made by the government of the DPRK against the USA, cannot weaken our position with regard to this question in the Far Eastern Commission. Therefore it is necessary for you to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the Americans of Japanese servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts brought forth in the statement of Pak HonYong, in one of your next speeches in the

General Assembly at an appropriate moment, according to your discretion.

We are simultaneously giving an order to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far Eastern Commission] to make a corresponding statement on this question and to support the protest of the government of the DPRK against the use by the United States of Japanese in military operations in Korea.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO

To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78 TOP SECRET

Attachment 2

WASHINGTON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

It is necessary for you the make the following statement at the next meeting of the Far Eastern Commission:

"As is known, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the chairman of the General Assembly and to the chairman of the Security Council a protest against the use of Japanese servicemen in military actions in Korea. In this protest it is shown that in the fundamental facts found in the decree of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, it is established that Japanese servicemen participated in battles in the area of Seoul together with American troops, that one Japanese company participated in battles in the area of Chkholvon and that a significant number of Japanese are found in the 7th and 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.

The use by the United States of Japanese servicemen in military operations in Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam declaration, and also of section III of the resolution of the Far Eastern Commission "Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after Capitulation" of June 19, 1947, and the resolution adopted on the basis of this document "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equipment" of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam declaration and aforementioned resolution of the Far Eastern Commission provide for the full disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, forbid the reestablishment or possession of any kind of Japanese military formations.

The Soviet delegation supports the protest of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic against the use by the

USA of Japanese servicemen in the war against the Korean people. The Soviet delegation considers that the Far Eastern Commission must not disregard the aforementioned facts, which testify to the direct violation of the agreed-upon decision on the demilitarization of Japan."

Give the statement to the press.
A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]

32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via Roshchin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From Beijing Received 19 hours 50 minutes 28.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

27 October I received the following telegram from Mao Zedong addressed to you: "Comrade Filippov!

In connection with the military situation that has developed in China at the present time, we urgently need to acquire from the Soviet Union the following armaments for the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress artillery and torpedo bomber planes.

I therefore intend to send immediately to Moscow by plane the commander of the navy Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Comrade Kuz'min in order to conduct negotiations with the responsible comrades of the Soviet Navy on the question of the request for the above mentioned arms and on the question of the construction of the Chinese navy in the future.

Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, two other comrades from the navy administration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy chief of the rear administration of the navy Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Moscow].

I ask you to review the aforementioned and give me a corresponding reply.

MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950."

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You request that our officers and advisers remain in the disposition of the [North] Koreans for the formation of Korean divisions. Such a point of view of yours is well known to us. But we do not know the points of view of the [North] Korean government, we do not know whether it wishes to have Soviet officers and advisers in the future or prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not communicated the point of view of the Korean government on this subject. We cannot impose our advisers and officers on the Korean government. Let KIM IL SUNG communicate his point of view regarding this. FYN SI [STALIN]

1 November 1950

Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the General Staff to Shtykov

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,

List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161]

35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military representative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin)

Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, Lomov From Beijing 15 hours 30 minutes 2.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY E
FYN SI [Stalin]

To No. 5228 of 2.11.50

I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, adviser to the Korean air force, I have obtained the following specific information:

1. By the first of November a regiment was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are located in An'dun.

2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes of this regiment went into battle for the first time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were downed. Two Yak-9's did not return from the battle.

The first report from comrade Belov to me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU was thus imprecise.

The losses relate to a battle in the region of ANSIU.

3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in MIG-15's and two planes were downed by anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were downed].

We had no losses in the air battle. 4. MIG-15's of Comrade Belov flew from airbases at MUKDEN and AN'SHAN'. In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport.

5. At present there are 16 battle [as opposed to training] Yak-9's at the airbase at ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is possible to restore them. In addition, 2 planes were lost while patrolling.

In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not return from the region of ANSIU.

In addition to the Yak-9's there are:

a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully combat ready and are carrying out night missions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during landings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 planes were lost while on missions.

b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to now there are no planes for them

6. The command of the mixed air division of Koreans in ANDONG has been formed. It is headed by General LI FART. 7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about the possibility of receiving 25 Il-10 planes and 10 PO-2 planes.

No. 2702 2.11.50

[S.E.] ZAKHAROV

Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade Zakharov about the fact that there are discrepancies between his report and Belov's report about the air battle in the region of Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this discrepancy and report about the participation of Korean planes in battles and about the fact that two of them did not return.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188]

36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov)Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 min

utes 8.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] In view of the fact that the infantry arms of the People's Liberation Army are mainly trophies captured from the enemy, there is a great variety in the calibers of the rifles.

Such a situation creates great difficulty for the manufacture of ammunition, and in particular for the production of rifle and machine gun cartridges, especially as our factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.

At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions of the twelve armies, which are taking

part in military operations in KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In the future, in connection with the development of military operations, we will have a very great need to supply the army with ammunition. If there is no change in military production, then the rearmament can be begun in the second half of 1951.

For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question of the possibility of the delivery of small arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February 1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces): 1. Soviet rifles 140,000.

2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000. 3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000. 4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.

5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000. 6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.

7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000. 8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.

9. Pilots' handguns 1,000.

10. Cartridges for pilots' handguns 100,000.

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR For transmission to Zhou Enlai. I have received your telegram with the request for a consultation on the question of the participation of China in the [UN] Security Council.

In our opinion two variants are possible.

The first variant [is] to refuse to accept the invitation in the manner in which it was formulated in the Security Council. Motives: the invitation deprives the Chinese people's republic of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most urgent questions of China, in particular the question of the military intervention in Korea and the question of the seizure of Taiwan by the United States of America, its right being limited only to the review of the report of MacArthur.

The second variant [is] to accept the invitation and to commission the Chinese delegation to make a statement in the Security Council on all the abovementioned questions, turning the discussion of the question into an indictment of the USA. If they do not allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out its position, the Chinese delegation will walk out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even one report of MacArthur.

It seems to us that the first variant is more advisable.

You should not connect yourself to the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council, where he voted for the resolution of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, especially since, speaking between us, Soviet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an instruction to vote for the English resolution, but had a direct directive to put in a veto if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik apparently was carried away by the fact that he had nevertheless forced the Americans to vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not take into account that the form of the invitation adopted by the Security Council would place China in a disadvantageous position. Telegraph the fulfillment. A. GROMYKO

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, Listy 4-5]

38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Zakharov

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901. Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin,

Khrushchev.

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev

From Beijing Received 20 hours 15 minutes 16.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

At present the number of our troops operating in Korea has increased from 18 (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. Moreover we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies

From Beijing Received 06 hours 10 minutes in reserve. In connection with this, transport 16.11.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV:

I fully agree with your proposal to reinforce Belov's aviation force by an additional delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) pieces and to create a command apparatus for the air corps.

As concerns questions regarding the airports in MANCHURIA and the strengthening of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] measures, we will resolve them together with comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV.

I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for the heroism and effort they have displayed in battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 days they downed 23 invading American planes. I think that this is worth reporting to planes. I think that this is worth reporting to you.

I congratulate you on the successes!
MAO ZEDONG.

Nov 15, 1950.

NEW PARAGRAPH.

To Comrade FILIPPOV. I report.

is faced with very large tasks. With regard to automobiles, we have already received agreement from the Government of the Soviet Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles before December 15.

It is necessary that we urgently resolve the question of gasoline and lubricant. I ask you to confirm the delivery of gasoline and lubricant in the quantity indicated below:

1. New request: 10 thousand tons of gasoline, 2720 barrels (capacity of 53 gallons, the same as below) of lubricating oil for diesel engines, transmission oil 220 barrels, brake oil 1 10 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 144 barrels.

2. I ask you to ship the following oils on the oil quota agreed upon in the request made by the Ministry of Trade of the Chinese People's Republic to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR: gasoline 7000 tons, diesel lubricant 2380 barrels, transmission oil 190 barrels, brake oil 95 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 126 barrels.

3. The total quantity of various oils (1 and 2), which we must acquire from the Soviet Union: gasoline 17,000 tons, diesel lubricant 5100 barrels, transmission oil 410

Your telegram was communicated at 20 barrels, brake oil 205 barrels, yellow oil hours 30 minutes local time 15.11. ZAKHAROV

No. 2910 16.11

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189]

39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935

(Grease) 270 barrels.

I ask you to deliver the first half (50%) of the aforementioned gasoline and oil by the end of December, and the second half (50%) by 20 January 1951.

Will this be subject to regulations?
We await your answer.
With bolshevik greetings.
ZHOU ENLAI

No. 2917 14/16.11.50

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 117-118]

40.17 November 1950, ciphered telegram,

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