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Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev

From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes 17.11.1950

EXTREMELY URGENT T To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] According to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are experiencing hunger and cold.

A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subjected to bombardment by enemy planes every day.

The river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will have an influence on the next stage of the fulfillment of the operation.

In view of this, besides the mobilization of all automobiles in Manchuria that could be mobilized on the front, we can mobilize a maximum of 200 automobiles from Northern China and immediately send them to the front to relieve the difficult situation.

I earnestly ask you to give a command to the commander of the Soviet Army on the Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500 automobiles for our army. These 500 automobiles will be reimbursed on the account of the portion which you promised to send from 25.11 to 25.12, numbering 3,000 automobiles.

Can you satisfy my request? I await your swift reply.

With bolshevik greetings.

No. 2933

17.11 10:00

ZHOU ENLAI

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 122-123]

41.17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5708
BEIJING

To Comrade Zakharov
For Comrade Zhou Enlai

I received the telegram with the request for urgent delivery of 500 automobiles. Your request will be satisfied by us. In order to speed up the transfer of the automobiles to you, having in mind to give you new automobiles, orders have been given to our military command not to give you old automobiles from Port Arthur, but to send new automobiles to the Manchuria [railway] station and to transfer 140 automobiles to Chinese representatives on 20 November and 355 automobiles on 25-26 November.

We will speed up the shipment of the remaining automobiles and another 1,000 automobiles will arrive at the Manchurian station before 5 December.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

17 November 1950

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, List 124]

42. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Gromyko transmitting 16 November 1950 message from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600742/III From CORRESPONDENT 13 Sent 17.11.50 Received 18.11 4:03-19:35

Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces USSR 18.114:20-19:50 By telegraph

extremely urgent

To Comrade GROMYKO

I transmit a note I received from the Korean government with the following contents:

"TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR Comrade STALIN I.V.

For preparation of pilot cadres needed for the forthcoming offensive operations against the American troops I ask you, Comrade STALIN, to allow:

1) The preparation of 200-300 pilots on the territory of the Soviet Union from among Korean students sent to the USSR for educa

tion.

2) The preparation of pilots for two regiments of jet planes and one regiment of bombers from among the 119 pilots of the Korean People's Army who are being trained on the territory of the Soviet Union.

3) The dispatch to the Soviet Union of 120 men for the preparation of aviation technicians and 30 crew members for attack planes which we ourselves are not in a position to prepare.

4) By January 1 to send an additional 170 Korean pilots to the Soviet Union for flight training, who will have completed theoretical preparation by that time.

I hope that you, comrade STALIN, will assist us in the resolution of these questions. With respect KIM IL SUNG

16.11.50"

No. 15 T. SHTYKOV 17.11.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, Gromyko, file of 8th Dept. of General Staff of Armed Forces

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 88-89 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 180-181]

43.20 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)

8th Department of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75835
To Comrade SHTYKOV

for Comrade KIM IL SUNG

I have received your telegram about the preparation of pilot cadres after a delay which was the fault of the Soviet apparatus.

In the opinion of our military this question is more expediently resolved in the following manner:

1. To organize the preparation of 200300 pilots from Korean students, in the flight school already existing in YANTSZY on the territory of MANCHURIA. An additional contingent of Soviet instructors will be given for this.

2. The preparation of pilots for two jet fighter regiments can be organized at one of our jet divisions of MIG-15's located in MANCHURIA. After the preparation of the pilots, the appropriate number of MIG-15 planes will be delivered.

With regard to the preparation of pilots for one bomber regiment, it is more convenient to prepare them in the Korean school we have in the Far East Maritime Region. The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber regiment, will also be given.

3. We agree to accept an additional 120 men in the Korean pilot school that we have in the Far East Maritime Region, to train them as technicians and crew for attack planes.

4. It is better that the Korean pilots receive flight training in the place where they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in our Maritime Region.

If you agree with these proposals, corresponding orders will be given to our military command.

No. 4/7556

FYN SI [Stalin].

20 November 1950 Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 90-91 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 165-166]

44.22 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Fyn Si (Stalin) via Shtykov

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600782/sh From CORRESPONDENT No. 18 Sent 22.11.50 6:30 Received 22.11 9:55 Sent to 8th Department of General Staff of Armed Forces 22.11 10:02

By telegram

Extremely urgent

To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin].

I transmit the letter I received from KIM IL SUNG addressed to you with the following contents:

"To Comrade FYN SI

I received your telegram of 20.11.50 about the preparation of pilot cadres. We fully agree with your opinions.

Accept, Comrade FYN SI, our deepest gratitude for your tireless assistance to the Korean people in its struggle for its independence.

Yours truly - KIM IL SUNG 21.11.50"
SHTYKOV

No. 35

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File of 8th Department

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182]

45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR
To transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram No. 3153. I thank you for the information about the state of affairs in China, in connection with the successful offensive of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Korea.

Your successes gladden not only me and my comrades in the leadership, but also all Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the soul you and your friends in the leadership, the People's Liberation Army of China and the entire Chinese people in connection with these enormous successes in their struggle against the American troops.

I have no doubt that in the war against the up-to-date and well-armed American army the Chinese army will receive great experience in contemporary warfare and will turn itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in the struggle with the first-class-armed German army received experience in contemporary warfare and turned into an up-to-date well-equipped army.

I wish you further successes.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1 December 1950

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802. We are answering point by point.

Regarding point one. We agree with your proposal. However, you should not make the stipulations you proposed, that the Assembly has the right to review a question of aggression if the Security Council turns out not to be in a condition to fulfill its obligation regarding supporting peace. Such a stipulation would mean that we recognize as having legal force the resolution of November 3, which the Soviet delegation declared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Charter.

Regarding point two. We agree with your proposal. As for the invitation to a representative of the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly, do not introduce a proposal about the invitation before you receive from us an additional order, which we will give after the government of the PRC makes it clear whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Regarding point three. We agree with your proposal.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO

Peking

TOP SECRET

Attachment 2

to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79

Soviet Ambassador

Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and communicate to him the following.

According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce into discussion at the [UN General] Assembly a question under the heading "The Intervention in Korea of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Repub

lic.'

The Soviet delegation will express opposition to the inclusion of this question on the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the Soviet Government needs to know the opin

ion of the government of the Chinese People's Republic-whether it considers it advisable for its representative to participate in the discussion of the question raised by the Americans in the General Assembly. If Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the Soviet Government is on this question, you should answer that in this case, as well as in the case of the discussion of MacArthur's report in the Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it more advisable that the Chinese government not take part in the discussion of this question in the General Assembly.

Telegraph the results.

A. Gromyko

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6]

47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Copying Prohibited

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin,
Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Copy.
From Beijing No. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes
7/XII 1950

Special Nos. 2522, 2523
TOP PRIORITY

SPECIAL

On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office] and transmitted the following in the name of the Chinese government:

At Lake Success representatives from India, England, Sweden and the general secretary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently appealed several times to the representative of the Chinese people's republic [General] Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions it is possible to end the military operations in Korea.

Their aspirations are to hold the position in Korea at the 38th parallel.

Not wishing to put ourselves in a disadvantageous position and having the goal of holding the initiative in our hands and also showing assertiveness on this question, the government of the Chinese people's republic intends to give the following instruction to Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representa

Lie:

"Military operations in Korea will be ended under the following conditions:

1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

2. The withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan strait and from the territory of Taiwan.

3. The Korean question must be resolved by the Korean people themselves.

4. The participation of a representative of the Chinese people's republic in the UN and the exclusion from the UN of a representative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].

5. Convening a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the four great powers for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.

6. If the five aforementioned conditions for the cessation of military operations are accepted, the five great powers can send their representatives to convene a conference for signing the conditions of an armistice."

Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated conditions in written form.

Further, Zhou stated that before sending the present conditions for cessation of military operations in Korea, the Chinese government wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult with the government of the USSR and asks the Soviet government to express its opinion on this question.

Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to transmit to the Soviet government that the Chinese government wishes to receive an answer today.

I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was communicated by him: the report, the conditions for ceasefire in Korea and the request for an answer will be immediately brought before the government of the USSR.

7.XII.50 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 17-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 193-195]

48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko.

7 December 1950.

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No. 825. Your proposal about the cessation of military activity in Korea we consider incorrect in the present situation, when American troops are suffering defeat and when the Americans more and more often are advancing a proposal about a cessation of military operations in Korea, in order to win time and prevent the complete defeat of the American troops.

The draft of the Soviet delegation should include the following:

1. The immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

2. The resolution of the Korean question must be left to the Korean people themselves.

The text of your preamble does not elicit objections.

By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. Gromyko

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Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting that without the satisfaction of these condi

tions military activity cannot be ceased. In addition, we consider that you should not be too open and show all your cards too early before the representatives of the three states, who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. We think that the time has not arrived for China to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could use China's five conditions to box us on the ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not necessary to give this advantage to the USA.

We therefore think that it is possible at the present time to limit oneself to the following:

1. The Chinese Central People's Government along with you, gentlemen delegates of England, Sweden, India would welcome the soonest possible conclusion of the military actions in Korea. China is applying all its strength in order to conclude quickly the military activity forced on Korea and China.

2. Therefore, we would like to know the opinion of the UN and the USA with regard to conditions for an armistice. As far as we know, you have not been commissioned by the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, the delegation from England together with the delegation from the USA, France, Norway, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced into the First Committee [of the General Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemning China, thereby hindering the matter of a settlement of the Korean question.

3. In view of this we will eagerly await the opinion of the UN and USA about the conditions for a cessation of military actions in Korea.

7/XII-50

FILIPPOV [Stalin]." Telegraph the fulfillment. GROMYKO.

Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197]

50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 4 January 1951 message from Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak II U to Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 minutes 8.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T.
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of the telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak Il U, sent 24:00 4.1 [January 4].

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it:

"To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We are simultaneously sending a copy to the commanders of the corps and army Comrades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast.

1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry division and a unit of troops from the 117th infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units of our 66th army.

The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen and to areas further south.

It is supposed that the next attempt by enemy troops will be the defense of the river, which is beginning in the area of Chemul' po [Inchon], Kimpo, Iokhei, and is going on along the south bank of the Kanko river, through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio.

It is possible that the enemy, regrouping behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko river and the mountainous areas, will gather the remnants of its forces, gain time and make preparations for new military operations.

Another possibility is that, in case of further more powerful strikes by our troops, the enemy will withdraw to the south.

2. If we give the enemy the possibility to continue to occupy defensive positions along the south bank of the river Kanko, to control the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at Chemul❜po for supply, then although Seoul will be in our hands, it will be under constant threat from enemy air force and artillery, which will be extremely disadvantageous for preparing our troops for a spring offensive.

If, in the presence of success, our troops make one more effort and destroy another unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to retreat from the south bank of the Kanko river, then we not only will be able to take the

Kimpo airport and control the port of Chemul❜po, but this will create more advantageous conditions for the preparation of our troops for a spring offensive.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals the following plan has been worked

out:

a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the People's Army for garrison duty in the city of Seoul.

The main forces of the corps will be deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, Dzinsori, Mokudo.

After rest and regrouping, in three days they must prepare to make a forced crossing of the Kanko river and at the appropriate moment occupy the Kimpo airport, Chemul' po port and consolidate themselves there.

b) Troops of the left column as before are under the unified command of Khan' Sian'-chu.

The 50th army will continue to advance in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriudo and the area to the northwest of these points. It will send out immediately a strong detachment to control the bridge across the Kanko river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river). This detachment will find out what the situation is, make active preparations for a forced crossing of the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the south bank and continue to carry out the battle in cooperation with the main forces.

If the enemy continues to withdraw to the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further orders.

The line of delimitation between the 50th army and the 1st corps of the People's Army runs through Kokusekiri, Riuzan, Kasaivairi. The line itself and the areas to the west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps. The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put themselves in order, rest for three days (until 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced crossing of the Khokukan-ko river above and below Seisen. They will first strike the enemy in the area of Iuokhei, after which they will develop an offensive along a line from the southeast to the northwest on the enemy positions in the area of Risen, Kosiu, Suien, Eitokho.

A detailed plan is being worked out by Comrade Hun Xianchu.

c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the People's Army under the unified command of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint forces plan established earlier, must destroy the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Odzio, and afterwards await further orders.

All the aforementioned troops must send spies and outposts toward the enemy troops located in front of the frontline.

When the troops of the right column begin a new offensive these units must be ready to render assistance. Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, Pak Il U. 24:00 4.1."

With bolshevik greetings.

No. 103

7.1.51.

MAO ZEDONG.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Listy 88-90]

51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram,

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Copy.

From BEIJING No. 1309 20 hours 05 minutes, 13.1.1951

Special No. 62
SPECIAL

TOP PRIORITY

Your order No. 48 has been fulfilled. Zhou Enlai asked to give great thanks to comrade Filippov for the advice and consultation. Further he stated that the Korean comrades will be informed. In addition, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai with a request to come to Beijing for a short time to discuss a number of questions. During their time in Beijing Mao Zedong will also talk over with Kim Il Sung the questions touched on in the memorandum.

13.1.51 ROSHCHIN Spravka: no. 48 (from no. 837) of Jan 13, 1950. Vyshinsky proposed to visit Zhou

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