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Enlai and transmit to him Filippov's telegram regarding the memorandum of the Chinese government.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 122 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 13]

53. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15607 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Vasilevsky, Men'shikov

From BEIJING Received 14 hours 30 minutes 16.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] 1. I received your telegram of 4.1.51. I fully agree with all the arrangements contained in your telegram. I thank you and the Soviet Government for the assistance you are rendering to us.

goods ordered in the requests have been sent only in part? Will this difference be covered in 1951? I ask you to communicate about this.

4. That you have established the amounts of military credit for 1951 is very good. As soon as we sort out the first two requests we will make an application for military goods for 1951, with a careful calculation of the cost of this military hardware, so that the total sum will not exceed the amount of 400,000,000 rubles established by you, so that the Soviet rubles established by you, so that the Soviet government will not be burdened by the fulfillment of our military applications.

5. I thank you for your decision about the delivery of railway equipment as a part of the military credit in accordance with the agreement on military credit, with a reduction of 25% of the cost of this equipment.

6. We agree that 5,000 automobiles delivered to us in 1950 and 12,000 automobiles which will be delivered in 1951 should be paid through trade exchange. I hope that you will review my request and communicate an answer about the delivery ahead of time of the answer about the delivery ahead of time of the remaining 12,000 automobiles for satisfying

2. We have studied the draft agreement the needs of the front. on military credit.

We fully agree with the draft of this agreement, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd points of the third article, to which were introduced changes on the basis of your telegram of 4.1 of this year, about which we requested Comrade Zakharov to inform you.

With regard to the signing of this agreement, Comrade Zhou Enlai will resolve this question together with Comrade Zakharov.

3. You communicated in your telegram that in the first nine and a half months of 1950 the USSR has agreed, in accordance with the agreement on credit of 14.2.1950, to deliver to China military goods in the amount of 140 million rubles.

Not long ago Comrade Wang Jia-xiang brought the requests of February and May for military goods that he received from the military-engineering administration of MVT to the general sum of 237,548,103.64 rubles, of which the request for February is 114,415,274.67 rubles and for May 123,132,828.97 rubles.

Thus, the total value of the military goods delivered, contained in our telegram, is 97,500,000 rubles less than the value of the military goods in the February and May requests.

Should it be considered that the military

7. I ask you to communicate to us whether gasoline and aviation fuel, for military purposes, included in the application for military poses, included in the application for military equipment sent after 19.10.1950, will be included in the military equipment stipulated by the agreement on military credit. Is the agreement on military equipment applicable to the aforementioned gasoline?

No. 262 14.1.51

With bolshevik greetings! MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, delo 337, Listy 4-5]

54. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting 14 January 1951 message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15603 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov From BEIJING Received 14 hours 45 minutes 16.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin].

I send you a copy of my telegram of 14 January 1951 to Comrade Peng Dehuai for transmission to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: "To Comrade Peng Dehuai. I ask that the contents of this telegram be transmitted to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The approximately 100,000 Korean recruits being trained in Northeast China must be incorporated into various corps of the People's Army in the next 2-3 months, in the period of rest and reformation, so that the companies in all divisions of the People's Army will be fully manned. There must be more than 100 men in each company and 10,000 - 15,000 men in each division.

In the Korean army there are too many units of the division and brigade type. It is necessary that all personnel be consolidated into fifteen divisions (approximately) and Soviet arms be apportioned to them so that these Korean divisions, cooperating with the Chinese volunteers, provide major support to them during the spring offensive (April May), with the goal of finally resolving the South Korean question.

In the next two to three months the Chinese volunteers and the Korean troops must carry out serious and major work, in particular to replenish the troops with newly trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly trained soldiers imitate the experience of the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armaments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store food and ammunition, to improve the work of transport and the rear service. Carrying out this work can secure the final victory. It is possible that the enemy command will have two variants for conducting subsequent military operations:

1. Under pressure from Chinese and North Korean troops the enemy will make insignificant resistance and then withdraw from Korea. If this happens, it will be the result of our carrying out thorough preparations, because the enemy, having received information about the preparation work being carried out, will be convinced that our military forces have grown even greater, and therefore, fearing difficulty, he will withdraw from Korea.

2. The enemy will make stubborn resistance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he becomes convinced of the uselessness of resistance, and then he will withdraw from South Korea.

If this happens, it is necessary for us to

carry out good preparation so that it will be possible to continue to fight. In the opposite case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by the Korean troops in the period from June to September 1950.

But it is also possible that objective causes will force us to make a single operation in February, after which again to continue the respite and reformation for the purpose of completing the necessary preparation for the next operation. This also must be taken into account. However, if this does not happen, then conducting the last decisive operation after finishing the necessary preparation in two-three months, which was discussed above, will be necessary and practicable.

Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparation.

comrades think that it is not possible to pursue the retreating American and puppet [South Korea] troops with the forces of the Korean People's Army alone. This would also take on an adventuristic character.

They stated that the Politburo regards as correct the proposal made from my side about the necessity of conducting rest and reformation for two months in order to make a forward advance cautiously, without hurrying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG had his own opinion, after the second elucidation I made on 17 January, about the positive and negative sides of a risky forward advance without carrying out preparation and a cautious forward advance with advance preparation, he was satisfied.

The Soviet adviser also agreed that the next operation is decisive, therefore with the approval of the Politburo of the Korean Work

I ask you to communicate your opinion. ers' party, it will be conducted better. MAO ZEDONG."

[blocks in formation]

2. The question of the defense of the sea

coast.

Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade RAZUVAEV put forth the following opinions: 26 brigade will be based in TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in Listy 1-3]

55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il Sung

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 minutes 27.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
I send you a copy of the telegram from
Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January
1951.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it.
"To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.
Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG.

I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL SUNG's in the evening on 16 January 1951 and returned on the evening of 18 January 1951.

I report about the results of our meeting: 1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his

BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These brigades will occupy by battalion, portions of the defense along the western and eastern sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 men, and moreover their combat capability is not high.

In addition to this, three newly organized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. No decision was made about which units to leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL'PO. They also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volunteers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to leave one army, which will be located in TET-SUGEN.

1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank and other mines have been received from the USSR. So far a decision was made to use 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast and to place the sea mines in the most important ports. The task of defending the sea coast to the south of the SUIGENSANSIOKU line was assigned to the forward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, which is located in the area of SINGISIU, they asked to assign to troops VO of northeast CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for

this). In the main I agreed with the aforementioned plan for the defense of the sea coast. I ask you to review.

3. The question of restaffing five corps. It was decided that each corps must be composed of three divisions. At present, all five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, have 4-5 divisions. However, these divisions are not fully manned, there are 3,0004,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each corps fill out three divisions using the fourth division of the corps. In this way each division can be brought to an average of 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to apportion 20,000 men per five armies from among the South Korean prisoners, but they did not agree with me.

With regard to my proposal to fill out the existing corps with the newly organized three corps, they did not agree with this. Although such a proposal was advanced by me, I considered it awkward to defend it further. They are planning the participation in the next operations of three of their corps.

4. A sufficient number of cadres were not prepared for carrying out work in the newly liberated regions.

SEOUL earlier had a population of 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. There are great difficulties with food and fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees and the unemployed. There is only just enough food for the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the regions to the west of KAIDZIO and to the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which have even seized some locations. We agreed to send one regiment and four battalions from the People's Army to destroy these gangs. In addition it was decided to send one division from the 39th corps to the region to the west of the RINSINKO river to assist. Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we will be able to receive several dozen tons of food.

Agreement in principle was obtained from our side in the discussion of such questions as: fortifying the areas under control; demoralization of the enemy-for example preparation for the spring planting in Northern KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial restoration of production in several factories; developing a political offensive in the areas temporarily occupied by the American and puppet [South Korean] troops; creation of armed detachments which will include

party and administrative workers and leaders of mass organizations which will penetrate the enemy's rear, where under the cover of armed units of the detachment they will carry out organizational work in the locality; the combination of legal and illegal forms of struggle; striking a blow at the most reactionary elements; assistance to the progressive elements; attracting to their side the intermediate elements; and also all methods of carrying out these measures. However, in the future it will be clearer how to begin the organization of the implementation of these measures resolutely and with the correct placement of cadres.

PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51."
With bolshevik greetings!

No. 449 26.1.51

MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 37-40]

56. 29 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16052 Copies: Stalin (2) From BEIJING Received 18 hours 40 minutes 29.1.1951

EXTREMELY URGENT T To FILIPPOV [Stalin] At the present time the American troops are trying to attack the regions of the southern bank of the Kanko river adjacent to Seoul and Chemul' po [Inchon]. Such a situation has developed that our troops are deprived of the possibility of continuing rest and reformation and are forced immediately to begin preparation for the fourth operation. I send you my telegram of 28.1.51, addressed to Comrade PENG DEHUAI.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and communicate your opinion about whether this is advisable from the point of view of the international situation:

"Comrade PENG DEHUAI!

1. I received your telegram of 27.1.51, 24:00, and your order about preparation for conducting military operations sent to all armies.

2. Our troops must immediately conduct preparations for the fourth operation, with the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 American and puppet [South Korean] troops and the occupation of the area to the north of the Taiden-Anto boundary.

3. In the course of the preparation for this operation it is necessary to hold Chemul' po, the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river and the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region. After the beginning of the operation the main forces of the North Korean and Chinese troops must break through the enemy's line of defense in the region of Gensiu and make attacks in the direction toward Eisiu and Anto.

4. The withdrawal of Chinese and North Korean troops for 15-30 km to the north and the publication of a communication about support for the proposal about a temporary ceasefire is disadvantageous for us, since the enemy precisely wishes to cease military operations only at the time when our troops withdraw some distance to the north and in order that he (the enemy) can blockade the Kanko river.

5. After the conclusion of the fourth operation, it is possible that the enemy will conduct peace negotiations with us regarding a resolution of the Korean question. Conducting negotiations will then be advantageous for China and Korea. However, the enemy at present is calculating to return the fortification before the bridge on the south bank of the Kanko river, to the south of the line Seoul-Chemul' po and to blockade the Kanko river, so that Seoul would be under threat of shelling from enemy artillery, so as thereby to force us to cease military operations and begin peace negotiations. In this way the enemy wants to place China and Korea in a disadvantageous position, which we can in no case allow.

6. Our troops have not been able to receive reinforcements. Transporting troops is also inadequate. We have a very great difficulty in this regard. However, we are in a position to concentrate the main forces and with a strike in the direction of Gensiu-Eisiu destroy a unit of American troops and four to five divisions of South Korean troops.

I ask you explain this to a meeting of the high command. This meeting must be completely directed to the preparation of the fourth operation.

7. After the Chinese and Korean troops occupy the region to the north of the TaidenAnto boundary, they must again make a two to three months long preparation, after which to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of decisive significance. This is advantageous in all respects.

8. The ninth army group must in the near future be redeployed to the region of Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul❜po, Suigen for rest and reformation. At the same time they must fulfill the task of defending the given region so as not to give the possibility to enemy troops to land in Chemul' po an Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation the given army group must participate in military operations on the western portions of the front.

9. At the time of implementing the fourth operation I ask you to think over the question of whether it will be better for the main forces of the Chinese and North Korean troops to divide into two echelons. Troops of each echelon must have a five day dry ration. Troops of the first echelon must make the breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the enemy to a determined border, and the troops of the second echelon must continue the pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation will continue for 10-12 days and that in this time it will be possible to destroy as many enemy troops as possible.

I ask you to communicate your opinion.
MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51

19:00."

No. 478.

28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, Listy 41-43]

57.30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633
BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV
FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG
Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I received your telegram to PENG DEHUAI of 28 January. I agree with you. From the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL'PO and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 60/sh

30 January 1951.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, List 44]

58.30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

leading the corps, but there are already army apparatuses. It would be better to organize the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions in each army, so that the army apparatus itself directly commands its divisions. In this case the Korean armed forces would have in its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the main command for assisting the most needy armies according to the course of the opera

8th Administration of the General Staff of tion. With time, when the commanders ma-
the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269

To Comrade RAZUVAEV. Discuss the following telegram with Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends and communicate their opinion.

1. It is possible to consider it incontestable that the present [North] Korean divisions are less battle capable than the old divisions in the summer of last year. This is explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10 divisions, well fitted out with officer corps and more or less satisfactorily trained. And now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are not in a position to supply such a large number of divisions with officer corps. According to our norms, each division, having, let's say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 officers, not counting sergeants. I have in mind the genuine officers, capable of cementing a division, and not hastily commissioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans still don't have such a number of officers. Therefore the present Korean officers are understrength, unstable and little capable of battle. The Koreans increased the number of divisions and forgot about quality, but quality plays the decisive role here.

2. It would be advisable in the given situation to have not more than 23 divisions in the Korean army, so that the officer corps of the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill out the officer corps of the remaining weak divisions, and the rank and file to use as reinforcement. This will strengthen the divisions, lessen the expenses and make for a gain in arms. The same needs to be said regarding the four Korean infantry brigades which are in poorly combat readiness and which also can be used to fill out the divisions with officers and rank and file.

3. At this stage the organization of corps administration is inadvisable, since there are no, or almost no, commanders capable of

ture, when there will be enough of them and when they learn to command joint divisions, then it will be possible to transfer to a corps system.

Of course, this reform should not be carried out now, but during a time of rest after conducting the operation.

60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev

8th Administration of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100320

To RAZUVAEV for KIM IL SUNG
To Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

We have insufficient lead not only for satisfying the needs of China and Korea, but also for our own needs. In view of this we have decided to send to Korea a group of Soviet specialists to assist the Korean organizations in working out measures for the restoration of mines, concentrating mills and lead factories for the purpose of increasing the production of lead. We would like also to organize the export of lead ore to the USSR,

Discuss these proposals and communi- since it is not being processed now in Korea cate your opinion. for [industrial] processing. 30 Jan 1951

FYN SI [Stalin]

No. 4/854
Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 15-16]

59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev

this.

We hope that you will not be opposed to

[blocks in formation]

61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram,
Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting

8th Administration of the General Staff of message from Kim Il Sung
the Armed Forces of the USSR
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100319

To Comrade RAZUVAEV.

You did not understand my telegram of January 30 about the Korean divisions. This telegram is not a directive, but my proposal for discussion together with Korean comrades. I asked you to communicate to me the opinion of the Korean comrades and your own opinion. You answer me that my order will be fulfilled by you. You did not understand my telegram. Once again I ask you to familiarize KIM IL SUNG and his friends with my telegram and after my proposal is discussed, communicate to me the opinion of the Koreans.

FYN SI [Stalin]

3 February 1951. No. 81/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 20 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 198]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 500361/sh
From Correspondent 20 Sent 4.2.51 14:35
Received 4.2. 15:10
Sent to the 8th Administration of the General
Staff of the Soviet Army 4.2 15:25

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].
To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh.
I report:

KIM IL SUNG and the Korean com

rades discussed your telegram about the composition of forces of the Korean People's Army and arrived at the following conclusion:

1. To raise the battle readiness of the troops and to improve their quality, it is necessary to lower the number of army administrations and the number of divisions.

2. To produce the decrease in army administrations and divisions by increasing the three army administrations from Manchuria.

To reduce: two army administrations; -four pd [infantry divisions]: 2nd army

- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one pd by increasing 8th army

3. To temporarily keep naval brigades for the defense of bases and coastline.

To strengthen the naval brigades to significantly reduce VMU ["battle friction" that results from being understrength]; the sailor school and apparatus of naval command.

4. To carry out further reductions after the next operation, which will begin February 7-13, 1951.

5. To have the total number of army units and divisions be within the numerical limits that you recommended.

[blocks in formation]
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As is obvious, in the nearest future there will be major military operations in Korea by the Chinese and Korean liberation troops. It is apparent that you will need a large number of aviation both at the front and in the rear. In a previous telegram we accepted your proposal about shifting the base of Belov's air force to Korea, in the rear of your troops, but with the condition that two Chinese fighter divisions be placed in the Andong region to cover this area. However, we see now that in view of the forthcoming major operations, you will need the largest possible aviation force at the front. We have therefore decided to send to Andong from the USSR an additional large fighter division so that the two Chinese fighter divisions which were designated for covering Andong would be sent to the front for use in operations at the front. We hope that you will not object. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 139/sh

15 March 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, List 118 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 202]

64. 29 May 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

8th Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101255

PYONGYANG

To Comrade RAZUVAEV. Visit KIM IL SUNG and communicate to him that we have received their application for additional delivery of rifle-mortar arms that was sent through you. Communicate to Comrade KIM IL SUNG that we unfortunately cannot now fully satisfy this application, since he sent it almost in the middle of 1951, while arms were already allocated for the Peoples Democracies in February.

At this time we can send to KOREA during the month of June: 25,000 carbines, 5,000 sub-machine guns, 1,200 light machine guns, 550 medium machine guns, 275 TSHK machine guns, 500 antitank rifles, 700 82 mm mortars, and 125 120 mm mortars. Telegraph the fulfillment.

[blocks in formation]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 29 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 28]

65. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410
BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY
FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG

I received your telegram of June 4, and also the two directives of Comrade Peng Dehuai.

I also think, as do you, that the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.

In my telegram I wrote mainly about the fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if there are no strong defensive fortifications in the rear, to which the main forces could be quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai writes that he is creating three defensive lines in the rear. If this is done and the defensive lines are truly serious, then the affair will proceed in a better way and the troops will not fall into encirclement.

You complain that you have little artillery, antitank guns and other arms. I communicated to you two months ago that the Poles have retracted their orders and we therefore could make for you additional deliveries of arms in this year, thus increasing the volume of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told us that you will soon send new applications. However, there are no new applications from you. Why is this? How is this explained? Again I communicate to you that we could make new deliveries of artillery for you if you want this.

Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is necessary to strengthen the operations of partisan detachments in the enemy's rear. This is absolutely necessary.

Comrade Peng Dehaui writes about the presence of a relatively high fighting spirit among the Anglo-American troops, and about

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