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the fact that “serious rightist moods” have matter of the resolution of these important to six months, then why is it impossible to appeared among the Chinese troops. In my questions.

complete the training of Chinese pilots in opinion this is explained by the fact that your At the present time Comrade KIM IL seven to eight months? Isn't it time to throw local maneuvers with some forward advance SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with away this harmful overcautiousness? The but then a falling back, repeated several Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of Chinese troops will not fight without air times, create among your troops the impres- these questions with you.

cover. Therefore it is necessary to create sion of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, I ask you to communicate your opinion more quickly a group of eight Chinese air but create among the Anglo-American troops about the possibility of this trip.

fighter divisions and send them to the front. the impression of their might. I fear that this

MAO ZEDONG

This is now your main task. situation can undermine the spirit of the No. 2787

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will 5.6.51

Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divinot be possible to crush these unhealthy

sions can be held in the rear in North Korea, moods unless you prepare and carry out a (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of List 23]

fighter divisions closer to the front. This is three to four enemy divisions. This would

absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arlead to a serious turnaround in the moods of 67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, range matters so that the Chinese rely only on the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

their own aviation at the front. Anglo-American troops. This, of course,

Report the fulfillment. will not be broad and far from being an

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

FILIPPOV (Stalin] offensive, will be only a serious short blow BEIJING-TO KRASOVSKY

No. 303/sh against the enemy, but this will be the kind of for Comrade MAO ZEDONG. blow that will sober up the enemy and raise To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, the fighting spirit of the Chinese Korean We received your telegram about the List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, troops. Moreover this would give you the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33] possibility of undertaking then wider and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive more successful local maneuvers needed to Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG 69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, exhaust the enemy.

and to discuss with them the questions indi- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meetFILIPPOV (Stalin) cated in your telegram.

ing in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il No. 297/sh

On 8 June in the morning we will send a Sung 5 June 1951

plane from Moscow to Peking to transport

Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557 (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN Listy 17-18] on 9 June.

Deliver immediately to the addressee.

We ask you to give an order to your “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. 66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao authorities about the unimpeded flight of the Today there was a conversation with Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing your representatives from Manchuria and FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Korea (Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF

questions were raised: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, First—about an armistice. We recogARMY

List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, nized that an armistice is now advantageous. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448 Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30]

Second—about military advisers. If they Copies: Stalin (2)

are very necessary to you, then we are ready From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951 68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, to satisfy you. SERIES G T.

Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advi- Third—about the delivery of arms for TO FILIPPOV [Stalin] sor in Beijing Krasovsky

sixteen divisions. There will not be objecComrade FILIPPOV!

tions from our side. In the course of conducting the war in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559

I won't write about the details, since KOREA we have run into such serious ques- BEIJING

your representatives will report to you about tions as the financial question, the question

TO KRASOVSKY

them. of the conduct of military operations directly According to our information, our pilots We considerit absolutely necessary now at the front, the question of the danger of a are training the Koreans very slowly and in a to start moving at least eight fighter aviation possible enemy landing on the sea coast in slipshod manner. You and General Belov divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions.

apparently intend to make professors rather We think that besides two or three aviation Weintend to send Comrade GAOGANG than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to We consider this to be overcautiousness on front from central and southern China five or inform you regarding the aforementioned the side of our aviation specialists. If Rus

six divisions of MIG-9's, which operate very questions and to ask your directions in the sian pilots were trained during the war in five effectively against bombers. Eight fighter

our rear.

divisions on your front could fully satisfy of an armistice to Comrade GAO GANG in the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops the needs of the front. According to our order for him to relay it to you and receive must occupy a defensive position for the next information your pilots are already ready to instructions from you. I won't write about it two months. fly. It is necessary to put them into battle in detail here.

It is better to act in this way: more quickly, so that they will be not paper Comrade PENG DEHUAI very much 1. To wait for the enemy to make an pilots, but battle pilots. We trained our pilots needs Soviet advisers on strategy and tactics. appeal. for action at the front in five months. Seven It would be desirable if you could send them 2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the to eight months of training is fully sufficient as soon as possible.

statement of [State Department official onfor the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be With regard to the participation of eight leave George F.] Kennan, the Soviet governthe main question now for your front. fighter divisions in battles, in accordance ment would make an inquiry to the American

After the end of the conversation we with your advice, I gave an order to the government about an armistice. received information that the Anglo-Ameri- General Staff to draw up a plan. In addition, It is possible to bring this about in two cans intend to appeal soon to you and to the I gave an order to Comrade PENG DEHUAI

ways simultaneously, which are that from Koreans in the name of the sixteen nations that our troops firmly hold the line of defense one side the Soviet government makes an fighting against Korea with a proposal about at the second and third defensive lines and inquiry, and from the other—if the enemy an armistice. But before making this pro- create a new defensive line.

puts forth the question of an armistice, then posal they want to strike a blow against our The position at the front in June will be Korea and China will express their agreetroops. It is possible that these are merely such that our forces will be comparatively ment to this. We ask you to share opinions rumors, but it is fully possible and probable weaker than those of the enemy. In July we about which is more advisable and decide that these are not merely rumors, but corre- will be stronger than in June and in August we with Comrade Filippov. sponds to reality. We therefore advise you to will be even stronger. We will be ready in 3. Conditions for the armistice: restorahold tight the line of defense and not allow August to make a stronger blow to the enemy. tion of the border at the 38th parallel; to the enemy to advance.

MAO ZEDONG

apportion from both North Korea and South FILIPPOV (Stalin).”

13.6.51"

Korea an insignificant strip [to serve as a For Roshchin.

ROSHCHIN

neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral We ask you to familiarize Krasovsky No. 2974

zone come only from the territory of North with this telegram. We are sending him a 13.6.51

Korea will by no means be accepted. North special directive.

and South Korea (should not] interfere with FILIPPOV

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, one another. No. 302/sh

Listy 55-56; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis As concerns the question of the entrance 5a, Papka 11, List 34]

of China into the UN, we consider that it is [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339,

possible not to raise this question as a condiListy 31-32 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 71. 14 June 1951, handwritten letter from tion, since China can refer to the fact that the 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 31-32]

Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung to Stalin, with UN has in fact become an instrument of

13 June 1951 handwritten letter from Mao aggression, and therefore China does not at 70.13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung the present time attach a special significance Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Roshchin

to the question of entrance into the UN. To Comrade Stalin, I.V.

You must think about whether it is worth SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF We have received a reply telegram from raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to re- In order to bargain with them, we consider ARMY

ceive it and if time allows also to receive us that this question should be raised. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20772 today. We very much ask you to show us such If America firmly insists that the quesCopies: Stalin (2)

a high honor. Then we will have the possibil- tion of Taiwan be resolved separately, then From BEIJING Received 19:55

19:55 ity to depart tomorrow to resolve all the we will make a corresponding concession. 13.June. 1951

questions in accordance with your instruc- In the interests of the cause of peace we Series “G” T tions.

will resolve first of all the question of Korea. To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] With communist greetings!

I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and To my [telegram] No. 2967 (vkh. No.

Gao Gang

to receive orders from him. 20757).

Kim Il Sung

4. We have ordered Deng Hua and the 13.6.51 at 22:00 Beijing time I received 14 June 1951

commander of the armies of the 13th army the following telegram addressed to you [attached handwritten letter].

group immediately to return to the front and from MAO ZEDONG.

“To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung: to hold firmly the present line of the front. In “To Comrade FILIPPOV.

I received your telegram of 13 June.

. June and July preparations will be carried out I received your telegram of 13 June. Concerning how to raise the question of intensively. In August we will carry out a

Today I received a telegram from Com- negotiations about an armistice, we consider larger operation. If the enemy does not make rades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. I it inadvisable for Korea and China them- a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, communicated our opinion on the question selves to advance this question today, since then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy

does not send new reinforcements to Korea negotiations fully in accordance with your Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
and does not make an amphibious landing, opinion.
then in August we will be significantly stron- 3. According a telegram received from

CIPHERED TELEGRAM ger than now.

Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY 5. Right now we are planning the trans- negotiations with representatives of the So

For Comrade MAO ZEDONG fer of our aviation units to the front.

viet General Staff, of the total quantity of We received your telegram of June 21. Mao Zedong

arms for sixty divisions according to the 1. You must already know from [Soviet 13.6.51"

calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms ambassador to the UN Jacob]Malik's speech

for only sixteen divisions will be delivered that our promise about raising the question of [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, this year (including for three Korean [divi- an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis sions]), and arms for the remaining forty- It is possible that the matter of an armistice 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37]

four divisions will be delivered in 1952- will move forward.

1953. This is in contradiction to the needs 2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions 72. 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao and time frame of the Korean theater of then I must say to you directly that to fulfill Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) military operations.

this application in the course of a single year

4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent is physically impossible and altogether unSECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF needs of the Korean theater of military op- thinkable. Our production and military speTHE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET erations, I ask you to study the applications cialists consider it completely impossible to ARMY

transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Com- give arms for more than 10 divisions in the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039 rade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibil- course of 1951. The fulfillment of the appliCopies: Stalin (2)

ity of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artil- cation for 60 divisions is possible, and at that From BEIJING Received 21:15

lery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts with great difficulty, only in the course of 21.6.1951

for automobiles and GSM, medicines and 1951, '52, '53 and the first half of '54, i.e. in SERIES “G”T T

other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] the course of three years. Such is the final To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so opinion of our production and military speComrade FILIPPOV!

that the various military units in the Korean cialists. I have tried in every way to shorten 1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and theater of military operations receive replen- these periods even if by a half year, but transmitted your opinion on various ques- ishment according to the presently existing unfortunately upon examination it has turned tions.

organizational structure, what is advanta- out that this is impossible. I consider that they are all correct and we geous

for the conduct of military operations. I will communicate about all this in must do precisely thus.

5. With the availability this year of de- more detail in a separate telegram and also As regards the question of planting rub- liveries of arms according to our applica

liveries of arms according to our applica- about the staff-organizational structure of ber trees, we intend immediately to start the tions, the missing quantity of arms needed the present Chinese divisions. planning for units in accordance with the new organi

FILIPPOV [Stalin] I hope that the Soviet government will zational structure proposed by the Soviet 24 June 1951 send its representatives to assist us in formu- General Staff can be delivered in the next No. 635177 lating plans.

year. Simultaneously with this, in accor2. Our troops' eight months of experi- dance with the delivery of arms, we will [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, ence in conducting war in Korea has clearly reorganize the selections for this division List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, shown the great difference in the equipment and in that way gradually convert the sixteen Delo 5, Papka 11, List 38] of our troops and the troops of the enemy and divisions to the new organization. the extreme necessity of improving the equip- 6. We have delayed our applications for 74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, ment of our troops. This is why we commis- three months and have thus brought great Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing sioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have relaying telegram from Mao Zedong with a request about delivery to us of arms for appealed to you with such large numbers and sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This want all this to be delivered in six months.

CIPHERED TELEGRAM is the minimal requirement of our troops in This places before you great difficulties, BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY Korea for the present year.

especially in the area of transport. I do not We have received the following teleUpon his return Gao Gang said that you know if this can be done. I ask you to do as gram from Mao Zedong: consider our requirements in arms for each much as is possible.

“The government of the Chinese division insufficient and proposed to

MAO ZEDONG

People's Republic intends to send fighter strengthen each division with tanks and artil- No. 3107 21.6.51

divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for lery.

participation in the military actions, which I consider this completely correct. This [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, will be much better than sending divisions is necessary in war against imperialists. Listy 64-65]

armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu

necessary in the course of one and a half to Sian-tsian (with instructions] to conduct the 73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram, two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter divisions, which are armed with MIG- Gromyko notes that the text of the letter was 28.6.51 9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of send- transmitted by Soviet ambassador Razuvaev ing them to the front in September 1951. by telegraph, using the telegraph line of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, The government of the Chinese People's Ministry of War USSR.

Listy 85-86 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Republic asks you to give an order to the

5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 40-41] Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s Listy 34-36]

77.30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao in the indicated periods.” As is obvious,

Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting Mao Zedong does not want to take MIG-9s 76. 28 June 1951, ciphered telegram,

telegram, 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung from the Chinese airports for transfer to the Krasovsky to Filippov (Stalin) transmit- to Mao front, but prefers to leave them in place, and ting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il to use at the front only MIG-15 divisions. Sung to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Speak with Mao Zedong, and if our suppo

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET sition is confirmed, tell him that your people SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF ARMY will begin the retraining of Chinese pilots THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21336 now flying MIG-9s for flights on MIG-15s. ARMY

Copies: Stalin (2) It seems to us that this does not require two CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21266

From BEIJING Received 11:30 30.6.1951 months, but if the Chinese insist, then train Copies: Stalin (2)

SERIES “G” T them in the course of two months. Report From BEIJING Received 11:12 28.6.1951

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] the fulfillment.

SERIES “G”

A telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] “Comrade Mao Zedong! 26 June 1951

I report:

Malik's speech on the radio on June 23

A meeting took place 27.6.51 at 19 hours of this year aroused interest among the Ameri[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, 30 minutes Beijing time.

cans in the question of the cessation of miliList 81 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, In the conversation Comrade Mao tary actions in Korea. In the United Press Delo 5, Papka 11, List 39]

Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, report from Washington on June 28 it says:

12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which “Among American generals and senior of75. 26 June 1951, letter, Kim Il Sung to have been trained on MIG-9s, must retrain on ficers the hope for a cessation of military Stalin

MIG-15s before being sent to the front. The actions in Korea grows with every day. [U.S.

period of retraining was established as one Commander Matthew] Ridgway constantly Moscow, Kremlin

and a half to two months, so that these divi- maintains contact with the chief of the AmeriTO COMRADE STALIN, I.V.

sions could take part in the forthcoming op- can General Staff on the question of the I am happy to inform you that despite erations in Korea.

possibility of a cessation of military actions. the complicated military situation, our Ko- To the question I raised about the con- From the reports being circulated it is rean organizations were able to secure the struction of three additional airbases for the known that as soon as Ridgway receives an fulfillment of the plan for sending to the deployment of Chinese divisions, Comrade order from the Ministry of National Defense Soviet Union lead, lead ore and lead concen- Mao Zedong answered that Nie Rongzhen in of the USA, he will enter negotiations with trate.

the name of the Prime Minister sent a tele- the commander of the North Korean troops. As of 24 June of this year, in connection gram to Comrade Kim Il Sung with a request A report about this will be made by the staff with the plan for delivery of 7,000 tons, to select a place to the south of Pyongyang of UN troops. 8,379 tons were delivered, of which 7,239 and as soon as possible build three airbases How should we relate to this? How tons were transferred to Chinese territory. there for jet planes.

should we answer, if Ridgway wants to conBy the same date we delivered 10,714 The commander of the VVS [Air Force] duct negotiations. tons of lead concentrate and 10,714 tons of of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] of I ask you urgently to communicate your enriched lead ore, of which 9,749 tons were China Liu Yalou, who was present at the concrete opinion on this question. transferred to Chinese territory. conversation, stated that they have in mind

Kim Il Sung 29.6.51” The government of the Korean People's using the MIG-9s in the future in schools and

Mao Zedong Democratic Republic will also in the future in the PVO [Anti- Aircraft Defense] system No. 3261 devote maximum attention to the matter of of the country.

30.6 securing and increasing the delivery to the An order was given by me to the comSoviet Union of materials of lead content. mands of the 17th, 144th and 328th fighter (Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, KIM OIL SUNG

aviation divisions immediately to begin re- List 92 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 26 June 1951.

training the 6th, 12th and 14th Chinese fighter Delo 4, Papka 11, List 11] Pyongyang

aviation divisions on MIG-15 planes, accordThis copy was received July 30, 1951 bying to the confirmed program.

78. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao diplomatic post from Pyongyang and sent to

KRASOVSKY

Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) A.N. Poskrebyshev by A. Gromyko. No. 3235

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF send corresponding representatives to con- 3. For the goal of securing for our repreTHE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET duct negotiations.

sentatives time for full preparation for the ARMY

As regards how to answer Ridgway, meeting it seems to me advantageous to CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334 after receiving a demand from Ridgway, the name July 15 as the opening day of the Copies: Stalin (2)

contents should be discussed and an answer meeting From BEIJING Received 11:20

formulated. What is your opinion on this 4. In light of the compressed period of 30.6.1951 question?

time and the great importance of the given SERIES “G” T

If negotiations begin, it is extremely meeting I ask you to immediately communiTo Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin]

necessary

that you personally lead them, so cate with comrade Kim Il Sung, personally to 1. I have received your two telegrams that we do not find ourselves in a disadvan- lead this meeting and simultaneously to in(of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with tageous position.

form me. your opinion. I send you for familiarization the tele

Mao Zedong. a) As regards the time periods for the gram of Comrade Kim Il Sung. delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions,

MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, we should act only on the basis of the produc- No. 3260

Listy 93-94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis tive and transport possibilities of the Soviet 30.6

5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 12-13] Union, that is (we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, 80. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, course of three years, and in 1951 complete Listy 90-91]

Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong the deliveries for ten divisions.

b) The staff-organizational structure you 79. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3917 have proposed for the present Chinese infan- Zedong to Filippov (Stalin); note: no pho

BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY try divisions is very good. We are imple- tocopy available—text copied by hand and

for Comrade MAO ZEDONG menting it. With sixteen divisions armed in therefore exact heading not presented Your telegrams about an armistice have accordance with this staff-organizational

been received. structure, the Chinese army will be far stron- The commander of the troops of the In our opinion it is necessary immediger than at present.

enemy, Ridgway, today made a statement ately to answer Ridgway over the radio with 2. Malik's statement secured us the ini- with a proposal that representatives of both agreement to meet with his representatives tiative in the matter of conducting peace warring sides meet on a Danish ship in the for negotiations about an armistice. This negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through port of Genzan for a meeting about the ces- communication must be signed by the ComComrade Roshchin the main positions of the sation of military activities. Simultaneously mand of the Korean People's Army and the contents of the conversation of Comrade with this he stated that a corresponding guar- command of the Chinese volunteer units, Gromyko with the American ambassador to antee is required, and only in this case can consequently by Comrade KIM IL SUNG the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of military actions be ceased.

and Comrade PENG DEHUAI. If there is no the text is stated: “Only two representatives I report to you my opinion on the given signature of the commander of the Chinese must participate from each side. Moreover question.

volunteer units, then the Americans will not these representatives must be from the com- I ask you to study [it] and give an an- attach any significance to only one Korean mand of the corresponding military units, swer, and I also ask you to communicate it signature. It is necessary decisively to refuse and not representatives of the governments. immediately to Comrade Kim Il Sung. the Danish hospital ship in the area of Genzan Thus, from the Chinese side a represen

1. Comrade Kim Il Sung presumably as a place of meeting. It is necessary to tative of the volunteer troops must partici- must give an answer to Ridgway on the 2nd demand that the meeting take place at the pate and not a representative of China, as a or 3rd of July. In this answer he must express 38th parallel in the region of Kaesong. Keep warring state.” I consider this completely his agreement to representatives of both sides in mind that at the present time you are the correct.

conducting negotiations about a cessation of bosses of the affair of an armistice and the I have received a telegram from Com- military operations, and to propose a time, Americans will be forced to make concesrade Kim Il Sung in which he asks how he place and number of participants for the sions on the question of a place for the should answer if Ridgway calls for negotia- meeting.

meeting. tions to begin.

2. As concerns the place for holding the Send to Ridgway today an answer I have already communicated to Com- negotiations, Ridgway suggests the port of roughly like this: rade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai that on the Genzan.

“To the commander of UN troops Genone hand we must carefully watch the mili- Considering that Genzan is a fortified eral RIDGWAY. Your statement of 28 June tary situation so as not to give the enemy the sea base of North Korea and the enemy regarding an armistice has been received. possibility of using this moment to his ad- intends to make a landing there, it seems to We are authorized to declare to you that we vantage, and on the other hand Comrade Kim me disadvantageous to agree to hold negotia- agree to a meeting with your representatives Il Sung and Peng Dehuai must discuss this tions in Genzan. Is it impossible to propose for negotiations about a cessation of military question and be prepared, in case of a de- for the conduct of negotiations the town of actions and the establishment of an armimand by the enemy to begin negotiations, to Kaidzio, a point on the 38th parallel? stice. We propose as a meeting place the 38th

a

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