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the fact that "serious rightist moods" have appeared among the Chinese troops. In my opinion this is explained by the fact that your local maneuvers with some forward advance but then a falling back, repeated several times, create among your troops the impression of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, but create among the Anglo-American troops the impression of their might. I fear that this situation can undermine the spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will not be possible to crush these unhealthy moods unless you prepare and carry out a serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of three to four enemy divisions. This would lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Anglo-American troops. This, of course, will not be broad and far from being an offensive, will be only a serious short blow against the enemy, but this will be the kind of blow that will sober up the enemy and raise the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean troops. Moreover this would give you the possibility of undertaking then wider and more successful local maneuvers needed to exhaust the enemy.

No. 297/sh

5 June 1951

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 17-18]

66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448

Copies: Stalin (2)
From Beijing Received 18:30 5 June 1951
SERIES G T.

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

Comrade FILIPPOV!

In the course of conducting the war in KOREA we have run into such serious questions as the financial question, the question of the conduct of military operations directly at the front, the question of the danger of a possible enemy landing on the sea coast in

our rear.

We intend to send Comrade GAO GANG to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to inform you regarding the aforementioned questions and to ask your directions in the

matter of the resolution of these important to six months, then why is it impossible to questions. complete the training of Chinese pilots in seven to eight months? Isn't it time to throw away this harmful overcautiousness? The Chinese troops will not fight without air cover. Therefore it is necessary to create

At the present time Comrade KIM IL SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of these questions with you.

I ask you to communicate your opinion more quickly a group of eight Chinese air about the possibility of this trip. fighter divisions and send them to the front. MAO ZEDONG This is now your main task.

No. 2787 5.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 23]

67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
BEIJING TO KRASOVSKY
for Comrade MAO ZEDONG.
To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram about the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG and to discuss with them the questions indicated in your telegram.

On 8 June in the morning we will send a plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing on 9 June.

We ask you to give an order to your authorities about the unimpeded flight of the plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30]

68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advisor in Beijing Krasovsky

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559
BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY According to our information, our pilots are training the Koreans very slowly and in a slipshod manner. You and General Belov apparently intend to make professors rather than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be overcautiousness on the side of our aviation specialists. If Russian pilots were trained during the war in five

Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divisions can be held in the rear in North Korea, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese fighter divisions closer to the front. This is absolutely necessary. It is necessary to arrange matters so that the Chinese rely only on their own aviation at the front. Report the fulfillment. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

No. 303/sh

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33]

69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meeting in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557
BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN
Deliver immediately to the addressee.
"To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

Today there was a conversation with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three questions were raised:

First-about an armistice. We recognized that an armistice is now advantageous. Second-about military advisers. If they are very necessary to you, then we are ready to satisfy you.

Third-about the delivery of arms for sixteen divisions. There will not be objections from our side.

I won't write about the details, since your representatives will report to you about them.

We consider it absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. We think that besides two or three aviation divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the front from central and southern China five or six divisions of MIG-9's, which operate very effectively against bombers. Eight fighter

divisions on your front could fully satisfy the needs of the front. According to our information your pilots are already ready to fly. It is necessary to put them into battle more quickly, so that they will be not paper pilots, but battle pilots. We trained our pilots for action at the front in five months. Seven to eight months of training is fully sufficient for the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be the main question now for your front.

After the end of the conversation we received information that the Anglo-Americans intend to appeal soon to you and to the Koreans in the name of the sixteen nations fighting against Korea with a proposal about an armistice. But before making this proposal they want to strike a blow against our troops. It is possible that these are merely rumors, but it is fully possible and probable that these are not merely rumors, but corresponds to reality. We therefore advise you to hold tight the line of defense and not allow the enemy to advance.

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of an armistice to Comrade GAO GANG in order for him to relay it to you and receive instructions from you. I won't write about it in detail here.

Comrade PENG DEHUAI very much needs Soviet advisers on strategy and tactics. It would be desirable if you could send them as soon as possible.

With regard to the participation of eight fighter divisions in battles, in accordance with your advice, I gave an order to the General Staff to draw up a plan. In addition, I gave an order to Comrade PENG DEHUAI that our troops firmly hold the line of defense at the second and third defensive lines and create a new defensive line.

The position at the front in June will be such that our forces will be comparatively weaker than those of the enemy. In July we will be stronger than in June and in August we will be even stronger. We will be ready in August to make a stronger blow to the enemy. MAO ZEDONG 13.6.51" ROSHCHIN

No. 2974 13.6.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 55-56; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, List 34]

71. 14 June 1951, handwritten letter from Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung to Stalin, with 13 June 1951 handwritten letter from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung

To Comrade Stalin, I.V.

We have received a reply telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to receive it and if time allows also to receive us today. We very much ask you to show us such a high honor. Then we will have the possibil

From BEIJING Received 19:55 ity to depart tomorrow to resolve all the 13.June.1951

Series "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] To my [telegram] No. 2967 (vkh. No. 20757).

13.6.51 at 22:00 Beijing time I received the following telegram addressed to you from MAO ZEDONG.

"To Comrade FILIPPOV.

I received your telegram of 13 June. Today I received a telegram from Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. I communicated our opinion on the question

questions in accordance with your instructions.

With communist greetings!
Gao Gang
Kim Il Sung

14 June 1951

[attached handwritten letter].

"To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung:

I received your telegram of 13 June. Concerning how to raise the question of negotiations about an armistice, we consider it inadvisable for Korea and China themselves to advance this question today, since

the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops must occupy a defensive position for the next two months.

It is better to act in this way:

1. To wait for the enemy to make an

appeal.

2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the statement of [State Department official onleave George F.] Kennan, the Soviet government would make an inquiry to the American government about an armistice.

It is possible to bring this about in two ways simultaneously, which are that from one side the Soviet government makes an inquiry, and from the other-if the enemy puts forth the question of an armistice, then Korea and China will express their agreement to this. We ask you to share opinions about which is more advisable and decide with Comrade Filippov.

3. Conditions for the armistice: restoration of the border at the 38th parallel; to apportion from both North Korea and South Korea an insignificant strip [to serve] as a neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral zone come only from the territory of North Korea will by no means be accepted. North and South Korea [should not] interfere with one another.

As concerns the question of the entrance of China into the UN, we consider that it is possible not to raise this question as a condition, since China can refer to the fact that the UN has in fact become an instrument of aggression, and therefore China does not at the present time attach a special significance to the question of entrance into the UN.

You must think about whether it is worth raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. In order to bargain with them, we consider that this question should be raised.

If America firmly insists that the question of Taiwan be resolved separately, then we will make a corresponding concession.

In the interests of the cause of peace we will resolve first of all the question of Korea. I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and to receive orders from him.

4. We have ordered Deng Hua and the commander of the armies of the 13th army group immediately to return to the front and to hold firmly the present line of the front. In June and July preparations will be carried out intensively. In August we will carry out a larger operation. If the enemy does not make a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy

does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.

5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front. Mao Zedong 13.6.51"

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37]

72.21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039
Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 21:15
21.6.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Comrade FILIPPOV!

1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and transmitted your opinion on various questions.

I consider that they are all correct and we must do precisely thus.

As regards the question of planting rubber trees, we intend immediately to start the planning.

I hope that the Soviet government will send its representatives to assist us in formulating plans.

2. Our troops' eight months of experience in conducting war in Korea has clearly shown the great difference in the equipment of our troops and the troops of the enemy and the extreme necessity of improving the equipment of our troops. This is why we commissioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you with a request about delivery to us of arms for sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This is the minimal requirement of our troops in Korea for the present year.

Upon his return Gao Gang said that you consider our requirements in arms for each division insufficient and proposed to strengthen each division with tanks and artillery.

I consider this completely correct. This is necessary in war against imperialists. I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian [with instructions] to conduct the

negotiations fully in accordance with your Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong opinion.

3. According a telegram received from Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary negotiations with representatives of the Soviet General Staff, of the total quantity of arms for sixty divisions according to the calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms for only sixteen divisions will be delivered this year (including for three Korean [divisions]), and arms for the remaining fortyfour divisions will be delivered in 19521953. This is in contradiction to the needs and time frame of the Korean theater of military operations.

4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent needs of the Korean theater of military operations, I ask you to study the applications transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Comrade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibility of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artillery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts for automobiles and GSM, medicines and other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so that the various military units in the Korean theater of military operations receive replenishment according to the presently existing organizational structure, what is advantageous for the conduct of military operations.

5. With the availability this year of deliveries of arms according to our applications, the missing quantity of arms needed for units in accordance with the new organizational structure proposed by the Soviet General Staff can be delivered in the next year. Simultaneously with this, in accordance with the delivery of arms, we will reorganize the selections for this division reorganize the selections for this division and in that way gradually convert the sixteen divisions to the new organization.

6. We have delayed our applications for three months and have thus brought great harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have appealed to you with such large numbers and want all this to be delivered in six months. This places before you great difficulties, especially in the area of transport. I do not know if this can be done. I ask you to do as much as is possible.

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY

For Comrade MAO ZEDONG We received your telegram of June 21. 1. You must already know from [Soviet ambassador to the UN Jacob] Malik's speech that our promise about raising the question of an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. It is possible that the matter of an armistice will move forward.

2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions then I must say to you directly that to fulfill this application in the course of a single year is physically impossible and altogether unthinkable. Our production and military specialists consider it completely impossible to give arms for more than 10 divisions in the course of 1951. The fulfillment of the application for 60 divisions is possible, and at that with great difficulty, only in the course of 1951, '52, '53 and the first half of '54, i.e. in the course of three years. Such is the final opinion of our production and military specialists. I have tried in every way to shorten these periods even if by a half year, but unfortunately upon examination it has turned out that this is impossible.

I will communicate about all this in more detail in a separate telegram and also about the staff-organizational structure of the present Chinese divisions. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

24 June 1951 No. 635177

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 38]

74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing relaying telegram from Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY We have received the following telegram from Mao Zedong:

"The government of the Chinese People's Republic intends to send fighter divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for participation in the military actions, which will be much better than sending divisions armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore necessary in the course of one and a half to

73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram, two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th

fighter divisions, which are armed with MIG9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of sending them to the front in September 1951.

The government of the Chinese People's Republic asks you to give an order to the Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s in the indicated periods." As is obvious, Mao Zedong does not want to take MIG-9s from the Chinese airports for transfer to the front, but prefers to leave them in place, and to use at the front only MIG-15 divisions. Speak with Mao Zedong, and if our supposition is confirmed, tell him that your people will begin the retraining of Chinese pilots now flying MIG-9s for flights on MIG-15s. It seems to us that this does not require two months, but if the Chinese insist, then train them in the course of two months. Report the fulfillment.

26 June 1951

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 81 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 39]

75.26 June 1951, letter, Kim Il Sung to Stalin

Moscow, Kremlin

TO COMRADE STALIN, I.V.

I am happy to inform you that despite the complicated military situation, our Korean organizations were able to secure the fulfillment of the plan for sending to the Soviet Union lead, lead ore and lead concen

trate.

As of 24 June of this year, in connection with the plan for delivery of 7,000 tons, 8,379 tons were delivered, of which 7,239 tons were transferred to Chinese territory.

By the same date we delivered 10,714 tons of lead concentrate and 10,714 tons of enriched lead ore, of which 9,749 tons were transferred to Chinese territory.

The government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic will also in the future devote maximum attention to the matter of securing and increasing the delivery to the Soviet Union of materials of lead content. KIM IL SUNG

26 June 1951. Pyongyang.

This copy was received July 30, 1951 by diplomatic post from Pyongyang and sent to A.N. Poskrebyshev by A. Gromyko.

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A meeting took place 27.6.51 at 19 hours of this year aroused interest among the Ameri30 minutes Beijing time.

In the conversation Comrade Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which have been trained on MIG-9s, must retrain on MIG-15s before being sent to the front. The period of retraining was established as one and a half to two months, so that these divisions could take part in the forthcoming operations in Korea.

To the question I raised about the construction of three additional airbases for the deployment of Chinese divisions, Comrade Mao Zedong answered that Nie Rongzhen in the name of the Prime Minister sent a telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung with a request to select a place to the south of Pyongyang and as soon as possible build three airbases there for jet planes.

The commander of the VVS [Air Force] of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] of China Liu Yalou, who was present at the conversation, stated that they have in mind using the MIG-9s in the future in schools and in the PVO [Anti- Aircraft Defense] system of the country.

An order was given by me to the commands of the 17th, 144th and 328th fighter aviation divisions immediately to begin retraining the 6th, 12th and 14th Chinese fighter aviation divisions on MIG-15 planes, according to the confirmed program.

No. 3235

KRASOVSKY

cans in the question of the cessation of military actions in Korea. In the United Press report from Washington on June 28 it says: "Among American generals and senior officers the hope for a cessation of military actions in Korea grows with every day. [U.S. Commander Matthew] Ridgway constantly maintains contact with the chief of the American General Staff on the question of the possibility of a cessation of military actions.

From the reports being circulated it is known that as soon as Ridgway receives an order from the Ministry of National Defense of the USA, he will enter negotiations with the commander of the North Korean troops. A report about this will be made by the staff of UN troops.

How should we relate to this? How should we answer, if Ridgway wants to conduct negotiations.

I ask you urgently to communicate your concrete opinion on this question. Kim Il Sung 29.6.51" Mao Zedong

No. 3261 30.6

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, List 92 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 11]

78.30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334

Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 11:20

30.6.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

1. I have received your two telegrams (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with your opinion.

a) As regards the time periods for the delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, we should act only on the basis of the productive and transport possibilities of the Soviet Union, that is [we should] complete the deliveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the course of three years, and in 1951 complete the deliveries for ten divisions.

b) The staff-organizational structure you have proposed for the present Chinese infantry divisions is very good. We are implementing it. With sixteen divisions armed in accordance with this staff-organizational structure, the Chinese army will be far stronger than at present.

2. Malik's statement secured us the initiative in the matter of conducting peace negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through Comrade Roshchin the main positions of the contents of the conversation of Comrade Gromyko with the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of the text is stated: "Only two representatives must participate from each side. Moreover these representatives must be from the command of the corresponding military units, and not representatives of the governments.

Thus, from the Chinese side a representative of the volunteer troops must participate and not a representative of China, as a warring state." I consider this completely

correct.

I have received a telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung in which he asks how he should answer if Ridgway calls for negotiations to begin.

I have already communicated to Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai that on the one hand we must carefully watch the military situation so as not to give the enemy the possibility of using this moment to his advantage, and on the other hand Comrade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai must discuss this question and be prepared, in case of a demand by the enemy to begin negotiations, to

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I report to you my opinion on the given signature of the commander of the Chinese question.

I ask you to study [it] and give an answer, and I also ask you to communicate it immediately to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

1. Comrade Kim Il Sung presumably must give an answer to Ridgway on the 2nd or 3rd of July. In this answer he must express his agreement to representatives of both sides conducting negotiations about a cessation of military operations, and to propose a time, place and number of participants for the meeting.

2. As concerns the place for holding the negotiations, Ridgway suggests the port of Genzan.

Considering that Genzan is a fortified sea base of North Korea and the enemy intends to make a landing there, it seems to me disadvantageous to agree to hold negotiations in Genzan. Is it impossible to propose for the conduct of negotiations the town of Kaidzio, a point on the 38th parallel?

volunteer units, then the Americans will not attach any significance to only one Korean signature. It is necessary decisively to refuse the Danish hospital ship in the area of Genzan as a place of meeting. It is necessary to demand that the meeting take place at the 38th parallel in the region of Kaesong. Keep in mind that at the present time you are the bosses of the affair of an armistice and the Americans will be forced to make concessions on the question of a place for the meeting.

Send to Ridgway today an answer roughly like this:

"To the commander of UN troops General RIDGWAY. Your statement of 28 June regarding an armistice has been received. We are authorized to declare to you that we agree to a meeting with your representatives for negotiations about a cessation of military actions and the establishment of an armistice. We propose as a meeting place the 38th

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