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parallel in the area of the city of Kaesong. If you agree, our representatives will be prepared to meet with your representatives July 10-15.

the following points:

Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 30

a) Time of ceasefire and cessation of June 1951 message from Kim Il Sung to military operations;

b) Withdrawal of troops from the 38th Commander in Chief of the Korean parallel to the north and south for 5-10 km; People's Army c) Crossing the 38th parallel by land or air is prohibited from the moment of the ceasefire;

KIM IL SUNG Commander in Chief of the Chinese

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Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21404
Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 12:10 3.7.1951
SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Telegram of Comrade KIM IL SUNG. "Comrade MAO ZEDONG!

I propose to create our delegation with a composition of three persons: chief of general staff of the People's Army of Korea NAM IL (head of the delegation), deputy minister of foreign affairs PAK DON CHO and one representative from the volunteer troops.

During the meeting of representatives of both sides we propose to advance the following points:

1. Beginning from a certain day and hour (according to Pyongyang time) both sides must cease fire and all other military

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, operations. Listy 3-4]

82. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim Il Sung

8TH ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101529
To Comrade RAZUVAEV.
We received your telegram of July 1, No.
1751.

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG that the Korean government must come to an agreement on the questions raised in the telegram with the Chinese government and together work out the proposals.

From the telegram received it is not apparent that the proposals of KIM IL SUNG have been agreed to by MAO ZEDONG. FILIPPOV [Stalin].

No. 4/3208 2 July 1951

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 5]

83. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao

2. Beginning from a certain day the troops of both sides must within three days withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 km and create a buffer zone in that region.

3. Both sides must cease the transfer of land, naval and air forces across the 38th parallel.

4. Withdraw all foreign ships from the territorial waters of North Korea and liquidate the blockage of the sea coast north of the 38th parallel.

5. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire all foreign land, naval and air forces will withdraw from Korea.

6. In the course of two months from the day of the ceasefire an exchange of prisoners will be conducted.

7. The civilian population forcefully taken by the American and Rhee Syngmann troops from regions north of the 38th parallel must be returned.

I ask you urgently to give an answer after familiarizing yourself with the telegram.

No. 3304 3.7.51

KIM IL SUNG 30.6.1951." MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 6-7]

84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405
Copies: Stalin (2)

From BEIJING Received 13:55
3.7.1951

SERIES "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Comrade FILIPPOV! During the meeting of military representatives of both sides we intend to advance the following 5 main points:

1. "Both sides must simultaneously issue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air forces of both sides, after the issuing of the order on a ceasefire, must within all the borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other hostile actions."

This point will possibly be accepted by the enemy without qualifications.

2. "Land, sea and air forces of both sides must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 English miles and create a buffer zone in the region 10 English miles to the south and to the north of the 38th parallel. The civil administration of the buffer zone must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other words to the north of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the Korean People's government and to the south of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean government."

It is possible that there will be some divergences [from this proposal] among the enemy but we consider that our proposal is extremely just and it will be difficult for the enemy to refute it.

3. "Both sides must cease the transport of arms, troops and reinforcements (including land, sea and air transport) into Korea from outside the country and also the aforementioned transports to the front line on the territory of Korea."

We think that the enemy for his part will also advance a proposal on this question, and we therefore intend to take the initiative in this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the last part of our proposal?

4. "To create a control committee of

neutral states which would supervise the fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this committee there must be an equal number of representatives of neutral states that have not taken part in the Korean war and that have been selected by both sides."

We think that the enemy also will advance an analogous proposal, therefore we intend to show initiative in this. However, there will be numerous difficulties in the fulfillment of this point.

"Members" of the control committee proposed by the enemy will monitor our military transport on the Chinese-Korean border and at important communications points in Korea. Or should we not take the initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to advance his proposal, after which we will accept it?

I ask you to communicate your opinion about how to proceed expediently. To completely refuse to create a control committee seems also inadvisable.

5. "Both sides must carry out repatriation of prisoners of war. In the course of four months after the cessation of military operations to conduct a full mutual exchange of them, in separate batches."

The enemy will possibly propose to conduct a one for one exchange. We must demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. However, the enemy has taken prisoner a relatively larger number of North Koreans, who have already been included in the ranks of the South Korean troops, and therefore this situation will possibly elicit an argu

ment.

In our opinion the 5 basic points indicated above must be accepted at the meeting of military representatives of both sides.

In addition there are some other points: 1. "All foreign troops including Chinese volunteer troops must completely leave North and South Korea within a specified period of time (for example within three-four months), in separate batches.

This is also a very important point. However, the representatives of the enemy possibly will think that this question belongs among political questions and should not be resolved at this meeting.

I ask you to study and communicate whether our side should advance this point.

2. "Within a specified period of time (for example in several months) refugees of North and South Korea must be returned to the areas where they lived previously."

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3950

BEIJING, TO KRASOVSKY.
For Comrade MAO ZEDONG.
"To Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegram of 3 July. With regard to the first two points of your proposal, we have no objections. It is possible to delete the second part of the third point, but if the Americans advance such a proposal, it can be accepted. The fourth point should not be advanced. But if the Americans advance a proposal about a control commission from the UN, then this proposal should be rejected, with reference to the fact that the UN occupies the position of a warring side, but you should then advance your proposal about a commission of representatives of neutral states named with the

agreement of the sides. The fifth point should be proposed and you should insist on it.

As concerns your remaining two points (about the withdrawal of all foreign troops and about refugees), both of these proposals should be advanced and should be insisted

on.

No. 340/III

3 July."

FILIPPOV [Stalin].

either before or during the negotiations, which the enemy may undertake in order to force us to sign a disadvantageous agreement.

If the enemy begins a large-scale attack, our troops must go over to the counterattack and defeat the enemy.

3. It is necessary to issue an order to second corps Yang Chengan and to the 50th corps to depart quickly for the indicated regions so that the enemy cannot make use of the opportunity to make a landing in Genzan. Our 38th, 39th and 42nd corps must be

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, ready to repulse possible landings by the List 11] enemy on the western coast.

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To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!

I send you the text of my telegram to Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG.

"Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG!

The period of preparations for and conduct of negotiations with representatives of the enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 days. I ask you with all seriousness to fulfill the following points:

1. In the course of the 10 days that we have, to make every effort to increase the personnel of the front line units and especially to replenish them with arms and ammunition.

I ask Comrade GAO GANG to transfer from the rear to North Korea in no more than 10 days the personnel, arms and ammunition marked for transfer. It is necessary to be prepared for the fact that after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations it will be impossible to transfer the aforementioned personnel and armaments.

2. To heighten vigilance up to the limit. Units of the first line must be prepared to repulse a possible large scale attack by the enemy and intensive bombing of our rear

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military situation.

We consider that the goal of this is to avoid defeat in the area of propaganda but also secretly to show that he can alter his proposal. Taking this into account, in our statement in today's meeting we pursued the goal of striking a blow against his unfounded theory of refusal to discuss the question of the 38th parallel, and also tried to ascertain if he intended to abandon his unfounded proposal.

At today's meeting the enemy displayed some interest in the portion of our statement where we tried to ascertain his intention. However, in his statement in the second half of the day the representative of the enemy expressed a strong [sense of] injustice and tried to lay on us the responsibility for the impasse that has been created in the negotiations.

Our statement for tomorrow will be constructed on the basis of your instructions. The goal of the statement will be to smash this [claim of] injustice of the enemy, to unmask his capacity for deception and simultaneously to advance such questions as to force the enemy more clearly to express his position.

The main goal of the statement is once again to underscore that if the enemy does not renounce his unfounded proposal, there will be no progress in the work of the conference. We consider that we can also express our wish to change the proposal about the buffer zone in the area of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line only in such case as the enemy clearly gives us to understand that he abandons his earlier proposal.

3. After the resumption of the work of the conference, the mistaken views of the enemy have become even more intensified and the enemy has become even more convinced that we yearn for peace, and therefore it is possible to get concessions from us. All this was possible to foresee.

However, from the entire course of the conference and the general situation outside the conference it is apparent that it is not possible to force the enemy to accept the proposal about the 38th parallel. In the course of several days the enemy on the one hand will put pressure on us and try to force us to be the first to make a concession, and on the other hand will prepare for a possible breakdown in the conference.

Therefore we consider it necessary to work out a definite resolution with regard to

the 38th parallel.

If our final goal consists of conducting a struggle for the principle of the determination of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line and if in this regard we can admit only certain alterations, then we should have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations and we must prepare for this.

In the opposite case we should have some kind of compromise position determined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not foresee the possible development of the present situation, but it is also not possible to win much time through action in accordance with your orders contained in the telegram of 17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy for the purpose of gaining time,

4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final goal of the enemy is to cease military operations at the present front line. In relation to this the enemy may allow small alterations.

It is thus necessary for us to decide: to struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a breakdown in the negotiations, to carry on the struggle for the cessation of military operations and to study the question of the cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Having studied, on the basis of the limited materials we have, the general world situation, the needs of our state and the fact that at present Korea cannot continue the war, we think that it is better to think over the question of cessation of military operations at the present front line than to carry on the struggle for the 38th parallel and bring the conference to a breakdown.

In connection with this it is necessary to take into consideration that it is possible to gain some concessions from the enemy in the discussion of the proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line.

Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 years time for preparation of forces.

Of course, if the enemy does not in any way abandon his unfounded proposal, which he is at present insisting on, then we also intend to choose only the path of a schism.

Having limited materials at our disposal, the situation has been studied superficially. We urgently ask your instructions for future actions.

No. 4061

LI KENONG12.8.51 4:00." MAO ZEDONG

13.8.51

region of the building where the negotiations are being conducted on his own initiative,

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, without agreement from the Americans. Listy 56-58]

88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23256 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING 01:3027.8.1951

SERIES "G"

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade Filippov!

In view of the fact that the enemy was not in a position to withdraw from the impasse created in the course of the negotiations on the question of a military demarcations on the question of a military demarcation line, he has undertaken a whole series of provocational actions.

On August 19 enemy troops, dressed in civilian clothes, made a raid on our security forces in the neutral zone in Kaesong, as a result of which one man was killed and one was wounded. After an investigation by representatives of both sides, the enemy in justifying himself stated that this was [committed by] partisans from the South Korean partisan detachment active in our region, and therefore he does not take any responsibility for this.

After this, on the night of August 22, one enemy plane dropped nine bombs on the territory of the neutral zone in Kaesong and fired on the house where our delegation is quartered. Although American officers came to investigate that same night, the enemy impudently refused to acknowledge their actions and contended that the fragments and craters found there are not from air force bombs. After this, the enemy, contradicting the former, said that the raid was made by an unidentified plane.

The enemy dared to make these impudent provocations because he considered that our side would not make a breakdown in the negotiations over this. He therefore wanted to use this measure to put pressure on us.

Of course, it is possible [that it was] a South Korean secret service plan to break up the negotiations, but the possibility is excluded that Syngmann Rhee could send a plane to make an attack on Kaesong in the

Therefore, the provocational acts of the enemy have caused us to make a decisive counterstroke.

We have declared a temporary cessation of the negotiations until the enemy accepts responsibility for what has happened. The negotiations will not be resumed until we receive a satisfactory answer-we'll let them cool their heels. However, we do not want to take the initiative in declaring a breakdown in the negotiations.

We suppose that the enemy will not openly acknowledge his provocational acts. The dragging out of the negotiations can end in two ways.

First, the delay may bring the negotiations to a breakdown.

We are forcefully preparing ourselves to resist a possible attack by enemy troops directly at the front. We are simultaneously strictly defending the ports on the western and eastern coast of North Korea from landings by the enemy. For the last several days enemy planes have passed through the area of the following cities on the China coast: Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hangchow. This was also done for provocational purposes.

Simultaneously with this, the enemy wanted to reconnoiter the air defense of our coastal regions. With regard to this, we want to strengthen our command in Korea and the air defense of the cities located in the coastal region. In a subsequent telegram I will communicate to you a draft [plan] for sending Soviet military advisers to work with the Chinese volunteer troops in Korea.

Simultaneously with this I will ask you about an additional delivery of artillery ar

maments.

Second, it is possible that as a result of the delay in the negotiations the enemy will find the means to extricate [himself] from the impasse and an agreement will be reached on the question of a military demarcation line.

At the present time we want to use the period of the break in negotiations for conducting a cold war in order to expose the impudent provocational acts of the enemy. However, we suppose that the enemy will not openly acknowledge his provocations.

If after some period of time the situation will develop so that the enemy wishes to renew the negotiations, then we think that at our own initiative we can propose a way

which would lead to a turn in the negotia- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
tions and to force the enemy to agree with
this.

Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the purpose of securing the neutral zone at Kaesong to ask representatives of neutral states to participate at the conference as monitors and witnesses for the period of negotiations, as a necessary condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Moreover, these representatives can be used in the future as a control organ for the implementation of the ceasefire.

How do you view this? Do you consider this necessary or do you have a better way? I ask your orders on the above. With greetings. Mao Zedong.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53]

89.28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from

THE SHTYKOV DIARIES: NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET POLICY IN KOREA

by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng

From the time of his appointment as Member of the Military Council of the USSR's Maritime [Far Eastern] Military District in the summer of 1945, until early 1951, when he was summoned to Moscow, Gen. Terentii Fomich Shtykov played the key role in planning and executing Soviet foreign policy in Korea. According to Gen. Nikolai Georgievich Lebedev, the Director of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea from the autumn of 1947, "there was not an event in which Shtykov was not involved." Recently, it has emerged that Shtykov kept personal diaries and that these were in the possession of his son, Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, who lives in St. Petersburg. Although, unfortunately, the diaries for some years are missing, they constitute an important new primary source for scholars of Soviet-Korean relations in the period from the end of World War II to the onset of the Korean War, and of other issues with which Shtykov was involved.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations in

All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), Kaesong and with your line on the necessity

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P83/280

Malenkov,

28 August 1951 Copies:
Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky
Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of
the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Commit-
tee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]
Decision of 28 August 1951
280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong
of 27 August (No. 4279)

To adopt the attached draft answer of
Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong.
SECRETARY CC

BEIJING

To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83
TOP SECRET

TO KRASOVSKY
For transmission to MAO ZEDONG
"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram of August
27.

Soviet Union who participated in the found-
ing of the North Korean regime have pub-
lished accounts, among them Gen. Kirill
Meretskov, the Commander of the Maritime
Military District (1971); Gen. Ivan
Chistiakov, Commander of the Soviet 25th
Army in North Korea until April 1947 (1975);
Lebedev (1976); I. Kravtsov, Special Aide to
Shtykov (1951); and V. Petukhov, a Soviet
Foreign Ministry official (1987). Although
these accounts are important sources for un-
derstanding the period, they all try more or
less to reproduce the "myth" that the Soviet
Army "liberated" North Korea. What makes
Shtykov's diaries so significant is that they,
unlike the writings of the others who worked
with him, provide candid and vivid pictures
of the Soviet occupation period.

Shtykov started his political career in 1938 as the Second Secretary of the Leningrad Communist party committee. He was Zhdanov's faithful protege.2 After 1938, he served as Member of the Military Council of the 7th Army during the Winter War in Finland (1939-40); Member of the Military Council of the Maritime Military District (1945-47); Deputy Commander of Political Affairs of the Maritime Military District (1947-48); the first Soviet Plenipotentiary Ambassador to North Korea (1948-51)3; Since 1960, many individuals from the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (1959-61);

of getting a satisfactory answer on the question of the incident provoked by the Americans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. As before, with regard to this we will proceed from the fact that the Americans have greater need to continue the negotiations.

We do not see the use in inviting, according to your initiative, representatives of neutral states to participate in the negotiations as monitors and witnesses during the present period of negotiations. The negative side of this proposal is that the Americans will view it as [an indication] that the Chinese-Korean side has more need quickly to reach an agreement about an armistice than do the Americans. If you are of such an opinion on this question, then you must communicate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung. FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,

full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1956-61); and four times Representative to the Supreme Soviet.4 He also received numerous decorations, including the Lenin medal (three times) and the firstdegree Kutuzov medal (three times).5

Shtykov started writing his memoirs in his last years but a fatal heart attack in 1964 halted the writing.6 He was not only a vigorous political activist but an ardent recorder, almost an archivist. He kept numerous diaries from 1938, when he became the Second Secretary of the Leningrad party committee, until his death; 60 volumes survive, each containing roughly 100-200 pages. Such record keeping was quite unusual in the Soviet Union, as many people were reluctant to keep private records for fear of frequent political purges.7 Shtykov also kept other official documents and pictures: as a photo collector, he kept thousands of pictures; he also saved letters, reports, and telegrams which he wrote or were sent to him; he even kept some newspaper scraps. Thus his diaries open for us a new horizon in studying Soviet policy in Korea after 1945.

Unfortunately, however, only a portion of his diaries covering the period when he was in charge of Korean affairs exists. For the entire period 1945-1951 only four vol

continued on page 92

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