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Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer If you agree with this decision of ours, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55] The telegram troops: in all nine persons, including: Main then General of the Army Zakharov can was sent to Beijing on August 29 (APRF, adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, depart soon for Beijing for further movement Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89]
adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser to the location of the staff of the Volunteer
on intelligence - 1, adviser on communica- troops in Korea. 90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, tions - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on
FILIPPOV [Stalin)." Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
VOSO [voennye soobshcheniie, military 3-ae.
communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, 10.IX.51 SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET [samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, ARMY engineering matters - 1.
List 109] CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397
2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, persons. Two advisers to each army, specifi- 93. 14 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Bulganin
cally: adviser of the command of the army Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951 and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the SERIES “G” T
army-1, adviser on operational questions -1. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Comrade FILIPPOV.
83 persons. Three persons in each corps, ARMY I I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I specifically: adviser of the command of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25902 agree that it is not advisable to take the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff Copies: Stalin (2) initiative in inviting representatives of neu- - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks From BEIJING Received 13:40 tral states as monitors and witnesses at the and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that 14.11.1951 present stage of the negotiations. the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea
SERIES "G” T. I have already communicated about this through Beijing in September and October
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] to Comrade KIM IL SUNG. 1951.
I ask you to study this question and After the resumption of negotiations for No. 4358 communicate your decision.
cessation of military operations in Korea, in 30.8.51
view of the large losses at the front over the MAO ZEDONG
last two months and the increase in demands [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, No. 4492
within America and outside its borders for List 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 8.9.51
cessation of military operations, the possibilDelo 5, Papka 11, List 56]
ity of the American side accepting the condi(Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, tions for an armistice has increased. HowListy 98-99]
ever, at the same time, taking into account 91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram,
internal and external politics, the American Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
92.10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, government is still trying to keep the internaFilippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
tional situation tense, and therefore the AmeriSECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
cans, while actively engaged in spying and THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET BEIJING
carrying out a policy of an advance in the ARMY
To Comrade KRASOVSKY course of the negotiations, are trying to drag CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703
for Comrade Mao Zedong
out the negotiations. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, “Comrade Mao Zedong!
The main question in the negotiations is Bulganin
We have received your telegram of 8 the determination of the demarcation line. In From BEIJING Received 16:20 September.
place of the demand for designation of the 8.9.1951
We agree to send a main military adviser demarcation line deep in the rear of our SERIES “G” T
and a group of military specialists as military troops, the enemy has proposed to designate
a To Comrade FILIPPOV (Stalin] advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer it on the basis of the present line of the front, Comrade FILIPPOV! troops in Korea.
with some alterations and with the inclusion In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this We consider it advisable to resolve the of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. year I communicated to you that we intend to question of sending military advisers to the At present the enemy is already deask the Soviet Government to send its mili- armies and corps after the main military manding the designation of the line in fact tary advisers for work among the troops of adviser familiarizes himself with the situa- contiguous with the line of the troops at the the Chinese volunteers in Korea.
tion on location and presents his consider- time of the signing of an agreement on cessaAfter studying this question and con- ations on this question.
tion of military operations as the demarcasulting with the Main Military Adviser Com- As main military adviser for the staff of tion line without the inclusion of the region rade Krasovsky, we consider that it is neces- the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are sary to invite 83 advisers: General of the Army Zakharov.
insisting on the cessation of military operations at the present front line and the desig- tions to propose to transfer the monitoring ther strengthening of the campaign to aid nation of the present line contiguous to the functions to neutral states, in other words to Korea and struggle against American impetroops of both sides as the demarcation line states that are not participating in the war. We rialism, for the purpose of ensuring the furwith the introduction of alterations in the want to invite three states to fulfill these ther conduct of the war in Korea, securing line contiguous to troops of both sides in tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India. also by financial means the stabilization of case of alterations of it in the period of the It is possible that the Americans will the scene within the country, and also achievement of an agreement on all points of oppose this at the beginning. Then we will strengthening state construction and mainly the agenda. At the present time the enemy is propose to introduce [as monitors) represen- construction of defense. fighting with us precisely on this question, tatives from Sweden and one state of Latin In the present year, in light of rendering but we assume that this fight will not con- America.
aid to Korea and the struggle against Ameritinue for long.
As regards the exchange of prisoners of can imperialism, the budget of the Chinese Our proposal about cessation of mili- war, we will oppose exchange according to state in comparison with 1950 has increased tary operations at the present front line and the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly our agreement to set aside the question of the exchange according to the principle of return being used in the Korean theater of military 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the of all prisoners of war by both sides. operations. (Military credit extended to us question of the withdrawal of all foreign I think it will not be difficult to reach by the Soviet Government is not included in troops from Korea before the convening of a agreement on this question.
this calculation.) political conference, was made not only be- On the question of the governments of Thus, if a regime of economizing is not cause the present negotiations are negotia- the interested states convening a conference introduced now, in the next year the budget tions about cessation of military operations of high level officials, three variants are pos- will increase even more, which inevitably and [because] the enemy will not in any case sible:
will have an influence on finances and lead to want to exchange eastern mountainous re- 1. Convening a conference of political a great rise in the prices of goods, which in gions to the north of the 38th parallel for representatives of both sides which are pres- turn will create difficulties at the front, and low-lying regions to the south of the 38th ently conducting negotiations. (It is possible also in the area of construction in the rear. It parallel, but also because in case the enemy that America will propose this variant.) is true that achieving peace as a result of the refuses to leave the eastern mountainous 2. Convening a conference with the par- negotiations is advantageous for us, but we regions we also have mountainous regions ticipation of four states: the Soviet Union, also are not afraid of dragging out the negothere [that are] advantageous for defense; as China, America, England and representatives tiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able regards the western coastal plain to the south of North and South Korea.
to achieve victory. At the same time we will of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us 3. Convening a conference with partici- be able successfully to carry out various because it has a much greater population pation of seven states: the Soviet Union, measures within the country and secure stathan the eastern regions, and furthermore it China, America, England, France, India, bilization and further development in the is rich in agricultural products, plus the re- Egypt and representatives of North and South area of politics and the economy. gion of Kaesong is an advanced post for Korea.
I ask your instructions on the above. taking Seoul. I ask you, proceeding from the interna
MAO ZEDONG Comrade Kim Il Sung during the dis- tional situation, to give instructions regard- No. 5631 cussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in ing which of the three variants is best or 14.11.51 June of this year had the same opinion on this propose a new variant. question. This time it also was done with his At the present time, on the basis of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, agreement.
aforementioned we will achieve cessation of Listy 16-19] As regards the discussion of the ques- military operations this year. At the same tion of monitoring at the negotiations, we time, we will carry out the necessary prepara
94. 19 November 1951, ciphered telegram earlier suggested to propose to create an tion in case of a dragging out of the negotia- from Roshchin conveying message from organ for cessation of military operations, in tions by the enemy and their breakdown. Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) which would be included representatives of Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn both sides, and to assign to it the task of out for another half year or year, we have
Ciphered Telegram monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions moved toward economizing on our human Copies: Stalin (2), Copy of the cessation of military operations and and material forces in the Korean theater of From BEIJING 17:10 19/XI.1951 monitoring in the buffer zone. military operations and we are pursuing the
Special No. 1821 However, the enemy is sure to demand tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal
TOP PRIORITY the establishment of monitoring in the rear of holding the position we presently occupy
SPECIAL of both sides, in order to limit the transport and inflicting great manpower losses on the 19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I by both sides of reinforcements and military enemy, in order to gain victory in the war. was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked goods.
Within the country we are preparing for me to transmit to Comrade Filippov the reWe intend to agree to the establishment the reorganization of the army, reduction of quest of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filippov sides and in accordance with your instruc- economizing, increasing production and fur- [Stalin) on the question of negotiations in Korea, which was transmitted to the Center not showing haste and not displaying interest 1352. From your telegram it is not clear on 14 November through Krasovsky. in a rapid end to the negotiations.
in connection with what and on whose initiaZhou Enlai acquainted me with the tele- We consider your position on the defini- tive the question arose about an appeal by the gram and added that while awaiting the reply tion of the line of demarcation and the estab- government of the DPRK to the General of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had lishment of monitoring in one or two border Assembly and the Security Council with a already twice declined to meet with Ameri- points to be correct. We also agree with you demand concerning a speeding up of the can representatives in Korea.
about the composition of the commission for resolution of the Korean question. It is also 19.XI.51 ROSHCHIN
the fulfillment of monitoring functions. not clear how the Chinese friends regard this,
Your position on the question of an since you do not communicate anything about [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, exchange of prisoners of war is completely this in your telegram. List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, correct and it will be difficult for the
oppo- An appeal by the government of the Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62] nent to dispute it.
DPRK to the General Assembly and to the
As regards the possible variants of con- Security Council as it is set forth in your 95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Polit- vening a conference for the further resolu- telegram: about the immediate cessation of buro decision with approved message tion of the Korean question after the conclu- military operations in Korea, about the withFilippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong
sion of an armistice, it seems to us that it drawal of troops along the front line and the
would be more expedient to convene a con- creation of a two kilometer demilitarization ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bol- ference of political representatives of both zone and about making answerable those sheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE sides which are presently conducting the guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could No. P84/421
negotiations, with the obligatory participa- be evaluated in the present situation, in con
, 19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, tion of representatives of North and South ditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky Korea.
sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting
FILIPPOV [Stalin] side, which is politically disadvantageous. of the Politburo CC VKP(b) (Central Com- 19 November 1951
Therefore, not having the text of the mittee, All-Union Communist Party
appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chi(bol'shevik)]
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 nese comrades and not knowing the motives Decision of 19 November 1951
, Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, which are guiding the Korean friends, we 421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on ques- Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy consider it necessary that you advise the tions of the negotiations about an armistice in of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in Korean friends to set aside resolution of the Korea.
[APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23] question of an appeal until the elucidation of
1 To adopt the attached draft answer of
the aforementioned questions. Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Com- 96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Polit- We await a more detailed report from rade Mao Zedong on questions of the nego buro decision with approved message from you. tiations about an armistice in Korea. Gromyko to Razuvaev
Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis TO KRASOVSKY 19 November 1951
5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 65-66] For transmission to Comrade MAO Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting ZEDONG.
of the Politburo CC VKP(b) (Central Com- 97. 20 November 1951, Gromyko to G.M. “Comrade Mao Zedong!
mittee, All-Union Communist Party Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to We received your telegram on the ques- (bol'shevik)]
Razuvaev tions of the negotiations about an armistice in
Decision of 19 November 1951 Korea.
422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev To Comrade MALENKOV G.M. We agree with your evaluation of the No. 1352.
I am sending a draft telegram to Compresent condition of the negotiations.
To adopt the attached draft instruction rade Razuvaev. I ask you to review it. The entire course of the negotiations for to Comrade Razuvaev.
A. Gromyko some time past shows that although the
20 November 1951 Americans are dragging out the negotiations,
No. 334/ag they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly
Copies: Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev concluding them. This is based on the
To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84
TOP PRIORITY overall international situation.
NORTH KOREA We consider it correct that the Chinesel
SOVIET AMBASSADOR Korean side, using flexible tactics in the NORTH KOREA
We draw your attention to the inadmisnegotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, To RAZUVAEV
sibility of your actions in connection with the
appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the UN with the aforementioned demands, and Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, opis 5a, question of speeding up a peace settlement you elucidated this only when you had re- Delo 5, papka 11, Listy 67-68] in Korea.
ceived a direct order to do so and after the You communicated only on 18 Novem- Koreans had already made their statement. 99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, ber (your No. [number is illegible]) about Learn this in the future.
Gromyko to Razuvaev the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and (Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,
To Comrade STALIN I.V. the Security Council with demands: about Listy 46-48 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, According to the report of Comrade the immediate cessation of military opera- Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 27-29)
Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately tions in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops
in French and American newspapers in Paris from the front line and creation of a 2- 98. 21 November 1951, ciphered telegram, which underscore the inevitability of a breakkilometer demilitarization zone and about Gromyko to Razuvaev
down in the peace negotiations in Korea and making answerable those guilty of prolong
the possibility of broadening the Korean ing the war in Korea—asking if such an MID USSR
conflict and which lay the responsibility for appeal would contradict the statement of Tenth Department
Received 18:35 this on the Korean-Chinese side (telegram Comrade Vyshinsky. 21.XI.1951
No. 812). Since we knew nothing about the pro
Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951
In connection with this, Comrade posed appeal of the Korean friends with a
Vyshinsky is introducing a proposal that by statement of the indicated demands, or at To NORTH KOREA
the time the period for agreement about a whose initiative arose the question of put- To RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY demarcation line [expires), i.e. by 27 Deting these demands before the UN, we asked
cember, the Korean-Chinese command pubyou to elucidate (our No. 1059).
On 20 November the following directive lish a communiqué about the course of the Without waiting for an answer to your
from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to negotiations with an exposure of the position telegram, in which were laid out the de- Roshchin:
of the Americans, which is aimed at drawing mands of the Korean friends mentioned “Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim out and breaking down the negotiations for above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is in- an armistice in Korea. In the opinion of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 deed a difference between Vyshinsky's de- Vyshinsky, MID [Ministry of Foreign AfNovember, the text of the statement by Pak mand about the immediate withdrawal of fairs]DPRK should send such a communiqué Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the ra- USA troops across the 38th parallel and the to the chairman of the General Assembly of dio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry present position of the Chinese-Korean com- the UN with a request to publish it as a (our No. 1059), on the question of the indi- rades about the delineation of the demarca- document of the UN and to send it to all the cated demands of the Korean friends you tion line at the present front line. Vyshinsky delegations in the Assembly session. limited yourself only to a report that you had could not speak otherwise in order to demon- MID USSR considers the above indiraised the question at your own initiative and strate the injustice of the USA position of cated reports of the French and American to a repetition of the question of whether refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the newspapers as blackmail, done for the
purthere is a discrepancy between the proposals 38th parallel. Vyshinsky's position is advan- pose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chiof Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of tageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, nese side. troops from the 38th parallel and agreement since it demonstrates from one side the greedi- As regards the communiqué proposed in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about ness of the Americans and from the other side by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is the establishment of a demarcation line. Con- the tractability and peaceableness of the Chi- scarcely necessary to give advice to the Kocerning the appeal, you also only reported nese-Korean comrades, who are making seri- reans and Chinese on this account, since they that it would be announced 19 November. ous concessions for the sake of achieving systematically publish reports which disThus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 peace.”
close the line taken by the Americans in the November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin negotiations about an armistice in Korea. November, you informed us that the Korean does not have communications with you and From the other side, the distribution of a friends will announce their appeal, even therefore cannot fulfill through you the order Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document though at that time you did not have instruc- about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the eluci- of the UN will not give any practical results, tions from us and could not yet have re- dation given in the directive of Comrade and a request from the Koreans and Chinese ceived an answer to your inquiry. As a result Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs) about this can be evaluated as a sign of their the Korean friends made the appeal without is sending the directive to you.
weakness. agreement with us.
In view of this, MID considers that to In that way you acted inadmissably Immediately telegraph the fulfillment. give any kind of advice to the Korean and thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also
Chinese governments regarding the by the fact that you did not even take the 21.X1.51
communiqué is inadvisable. trouble to find out from the Korean friends Copies: Stalin, Copy
A draft resolution is attached. whether they had reached agreement with
I ask you to review. the Chinese friends about the appeal to the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, (
25 December 1951
continuation of the war in Korea, the satel- states must name one deputy representative No. 396
lites of the enemy and the USA itself are who could participate in the meetings of the Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, monitoring organ in the name of its represenKaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev. therefore in recent days the enemy was forced tative. All representatives can take with
to set aside the discussion of the question of them assistants-advisers from among the citi[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, limiting restoration and construction of air- zens of their country. All invited neutral Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis ports in Korea and moved to discussion of states will provide the necessary number of 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]
small questions concerning the agreement. administrative workers for the creation of a
According to the concrete conditions of secretariat responsible for keeping proto100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram, the text of the agreement on an armistice cols, transmitting documents and translaMao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)
proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as tions.
before, this text is not final, in other words 3. The functions of the monitoring organ SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF that, as before, the enemy has included con- of neutral states are: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ditions about limiting the restoration and a) Practical control and monitoring of ARMY
construction of airports and about liberation the observation of the agreement by both CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008 of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after sides—not to transport to Korea from abroad, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, having declared that these conditions can be through mutually agreed upon points, shipBulganin
omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. ments to the rear as reinforcements, military From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951 From this it is obvious that the possibility of personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, Series “G” T
reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of tanks, arms and ammunition after the armiTo Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
course, we never have and are not now count- stice agreement is signed and goes into force, For the past period of time, in view of the ing only on these possibilities.
and also to carry out an exchange of military deliberate prolongation of the negotiations We simultaneously will vigilantly fol- personnel of both sides on the scale stipuby the enemy in the course of the negotia- low the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA lated by the agreement and in identical numtions for an armistice in Korea, up to the who in view of the growth of internal and bers: present time a final agreement has not been external opposition will carry out as before a b) Report about places where an inciachieved.
policy of prolonging and even of breaking dent occurs, about the guilt of anyone from However, on the basic questions of the down the negotiations in order to strain the the [two] sides outside the demilitarization cessation of military operations, for example: international situation even more. However zone who violates the agreement on armion the question “Establishment of a military we are prepared in military and in political stice, and also the carrying out of practical demarcation line between the two sides for relations to inflict decisive blows on the observation. the purpose of establishment of a demilita- enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the At the request of both sides or one side rized zone" an agreement has already been present time both sides in the negotiations of the commission on military armistice, the reached on three points.
have already moved over to detailed discus- monitoring organ must immediately send a On the question “working out practical sion of the questions.
neutral group for inspection and observation measures for the implementation of a For the purposes of achieving a final and also for bringing the results of the invesceasefire and armistice in Korea, including agreement on an armistice it is necessary to tigation to the commission on military armithe personnel, powers and functions of the receive your concrete instructions on the stice. apparatus for monitoring the implementa- following questions:
4. Simultaneously with the establishtion of the conditions of the ceasefire and 1. About the monitoring organ com- ment of the functions indicated in column armistice” an agreement has already been posed of representatives of neutral states. “A” point 3, the American side also proposes reached on six points (the texts are attached). The American side proposes that both that both sides after cessation of military
However, on the questions “Measures sides each invite three states whose armed operations must present information about about prisoners of war” the enemy in prin- forces are not participating in the military precise places of deployment of the land, sea ciple cannot oppose the liberation of all pris- operations in Korea, and also that each in- and air units which are participating in the oners of war. As a consequence of this, the vited state name one senior officer as a rep- military operations in Korea, and also must negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long resentative (in all 6 persons from the neutral not change the deployment or carry out a time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to states of both sides) for the creation of a concentration of their troops. We intend not drag out the negotiations under the pretext of monitoring organ of neutral states.
to agree with this, since it was not stipulated a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding We intend to agree with this arrange- in the points on which agreement was reached. and construction of airports after the cessa- ment and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and 5. As concerns the points of disembartion of military operations and also a demand Czechoslovakia to send representatives so kation in the rear where observation must be about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary that they could discuss the matter on an equal established, the American side proposes to basis. However, in view of the fact that our basis with representatives of the three states establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo side decisively opposes these proposals and invited by the USA and also have the right to [Inchon], Dzioio, Gensiu, Tsiusiu, Taiden, also in view of the fact that it is very difficult
Anto, Dzensiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten, for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for 2. Each of the abovementioned neutral Pusan—in all 12 points. In North Korea to