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1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer troops: in all nine persons, including: Main adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser on intelligence - 1, adviser on communications - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on VOSO [voennye soobshcheniie, military communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns [samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on engineering matters - 1.

2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 persons. Two advisers to each army, specifically: adviser of the command of the army and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the army -1, adviser on operational questions -1.

3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all 83 persons. Three persons in each corps, specifically: adviser of the command of the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea

I have already communicated about this through Beijing in September and October to Comrade KIM IL SUNG.

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1951.

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To Comrade KRASOVSKY
for Comrade Mao Zedong
"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We have received your telegram of 8 September.

We agree to send a main military adviser and a group of military specialists as military advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea.

We consider it advisable to resolve the question of sending military advisers to the armies and corps after the main military adviser familiarizes himself with the situation on location and presents his considerations on this question.

As main military adviser for the staff of the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send General of the Army Zakharov.

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To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
Comrade FILIPPOV!

After the resumption of negotiations for cessation of military operations in Korea, in view of the large losses at the front over the last two months and the increase in demands within America and outside its borders for cessation of military operations, the possibility of the American side accepting the conditions for an armistice has increased. However, at the same time, taking into account internal and external politics, the American government is still trying to keep the international situation tense, and therefore the Americans, while actively engaged in spying and carrying out a policy of an advance in the course of the negotiations, are trying to drag out the negotiations.

The main question in the negotiations is the determination of the demarcation line. In place of the demand for designation of the demarcation line deep in the rear of our troops, the enemy has proposed to designate it on the basis of the present line of the front, with some alterations and with the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone.

At present the enemy is already demanding the designation of the line in fact contiguous with the line of the troops at the time of the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations as the demarcation line without the inclusion of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are insisting on the cessation of military opera

tions at the present front line and the designation of the present line contiguous to the troops of both sides as the demarcation line with the introduction of alterations in the line contiguous to troops of both sides in case of alterations of it in the period of the achievement of an agreement on all points of the agenda. At the present time the enemy is fighting with us precisely on this question, but we assume that this fight will not continue for long.

Our proposal about cessation of military operations at the present front line and our agreement to set aside the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the convening of a political conference, was made not only because the present negotiations are negotiations about cessation of military operations and [because] the enemy will not in any case want to exchange eastern mountainous regions to the north of the 38th parallel for low-lying regions to the south of the 38th parallel, but also because in case the enemy refuses to leave the eastern mountainous regions we also have mountainous regions there [that are] advantageous for defense; as regards the western coastal plain to the south of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us because it has a much greater population than the eastern regions, and furthermore it is rich in agricultural products, plus the region of Kaesong is an advanced post for taking Seoul.

Comrade Kim Il Sung during the discussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in June of this year had the same opinion on this question. This time it also was done with his agreement.

As regards the discussion of the question of monitoring at the negotiations, we earlier suggested to propose to create an organ for cessation of military operations, in which would be included representatives of both sides, and to assign to it the task of monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the cessation of military operations and monitoring in the buffer zone.

However, the enemy is sure to demand the establishment of monitoring in the rear of both sides, in order to limit the transport by both sides of reinforcements and military goods.

We intend to agree to the establishment of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both sides and in accordance with your instruc

tions to propose to transfer the monitoring functions to neutral states, in other words to states that are not participating in the war. We want to invite three states to fulfill these tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India.

It is possible that the Americans will oppose this at the beginning. Then we will propose to introduce [as monitors] representatives from Sweden and one state of Latin America.

As regards the exchange of prisoners of war, we will oppose exchange according to the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose exchange according to the principle of return of all prisoners of war by both sides.

I think it will not be difficult to reach agreement on this question.

On the question of the governments of the interested states convening a conference of high level officials, three variants are possible:

1. Convening a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting negotiations. (It is possible that America will propose this variant.)

2. Convening a conference with the participation of four states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England and representatives of North and South Korea.

3. Convening a conference with participation of seven states: the Soviet Union, China, America, England, France, India, Egypt and representatives of North and South Korea.

I ask you, proceeding from the international situation, to give instructions regarding which of the three variants is best or propose a new variant.

At the present time, on the basis of the aforementioned we will achieve cessation of military operations this year. At the same time, we will carry out the necessary preparation in case of a dragging out of the negotiations by the enemy and their breakdown. Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn out for another half year or year, we have moved toward economizing on our human and material forces in the Korean theater of military operations and we are pursuing the tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal of holding the position we presently occupy and inflicting great manpower losses on the enemy, in order to gain victory in the war.

Within the country we are preparing for the reorganization of the army, reduction of the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of economizing, increasing production and fur

ther strengthening of the campaign to aid Korea and struggle against American imperialism, for the purpose of ensuring the further conduct of the war in Korea, securing also by financial means the stabilization of the scene within the country, and also strengthening state construction and mainly construction of defense.

In the present year, in light of rendering aid to Korea and the struggle against American imperialism, the budget of the Chinese state in comparison with 1950 has increased by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly being used in the Korean theater of military operations. (Military credit extended to us by the Soviet Government is not included in this calculation.)

Thus, if a regime of economizing is not introduced now, in the next year the budget will increase even more, which inevitably will have an influence on finances and lead to a great rise in the prices of goods, which in turn will create difficulties at the front, and also in the area of construction in the rear. It is true that achieving peace as a result of the negotiations is advantageous for us, but we also are not afraid of dragging out the negotiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able to achieve victory. At the same time we will be able successfully to carry out various measures within the country and secure stabilization and further development in the area of politics and the economy.

I ask your instructions on the above.
MAO ZEDONG

No. 5631 14.11.51

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 16-19]

94. 19 November 1951, ciphered telegram from Roshchin conveying message from Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

Ciphered Telegram
Copies: Stalin (2), Copy
From BEIJING 17:1019/XI.1951
Special No. 1821

TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked me to transmit to Comrade Filippov the request of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filippov [Stalin] on the question of negotiations in

Korea, which was transmitted to the Center on 14 November through Krasovsky.

Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the telegram and added that while awaiting the reply of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had already twice declined to meet with American representatives in Korea.

19.XI.51 ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62]

95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/421

not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.

We consider your position on the definition of the line of demarcation and the establishment of monitoring in one or two border lishment of monitoring in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission for the fulfillment of monitoring functions.

Your position on the question of an exchange of prisoners of war is completely correct and it will be difficult for the opponent to dispute it.

As regards the possible variants of convening a conference for the further resolution of the Korean question after the conclusion of an armistice, it seems to us that it would be more expedient to convene a conference of political representatives of both sides which are presently conducting the negotiations, with the obligatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea.

19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov,
Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky
Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting
of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- 19 November 1951
mittee, All-Union Communist Party
(bol' shevik)]

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FILIPPOV [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23]

96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko 19 November 1951

For transmission to Comrade MAO Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting ZEDONG. of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

"Comrade Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram on the questions of the negotiations about an armistice in Korea.

We agree with your evaluation of the present condition of the negotiations.

The entire course of the negotiations for some time past shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations, they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly concluding them. This is based on the overall international situation.

We consider it correct that the Chinese/ Korean side, using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line,

Decision of 19 November 1951 422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev No. 1352.

1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initiative the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous. Therefore, not having the text of the appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chinese comrades and not knowing the motives which are guiding the Korean friends, we consider it necessary that you advise the Korean friends to set aside resolution of the question of an appeal until the elucidation of the aforementioned questions.

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appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the question of speeding up a peace settlement in Korea.

You communicated only on 18 November (your No. [number is illegible]) about the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and the Security Council with demands: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops from the front line and creation of a 2kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea-asking if such an appeal would contradict the statement of Comrade Vyshinsky.

Since we knew nothing about the proposed appeal of the Korean friends with a statement of the indicated demands, or at whose initiative arose the question of putting these demands before the UN, we asked you to elucidate (our No. 1059).

Without waiting for an answer to your telegram, in which were laid out the demands of the Korean friends mentioned above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 November, the text of the statement by Pak Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the radio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry (our No. 1059), on the question of the indicated demands of the Korean friends you limited yourself only to a report that you had raised the question at your own initiative and to a repetition of the question of whether there is a discrepancy between the proposals of Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel and agreement in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about the establishment of a demarcation line. Concerning the appeal, you also only reported that it would be announced 19 November.

Thus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 November, you informed us that the Korean friends will announce their appeal, even though at that time you did not have instructions from us and could not yet have received an answer to your inquiry. As a result the Korean friends made the appeal without agreement with us.

In that way you acted inadmissably thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also by the fact that you did not even take the trouble to find out from the Korean friends whether they had reached agreement with the Chinese friends about the appeal to the

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Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951
CIPHERED TELEGRAM

To NORTH KOREA

To RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY
SPECIAL

On 20 November the following directive from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to Roshchin:

"Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is indeed a difference between Vyshinsky's demand about the immediate withdrawal of USA troops across the 38th parallel and the present position of the Chinese-Korean comrades about the delineation of the demarcation line at the present front line. Vyshinsky could not speak otherwise in order to demonstrate the injustice of the USA position of refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the 38th parallel. Vyshinsky's position is advantageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, since it demonstrates from one side the greediness of the Americans and from the other side the tractability and peaceableness of the Chinese-Korean comrades, who are making serious concessions for the sake of achieving peace."

In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin does not have communications with you and therefore cannot fulfill through you the order about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the elucidation given in the directive of Comrade Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is sending the directive to you. Confirm receipt.

Immediately telegraph the fulfillment.
21.XI.51 GROMYKO

21.XI.51
Copies: Stalin, Copy

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348,

Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, opis 5a, Delo 5, papka 11, Listy 67-68]

99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, Gromyko to Razuvaev

To Comrade STALIN I.V. According to the report of Comrade Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately in French and American newspapers in Paris which underscore the inevitability of a breakdown in the peace negotiations in Korea and the possibility of broadening the Korean conflict and which lay the responsibility for this on the Korean-Chinese side (telegram No. 812).

In connection with this, Comrade Vyshinsky is introducing a proposal that by the time the period for agreement about a demarcation line [expires], i.e. by 27 December, the Korean-Chinese command publish a communiqué about the course of the negotiations with an exposure of the position of the Americans, which is aimed at drawing out and breaking down the negotiations for an armistice in Korea. In the opinion of Vyshinsky, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] DPRK should send such a communiqué to the chairman of the General Assembly of the UN with a request to publish it as a document of the UN and to send it to all the delegations in the Assembly session.

MID USSR considers the above indicated reports of the French and American newspapers as blackmail, done for the purpose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chinese side.

As regards the communiqué proposed by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is scarcely necessary to give advice to the Koreans and Chinese on this account, since they systematically publish reports which disclose the line taken by the Americans in the negotiations about an armistice in Korea. From the other side, the distribution of a Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document of the UN will not give any practical results, and a request from the Koreans and Chinese about this can be evaluated as a sign of their weakness.

In view of this, MID considers that to give any kind of advice to the Korean and Chinese governments regarding the communiqué is inadvisable.

A draft resolution is attached.
I ask you to review.
A. Gromyko

25 December 1951 No. 396

Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan,
Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev.

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77]

100.31 January 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Bulganin

From BEIJING

Received 23:00 31.1.1951
Series "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
For the past period of time, in view of the
deliberate prolongation of the negotiations
by the enemy in the course of the negotia-
tions for an armistice in Korea, up to the
present time a final agreement has not been
achieved.

However, on the basic questions of the cessation of military operations, for example: on the question "Establishment of a military demarcation line between the two sides for the purpose of establishment of a demilitarized zone" an agreement has already been reached on three points.

On the question "working out practical measures for the implementation of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the personnel, powers and functions of the apparatus for monitoring the implementation of the conditions of the ceasefire and armistice" an agreement has already been reached on six points (the texts are attached).

However, on the questions "Measures about prisoners of war" the enemy in principle cannot oppose the liberation of all prisoners of war. As a consequence of this, the negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to drag out the negotiations under the pretext of a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding and construction of airports after the cessation of military operations and also a demand about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary basis. However, in view of the fact that our side decisively opposes these proposals and also in view of the fact that it is very difficult for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for

continuation of the war in Korea, the satel-
lites of the enemy and the USA itself are
trying to bring an end to the war in Korea,
therefore in recent days the enemy was forced
to set aside the discussion of the question of
limiting restoration and construction of air-
ports in Korea and moved to discussion of
small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of
the text of the agreement on an armistice
proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as
before, this text is not final, in other words
that, as before, the enemy has included con-
ditions about limiting the restoration and
construction of airports and about liberation
of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after
having declared that these conditions can be
having declared that these conditions can be
omitted and it is possible not to discuss them.
From this it is obvious that the possibility of
reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of
course, we never have and are not now count-
ing only on these possibilities.

We simultaneously will vigilantly follow the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA who in view of the growth of internal and external opposition will carry out as before a policy of prolonging and even of breaking down the negotiations in order to strain the international situation even more. However we are prepared in military and in political relations to inflict decisive blows on the enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the present time both sides in the negotiations have already moved over to detailed discussion of the questions.

For the purposes of achieving a final agreement on an armistice it is necessary to receive your concrete instructions on the following questions:

1. About the monitoring organ composed of representatives of neutral states.

The American side proposes that both sides each invite three states whose armed forces are not participating in the military operations in Korea, and also that each invited state name one senior officer as a representative (in all 6 persons from the neutral states of both sides) for the creation of a monitoring organ of neutral states.

We intend to agree with this arrangement and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia to send representatives so that they could discuss the matter on an equal basis with representatives of the three states invited by the USA and also have the right to invited by the USA and also have the right to veto.

states must name one deputy representative who could participate in the meetings of the monitoring organ in the name of its representative. All representatives can take with them assistants-advisers from among the citizens of their country. All invited neutral states will provide the necessary number of administrative workers for the creation of a secretariat responsible for keeping protocols, transmitting documents and translations.

3. The functions of the monitoring organ of neutral states are:

a) Practical control and monitoring of the observation of the agreement by both sides—not to transport to Korea from abroad, through mutually agreed upon points, shipments to the rear as reinforcements, military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, arms and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into force, and also to carry out an exchange of military personnel of both sides on the scale stipulated by the agreement and in identical numbers:

b) Report about places where an incident occurs, about the guilt of anyone from the [two] sides outside the demilitarization zone who violates the agreement on armistice, and also the carrying out of practical observation.

At the request of both sides or one side of the commission on military armistice, the monitoring organ must immediately send a neutral group for inspection and observation and also for bringing the results of the investigation to the commission on military armistice.

4. Simultaneously with the establishment of the functions indicated in column "A" point 3, the American side also proposes that both sides after cessation of military operations must present information about precise places of deployment of the land, sea and air units which are participating in the military operations in Korea, and also must not change the deployment or carry out a concentration of their troops. We intend not to agree with this, since it was not stipulated in the points on which agreement was reached.

5. As concerns the points of disembarkation in the rear where observation must be established, the American side proposes to establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo [Inchon], Dzioio, Gensiu, Tsiusiu, Taiden, Anto, Dzensiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten,

2. Each of the abovementioned neutral Pusan-in all 12 points. In North Korea to

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