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establish Singisiu, Manpkhodin, Kangge, Khesandun, Khekido, Sengdzii, Kaisiu-in all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the “construction and characteristics” of all types of arms and ammunition.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subordinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs.

All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrade leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia[?]

I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

No. 326 31.1.52

With greetings. MAO ZEDONG

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 73-77]

101.3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

Confirm receipt.

Telegraph the fulfillment. No. 72/III

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]

102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply from Mao to Peng Dehuai

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 21:45 8.2.1952

SERIES "G" T

TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]

I send you for familiarization the abbreviated text of the telegram to me from Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of 4.2 of this year.

The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai of 22.1 of this year.

"1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak HonYong was at my place. In a conversation he said that the Korean people throughout the

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709 country demand peace and do not want to
TOP PRIORITY
continue the war.
SPECIAL

TO KRASOVSKY

Transmit the following answer to MAO ZEDONG.

"Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We received your telegrams of January 31 concerning the negotiations on questions of an armistice.

We agree with the plan outlined by you and the evaluation of the course of the negotiations which you give. The firm position taken by you has already given positive results and must force the enemy to make further concessions.

We consider that you must make an agreement with the leading comrades of Poland and Czechoslovakia about including their representatives in the commission of observers, and they, of course, will agree with this. With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin]."

If the Soviet Union and China consider it advantageous to continue the war, then the Central Committee of the Labor Party will be able to overcome any difficulties and hold to their position.

I answered that a peaceful settlement on the basis of justice and rationality is advantageous for us. I also explained to him about the favorable conditions of our side in the present military situation and about the increase in the difficulties of America. Therefore an agreement on an armistice can be reached. However in military relations we will carry out active preparation of our forces for further conduct of military operations.

While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong agreed with my point of view about the general situation and said that his visit had the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion is not the opinion of the Central Committee of the Labor party and the Korean govern

ment, but purely his personal opinion.

2. In 1951 the Korean government collected agricultural taxes in kind in grain in the amount of 650,000 tons, which constituted too large a percentage of the entire yield. At the present time 10 percent of the population is suffering from hunger. The majority of the peasant population will be able to subsist only until April-May.

If there is no assistance soon, then this will influence not only the carrying out of spring sowing but also the gathering of the harvest.

They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean government 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in spring planting.

3. I consider that although our budget is also very strained, in 1952 we nevertheless need to plan to apportion 1,600,000 million yuan (which constitutes approximately 237 million rubles) according to the plan of 1951 budget year for rendering aid to Korea. This amount can hardly be reduced. I ask that all this possibly be planned earlier in the general budget."

My answer of 4.2 of this year.

"I received your telegram of 22.1 of this year. As concerns rendering aid to Korea, in our budget for 1952 we have already included expenditures of 1,500,000 million yuan (approximately equal to 222 million rubles), which somewhat exceeds the sum of the trade credit extended by China to Korea in 1951, the sum granted by China for urgent restoration of Korean railroads and also the sum granted by China for maintenance of Korean citizens located in Manchuria.

If military operations in Korea are ended, then it is assumed that expenditures for aid to Korea will be increased.

At the end of January of this year the Minister of Trade of Korea Comrade Chan Si U came to Beijing for negotiations about deliveries of goods in 1952. As a result of these negotiations the total value we established for goods delivered by us comes to 700,000 million yuan (approximately 103 million rubles).

Korea will not deliver anything to us in exchange, and therefore the aforementioned amount was established as the sum of trade credit.

As concerns foodstuffs stipulated in the application, the delivery according to this application will be carried out from February to May. In each month 5,000 tons of rice and 5,000 tons of chumiza [a cereal grain in Northeast Asia] (in all 40,000 tons of rice and chumiza will be delivered), in each month 200 tons of bean oil.

I ask you to review.
A. GROMYKO

5 March 1952
[As indicated in the file in AVPRF, the
Politburo decision was taken on March 7 to
reject Razuvaev's proposal, 1. 82. Draft
resolution to this effect is on 1. 83]

In addition, in February 3,300,000 meters [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, of cotton fabric will be delivered. List 3 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 81-83]

Negotiations will be concluded soon. According to your practical observation, if military operations in Korea cease, what is necessary to restore in Korea as first priority?

The army of the Chinese volunteers can render assistance as a work force to restore the highways and agricultural economy. What other kind of aid is needed from us? I ask you to study these questions and communicate your opinion." MAO ZEDONG

No. 431 8.2.52

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 81-83]

103. 5 March 1952, memorandum, Gromyko to Stalin

To Comrade STALIN I.V.

The Ambassador of the USSR in Korea Comrade Razuvaev proposes to advise Kim Il Sung to publish an interview with a TASS correspondent concerning the negotiations for an armistice in Panmunjom. (telegram No. 188).

In the draft presented by Razuvaev the interview touches on three questions: the dragging out of the negotiations by the American side; inviting representatives of the Soviet Union to a neutral organ for monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions of the armistice; the position of the Korean side in case of a breakdown in the negotiations by the American side.

In the opinion of MID USSR, the proposal of Comrade Razuvaev is unacceptable. The publication of such an interview could be interpreted as a manifestation of haste and nervousness on the Korean-Chinese side. Moreover, the elements of threat, contained in the answer to the third question, could be used for accusing the Korean-Chinese side of trying to complicate the course of the negotiations for an armistice.

Draft resolution is attached.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, File of 8th enemy almost without suffering any kind of Administration (2)

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

The government of the DPRK is moved by your fatherly concern about the urgent needs of the Korean people.

Your proposal to send us 50,000 tons of bread, which we accept with endless gratitude, is one more expression of the selfless fraternal assistance of the great Soviet people to Korea, which has suffered from American aggression but is prepared to defend to the end its freedom and independence.

A grateful Korean people wishes you, dear leader and teacher, many years of life and health for the happiness of mankind. KIM IL SUNG

16 April 1952

losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values.

Thus, for example, just recently the enemy put out of operation all the electrical stations of Korea and because of the active operations of VVS [air force] does not allow the possibility to restore them, which has caused and continues to cause huge losses to the entire national economy of the DPRK.

In only one 24 hour period of barbaric bombing, of only one city of Pyongyang (on July 11 and the night of July 12) more than 6,000 peaceful inhabitants were killed and wounded.

The enemy, making use of this situation, makes demands in the negotiations that are unacceptable to us.

Naturally, the Chinese friends refuse to

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, accept these conditions. We share the opinListy 60-61] ion of Comrade MAO ZEDONG on this question.

106.16 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Kim Il Sung to Stalin via Razuvaev

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 502597/sh
From Correspondent 20 Sent 17.7.52
18:45 Received 17.7 20:50
Sent to 8th Administration of the General
Staff of the Soviet Army 17.7 21:10

Extremely Urgent

To Comrade A. Vasilevsky
To Comrade A.Ia. Vyshinsky

I report the letter from KIM IL SUNG to Comrade STALIN I.V. of 16.7.52.

RAZUVAEV

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov,
Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin,
Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky.
No. 2250
17.7.52

"Respected comrade ambassador, I ask you to bring to the attention of Comrade STALIN I.V. the contents of the following telegram:

"Dear Comrade STALIN I.V.

I consider it necessary to report to you,

Josef Visarrionovich, about the following:

However, in order to spare the DPRK and its people suffering and unjustified, needless losses, it is necessary for us hopefully to provide cover for the most important sites and to go over to active operations.

For this it would be desirable:

1. To strengthen antiaircraft defense. By our accounting, for this it is necessary to receive additional arms for ten antiaircraft regiments (including three middle caliber regiments and seven small caliber regiments).

It is desirable in connection with this that the Chinese comrades put out half and that the KPA receive arms for five antiartillery regiments directly from you.

2. To activate the night operations of the VVS [Air Force] of the KPA [Korean People's Army] and CPV [Chinese People's Volunteers]. It is necessary to cover North Korea in the daytime with fighter aviation, if only up to the line of Pyongyang.

VVS of the KPA is prepared at any time to begin active military operations. Along with this, in the near future 40 crews of KPA TU-2 pilots will finish their training in the Soviet Union. We would like for these pilots

to come to the DPRK together with TU-2 airplanes so that they could immediately take part in active military operations and bring influence to bear on important enemy sites. 3. To carry out a number of ground operations, appreciable to the enemy, so as to divert the operations of the enemy VVS from our rear and to influence the course of the negotiations in Kaesong.

Aside from all of this, to raise the battle capability of the KPA it is extremely necessary for us to receive from you in the nearest future technical goods and materials according to our note of January 10, 1952 and July 9, 1952 and application for 1952 in the note of October 6, 1951, within the limits of your possibilities.

4. In Kaesong we need simultaneously to move decisively toward the soonest conclusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and transfer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva convention. These demands are supported by all peaceloving peoples and will lead us out of a passive position in Kaesong.

The change in the character of military operations on the ground and in the air will have a corresponding, desirable influence on the enemy.

A telegram of analogous content was sent to comrade MAO ZEDONG.

The Korean people are boundlessly grateful to you for the enormous selfless assistance being rendered to the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

We await your orders and advice on the aforementioned questions.

We wish you good health and long years of life for the well-being and happiness of progressive humanity.

With deep respect and esteem
Your Kim Il Sung
Pyongyang 16.7.52."

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65-68 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43]

107. 17 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 4018 BEIJING

TO KRASOVSKY

Transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG the following answer:

"Comrade MAO ZEDONG.

We consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely

correct.

Today we received a report from Pyongyang that Comrade KIM IL SUNG also agrees with your position.

FILIPPOV [Stalin]

16 July 1952"

Telegraph the fulfillment.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, List 69 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 89]

108. 18 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 15 July 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il Sung and 16 July 1952 reply from Kim to Mao

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21646 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky From BEIJING Received 12:15 18.7.1952 Series "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] I send to you for familiarization the text of my telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year to KIM IL SUNG and the text of the reply telegram to me from Comrade KIM IL SUNG of 21:00 16 July of this year:

"To Comrade KIM IL SUNG. Copy to Comrade LI KENONG. After we wrote a telegram to comrade LI KENONG we received your telegram of 18:00 14 July of this year.

After a two-day study by us of the given questions our comrades unanimously consider that at present, when the enemy is subjecting us to furious bombardment, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy, which does not signify in fact any kind of concession, is highly disadvantageous for us.

We will look at the positive and negative sides of this question:

Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will bring only one harmful consequence-further losses for the Korean people and Chinese people's volunteers. However, once the war began, China began to help Korea, the Korean people already honestly stood on the front line of defense of the camp of peace

of the whole world.

At the cost of the sacrifices of the Korean people a strengthening of the position at the 38th parallel has been won, North Korea and Northeast China have been defended.

The people of Korea and China, especially their armed forces, have received the possibility of being tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.

In addition, in the course of the struggle of the Korean and Chinese peoples, their might has been strengthened, which is inspiring the peaceloving peoples of the whole world in the struggle against aggressive war and is facilitating the development of the movement for defense of peace throughout the world. This also limits the mobility of the main forces of American imperialism and makes it suffer constant losses in the east. As the stronghold of peace throughout the world-the Soviet Union can strengthen its reconstruction and can exercise its influence on the development of the revolutionary movement of peoples of all countries. This will mean the delay of a new world war.

The presence of these great movements testifies to the fact that the Korean people are no longer alone.

In the first place, the Chinese people want to apply all their strength to overcome the difficulties of the Korean people. Therefore at the present time we ask you not to be ashamed to appeal to us with questions which demand an urgent resolution of the situation in Korea.

If we are not able to resolve your questions, then we will together with you appeal to FILIPPOV with a request to render assistance for the resolution of these questions.

As concerns the acceptance of the proposal of the enemy, that will bring great harm.

In the first place, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy under the influence of its bombardment will place us in a disadvantageous position in political and military relations.

The enemy will surely use this weakness of ours for further pressure on us, which will lead to new provocations from the side of the enemy. Then, being in a disadvantageous position, upon putting pressure on the enemy we possibly will suffer even greater failures and the aforementioned positive sides will lose their significance. This will signify an unsuccessful course, because of which the

whole game will be lost.

Therefore to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.

If we display resolution not to accept the enemy's proposal and to prepare ourselves for a breakdown in the negotiations from the side of the enemy, the enemy surely will not cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

In the process of a further delay of the negotiations, upon decisive insistence by our side on our point of view, it is possible that the enemy will make a new concession.

If the enemy will not concede or breaks off the negotiations, then we must continue military operations so as to find in the course of the war, which the enemy cannot resolve, a means for changing the present situation.

We will report to Comrade FILIPPOV about this proposal and the course taken by us and we will ascertain his opinion.

We will report to you the results upon receiving an answer from him.

With greetings! MAO ZEDONG,
3:00, 15.7.52"

"To Comrade MAO ZEDONG! Your telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year was received.

As a result of careful study and discussion of it, we have arrived at a unanimous conclusion. We consider that your analysis concerning the present situation is correct.

At the same time, considering our present position, you have communicated to us to that we henceforth not be ashamed to raise questions about the assistance we need, for which we are sincerely grateful to you.

We consider it necessary to activate military operations in the long struggle against the enemy. If we do not show aggressiveness in military operations and continue a passive defense, the enemy will not take into consideration our forces, and will continue furious bombardment for the purpose of putting military pressure on us.

We therefore propose to implement the following urgent measures:

1. It is necessary to strengthen antiaircraft artillery, by at least 10 regiments. It is necessary to strengthen PVO [Anti-aircraft Defense] of the city of Pyongyang and all important industrial sites, for example: Shuifens-kaya, Chandzinganskaya, and Puchenganskaya electrical stations.

2. It is necessary to make the air battles

of our VVS [Air Force] more active:

a) To improve the command of the VVS so that it correctly directs the air battles on Korean territory.

b) The diameter of operations of aviation units must not be limited only to the present line along the Yalu river. At the least, it is necessary to extend it to the border of Pyongyang and to strengthen by all measures the PVO of the capital and important industrial sites.

c) It is necessary to send already trained air force bomber units on night actions deep in enemy [territory], to boldly carry out air battles, subjecting to bombardment a number of airports, warehouses, barracks and other military installations of the enemy.

3. In infantry operations it is necessary to make local attacks on several parts of the front in order to put military pressure on the enemy.

I ask you to review the opinions indicated above and to make a decision about rendering us assistance.

With highest respect toward you. KIM IL SUNG. 21:00 16 July 1952.” MAO ZEDONG

No. 2084 18.7.52"

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 72-75 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 90-93]

[Ed. note: The next two documents coincide with a visit to Moscow by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952; the transcripts of three of Zhou's conversations with Stalin during this visit are printed elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.

109. 16 September 1952, hand-delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin conveying telegram from Mao to Zhou

To Comrade STALIN, I.V.

I send you a Russian translation of a telegram I received from comrade Mao Zedong.

I ask you to familiarize yourself with it and indicate a time of meeting convenient for you for receipt of your personal orders. With communist greetings.

Zhou Enlai.

16 September 1952.

Comrade ZHOU ENLAI.

1. According to our information, the Korean question will be discussed at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the UN. Regarding the question of prisoners of war Mexico has advanced a proposal consisting of 3 points, which are: first, both sides immediately conduct an exchange of prisoners who have expressed the wish to return to their homeland; second, the remaining POWs will be transferred to the temporary protection of UN member states and be subject to repatriation according to an agreement which will be concluded; third, after a normal situation is established in Korea, to guarantee that these POWs can return to their homeland and to provide them with the possibility for this. Until the restoration of a normal situation in Korea, if the POWS ask to return to their homeland, then the corresponding government also must take measures and present to them all possibilities for repatriation.

Apparently, the proposal to discuss the Korean question in the General Assembly of the UN was advanced at the initiative of England. The proposal of Mexico arose at the initiative of the USA. The latter have already expressed the wish to discuss this question in the UN General Assembly.

We intend to express opposition to such a variant.

I ask you to consult with comrade FILIPPOV about what our position should be on this question.

2. India and Burma have made indications that they would like to sign a nonaggression pact with us, and also hope that aggression pact with us, and also hope that you will visit these countries. The essence is that [Indian leader Jawaharlal] Nehru would like to visit China, with a view, however, that you will go to India on a return visit. We received this information from our ambassador in Burma Iao Chzhun-min.

I suggest that it is highly possible that India and Burma will advance these questions for an exchange of opinion. If India and Burma make these proposals officially, then it would be inconvenient for us to refuse.

I ask also that you consult with Comrade FILIPPOV about whether it is advisable for China to conclude such pacts with India and Burma.

Mao Zedong.

15 September 1952

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 94-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,

Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 96-98]

110. 17 September 1952, hand-delivered letter, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG We agree with you that the proposal of the Mexicans is unacceptable, since it reflects the position of the USA in the negotiations in Korea. As is obvious, the USA, not having achieved successes in negotiations in Korea, intends now to receive approval of their position in the UN and to make those same demands in the name of the UN. The Mexicans are the agents of the USA.

If the Mexicans advance their proposal in the UN, the delegation of the USSR will reject this proposal as not corresponding to the interests of cessation of the war in Korea, and will try to attain the following:

"1. Immediate cessation of military operations of the [warring] sides on land, sea and air.

2. Return of all POWs to their homeland according to international norms.

3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, including also the Chinese volunteer units, in the course of 2-3 months and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question in the spirit of the unification of Korea, carried out by the Koreans themselves under the observation of a commission with the participation of the sides directly interested as well as other states, including states which have not taken part in the war in Korea."

As concerns the proposal about temporarily withholding 20% of POWs from both sides and returning all remaining POWs, the proposal of the Soviet delegation will not touch on this and it will be left with you in

reserve.

On the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with India and Burma we completely share your point of view. FILIPPOV [Stalin]

17 September 1952

Stalin's handwritten draft is attached.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 97-103 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 99]

111. 27 December 1952, Semenov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong

BEIJING

To the Main Military Adviser

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