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for Comrade MAO ZEDONG
It is not necessary to dwell in detail on Comrade Mao Zedong!
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, all that the aggressor has done in the course We have received your telegram of 17 Listy 115-116)
of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest December
people of the whole world, the actions of the Your observations regarding the prob- 112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea ability of an attack by the Americans in the Council of Ministers with draft letters more and more expose that bloc, and espespring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong
from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong cially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an American command in Korea, who are oper- and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet international factor that is pursuing a policy ating under the leadership of the Truman delegation at United Nations
of preparing a new war and is ready to shift government. It is fully possible that these
to a policy of broadening the war solely in plans will be changed by the Eisenhower
COUNCIL OF MINISTERSUSSR order to dictate to people their aggressive government in the direction of less tension
imperialistic will, which expresses an aspiraon the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are
Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc. tion for world domination, for the subjugaacting correctly when you count on the worst
tion of peoples to their imperialistic aims. and proceed from the probability of an attack
The Soviet Government considers that by the Americans.
Question of MID
we should regard all these important circumWe have reviewed your application for
stances of the international order in the same military goods for 1953 and the application The Council of Ministers of the USSR way that we have regarded them until now. for urgently needed military goods. RESOLVES:
This does not mean, however, that in present The quantity of arms, ammunition and 1. To confirm the attached draft letters conditions we must simply mechanically conother military goods which you requested of the Government of the USSR to Comrades tinue the line followed until now in the quesoversteps the limits of our possibilities in Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment tion of the war in Korea and not attempt to 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact No. 1).
display initiative or to use an initiative of the that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, To transmit the present letter to Com- opposing side and to secure the withdrawal ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry rade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou of Korea and China from the war in accordivisions, this means that we must deliver for Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and dance with the fundamental interests of the each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Chinese and Korean peoples and also in of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of vari- Comrade Malik, who will immediately be
Comrade Malik, who will immediately be accordance with the interests of all other ous types and other goods. sent to Pyongyang.
peaceloving peoples. Taking into account the situation you 2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet In connection with all the abovestated speak of in your telegram, with great diffi- delegation in the General Assembly (Attach- and taking into account the concrete facts of culty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides ment No. 2).
late regarding the war in Korea, we consider the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions Representative of the Council of Minis- it urgently necessary to carry out a number of [already] earmarked, with equal shipments ters of the USSR G. Malenkov
measures, in particular: until the end of the year, approximately one
1. It is necessary that Kim Il Sung and fourth of the quantity you stated in your Business Manager of the Council of Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the telegram of 17 December, specifically: Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on Feb600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of
ruary 22 on the question of an exchange of artillery of various types, tractor artillery,
Attachment No. 1
sick and wounded prisoners of war. detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts
2. Immediately after the publication of of the deliveries of each will be determined The Soviet Government has thoroughly the answer of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, by our War Ministry.
reviewed the question of the war in Korea an authoritative representative of the govThus, with a calculation of the arms and under present conditions and with regard to ernment of the PRC (best of all would be ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry the entire course of events of the preceding Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to period. As a result of this, the Soviet Govern- Beijing in which is underscored a positive you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed ment has reached the conclusion that it would attitude toward the proposal on an exchange to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 be incorrect to continue the line on this of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and pieces of artillery of various types, as op- question which has been followed until now, also to indicate that the time has arrived to posed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952. without making those alterations in that line resolve the entire question of prisoners and,
As regards the applications for materi- which correspond to the present political consequently, to secure the cessation of the als for military production mentioned in your situation and which ensue from the deepest war in Korea and the conclusion of an armitelegram, transmitted to us by Minister of interests of our peoples, the peoples of the stice. Foreign Trade Comrade E Tszi USSR, China and Korea, who are interested 3. Simultaneously with the aforemenChzhuanom—this application is now being in a firm peace throughout the world and tioned statement in Beijing, the head of the studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade. have always sought an acceptable path to- government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, , SEMENOV (Stalin).
ward the soonest possible conclusion of the should make a statement in Pyongyang which 27 December 1952. war in Korea.
declares full support for and the justice of the
aforementioned statement of the govern- sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed their command, including all units and perment of the PRC.
from that fact that the task consists not only of sonnel of land, sea and air forces, going into 4. We consider it also advisable that securing a positive resolution of the indicated effect twelve (12) hours after the agreement immediately after the aforementioned state- question, but also in securing a positive reso- on armistice is signed, and guarantee the ments in Beijing and Pyongyang, the Minis- lution of the entire question of prisoners of fulfillment of this order.” ter of Foreign Affairs of the USSR make a war, and consequently, to remove the ob- There was also agreement on the folstatement in Moscow with corresponding stacles to the achievement of an agreementon lowing important conditions for the armifull support for the Beijing and Pyongyang the cessation of military action and the con- stice: statements.
clusion of an armistice. Article 109 of the 1) About the determination of a military 5. In accordance with the four measures Geneva Convention should be used for this, demarcation line, which must run along the enumerated above, the Soviet delegation to especially the second paragraph of this ar- line contiguous to [the position of] the troops the General Assembly of the UN in New ticle, which stipulates the conclusion of “an of the warring sides on the day the armistice York should do everything possible to sup- agreement on repatriation or internment in a goes into effect, in other words along the line port and move forward the new political line neutral country of healthy prisoners of war of the front, from which “troops of both sides which is laid out above.
who have spent a long time in captivity.” will withdraw for two kilometers in order to We consider it necessary to give the In the negotiations propose that all pris- form a demilitarized zone...” (point 1 of the following elucidation of the abovestated: oners of war who insist on repatriation be draft agreement on armistice).
First. About the answer to General Clark. repatriated immediately, but the remaining 2) About the establishment of a Military We consider that the response letter of Kim prisoners be handed over to a neutral country
Commission on the armistice composed of Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark in order to secure a fair resolution of the 10 senior officers, from whom five will be should express full agreement with Clark's question of their repatriation.
named by the Commander in Chief of the proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and With regard to these prisoners add that a armed forces of the UN and five by the wounded prisoners of war, with an indica- classification according to nationality and Command of the Korean People's Army and tion that they have in mind a positive resolu- place of residence be made, as was proposed the Command of the Chinese volunteers tion of this question in accordance with in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng (point 19). The Commission must monitor article 109 of the Geneva Convention. Dehuai to General Clark on October 16, 1952 the observance of the armistice agreement,
In the answer to Clark indicate that the (this is also in accordance with the Indian including monitoring the work of the Comquestion of the exchange of sick and wounded draft on Korea).
mittee on repatriation of prisoners of war and prisoners has the greatest significance for a After the classification, prisoners of war regulate through negotiations possible violasuccessful resolution of the entire question immediately receive the right to return to tions of the armistice agreement (pp. 24 and of prisoners of war, and consequently, for a their homeland, which will be facilitated by 25). successful resolution of the question of the the assistance of all interested sides.
3) About the creation of a Commission cessation of the war and the conclusion of an Second. About the statement in Beijing of neutral states to supervise the armistice, armistice. In view of this, propose to resume In this statement it would be advisable to say composed of representatives from Sweden the negotiations in Panmunjom between the that the government of the PRC has discussed and Switzerland named by the Commander main representatives of both sides to nego- the question raised by General Clark with the in Chief of the UN Military Forces and tiations for an armistice.
government of the DPRK and both the
gov- representatives of Poland and CzechoslovaPropose that the date of the negotiations ernment of the PRC and the government of kia named by the Supreme Commander of be established by the officers connected the DPRK have reached the same conclusion the Korean People's Army and the Comwith both sides.
about the necessity to give their representa- mander of the Chinese Volunteers. (pp. 36 In the course of the negotiations on the tives in Panmunjom an order to enter into and 37) exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, in negotiations with General Clark on the ques- The Commission may create inspection accordance with article 109 of the Geneva tion of the exchange of sick and wounded groups composed of representatives of those Convention, which stipulates that “not a prisoners of war, having in mind the achieve- states. (p. 40). single wounded and sick prisoner of war can ment of a positive resolution of this question The Commission of neutral states must be repatriated against his wishes during mili- in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva supervise the implementation of the agreetary action,” add the receipt of a guarantee Convention of 1949, and also a positive reso- ment on the armistice and fulfill the funcfrom the American side that in relation to lution of the question of prisoners of war as a tions of control (p. 41). prisoners of war, under no circumstances whole. In the statement indicate that in the Inspection groups of neutral states will will forcible measures be applied to prevent course of the negotiations between both sides disembark at the ports of Synyidzhu, their return to their homeland. in Kaesong and Panmunjom, agreement was Chongchin, Khungnam, Manpo and
, Propose also to establish a commission reached on all questions except the question Sinandzhu (North Korea), Inchon, Taegu, of representatives of Poland, Czechoslova- of prisoners of war.
Pusan, Kanchung and Kunsan (South Kokia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assis- Thus, agreement was reached that com- rea). tance in returning sick and wounded prison- manders of military forces of both sides “give Moreover, the sides reached agreement ers to their homeland. an order for the full cessation of any type of
that the commanders of both sides must In the negotiations on the exchange of military action in Korea by all troops under “recommend to the governments of interested countries of both sides that a political which should be made immediately after the operations on land, sea and in the air. conference of all sides at the highest level be aforementioned statements in Beijing and At the initiative of the Soviet Union, convened within three months of the signing Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow
Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow negotiations between the warring sides were and implementation of the armistice...for the statement to be underscoring before the whole begun in Kaesong in June 1951 for a ceasefire resolution by means of negotiations of ques- world the full solidarity and concordance of and armistice in Korea. These negotiations tions regarding the withdrawal from Korea action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK led to agreement on all questions except the of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution on the question of the war in Korea. question of repatriation of prisoners of war. of the Korean question etc.” (point 60).
Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the The Soviet Union continues to consider the A significant portion of the articles of General Assembly of the UN in New York. position taken in this question by the Chinese the draft agreement concerning prisoners of The Soviet delegation in the General Assem- People's Republic and the Korean People's war was also agreed to, with the exception of bly must act in accordance with the entire Democratic Republic to be just and fully in the question of repatriation of prisoners. The abovedescribed political plan with regard to accordance with the principles of internagovernment of the PRC (Government of the the war in Korea. In this connection it is tional law and international practice, and DPRK), following its policy of preserving necessary that as soon as the Polish draft also the positions of the Geneva Convention and strengthening peace, striving for a peace- resolution “On Averting the Threat of a New of 1949. The Soviet Union fully supports ful resolution of the Korean question and World War” comes up for discussion, the this position. applying all its efforts to the immediate ces- Soviet delegation would secure the introduc- The question of the exchange of prisonsation of the war, proposes to resolve also the tion of the corresponding alterations to this ers of war is the single unresolved question in question of prisoners of war as a whole. The draft in the part concerning Korea and also the negotiations between the warring sides in government of the PRC (Government of the the necessary statements by the Soviet del- Korea. The governments of the PRC and DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt mea- egation and the delegations of Poland and DPRK have declared their readiness to adopt sures to eliminate the disagreements on this Czechoslovakia.
measures from their sides toward the settlequestion, which is at present the only ob- Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without ment of this question, in order to remove the stacle to the conclusion of an agreement on saying that at the present time we cannot last obstacle to a ceasefire in Korea and the ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, foresee all steps and measures which the conclusion of an armistice. the Government of the PRC (DPRK) pro- governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK The Soviet Union welcomes the noble poses that all prisoners of war who insist on will need to make. However, if there is full initiative of the Chinese People's Republic repatriation be immediately repatriated and agreement between our governments in the and the Korean People's Democratic Repubthe remaining prisoners be handed over to a conduct of a general line on this question, for lic on this question. The Soviet Union ferneutral country to secure a just resolution of which we fully hope, then the remaining vently supports the proposal on resumption the question of their repatriation.
points can be agreed upon in the course of the of negotiations in Korea with the goal of The Beijing statement must also say the affair.
achieving an agreement on exchange of sick following:
and wounded prisoners of war, and also on Our new step, which is directed at the DIRECTIVES FOR THE
settlement of the entire question of prisoners conclusion of the war in Korea, should also SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE
of war, and consequently, also the question serve as an example for a positive resolution GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN. of cessation of the war in Korea and concluof a number of other important and urgent
sion of an armistice. international questions, first of all the resto- 1. To commission the delegation of the Commission the Soviet delegation in ration of the rights of China and Korea in the USSR in the General Assembly (Comrade the General Assembly to reach an agreement UN.
Vyshinsky), upon the presentation for dis- with the Polish delegation about introducing Third. On the statement in Pyongyang.
cussion of the resolution of the Polish del- into the draft Polish resolution on the quesWe suggest that in this statement Comrade egation, the part concerning Korea, to make tion of averting the threat of a new world war Kim Il Sung should indicate that the afore- a statement with firm support for the last the following alterations in the part concernmentioned statement of the representative of proposals and statements of the PRC and ing the Korean question: in place of the old the PRC was worked out jointly by the gov- DPRK.
text of p. "b)” (about returning all prisoners ernments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Having set forth the position of the So- of war to their homeland) to include the Government of the DPRK fully shares both viet Union in the question of exchange of following text: “b) immediate resumption of the evaluation of the political situation con- prisoners of war as a position which fully negotiations on an armistice between the tained in the Beijing statement and the con- corresponds to generally acknowledged prin- sides, having in mind that at the same time crete conclusions and proposals contained in ciples of international law and the positions the sides will apply all efforts to achieve an it. In connection with this, underscore not of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which agreement on the question of exchange of only the full support for, but also the justice demands repatriation of all prisoners of war, sick and wounded prisoners of war as well as of, the statement of the representative of the the representative of the USSR must point on the entire question of prisoners of war and PRC.
out the following. The Soviet Union has will thus apply all efforts to remove the Fourth. About the statement in Mos- repeatedly proposed and is proposing to rec- obstacles that are hindering the conclusion of cow. We consider expedient a statement by ommend to the warring sides in Korea that the war in Korea.” the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, they immediately and fully cease military
(Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will inform [
Concerning economic causes, Mao Listy 60-71 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the Chinese friends about this.
stated that in the first two years of the war the 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 54-65]
29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko American monopolists amassed colossal
SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265) profits in military orders and deliveries, but 113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram 29.III.53
with the end of the negotiations for an armifrom Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvaev and stice, and also as a result of the strengthening Pyongyang (from notes taken at AVPRF; Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 of the movement to end the war in Korea, photocopy not available]
they were received by Kim Il Sung in the their profits began to fall sharply.
presence of General Nam II, that Kim Il Sung Having returned to the military side of CIPHERED TELEGRAM
was given the document which arrived from the matter, Mao noted that from a purely From PYONGYANG
Moscow and that they agreed to meet again military point of view it would not be bad to Top Priority
after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in continue to strike the Americans for approxiSpecial File detail with the document.
mately another year in order to occupy more In response to your communication No. No. 242 (iskh. No. 6277) 24.III.53 favorable borders along the Changan river. 359.
Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Further movement to the south would risk During the second meeting on March Sung that Moscow advises that the decision stretching out the flanks in the west and east 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully of the question of naming Nam Il as Minister shore of Korea. In this case the danger of agrees with the proposal of the Soviet gov- of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik's landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean ernment on the Korean question and consid- arrival and that it would be good at the present troops would grow significantly. ers that this proposal must be implemented moment to be limited to the naming of a Touching on further steps after the signas soon as possible.
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who ing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the Kim Il Sung further underscored that would meanwhile serve as minister.”
government of the PRC has a number of the time has come to show initiative from
questions about which it would like to conour side on the question of the conclusion of [Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo sult with the government of the USSR. By the war in Korea and achievement of peace. 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122]
approximately 10 August, we will prepare a It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to
proposed plan of measures about which it is carry out military operations or to end the 114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, necessary to consult with the Soviet governwar; a further dragging out of the existing Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re ment. situation is not in the interests of the DPRK meeting with Mao Zedong
Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting. and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp.
KUZNETSOV In connection with this, Kim pointed out that
CIPHERED TELEGRAM the losses on the Korean side at the front and From BEIJING From Kuznetsov
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) are To MID USSR
Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis very significant and it is hardly advisable to Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158] conduct further discussion with the Ameri- Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, cans regarding repatriation of a disputed Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky,
, , 115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, number of prisoners of war. In the present Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob
excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassaconditions, Kim said, the proposal of the [reporting a meeting of July 28]
dor to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Soviet government is the most advisable and After listening to the greetings of the CC Mao Zedong
CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude Kim Il Sung is taking measures to pre- to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP.
CIPHERED TELEGRAM pare for the anticipated negotiations: the Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach Strictly Secret number of sick and wounded prisoners in the an armistice not only by force of military From BEIJING DPRK is being determined, materials for the reasons but also by force of political and 31 March I visited Comrade Mao negotiations in Panmunjom are being pre- economic reasons. In military matters the Zedong. pared, a statement from Pyongyang is being last year has shown that the enemy is not only ... The important moments that apparently prepared, etc.
not in a condition to advance on land but is somewhat strengthened Stalin's trust in the Following your instructions (Your Com- also not able firmly to hold and defend the CCP were your (my) information about the munication #242) we agreed with Kim Il line of the front. The Chinese troops had trip to China and the Korean war—the perSung that the representative at the negotia- begun not only to conduct a positional war formance of the Chinese People's Voluntions (if they resume) will be Nam Il, as but also to break through the front.
teers, although in this question, said Mao before. In connection with this, the publica- Among the political causes that forced Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. tion of a decree of the Presidium of the the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao On the Korean question, when I (Mao Supreme People's Assembly about naming noted the military contradictions in the camp Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949Nam Il Minister of Foreign Affairs will be of the imperialists and the significant activa- January 1950] we came to an understanding delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign tion of world social opinion, which is speak- about everything, the issue was not about the Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being ing out against the war in Korea.
seizure of South Korea, but about the signifi
cant strengthening of North Korea. But Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci
Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci- People's Republic of China subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, phered telegrams
Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul where some kind of agreement was reached, Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Politiabout which no one considered it necessary the Chinese Communist Party
cal Adviser in North Korea to consult with us beforehand. It should be Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a Foreign Affairs, USSR
of the Soviet Armed Forces serious miscalculation in the Korean war Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade- Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the about the supposed impossibility of inter- Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist DPRK until December 1950 vention of international forces on the side of Party who established a rival government in Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delegaSouth Korea...
Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland tion to United Nations, had served as Minis-
ter Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to KoKaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR rea 1946-48 (Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Kim Ch’aek, Deputy Commander of Korean Vasiliev, Major General, Head of Soviet Delo not given] People's Army
Military Advisory Group in DPRK Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Com- Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS mittee of the Korean Workers' Party Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Af
Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence fairs, USSR APRF Archive of the President, Russian and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Af- Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special delFederation
fairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at egation to the United Nations from the AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian armistice negotiations
People's Republic of China in December Federation Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force,
1950 CC Central Committee (of a communist PRC
Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of party)
Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the the People's Republic of China
Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People's CPV Chinese People's Volunteers (the Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United Volunteers designation given PLA units sent to fight in Nations
Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich, Korea)
Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the
, DPRK Democratic People's Republic of spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Com- Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special MiliKorea (North Korea) munist Party
tary Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev) KPA Korean People's Army (the army Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V.Zakharov Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Comof North Korea)
Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, missar sent to Beijing during Korean War as MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del USSR
Stalin's personal military envoy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of For- Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People's PLA People's Liberation Army (Army eign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chair- Republic of China of the PRC)
man of Council of Ministers, USSR, until PRC People's Republic of China restored to Foreign Minister's post followVKP(b) All-Union Communist Party ing Stalin's death in March 1953
Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Profes(bolshevik)
Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff sor of History, Florida State University VVS Voennye Vozdushnye Sily Air of People's Liberation Army
(Tallahassee), is working on a book on Force Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean
the Soviet Union and the Korean War. People's Democratic Republic
She contributed articles on new Russian
archival evidence on the Korean War to named by Mao Zedong as deputy com
CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR mander and deputy political commissar of Belov, General M. Chief of Staff for Soviet Chinese People's Volunteers
(Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese Working Paper No.8 on "Soviet Aims in Air Corps People's Volunteers in Korea
Korea and the Origins of the Korean Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Coun- Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from cil of Ministers, USSR
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Russian Archives.”
Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to
DPRK following Shtykov's dismissal in Deand Political Commissar
cember 1950 Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 apthe Soviet embassy in Beijing
pointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in
Korea Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ciphered telegrams
Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the