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for Comrade MAO ZEDONG
Comrade Mao Zedong!

We have received your telegram of 17 December.

Your observations regarding the probability of an attack by the Americans in the spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

We have reviewed your application for military goods for 1953 and the application for urgently needed military goods.

The quantity of arms, ammunition and other military goods which you requested oversteps the limits of our possibilities in 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry divisions, this means that we must deliver for each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of various types and other goods.

Taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram, with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions [already] earmarked, with equal shipments until the end of the year, approximately onefourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram of 17 December, specifically: 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts of the deliveries of each will be determined by our War Ministry.

Thus, with a calculation of the arms and ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 pieces of artillery of various types, as opposed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952.

As regards the applications for materials for military production mentioned in your telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of Foreign Trade Comrade E Tszi Chzhuanom-this application is now being studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade. SEMENOV [Stalin].

27 December 1952.

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 115-116]

112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR Council of Ministers with draft letters from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet delegation at United Nations

It is not necessary to dwell in detail on all that the aggressor has done in the course of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest people of the whole world, the actions of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea more and more expose that bloc, and especially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an international factor that is pursuing a policy of preparing a new war and is ready to shift to a policy of broadening the war solely in

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR order to dictate to people their aggressive RESOLUTION

Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc. Moscow, Kremlin

Question of MID

1. To confirm the attached draft letters of the Government of the USSR to Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment No. 1).

imperialistic will, which expresses an aspiration for world domination, for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic aims.

The Soviet Government considers that we should regard all these important circumstances of the international order in the same

The Council of Ministers of the USSR way that we have regarded them until now. RESOLVES: This does not mean, however, that in present conditions we must simply mechanically continue the line followed until now in the question of the war in Korea and not attempt to display initiative or to use an initiative of the opposing side and to secure the withdrawal of Korea and China from the war in accordance with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples and also in accordance with the interests of all other peaceloving peoples.

To transmit the present letter to Comrade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Comrade Malik, who will immediately be sent to Pyongyang.

2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet In connection with all the abovestated delegation in the General Assembly (Attach- and taking into account the concrete facts of ment No. 2). late regarding the war in Korea, we consider Representative of the Council of Minis- it urgently necessary to carry out a number of ters of the USSR G. Malenkov measures, in particular:

1. It is necessary that Kim Il Sung and Business Manager of the Council of Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly reviewed the question of the war in Korea under present conditions and with regard to the entire course of events of the preceding period. As a result of this, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in a firm peace throughout the world and have always sought an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea.

appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on February 22 on the question of an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

2. Immediately after the publication of the answer of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, an authoritative representative of the government of the PRC (best of all would be Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in Beijing in which is underscored a positive attitude toward the proposal on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also to indicate that the time has arrived to resolve the entire question of prisoners and, consequently, to secure the cessation of the war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

3. Simultaneously with the aforementioned statement in Beijing, the head of the government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, should make a statement in Pyongyang which declares full support for and the justice of the

aforementioned statement of the government of the PRC.

4. We consider it also advisable that immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR make a statement in Moscow with corresponding full support for the Beijing and Pyongyang

statements.

5. In accordance with the four measures enumerated above, the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly of the UN in New York should do everything possible to support and move forward the new political line which is laid out above.

We consider it necessary to give the following elucidation of the abovestated:

First. About the answer to General Clark. We consider that the response letter of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark should express full agreement with Clark's proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with an indication that they have in mind a positive resolution of this question in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

In the answer to Clark indicate that the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners has the greatest significance for a successful resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, for a successful resolution of the question of the cessation of the war and the conclusion of an armistice. In view of this, propose to resume the negotiations in Panmunjom between the main representatives of both sides to negotiations for an armistice.

Propose that the date of the negotiations be established by the officers connected with both sides.

In the course of the negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that "not a single wounded and sick prisoner of war can be repatriated against his wishes during military action," add the receipt of a guarantee from the American side that in relation to prisoners of war, under no circumstances will forcible measures be applied to prevent their return to their homeland.

Propose also to establish a commission of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners to their homeland.

sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from that fact that the task consists not only of securing a positive resolution of the indicated question, but also in securing a positive resolution of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, to remove the obstacles to the achievement of an agreement on stacles to the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of military action and the conclusion of an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention should be used for this, especially the second paragraph of this article, which stipulates the conclusion of "an agreement on repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent a long time in captivity."

In the negotiations propose that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be repatriated immediately, but the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country in order to secure a fair resolution of the question of their repatriation.

With regard to these prisoners add that a classification according to nationality and place of residence be made, as was proposed in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark on October 16, 1952 (this is also in accordance with the Indian draft on Korea).

After the classification, prisoners of war immediately receive the right to return to their homeland, which will be facilitated by the assistance of all interested sides.

Second. About the statement in Beijing. In this statement it would be advisable to say that the government of the PRC has discussed the question raised by General Clark with the government of the DPRK and both the government of the PRC and the government of the DPRK have reached the same conclusion about the necessity to give their representatives in Panmunjom an order to enter into negotiations with General Clark on the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, having in mind the achievement of a positive resolution of this question in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and also a positive resolution of the question of prisoners of war as a whole. In the statement indicate that in the course of the negotiations between both sides in Kaesong and Panmunjom, agreement was reached on all questions except the question of prisoners of war.

Thus, agreement was reached that commanders of military forces of both sides "give an order for the full cessation of any type of In the negotiations on the exchange of military action in Korea by all troops under

their command, including all units and personnel of land, sea and air forces, going into effect twelve (12) hours after the agreement on armistice is signed, and guarantee the fulfillment of this order."

There was also agreement on the following important conditions for the armistice:

1) About the determination of a military demarcation line, which must run along the line contiguous to [the position of] the troops of the warring sides on the day the armistice goes into effect, in other words along the line of the front, from which "troops of both sides will withdraw for two kilometers in order to form a demilitarized zone..." (point 1 of the draft agreement on armistice).

2) About the establishment of a Military Commission on the armistice composed of 10 senior officers, from whom five will be named by the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the UN and five by the Command of the Korean People's Army and the Command of the Chinese volunteers (point 19). The Commission must monitor the observance of the armistice agreement, including monitoring the work of the Committee on repatriation of prisoners of war and regulate through negotiations possible violations of the armistice agreement (pp. 24 and 25).

3) About the creation of a Commission of neutral states to supervise the armistice, composed of representatives from Sweden and Switzerland named by the Commander in Chief of the UN Military Forces and representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia named by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese Volunteers. (pp. 36 and 37)

The Commission may create inspection groups composed of representatives of those states. (p. 40).

The Commission of neutral states must supervise the implementation of the agreement on the armistice and fulfill the functions of control (p. 41).

Inspection groups of neutral states will disembark at the ports of Synyidzhu, Chongchin, Khungnam, Manpo and Sinandzhu (North Korea), Inchon, Taegu, Pusan, Kanchung and Kunsan (South Korea).

Moreover, the sides reached agreement that the commanders of both sides must "recommend to the governments of inter

ested countries of both sides that a political conference of all sides at the highest level be convened within three months of the signing and implementation of the armistice...for the resolution by means of negotiations of questions regarding the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution of the Korean question etc." (point 60).

A significant portion of the articles of the draft agreement concerning prisoners of war was also agreed to, with the exception of the question of repatriation of prisoners. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK), following its policy of preserving and strengthening peace, striving for a peaceful resolution of the Korean question and applying all its efforts to the immediate cessation of the war, proposes to resolve also the question of prisoners of war as a whole. The government of the PRC (Government of the DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt measures to eliminate the disagreements on this question, which is at present the only obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, the Government of the PRC (DPRK) proposes that all prisoners of war who insist on repatriation be immediately repatriated and the remaining prisoners be handed over to a neutral country to secure a just resolution of the question of their repatriation.

The Beijing statement must also say the following:

Our new step, which is directed at the conclusion of the war in Korea, should also serve as an example for a positive resolution of a number of other important and urgent international questions, first of all the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statement in Pyongyang. We suggest that in this statement Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate that the aforementioned statement of the representative of the PRC was worked out jointly by the governments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Government of the DPRK fully shares both the evaluation of the political situation contained in the Beijing statement and the concrete conclusions and proposals contained in it. In connection with this, underscore not only the full support for, but also the justice of, the statement of the representative of the PRC.

Fourth. About the statement in Moscow. We consider expedient a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow,

which should be made immediately after the aforementioned statements in Beijing and Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow statement to be underscoring before the whole world the full solidarity and concordance of action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK on the question of the war in Korea.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly of the UN in New York. The Soviet delegation in the General Assembly must act in accordance with the entire abovedescribed political plan with regard to abovedescribed political plan with regard to the war in Korea. In this connection it is necessary that as soon as the Polish draft resolution "On Averting the Threat of a New World War" comes up for discussion, the Soviet delegation would secure the introduction of the corresponding alterations to this draft in the part concerning Korea and also the necessary statements by the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without saying that at the present time we cannot foresee all steps and measures which the governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK will need to make. However, if there is full agreement between our governments in the conduct of a general line on this question, for which we fully hope, then the remaining points can be agreed upon in the course of the affair.

DIRECTIVES FOR THE

SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN.

1. To commission the delegation of the USSR in the General Assembly (Comrade Vyshinsky), upon the presentation for discussion of the resolution of the Polish delegation, the part concerning Korea, to make a statement with firm support for the last proposals and statements of the PRC and DPRK.

Having set forth the position of the Soviet Union in the question of exchange of prisoners of war as a position which fully corresponds to generally acknowledged principles of international law and the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which demands repatriation of all prisoners of war, the representative of the USSR must point the representative of the USSR must point out the following. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed and is proposing to recommend to the warring sides in Korea that they immediately and fully cease military

operations on land, sea and in the air.

At the initiative of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the warring sides were begun in Kaesong in June 1951 for a ceasefire and armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to agreement on all questions except the question of repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to consider the position taken in this question by the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic to be just and fully in accordance with the principles of international law and international practice, and also the positions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Soviet Union fully supports this position.

The question of the exchange of prisoners of war is the single unresolved question in the negotiations between the warring sides in Korea. The governments of the PRC and DPRK have declared their readiness to adopt measures from their sides toward the settlement of this question, in order to remove the last obstacle to a ceasefire in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic on this question. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal on resumption of negotiations in Korea with the goal of achieving an agreement on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also on settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, and consequently, also the question of cessation of the war in Korea and conclusion of an armistice.

Commission the Soviet delegation in the General Assembly to reach an agreement with the Polish delegation about introducing into the draft Polish resolution on the question of averting the threat of a new world war the following alterations in the part concerning the Korean question: in place of the old text of p. “b)” (about returning all prisoners of war to their homeland) to include the following text: "b) immediate resumption of negotiations on an armistice between the sides, having in mind that at the same time the sides will apply all efforts to achieve an agreement on the question of exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war as well as on the entire question of prisoners of war and will thus apply all efforts to remove the obstacles that are hindering the conclusion of the war in Korea."

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 60-71 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 54-65]

113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Pyongyang [from notes taken at AVPRF; photocopy not available]

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From PYONGYANG

Top Priority
Special File

In response to your communication No. 359.

During the second meeting on March 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully agrees with the proposal of the Soviet government on the Korean question and considers that this proposal must be implemented as soon as possible.

Kim Il Sung further underscored that the time has come to show initiative from our side on the question of the conclusion of the war in Korea and achievement of peace. It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to carry out military operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interests of the DPRK and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp. In connection with this, Kim pointed out that the losses on the Korean side at the front and in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) are very significant and it is hardly advisable to conduct further discussion with the Americans regarding repatriation of a disputed number of prisoners of war. In the present conditions, Kim said, the proposal of the Soviet government is the most advisable and

correct.

held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will inform the Chinese friends about this.

29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265) 29.III.53

Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvaev and Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 they were received by Kim Il Sung in the presence of General Nam II, that Kim Il Sung was given the document which arrived from Moscow and that they agreed to meet again after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in detail with the document.

No. 242 (iskh. No. 6277) 24.III.53 Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Sung that Moscow advises that the decision of the question of naming Nam Il as Minister of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik's arrival and that it would be good at the present moment to be limited to the naming of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would meanwhile serve as minister.”

[Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122]

114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
From BEIJING From Kuznetsov
To MID USSR
URGENT

Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov,
Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich,
Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky,
Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob

[reporting a meeting of July 28]

After listening to the greetings of the CC CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude Kim Il Sung is taking measures to pre- to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. pare for the anticipated negotiations: the Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach number of sick and wounded prisoners in the an armistice not only by force of military DPRK is being determined, materials for the reasons but also by force of political and negotiations in Panmunjom are being pre-economic reasons. In military matters the pared, a statement from Pyongyang is being last year has shown that the enemy is not only prepared, etc. not in a condition to advance on land but is also not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front. The Chinese troops had begun not only to conduct a positional war but also to break through the front.

Following your instructions (Your Communication #242) we agreed with Kim Il Sung that the representative at the negotiations (if they resume) will be Nam Il, as before. In connection with this, the publication of a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly about naming Nam Il Minister of Foreign Affairs will be delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being

Among the political causes that forced the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao noted the military contradictions in the camp of the imperialists and the significant activation of world social opinion, which is speaking out against the war in Korea.

Concerning economic causes, Mao stated that in the first two years of the war the American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and deliveries, but with the end of the negotiations for an armistice, and also as a result of the strengthening of the movement to end the war in Korea, their profits began to fall sharply.

Having returned to the military side of the matter, Mao noted that from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan river. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.

Touching on further steps after the signing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the government of the PRC has a number of questions about which it would like to consult with the government of the USSR. By approximately 10 August, we will prepare a proposed plan of measures about which it is necessary to consult with the Soviet government.

Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting.
KUZNETSOV

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158]

115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassador to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Mao Zedong

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Strictly Secret From BEIJING

31 March I visited Comrade Mao Zedong. ...The important moments that apparently somewhat strengthened Stalin's trust in the CCP were your (my) information about the trip to China and the Korean war-the performance of the Chinese People's Volunteers, although in this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. On the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything, the issue was not about the seizure of South Korea, but about the signifi

cant strengthening of North Korea. But subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, where some kind of agreement was reached, about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us beforehand. It should be noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of South Korea...

P. YUDIN

[Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Delo not given]

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF Archive of the President, Russian
Federation

AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian
Federation

CC Central Committee (of a communist
party)

ССР

Chinese Communist Party

CPV Chinese People's Volunteers (the designation given PLA units sent to fight in Korea)

Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci- People's Republic of China
phered telegrams

Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of
the Chinese Communist Party
Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, USSR

Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade-
Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist
Party who established a rival government in
Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland
China by the PLA in 1949

Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR
Kim Ch'aek, Deputy Commander of Korean
People's Army

Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Com-
mittee of the Korean Workers' Party
Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence
and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at
armistice negotiations

Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force,
PRC

Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, USSR

Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United
Nations

Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles DPRK Democratic People's Republic of spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Com

[blocks in formation]

MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

munist Party

Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V.Zakharov
Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade,
USSR

Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of For

PLA People's Liberation Army (Army eign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chairof the PRC)

[blocks in formation]

Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR
Belov, General M. Chief of Staff for Soviet

man of Council of Ministers, USSR, until
restored to Foreign Minister's post follow-
ing Stalin's death in March 1953
Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff
of People's Liberation Army
Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean
People's Democratic Republic

Pak II U, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK,
named by Mao Zedong as deputy com-
mander and deputy political commissar of
Chinese People's Volunteers

First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese
Air Corps

Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Coun-
cil of Ministers, USSR

Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army
Corps of the People's Liberation Army, in
June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander
and Political Commissar

Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at
the Soviet embassy in Beijing
Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci-
phered telegrams

People's Volunteers in Korea

Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau,
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of
Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations
Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to
DPRK following Shtykov's dismissal in De-
cember 1950

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 ap-
pointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in
Korea

Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the

Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul
in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Politi-
cal Adviser in North Korea
Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff
of the Soviet Armed Forces
Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the
DPRK until December 1950

Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delega-
tion to United Nations, had served as Minis-
ter Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ko-
rea 1946-48

Vasiliev, Major General, Head of Soviet
Military Advisory Group in DPRK
Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR
Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, USSR

Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special del-
egation to the United Nations from the
People's Republic of China in December
1950

Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of
the People's Republic of China

Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People's
Volunteers

Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Mili-
tary Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev)
Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Com-
missar sent to Beijing during Korean War as
Stalin's personal military envoy
Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People's
Republic of China

Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Professor of History, Florida State University (Tallahassee), is working on a book on the Soviet Union and the Korean War. She contributed articles on new Russian archival evidence on the Korean War to CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP Working Paper No. 8 on "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives."

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