cesses in the struggle against American troops.”34 On December 4, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, talking to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advised Beijing to continue its successful offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the emerging opportunities to the full extent. Both sides agreed that Americans were confused and had fallen into a very unfavorable situation, that disagreements had developed between Washington and London. The Chinese ambassador quoted reports from the front that Americans were poor fighters, much worse than the Japanese."35 On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed to go on with the fighting and present at the United Nations tough conditions for a ceasefire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: "From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction."36 On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim II Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint forces in Korea (in order "not to repeat mistakes committed by the Korean troops from June to September 1950"). After a certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring (April/May) offensive could start “with the purpose of achieving the final solution of the South Korean issue." Mao did not exclude that the Americans, having learned about serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean side, would cease resisting and leave the Korean peninsula. But even if Washington continued to resist, it would soon realize that resistance was futile and evacuate its troops from Korea.37 On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao's plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry things up). It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.38 10. Euphoria disappears By the end of January 1951, as documents testify, the communists' euphoria started to decline; soon it disappeared, replaced by worries, fear, confusion, and at times panic. Reading the documents, one also senses growing irritation among the ranks of the communist allies. It is also noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR as much as possible out of direct participation in the war-if he agreed to send Soviet advisers, pilots and other military personnel to Korea once in a while, every time he did so only after repeated pleas by Mao and Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the requests of his allies about supplies of armaments, but for objective reasons: they wanted more than the USSR, still weak after WWII and engaged in a global Cold War, could provide. On January 28, Mao informed Stalin that the adversary had begun an unexpected offensive and due to this the communist troops lost the opportunity to rest and to undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to launch a counterattack. After achieving an operational success the Chinese side hoped to resume preparation for the final assault on the South.39 Stalin promptly agreed with the strategy, stressing that "from the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that Inchon and Seoul are not captured by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops of the adversary."40 In late January/early February 1951, Stalin criticized the structure, organization, and quality of the Korean armed forces, and quality of the Korean armed forces, suggesting substantial changes. His proposals were immediately accepted by the Koreans and supported by Beijing. By that time the first reports of the falling spirit of the Korean troops reached Beijing and Moscow.41 That the situation for the communist side continued to deteriorate is quite clear from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 March 1951, in which the Chinese leader admitted that a general offensive was no longer possible, that the adversary had superiority in weapons and dominated the air, and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining heavy losses and urgently needed air cover by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that the communist side must prepare for a long war and admitted that American troops will not be driven out of Korea for at least a number of years.42 Stalin satisfied Mao's requests, immediately noting that large-scale military operations were in the offing for Sino-Korean troops.43 In the following months Moscow promptly and favorably responded to all other requests of the Chinese, concerning first of all airplanes and air defense. Meanwhile, further correspondence be tween the USSR and the PRC reveals that the fighting spirit of the communist side continued to deteriorate as that of the Americans improved.44 The situation got so bad that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao for wrong tactics employed in the war.45 11. Communists seek an armistice By June 1951 the situation at the front became so hopeless for the communists that they started to seek a way out. The question of an armistice was raised by the North Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice but to agree. Maneuvers around the armistice talks did not, however, prevent the communists from looking for every opportunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory and to strike at the opposite side. At the same time the communists constantly worried about attacks by the opposite side. The conditions presented by the communists for an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Mao to do the job. Another prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and military advisers. Mao kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation. 46 In June 1951, Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy. However, at the same time the communists discussed measures to beef up their military capabilities and to prepare for an offensive in August.4 In ensuing communications, tactics were worked out on who would raise the issue of the armistice first and how it would be done. It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested to raise, for the sake of bargaining, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. Simultaneously China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was "physically impossible and totally unthinkable.”47 Preparing for the negotiations, Mao cabled Stalin: "It is extremely important that you personally take charge of the negotiations in order to prevent us from getting into an awkward position."48 Stalin rejected the idea, saying: "In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It's you, comrade Mao Zedong, who'll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him."49 To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage. Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans. My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would stress that further archival research is needed to get definite answers to the following aspects of communist politics in the Korean war: 1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin's position on "the liberation" of South Korea. 2. The real motives behind China's initial refusal to enter the Korea War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950. 3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war. 4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. 5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950. 1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1949, APRF. 2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. 3. Shtykov report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shtykov's cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF. 4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shtykov, 30 October 1949, APRF. 5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. 6. See, e.g., memorandums of conversations of ambassador Shtykov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 and 14 August 1949, and Charge'd'Affaires Tunkin's cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF. 7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32. 8. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP RF. 9. Stalin's cable to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF. 10. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF. 11. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVPRF; cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversation with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61. 12. Shtykov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. 13. Coded message N 2220, 3 May 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61. 14. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950. 15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55. 16. See Ambassador Roshchin's cable to Moscow, 14 University. May 1950, AVP RF. 17. APRF, Fund 6, list 9, file 14, p 57. 18. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF. 19. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. 20. Coded message N 34691 /sh, 1 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, p. 104. 21. Coded message N 405809, 2 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 105-107. CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS The Cold War International History Project awards a limited number of fellowship for scholars from countries on "the other side" of the Cold 22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. War to conduct up to one year of archival research 5-6, 10-11. 23. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 12-15. 24. Coded message N 600262/sh, 27 September 1950, APRF, Fund 3, list 65, file 827, pp. 94-96. 25. Coded message N 600508/sh, 30 September 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp.41-45. 26. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 2 July 1950. 27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. 28. See, e.g., Mao's conversations with Soviet academician on 19 and 28 August 1950, and Zhou's comments on 14 September 1950 to Roshchin. 29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF. 30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 334, pp. 97-98. 31. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 3 October 1950, coded message N 25199, ibid., pp. 105-106. 32. See Stalin's cable to Kim Il Sung (quoting Stalin's earlier message to Mao), 8 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 65-67. 33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p.77. 34. Coded message N 9768. APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, p. 5. 35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37. 36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90. 37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951, 39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44. 42. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 78-82. in the United States. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Applications should include: CV; letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; research proposal, indicating topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; writing samples in English welcomed, though not required. Applicans should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States. Applications may be sent or faxed to: Jim Hershberg Cold War International History Project Woodrow Wilson Center 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW Washington, D.C. 20560 USA Fax: (202) 357-4439 E-mail: wwcem123@sivm.si.edu Recent recipients of CWIHP fellowships include: Vytas Berenis (Insitute of Culture and Arts, Vilnius); Wanda Jazarbek (Insitute of Political Studies, Warsaw); Michael Latysh (Institute of Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Moscow); Michael Lesniewski (Warsaw University); Bartek Pawlak (Warsaw University); Michael Skapa (Charles University, Prague); and Wenqian Gao (Research Center on Party Literature, Beijing). SHTYKOV continued from page 69 umes remain: Vol. 1, 149 pages (from Sept. 5-Nov. 16, 1946); Vol. 2, 141 pages (from Dec. 1, 1946-Feb. 5, 1947); Vol. 3, 193 pages (from July 7-Aug. 29, 1947); Vol. 4, 72 pages (from July 26-Sept. 6, 1948). The periods of Aug. 1945-Sept. 1946, Feb.-July 1947, Sept. 1947-July 1948, and Sept. 1948 to 1951 have been lost. In the diaries, of course, Shtykov wrote much about strictly military affairs. However, the majority of the diaries were devoted to the political and economic situation in Korea after the liberation from Japanese occupation in August 1945. The first volume deals with the September 1946 General Strike, the October 1946 Uprising, and the merger of the three leftist parties in the south; volume two covers the election for the People's committees of provinces, cities, and counties, and the Assemblies of the Committees in North Korea; the third volume includes the Second Soviet-American Joint Commission, when Shtykov himself was the head of the Soviet Delegation; and finally volume four covers the cabinet formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Most important, the diaries vividly show that the Soviet Stationary/Occupation Army intervened deeply in and exerted an enormous influence on not only North Korean but also South Korean politics.8 The merger of the three leftist parties and the September General Strike/October Uprising in the south are the two most conspicuous examples of the Soviet intervention. In the case of the merger of the parties, the Soviet Army played the role of moderator and leader in the process. Interestingly, despite the efforts by Shtykov and the Soviet Army to make Kim Il Sung the representative of the will of the Soviets, the South Korean leftist leaders preferred to deal with the Soviets directly rather than with Kim Il Sung. This demonstrates that the leftist leaders in the south did not yet approve Kim's leadership. In the process of the merger, the Soviet Army consistently supported Pak Hon-yong, head of the Korean Communist Party (KCP). The reasons were, first of all, that Pak controlled the biggest leftist party in the south; and second, that Pak's transition of policy from cooperation to confrontation with the U.S. Occupation Government was consistent with that of the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet I met with Kang Jin. I told him that he had to take full responsibility for the failure of the merger. I also told him, "Although I don't know whether you are a running-dog of American Imperialism, you are helping Americans enormously.... Comrade Pak Hon-yong's decision is not only his but also 400,000 North Korean Party members'.... You have to admit that you made a mistake if you truly want to be a real revolutionary which you have not been.” After the success of the merger, Shtykov ordered General Romanenko, the Director of the Soviet Military Administration in the north, to telegraph Pak Hon-yong as follows: "Congratulations on the hard-earned but successful merger."11 Even after the merger, Shtykov and the Soviet leaders closely worked with Pak and even supported him financially from time to time. 12 It has been a widely accepted view that extent spontaneously under KCP leadership. As regard to the strike, I instructed as follows: Continue the struggle until the demands of various economic claims, wage increase for workers, the release of the leftist leaders from prison, the cancellation of the warrant of arrests of Communist leaders, and revived publication of banned leftist newspapers are met. Stop the strike when the demands are met. Declare that [the strikers] will continue to talk with the American Occupation Government on the issue of transition of power to People's Committee [in the south]. Demand that the American Occupation Government not oppress the organizers and supporters of the strike. Probably the most striking evidence of intervention was that Shtykov funneled 2 million yen to support the General Strike and later 3 million yen for the October Riot. 14 There are some problems in analyzing the diaries. First, the information in the diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly impossible for us to understand completely how certain situations evolved. They also contain many abbreviations which can be understood only by the author himself and grammatical errors which are open to a variety of interpretations. Above all, Shtykov wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the Korean leaders were simply automatons. Therefore we must interpret historical events very carefully, comparing information from the diaries and that from other sources. Still, the Shtykov diaries are undoubtedly among the most important documents to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia. From the diaries, it is evident that Shtykov and the Soviet Army in North Korea played a major role in the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea were planned at Shtykov's desk and approved by the higher ranking Soviet army leaders and later by Moscow. After he received approval from Moscow, the diaries suggest, Shtykov and his lieutenants carefully choreographed and directed the political drama of North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) politics. Although not all of them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is 1. Lebedev, "S soznaniem ispolnennogo dolga," in 3. When the Communist regime was established in 4. Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1980), 544 5. Ibid. 6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, General Shtykov's son, in St.Petersburg. 7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shtykov, recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his documents, including reports he had written. 8. For convenience's sake, I use North Korea and South 10. Kim Il Sung's Report to Shtykov on Kim's meeting 12. Diaries, 6, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27 December 1946 Hyun-su Jeon is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; this article was edited and translated by Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, a fellow of the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University. A longer version of this article appeared in the Fall 1995 issue of the Korean-langauge publication Yoksa biyong [Critique of History]. DMITRII ANTONOVICH VOLKOGONOV General Dmitrii Volkogonov, a promi- Having been an orthodox Communist for most of his life, Volkogonov in the 1990s shifted toward a strongly anti-Communist position. As recently as when he wrote his books on Stalin and Trotsky, he had glorified Lenin. But by the time he completed his study of Lenin in 1994, Volkogonov had concluded that the founder of Bolshevism was in fact a "savage, cruel, uncompromising, remorseless, and vengeful" figure. Volkogonov said he had found it "painful" to "shed [his] illusions" about the Soviet regime, but shed them he did. His final books provide overwhelming support for his ideological change of heart. In late 1991, Volkogonov was ap pointed head of a special parliamentary commission to oversee the handling of archives from the Soviet period. In that capacity, he helped secure the release of many valuable documents, including items from the Presidential Archive, the collection of highly-sensitive materials kept under the personal control of Soviet and then Russian leaders. Even so, critics of Volkogonov frequently charged that he exploited his privileged access to the archives and held back from circulation the most significant or sensational documents for his own use. After a lengthy article along these lines appeared in the newspaper Izvestiya in July 1994, Volkogonov sent a letter to the editor asserting that he had enjoyed no special access for his Stalin and Trotsky biographies, and that virtually all the documents he used for his Lenin book were "accessible to everyone." Partly as a result of this controversy, the translator's preface to the English edition of the Lenin biography was modified to include a pledge that all documents cited in the book, including those from the Presidential Archive, would be made available to all researchers. Unfortunately, the access envisaged in that pledge has not yet materialized. Russian and foreign scholars who worked in the Russian archives in 1995 (including myself) were summarily turned down when they requested access to documents adduced in the Lenin book. Whether because of bureaucratic inertia or some other motive, most of the senior archival officials in Moscow displayed no interest in gathering and making available the items that Volkogonov cited. One hopes that with Volkogonov's death, a renewed effort will be made to release for open research the many documents he employed to such good effect. That would be a fitting tribute to a courageous historian. -Mark Kramer Russian Research Center STALIN, MAO, KIM, AND CHINA'S DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR, SEPTEMBER 16-OCTOBER 15, 1950: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov1 At 5:45 a.m. on 15 September 1950, the 5th Marine Brigade of the X Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond began its unprecedented amphibious landing onto the beaches of Inch'on. There were about 500 North Korean soldiers on Wolmido, a tiny island protecting the entry into the Inch'on harbor, another 500 at Kimpo, and about 1,500 within Inch'on.2 They were confronted with more than 70,000 troops from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Holland, and the UK disembarking from more than 260 ships. The surprise of the UN attack, and the preponderant firepower and manpower of the U.S.-led forces, destroyed pockets of the dazed North Korean resistance within hours. By the next morning the 1st Marines had been able to squeeze the remnants of the Korean People's Army (KPA) out of Inch'on and had started their rapid advance towards Kimp'o and Seoul. Operation Chromite was a complete success and later labelled as "a masterpiece of amphibious ingenuity."3 In a little more than a week Seoul was recaptured by the UN forces. On 1 October 1950, they crossed the 38th parallel, and began their rapid, sweeping advance northward. The KPA surrendered Pyongyang on October 19, and soon the first Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. battalions approached the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border. However, U.S./UN Commander Douglas MacArthur's promise to "Bring the Boys Home by Christmas” never came true. The Thanksgiving offensive proved stillborn, for it was a new enemy that the UN troops confronted in Korea from then on: 36 divisions of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) who entered North Korea in late October-early November, supported by almost twelve wings and air defense divisions of the Soviet Air Force operating from nearby airfields in Northeast China. Recognizing new patterns in the enemy's behavior, in his special communiqué to the UN dated 28 November 1950, MacArthur called it "an entirely new war." Indeed, it was. In the Western literature there are many scholarly and eyewitness accounts of the preparation, implementation, and strategic and military significance of Operation Chromite, as well as the subsequent prosecution of the war by the UN forces, including the origins and aftermath of the reversal of fortunes for the UN troops in November 1950.4 In addition, in his 1960 study China 1950.4 In addition, in his 1960 study China Crosses the Yalu, Allen S. Whiting persuasively showed how national security concerns, as well as domestic political and economic considerations, may have led the People's Republic of China (PRC) government to decide to enter the Korean War. His preliminary conclusions were supported almost three decades later by Russell Spurr,5 who focused his research on the psychological background of the Chinese leaders' decision to provide military assistance to a friendly communist regime in Pyongyang. Then, a wave of memoirs published in the PRC by former high-ranking Chinese officials, military leaders, and other insiders allowed scholars to reconstruct in great detail the relevant decision-making processes in Beijing and Northeast China regarding the merits of Chinese military intervention in Korea, including debates within the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and among PLA senior commanders. These works also brought to light some differences in the individual positions of Chinese leadin the individual positions of Chinese leaders, including last-minute doubts, reversals, disagreements, and vacillations on the part of those involved, and analyzed the correspondence between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and their military officials, as well as other political, economic, military, and administrative events related to the war which negotiations between Stalin and Zhou Enlai on 10-11 October 1950, as well as the stillenigmatic October 1950 correspondence between Beijing and Moscow.9 But due to the unavoidable lack of hard top-level archival evidence, these accounts fell far short of being able to reconstruct in detail the attitudes and policy orientations of Stalin or other key Soviet leaders in Moscow and their representatives on the ground in Korea, nor the decision-making processes taking place inside the Kremlin immediately after the U.S. landing at Inch'on and leading up to the final Chinese decision a month later to intervene militarily in Korea. Moreover, this literature suffered from the lack of previously classified Moscow-Pyongyang toplevel correspondence, and to rely primarily on the officially authorized, at times propagandistic Chinese sources of the exchanges between the PRC and USSR leaders. This absence of critical Soviet source materials, consequently, gave birth to a number of academic debates. First, many scholars disagree in their assessments of Soviet and Chinese intentions and motivations in Northeast Asia and the nature and parameters of their respective perceived national interests on the Korean peninsula at this stage of the war. Second, an overarching debate among historians involves a series of interrelated questions about alliance commitments between Moscow and Beijingwhat commitments were made, why and how they were reached, whether they were broken or honored, and how they affected the subsequent course of Sino-Soviet relations (a good example of this is the claim advanced in some Chinese accounts that occurred in China in August-October 1950.7 Stalin, in his 10-11 October 1950 meeting However, what this literature still left to speculation was the Soviet side of the story. Some of the books, especially Uncertain Partners (1993), by Sergei N. Goncharov, Partners (1993), by Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, and William W. Stueck's recently-published The Korean 8 War: An International History, discuss strategic calculations which Stalin might have tegic calculations which Stalin might have made at this crucial juncture of the Korean War, the course and outcome of crucial with Zhou, reneged on a prior commitment for the USSR to provide air support for the CPVs). This debate includes controversies related to the personal roles of Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung in manipulating one another's decisions regarding the war, especially the initial decision to initiate a largescale attack against the south in June 1950 and later over China's intervention. There is also a cloud of uncertainty over the role of |