hension of the embarrassment which a double nationality might give rise to, led to this singular species of naturalization, which, while it causes the original nationality of the alien to be forfeited, fails to give him, in substance and reality, that of this country in return. Her Majesty's Commissioners have recommended that the present practice shall be discontinued, and that in future all the rights of a British subject shall follow on naturalization; and it is to be hoped that this recommendation will be carried into effect. Even as regards political rights it would be difficult to suggest any ground why a naturalized subject should not enjoy the same rights as the natural born subject. If a naturalized subject should occupy such a social position, or exhibit such capacity for public business as to make a parliamentary constituency desire him for its representative, or that Her Majesty should be pleased to appoint him a member of the Privy Council or to an office of trust, it may be presumed that his presence will be an accession to the public councils, or that his services will be useful to the State. Even if any ground existed for a distrust of naturalized aliens as members of the national councils or as holding offices of trust, it is impossible that the number thus returned to Parliament or employed in the public service can ever be sufficiently large to have the slightest effect on the national interests. On the other hand, it is desirable to attach the newly admitted subject as much as possible to the country of adoption, and not to leave room for any feeling of hardship or wrong arising

from a sense of illiberal jealousy or ungenerous dis

trust.

The difference between denization and naturalization has already been pointed out. It appears that, though denization has fallen into comparative desuetude, it is still occasionally resorted to. Should it be deemed expedient to continue to employ this process for conferring the status and rights of a subject, the same effects should in all respects follow from it as will result from naturalization.

Next as to the family of the party naturalized. And first as to the wife. Jurists are divided as to whether the wife should lose her former nationality when the husband changes his. Monsieur Fælix asserts the affirmative. His learned editor, Monsieur Demangeat, citing several French jurists, maintains the reverse." The question, however

*

seems scarcely to admit of serious discussion. The identity of interest which exists between husband and wife, and which leads in the foreign law to the general rule-a rule which ought to be adopted in our own-that the nationality of the wife shall follow that of the husband, must apply as much to a substituted nationality as to that of origin. The consent

* Droit International, vol. i. p. 93, n. (a). On the discussion of Article 214 of the Code Civil in the Council of State, Napoleon is reported to have said on this subject, "Il y a une grande différence entre une Française qui épouse un étranger et une Française qui, ayant épousé un Français, suit son mari lorsqu'il s'expatrie la première par son mariage a renoncé à ses droits çivils; l'autre ne les perdrait que pour avoir fait son devoir."

Р

given by the wife on marriage to exchange her nationality for that of the husband may be taken as equally applying to any nationality which he may afterwards acquire in the place of the former one. Besides which, it may fairly be assumed that, in the vast majority of instances, the wife is as much a party to the expatriation as the husband.

As regards the children, those born after the naturalization should of course follow the nationality of the father. Of those born before, a distinction should be made between those who accompany the father to the new country and those who do not. The latter should retain their nationality of origin. As regards the former, a distinction is again to be made between those who have attained their majority and those who have not. Those who are still minors, and who as such are still subject to the authority of the father and form part of his family, must be taken, at all events for the time, to follow his nationality; and as it may fairly be presumed that they will in the future remain in the new country and desire to become its citizens, they should be deemed to be such in the absence of any declaration to the contrary. But, inasmuch as by their birth they have acquired a right to the nationality of the country of birth, it ought not to be in the power of the parent to deprive them of it, if, on arriving at full age, they desire to retain it; and a reasonable time should be allowed them to reject the nationality acquired by the father, and to claim that the former country, without being subjected to the

necessity of becoming naturalized in it. The proposal of the Commissioners that, on the naturalization of the father, the children, if minors, shall necessarily assume the new nationality, ignores this right, which should, it is submitted, be respected so far as to afford the option above suggested.

Children who, at the time of the father's naturalization, have attained their majority, being sui juris, and capable of exercising their own judgment, and at the same time capable of being themselves naturalized, should be left free to follow their own course; unless, indeed, it should be thought that, if still continuing to form part of the father's family, they should be allowed (as is provided by the law of France) within a certain period after the naturalization of the father, to claim to become subjects of the new country on settling themselves therein, without the necessity of being naturalized. Thus the distinction between the children forming part of the father's family who are minors, and those who are not, would be that the former would have to declare their rejection of the citizenship of the new country if they desired to retain that of the old; the latter would have to declare their election to adopt that of the new, they desired to acquire it.

if

When a woman by the death of her husband becomes the head of the family, her naturalization should carry with it the same consequences, as regards the children, as would have attended that of the father had he been living.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

THE results at which we appear to have arrived are these:

1. That under a sound system of international law such a thing as a double nationality should not be suffered to exist.

2. That nationality of origin should be derived from descent alone; except in the case of children born of foreigners domiciled in the country of such childrens' birth-in the first generation, on a claim being made within a fixed period after attaining majority-in the second in the absence of a declaration that they desire not to become subjects. But in both these instances, in order to avoid the evil of a double nationality, the right should be given only where a corresponding law exists in the country of the foreign parent.

3. That it should be free to every one to expatriate and denationalize himself, and to transfer his allegiance to another country.

4. That the effect of naturalization should be to do away altogether with the prior nationality.

5. That emigration with the intention of expatriation and of becoming a citizen of another State should have the effect of putting an end to the relation of subject, unless, prior to naturalization, the party should abandon the intention of becoming naturalized