been introduced in Poland on 13 December 1981, allied troops would have entered Poland. Let me emphasize that there were indeed such plans, and the Polish state and military leadership knew about them. But there was not, and could not have been, any final decision on whether to send in troops . . .5

Gribkov would have had no incentive to acknowledge the existence of these plans unless his motivation was simply to tell the truth. As a former high-ranking Soviet military officer who takes great pride in his many years of service, Gribkov might have been expected to deny that any plans for a Soviet invasion of Poland were ever drafted. His willingness to admit that full-fledged plans did exist lends a great deal of credibility to his account. Moreover, his remarks are borne out by a large number of newly declassified documents, including East German and Warsaw Pact maps, military charts, and mobilization orders that show entry routes into Poland and the specific allied units that were slated to take part in joint military operations. Even though a large number of crucial items in the former East-bloc archives (especially the Russian archives) are still off-limits, all evidence to date fully corroborates what Gribkov said.

The release of the Suslov Commission's memorandum not only adds to, but helps clarify what has already been known about Soviet and Warsaw Pact military planning in 1980-81. Several points are worth highlighting.

First, the date of the memorandum, 28 August 1980, is significant. Just three days after the Suslov Commission was formed on 25 August, the five senior members of that body were seeking to authorize extensive military preparations "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." This suggests that military contingencies were taken very seriously by the CPSU Politburo, and that Soviet leaders were not just bluffing when they asked Polish leaders several times in 1980-81 whether it would help matters if Soviet and allied troops entered Poland to help impose martial law. (On each occasion when the two Polish leaders, Stanisław Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, were asked about “fraternal assistance," they warned Soviet officials that the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland to help implement martial law would exacerbate the situation and lead to a "catastrophe." They insisted that if they were given more time to devise appropriate arrangements, they would be able to handle the situation on their own. New evidence suggests that Jaruzelski may have sharply changed his view of this matter in the final few days before martial law, but there is little doubt that earlier in the crisis, he, like Kania, had cautioned strongly against the entry of Warsaw Pact forces.)

Second, the directive stipulates that the Soviet defense ministry should be able to bring the initial four divisions up to full combat strength by 6:00 p.m. on 29 August, that is, just twenty-four hours after the memorandum was drafted. It is not entirely clear why such haste was deemed necessary. One possible explanation is

that Soviet leaders were preparing to send troops to Poland in the very near term. Presumably, this would have been a limited operation to help the Polish authorities crush the strikes and impose martial law. The most logical timing would have been at the end of August 1980, before the Polish government had signed any agreements with the Inter-Factory Strike Committee.

It is not yet known for certain whether this option was under serious consideration in Moscow on 28 August. Soviet Politburo transcripts from the final week of August 1980 are still classified. Despite this limitation, enough other evidence is available to suggest that Soviet leaders might indeed have been contemplating a limited military intervention. U.S. intelligence sources at the time picked up evidence that the Soviet Army was mobilizing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the western USSR. That in itself would not necessarily imply an intention to use the mobilized forces, but there is no doubt that by 28 August the Soviet Politburo was alarmed by the growing strength of the workers' movement in Poland. After refraining from public criticism in July and the first few weeks of August, the Soviet media on 27 August began denouncing the "subversive actions" of "anti-socialist forces" in Poland.10 That same day, the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov, secretly delivered a stern letter of warning from the CPSU Politburo to the then-First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), Edward Gierek." The letter demanded tougher action to quell the unrest. Gierek, for his part, had been making overtures to Soviet leaders since mid-August about the possibility of sending Soviet troops to Poland on his behalf.12 Soviet officials had not yet responded directly to Gierek's pleas, but that does not necessarily mean they had rejected the idea outright. Although they may not have wanted to keep Gierek in power, they might have been considering bringing in a hardline successor, such as Stefan Olszowski.

Another factor that could have induced Soviet leaders to contemplate the prospect of military intervention in Poland was a meeting of the PUWP Politburo that was due to take place the following day, on 29 August. The session was being convened to decide whether to sign the agreements with Solidarity or, instead, to introduce martial law. A special task force, known as Lato-80 (Summer 80), had been set up at the Polish internal affairs ministry in mid-August 1980 to prepare for a sweeping crackdown.13 The head of the task force, General Bogusław Stachura, a deputy minister of internal affairs, was ready to assure the PUWP Politburo on 29 August that his troops would be able to "exterminate the counterrevolutionary nest in Gdańsk" if the PUWP leadership gave him the go-ahead. 14 Soviet leaders clearly were aware of both Lato-80 and the forthcoming PUWP Politburo meeting, and they may have wanted to be ready to help out.

An intervention by the four mobilized Soviet divisions, perhaps supplemented by a Soviet airborne division and units from the USSR's Northern Group of Forces, would

have been designed to prop up Gierek or, more likely, to replace him with a more credible hardliner who would forcibly suppress the nascent Solidarity movement. The intervention thus would have been similar to the Soviet army's limited incursion into Hungary on 24 October 1956, which came in response to an urgent request from the Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.15 The intervention on 24 October 1956 was intended to help Gero impose a crackdown and put an end to the violent unrest that began the previous day. As it turned out, the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, far from improving the situation, caused a sharp escalation of tension and violence. A fullscale revolution ensued, and the Soviet Union had to send a much larger contingent of troops to Hungary to crush the rebellion.

It is impossible to know whether anything comparable would have happened in Poland if the PUWP Politburo had decided on 29 August 1980 to pursue a crackdown. A few PUWP hardliners, such as Władysław Kruczek, did want to impose martial law, but a substantial majority of the Politburo members were convinced that, as Kania put it, it was a "fantasy" to expect that a large-scale crackdown could be carried out at such short notice.16 Hence, the Politburo authorized the Polish government to press ahead with the Gdańsk accords. No one on the Politburo welcomed this decision-Gierek insisted that “under threat of a general strike, we must choose the lesser evil and then find a way to get out of it"--but in the absence of a viable alternative, the Politburo reluctantly concluded that, for the time being, the strikers' demands would have to be fulfilled."

Third, the Suslov Commission's directive specified two related but separate tasks. The first was the granting of authority to the Soviet defense ministry to mobilize "up to 25,000 military reservists and 6,000 vehicles" to flesh out three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the Belorussian, Baltic, and Transcarpathian Military Districts. As mentioned above, this task was carried out right away. The four divisions in question were all mobilized within a day or two, but they were not intended to remain that way indefinitely. Soon after the Soviet Politburo decided in late August 1980 that the time was not yet ripe to "provide military assistance" to Poland, these initial four divisions were brought back to a lower state of readiness and the mobilized reservists were released.

Even so, this did not mean that the first part of the 28 August directive ceased to be relevant. The scenario envisaged in the directive was largely preserved in the subsequent mobilization of Soviet troops in late 1980 and 1981. In the fall of 1980, after the initial four Soviet divisions had been demobilized, the Soviet Union gradually brought three motorized rifle divisions (one each in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts) up to full troop strength and put them on high alert. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. electronic intercepts and satellite reconnaissance were able to confirm that these three divisions could have joined an airborne

division and the two divisions of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of Forces to deal with military contingencies in Poland. 18

The other task specified in the 28 August directive was the granting of authorization for the Soviet defense ministry to "plan for the call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles" (emphasis added). The difference between this task and the initial one is that in this case the authorization covered only planning for a further mobilization, not the mobilization itself. Although this planning was retained (and updated) for future contingencies, there is no evidence that any of the second-stage forces were actually mobilized at any point. In early December 1980, when the clouds covering Poland and the western Soviet Union were still too dense to permit clear satellite reconnaissance, U.S. officials had expected to find that some 15 Soviet tank and motorized divisions near Poland's borders were fully combat-ready. When the clouds abated in the latter half of December 1980 and the satellites were able to home in on Soviet units, U.S. intelligence analysts were surprised to learn that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were actually mobilized.19 There is no evidence that any further Soviet tank or motorized divisions in the USSR were brought up to full combat readiness over the next year. Although the Soviet defense ministry was authorized to plan and prepare for further mobilizations (of five to seven divisions), the ministry did not actually go beyond the initial mobilization of four divisions on 28-29 August (which were then soon demobilized) and the gradual mobilization of three motorized rifle divisions in the fall of 1980.

Fourth, the number of reservists to be mobilized for the hypothetical follow-on operation seems on the high side. Soviet tank divisions at full strength numbered some 10,500 troops, and Soviet motorized rifle divisions numbered 12,500. The divisions in the four Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe were normally maintained at full strength (a level of readiness designated as Category 1), but divisions in the western USSR were maintained at a much lower level of readiness. As of late 1980, roughly one-quarter of the 33 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts were maintained at 50-75 percent of full strength (Category 2 readiness), and the other threequarters were kept at only around 20 percent of full strength (Category 3).20 The allocation of these units is shown in Table 1. (Other Category 2 divisions, it is worth noting, could have been brought in from elsewhere in the western USSR.) Curiously, even though both types of line divisions were not combat-ready, they were described in Soviet parlance as "constantly ready divisions" (divizii postoyannoi gotovnosti).21

The initial mobilization covered by the Suslov Commission's directive, encompassing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, seems just about right in size. This mobilization most likely involved

four Category 2 divisions, which could be mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category 3 forces normally took at least one to three months to bring up to full readiness, it is doubtful that any were included in the initial mobilization on 28-29 August. The allocation of Category 2 tank divisions within the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts did not quite correspond to the numbers stipulated in the Suslov Commission's directive (the Baltic Military District had two Category 2 tank divisions and one Category 2 motorized division, whereas the Belorussian Military District had only one Category 2 tank division and one Category 2 motorized division), but the discrepancy was undoubtedly resolved by a slight adjustment in the geographic origin of the tank divisions (i.e., two came from the Baltic Military District and one from the Belorussian). Using the lower figure of 50 percent as the manpower strength of the four Category 2 divisions, one can see that some 22,000 reservists would have been needed to bring the four up to full strength. The other 3,000 reservists presumably would have been allocated to various support and logistical roles. Hence, the total number of mobilized reservists in this initial phase on 28-29 August 1980-that is, 25,000 seems perfectly plausible.

Table 1.

21a

The authorized numbers for the hypothetical second phase, however, are somewhat less easy to reconcile. If the additional 75,000 reservists were designated to flesh out five to seven more Category 2 divisions, the number of reservists was considerably higher than it should have been. Even if one assumes that seven (rather than five) additional Category 2 divisions would have been mobilized and that all seven were motorized divisions (with higher troop strength), only 43,750 reservists would have been needed to bring the seven divisions up to full strength. Some of the remaining 31,250 reservists might have been assigned to support and logistical roles, but it is unlikely that this would have accounted for more than about 8,000 to 10,000. Hence, a gap of well over 20,000 remains.

Two possible factors may account for this gap.

First, it might be argued that some or all of the five to seven extra divisions would have been Category 3 forces (so-called "cadre divisions” or “inactive divisions") rather than Category 2. If all seven were Category 3 motorized rifle divisions (of the fifteen that were available), roughly 70,000 reservists would have been needed to bring them up to full strength. The other 5,000 reservists could then have been assigned to support and logistical functions.22 This explanation may seem plausible at first glance, but it actually is problematic. It is true that all three of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions that were brought up to full strength as of December 1980 were originally Category 3 divisions. The weeks that passed in the autumn of 1980 had permitted enough time for all the pre-mobilization training and preparations of those units to be completed. But there is no evidence that Category 3 forces were slated for a potential second stage of mobilization (whose planning was authorized by the 28 August directive). On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that the "constantly ready divisions" designated for a hypothetical second stage were Category 2 forces (of which at least eight were available, as shown in Table 1) rather than Category 3. Soviet military commanders were willing to draw on Category 3 forces when they had ample time in the fall of 1980 to carry out pre-mobilization training and preparations for the projected Soyuz-80 "exercises" (scheduled for early December); but because they were not actually mobilizing any of the additional five to seven Soviet divisions needed for a possible second stage, they would have wanted to be able to mobilize the extra divisions very rapidly if circumstances so warranted. Hence, it is highly unlikely that they would have relied on anything other than Category 2 forces for a second-stage mobilization if such a mobilization had been deemed necessary. The much more numerous Category 3 forces were useful when sufficient lead-time was available to mobilize for the first stage of Soyuz-80, but if a second stage had been necessary at short notice, the Soviet Army would have wanted to rely on the eight Category 2 forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts, supplemented perhaps by Category 2 forces in other parts of the western USSR and by combat-ready units from the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe. A more plausible explanation for the high number of reserves in the projected second phase is that Soviet military planners wanted a margin of safety in case they needed to mobilize more than seven extra divisions. Authorization to plan for the mobilization of just five to seven extra divisions, as stipulated in the directive, may have seemed enough for an initial request. But Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted leeway to proceed with a larger mobilization if circumstances so warranted. They could have mobilized at least eight Category 2 divisions in the western USSR (as shown in Table 1), and they might have wanted additional reservists to fill out Category 2 divisions that could have been brought in from elsewhere.

Indeed, it seems likely that by December 1980 the Soviet Army was planning for the possible mobilization of another eleven divisions rather than just five to seven. East German military documents and the testimony of a former Polish General Staff officer, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, both refer to a total of as many as fifteen Soviet divisions that would have taken part in a two-stage process.23 (Four would have come in initially, and eleven could have served as reinforcements in a second stage.) Clearly, the planning that began in late August 1980 for the possible mobilization of an additional 75,000 reservists - the level stipulated in the Suslov Commission's memorandum - enabled Soviet military officials to expand their efforts very quickly so that a second-stage mobilization might have covered as many as eleven extra divisions. Although some of the extra divisions might have come from the combat-ready divisions in the USSR's Northern Group of Forces (which had two) and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (which had nineteen), Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted to minimize their drawdown of the Groups of Soviet Forces. Hence, they would have wanted to be ready to rely on as many Category 2 divisions as possible.

Whatever the precise explanation may be, there is no doubt that the numbers in the memorandum pertaining to a second phase of troop mobilization were large enough to give Soviet military planners a substantial degree of latitude.

Fifth, the projected size of each of the two stages of mobilization, as laid out in the memorandum, sheds valuable light on Soviet military options vis-a-vis Poland. The initial mobilization, on 28-29 August, applied to four Soviet divisions in the western USSR: three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. These four divisions were soon demobilized, but the scenario outlined in the 28 August directive, as noted above, was largely preserved. Top-secret East German military documents regarding units slated to take part in the Soyuz-80 "exercises" in Poland in early December 1980 mentioned four Soviet divisions.24 According to the East German documents, the four Soviet divisions were supposed to join two Czechoslovak tank divisions, one East German tank division, and four Polish mechanized divisions in the first stage of "exercises." (The four Polish divisions were included only after Jaruzelski insisted on it.) Because the numbers of Soviet divisions cited in the East German documents are identical to figures in the Suslov Commission's directive, this implies that the option of a limited Soviet intervention in Poland, as envisaged in the directive for late August 1980, was basically the same option under consideration in early December.

The numbers in the East German materials and the Suslov Commission's directive are fully in line with evidence from U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites, which in mid- to late December 1980 revealed that three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were combat-ready. Even though the satellites detected only

three mobilized Soviet divisions rather than four (the number specified in the East German documents and the initial number mobilized on 28 August under the Suslov Commission's directive), the difference is readily explained by East German military charts prepared for Soyuz-81.25 These charts reveal that after four Soviet divisions were mobilized on 28-29 August and then demobilized, and after pre-mobilization training got under way in the fall of 1980 for three Category 3 motorized rifle divisions, the complexion of the scenario was altered somewhat. Instead of three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, the contingent of four Soviet divisions was supposed to include an airborne division to go with three motorized rifle divisions. Because Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at full combat readiness, one of these divisions could have immediately joined the three full-strength Soviet motorized rifle divisions in early December 1980 to move into Poland under the guise of an "exercise." (U.S. intelligence sources at the time detected unusual preparations by a Soviet airborne division in the Baltic Military District, which presumably would have been the unit sent in.)

Thus, the fundamental scenario for the entry of Soviet forces into Poland, adjusted for the types of divisions included, is corroborated by evidence from all the newly available sources.

To the extent that this scenario was intended as a real option and not just a means of exerting pressure, these findings suggest that Soviet leaders in late November 1980 were seriously preparing to send troops to Poland in early December to help the authorities there impose martial law. It is crucial to note, however, that any such intervention would have been intended to support the regime, not to dislodge it. In that sense, the scenario was fundamentally different from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which was intended to eliminate the reform-minded Communists led by Alexander Dubcek and bring in a hardline regime.

The reason that this option ultimately was not carried out is that by early December 1980 both Jaruzelski and Kania had made clear to Soviet leaders that they were not yet ready to impose martial law. Under those circumstances, they warned, the entry of Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak troops would greatly aggravate the situation. The result, according to Kania and Jaruzelski, might be large-scale violence, which could spiral out of control. The two Polish leaders promised that if they were given a bit more time, they could resolve the crisis without having to rely on intervention by Soviet troops. If Kania and Jaruzelski had instead been amenable to the entry of Soviet forces on 8 December (the scheduled starting date for the "exercises"), the scenario undoubtedly would have been carried out as planned. But because the Polish leaders were not yet ready to accept allied troops, Moscow's plans had to be put on hold.

The second stage of troop mobilizations, involving another five to seven Soviet divisions, would have been

carried out only if "the situation in Poland deteriorates further" and "the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces." These rather vague formulations do not shed much light on the prospective timing of a second-phase mobilization, but even if the second phase were fully implemented, the numbers involved do not suggest that Soviet leaders were ever seriously planning to invade Poland in the same way they intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The numbers in question were simply too small. Judging from the size of the invading force deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would have wanted to mobilize at least 30 Soviet divisions if they were contemplating an invasion of Poland that would have been aimed at neutralizing the Polish army, crushing all armed resistance, and establishing a pro-Soviet regime. Secret estimates by U.S. military intelligence analysts in the fall of 1980 predicted that Soviet leaders would want to mobilize at least 30 divisions for a full-scale invasion of Poland.26 Some U.S. intelligence cables from Eastern Europe put the figure even higher, at around 45.27 These numbers would have made sense if the Soviet Politburo had been contemplating an invasion of Poland similar to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the numbers given in the 28 August memorandum fall so far short of that level that they could not possibly be for the same type of contingency. It is conceivable, of course, that the 28 August memorandum was superseded by other documents that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to plan for the mobilization of some 15 to 20 further divisions, making a total of at least 30. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case. Following the demobilization of the four Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that were briefly mobilized on 28-29 August 1980, only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were fully mobilized during the crisis. The figures provided by East German military sources and by Ryszard Kukliński indicate that as many as fifteen Soviet divisions might eventually have been brought up to full combat readiness if the situation had deteriorated. However, that figure, which was never attained, was still vastly short of 30 (not to mention 45, a figure that many U.S. intelligence officials were wont to cite all through the crisis). No documentation or other evidence gives any reason to believe that the Soviet defense ministry at any time was planning for a Czechoslovak-style operation.

On the other hand, the new evidence does suggest that, at least for a while, Soviet leaders were seriously considering the option of a limited military intervention in Poland. This option loomed large in late August 1980 and again in early December 1980. The Soviet leadership's preference all along was to have the Polish authorities implement martial law on their own as soon as possible. But if that goal proved infeasible, the Soviet Politburo was willing to provide help, at least during the first several months of the crisis. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized this point when he spoke with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw in early April 1981:

Our common goal should be to resolve the crisis without having to send allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should strive toward this end. Unless the Polish state security organs and Polish army are deployed, outside support cannot be expected, since it would cause international complications. The Polish comrades must try first to solve their problems on their own. But if they cannot manage on their own and appeal for help, that type of situation would be very different from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed in Poland from the outset.28

It is far from clear that Soviet intervention under these circumstances would have made much sense. Polish officials had discreetly warned Kulikov that “it is even possible that if other Warsaw Pact troops move into Poland, certain units [of the Polish army] might rebel."29 Because Soviet troops were already deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, the last thing the Soviet Politburo wanted was to provoke a large-scale conflict in Europe, which might drag on for months. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union went to such great lengths in 198081 to ensure that any prospective intervention by allied forces would be fully supported by Polish leaders.

***

Even though a good deal of new evidence shows that the Soviet Union made extensive plans and preparations for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81, this does not necessarily mean that there was ever a firm intention in Moscow to send in troops, especially if the Polish Communist regime was actively opposed to such a step. There is still not—and may never be—any way to know whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland if Polish leaders had openly refused to impose martial law or if the martial law operation in December 1981 had collapsed and widespread violence had broken out. None of the new evidence has resolved that question, and perhaps none ever will. Nevertheless, three things do now seem clear: first, that Soviet leaders for some time were willing to send in a limited number of Soviet divisions to help the Polish authorities impose martial law; second, that this option would have been pursued only if Polish leaders had supported it and been willing to make good use of the incoming forces; and third, that Soviet leaders wanted to give themselves fall-back options for other military contingencies in case the situation in Poland took a disastrous turn.

Not until mid- to late 1981 did the situation in Poland change enough to permit Soviet leaders to deemphasize the military option. Once Kania was gone from the scene and Jaruzelski was ensconced in all the top posts, Soviet officials had much greater confidence that martial law could be introduced in Poland without outside help. Some form of military option was still present, but the scenarios that loomed so large in late August and early December 1980 had largely receded by late 1981. Even so, the Suslov Commission's operational directive of 28 August 1980 is a telling reminder of how close the Polish crisis came to escalating into a much wider conflict.