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SPECIAL DOSSIER Top Secret Copy No.

Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University.

The situation in the PPR remains tense. The strike movement is operating on a countrywide scale.

Taking account of the emerging situation, the Ministry of Defense requests permission, in the first instance, to bring three tank divisions (1 in the Baltic MD, 2 in the Beloruss. MD) and one mechanized rifle division (Transcarp. MD) up to full combat readiness as of 6:00 p.m. on 29 August to form a group of forces in case military assistance is provided to the PPR.

To fill out these divisions, it will be necessary to requisition from the national economy up to 25 thous. military reservists and 6 thous. vehicles, including 3 thous. to replace the vehicles taken from these troops to help out with the harvest. Without the extra vehicles, the divisions cannot bring their mobile reserves up to full readiness. The necessity to fill out the divisions at the expense of resources from the national economy arises because they are maintained at a reduced level in peacetime. The successful fulfillment of tasks during the entry of these divisions into the territory of the PPR requires combat arrangements to be established some 5-7 days in advance.

If the situation in Poland deteriorates further, we will also have to fill out the constantly ready divisions of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts up to wartime level. If the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces, we must increase the group of our own forces by another fiveseven divisions. To these ends, the Ministry of Defense should be permitted to plan the call-up of as many as 75 thous. additional military reservists and 9 thous. additional vehicles.

In this case, it would mean that a total of up to 100 thous. military reservists and 15 thous. vehicles would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.

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"Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," No. P210/II (Top Secret), 25 August 1980, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 1, List (L.) 1.

2The length of the draft resolution can be gauged from a handwritten notation at the bottom of the memorandum, which indicates that the document is a total of three pages.

3Among the countless other documents composed in this way were dozens of memoranda outlining the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles and other weaponry in Cuba in 1962 and the vast quantity of forms filled out by the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) to supply arms, intelligence equipment, and combat training to Communist and pro-Soviet guerrillas in the Third World. A good sample of these latter documents are available in Fond 89 of TsKhSD.

"Of particular relevance to this article is an item by Kevin Klose that appeared on 2 December 1980 in The Washington Post under the title "Soviet Reservists Activated Since August" (pp. A-1, A-14). Klose reported that "according to stories circulating here [in Moscow], reservists in the Carpathian Military District were activated in great haste in August [and will] remain on duty until the end of the year." The Suslov Commission memorandum corroborates this report. It is interesting to see that even a limited call-up of reservists eventually became known to wellsituated observers.

"A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 55, 57.

"Several such maps are available from the former East German military archive, all of which deal with the same general scenario discussed below. Some of the relevant East German military documents, from the Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam, are cited below.

'See, e.g., several clear-cut references to the Polish leaders' objections in the Soviet Politburo transcripts I have translated for publication by CWIHP. See also "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in Militarisches Zwischenarchiv-Potsdam (MZA-P), Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54. See translation in this Bulletin.

On Jaruzelski's change of heart, see my article, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland," in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

"U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), declassified in December 1998; and CIA, NFAC, “Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the Polish Crisis, November-December 1980," Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), January 1981; declassified in December 1998. I am grateful to Douglas J. MacEachin for

providing me with a copy of these valuable documents, which, among other things, contain maps showing the location of Soviet divisions in the western USSR.

10TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, reprinted as "K sobytiyam v Pol'she," Pravda (Moscow), 28 August 1980, p. 4.

"Gierek discussed this letter at the PUWP Politburo meeting on August 28. See “Protokół Nr. 27 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 28 sierpnia 1980 r.," 28 August 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Włodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarność" 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 78-82.

12See the account by Stanisław Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 33-34.

13"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29.VIII.1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa (AUOP), Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2309/IV, Tom (T.) 2. See also the contributions by Janusz Krupski and Jarema Maciszewski in Kancelaria Sejmu, O stanie wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedziałości Konstytucynej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 108-110 and 126-128, respectively.

14"Posiedzenie Szabu MSW, 29. VIII. 1980r.," Stronica (S.)1. 15See Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 183-185.

16" Protokol Nr. 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.,” 29 August 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, pp. 84-90.

17 Ibid.

18CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 2-3; CIA, "Approaching the Brink," p. 5. These preparations were first reported by the CIA in a “Special Analysis" on 24 December 1980.

19The problems posed by the cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. The Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980, based on the imagery obtained between 16 and 18 December, marked the first solid determination since the cloud cover had receded over the western USSR that only three Soviet divisions were on full alert. For further information, see CIA "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 1-5; and CIA, "Approaching the Brink," pp. 2, 4-5.

20CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” pp. 2-4. For further comments on the state of Soviet line divisions, see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1986, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1986), pp. 98-99, which indicates that 40 percent, not 25 percent, of Soviet forces in the "western USSR" were Category 2. The discrepancy presumably arises because of different definitions of what the "western USSR" comprises.

21 All Soviet line divisions other than depot divisions were officially described as "constantly ready." In Soviet parlance, "constant readiness" was the lowest of four levels of combat readiness: constant, increased, "threat of war," and full.

21aIt is also possible, though less likely, that one Category 3 tank division (from the Belorussian Military District) was mobilized along with three Category 2 divisions. Bringing a single Category 3 tank division up to full strength could potentially be done quickly, though it would be a much less desirable approach than relying on a Category 2 division. Hence, it seems likely that the allocation stipulated in the Suslov Commission's directive was adjusted slightly. On the distribution of Soviet Forces, see the map in CIA, "Approaching the Brink,” p. 4.

22This proportion of reservists for support and logistical roles may seem low, but two factors may account for that. First, the support requirements for "exercises," involving mainly rations and transportation, would have been lower than those for "war," which would entailed much more demanding requirements for ammunition and the like. Second, logistical preparations do not proceed in a strictly linear fashion. Once a certain threshold has been reached, it is possible to expand logisitical/support effectiveness without a commensurate increase in the number of support personnel. 23"Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. The lengthy interview with Colonel Kukliński is in “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-55. Kukliński was one of the officers on the Polish General Staff responsible for drafting the martial law plans. He also had long been working for the CIA. He had to escape from Poland in November 1981. See my article in this Bulletin.

24See, for example, "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st). See also "Einweisung,” Bl. 16.

25 See the two documents cited in the previous note. 26Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 163-164.

27U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Estimates on Polish Intervention Forces," Cable No. 14933, 7 November 1980, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection, Polish Crisis 1980-1981. This cable evidently is based on comments by a high-ranking Romanian military officer.

28" Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 54.

29 Ibid., Bl. 55.

Special Issue of RODINA

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E. Zubkova, "Stalin and Public Opinion in the USSR"
V. Pozniakov, "Soviet Intelligence in the USA"
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G. Kennan"

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V. Zubok, “The First American Exhibition in the USSR" M. Leffler, Rethinking the Origins of the Cold War"

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More Documents on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981

Editor's Note: The translations of the following documents were prepared for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference “Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” organized and sponsored by the National Security Archive (Washington), the Institute of Political Studies/Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw), and CWIHP. Copies of these and other documents (as well as translations) are accessible in the Archive/CWIHP “Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database.” (For further information, contact: The National Security Archive; 2130 H St., NW; Gelman 701; Washington, DC 20037; tel: 202/994-7000.)

Stenographic Minutes of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Moscow, 5 December 1980

(Start: 11:00 a.m.)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Dear Comrades! I warmly welcome you, our allies in the Warsaw Pact, our friends, in the name of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU and thank you for your speedy and positive response to the invitation for the meeting.

[...]

There are also events in Poland, difficult and alarming ones. This is the main question. We understand the great concerns of Comrade Kania and of all our political friends who are in a difficult situation.

The crisis in Poland concerns, of course, all of us. Various forces are mobilizing against socialism in Poland, from the so-called liberals to the fascists. They are dealing blows against socialist Poland. The objective, however, is the entire socialist community.

As we all know, the Polish comrades only recently held the 7th CC Plenum. Perhaps we will ask them to provide us with information about this work. They will probably not mind discussing, here in the circle of friends, measures, the implementation of which could result in overcoming the crisis situation, strengthening socialist Poland.

I think the comrades will agree with me that Comrade Kania will speak first. Then the other comrades will have the opportunity to speak.

We should agree on the procedure of our consultation. What proposals do we have regarding the chairman?

Todor Živkov:

I think we should not chair our meeting today in alphabetical order. Since our meeting will only have two sessions, I would propose that the Soviet delegation as hosts chair this meeting.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Are there objections?-Thank you, comrades, for your confidence. [...] Comrade Kania now has the floor.

Stanisław Kania:

Dearest Comrade Leonid Ilyich! Dearest Comrades! It is difficult for me to speak to you here today as a representative of the leadership of the Polish Party. This is not only difficult because it is the first time that I speak to you, the party leaders, in this circle, but it is also difficult for us as representatives of the Polish leadership to speak here and before our compatriots at home; it is difficult to speak to you here in particular because the main sources of the political crisis which has gripped our country are concentrated at the level of our Party. The crisis is also the topic of our meeting today which we interpret as an expression of the internationalist concerns about the situation in our country.

Our situation is indeed very complicated. There are great dangers to socialism. The dangers pose themselves in the economic field and bring anarchy and counterrevolution into our country.

We are quite conscious what responsibility we carry for our Party, for our workers' class, and for the Polish people in order to resolve this crisis effectively. We are also aware of the internationalist responsibility for the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. We are an important and inseparable part of the socialist community of states, and we know that the situation in Poland is also causing various complications for our neighbors. We know very well that we ourselves must lead the country out of this difficult situation. This is our responsibility, and we are convinced that we have a real chance for the resolution of these tasks.

We keep in constant contact with the leadership of the CPSU and very much appreciate your views and advice, which you have given us, Comrade Leonid Ilyich. We realize the fundamental importance of your views of our difficulties, and it conforms to our opinion on the causes of the problems that are occurring in Poland.

For the second time, your name stands for sensitivity not only for a class-conscious assessment but also for the national peculiarities and for the situation in Poland. [...]

What are the causes of the crisis? This is not the first, but one of several profound crises in Poland. We had the year 1956 and the bloody events in Poznań, with the ensuing changes in the leadership of the Party and the great wave of revisionism in Poland. There was the year 1968, the well-known incidents by students, but there were dramatic, bloody events in 1970 as well, in December of that year, along the coast. In 1976, major incidents were

staged in Radom and Ursus in connection with the preparation for price increases.

Today's crisis affects the working class, but also other segments of the population, and the crisis is of a mass character. Young people prove to be particularly active, especially young workers, technicians, and engineers, and this crisis has lasted for a long time. The strike phase is behind us, but the crisis persists, and we are affected by the results on a daily basis. The situation has become demoralizing because one cannot hand out more than one produces.

strike committees, not at the initiative of the workers but at the initiative of anti-socialist elements. But by and large, this organization was supported by the workers throughout the entire country, and it is popular nationwide since the workers achieved social benefits through the strikes. [...]

Foreign imperialist diversion centers have shown great activity and even aggressiveness towards Poland, in particular the radio station "[Radio] Free Europe," the centers of reactionary emigration, which have supported anti-socialist actions by means of propaganda and also by giving financial support to "Solidarity”. We have protested

The crisis also created new structures which are not of sharply against this, and there are certain positive results, a our making, in particular the new labor unions which certain retreat of the enemy forces. create a lot of difficulties for us and pose an attempt by the enemy of socialism in Poland to test us.

There are various causes for [these] concerns, and questions can indeed be asked whether the estimate of the conflict in Poland is correct, whether we are on the right track to get out of this crisis.

We completely agree with Comrade Leonid Ilyich that it is necessary to analyze more thoroughly the anatomy of these occurrences which have led to the crisis, of all mechanisms which caused the undermining of the Party, the government, and even the economy of the country and which have allowed enemy forces, the forces of counterrevolution, to penetrate the working class.

Despite the various difficulties, we are of the opinion that our estimates accord with the reality of the situation. The main reason for the problems was dissatisfaction

[...]

We have, of course, lost some of our prestige in the eyes of party activists, due to these compromises. Even if a certain state of criticism has been reached, we nevertheless managed to isolate some of the anti-socialist elements. The public did not react too agreeably to this. A situation occurred in which it was necessary to put a number of repressive measures, including administrative measures, into effect.

Created by the Politburo, a group which operates under the direction of the premier, is preparing a series of different measures. This includes among other things the question of introducing martial law in Poland.-Actually, under our constitution we only have the option of declaring martial law.

It is also preparing an operation with the aim of

counterrevolution.

among the workers. There were, of course, real reasons for arresting the most active functionaries of the
this dissatisfaction. That was the reason for the mass
character of the strike movement. There were strikes in
many major Polish plants, even in those which can look
back to a long revolutionary tradition.

The Party proved to be extremely weak in the ideological field. We were faced with the results of policy which ignored the class character of society. The slogan of the achievement of modern socialist society was proclaimed much too early. This took place at a time when individual farmers in Poland still constituted the majority in the countryside, and in the 1970s, private enterprise spread over large parts of the trade business as well as other areas of the economy. [...]

Looking back today at these difficulties in the situation, we believe that the use of political measures for the resolution of the strike conflicts was a correct decision. Other solutions and other decisions could have provoked an avalanche of incidents and led to a bloody confrontation, the results of which would have affected the entire socialist world. Despite the difficult problems, it seems to us that there was no other resort than to compromise in the question of permitting the establishment of the new labor union.[...]

What is there to say about the period after the great wave of strikes? How should it be evaluated? It is a period of a very hard political battle, a difficult period for the Party. The new union "Solidarity" developed out of the

It also developed guidelines for communications in the case of an emergency, and the same for the mass media, the newspapers, railroads and the (automobile) transport facilities in general.

We will also create special groups of particularly trustworthy party members which, if necessary, can be armed. We have already selected 19,000 such party members and are of the opinion that we will have about 30,000 by the end of December.

Information on these preparations has in part fallen into the hands of leading of the counterrevolution. The assessment of the 7th Plenum has further toughened our policy. We think that it created a more favorable atmosphere for a counteroffensive than had previously existed.

[...]

We have to become active, on all fronts. Most important is the internal unity of the Party, its stamina, its influence on the working class. These are the main preconditions of taming the counterrevolutionary forces.

The course of events might naturally confront us with the necessity of implementing other measures, measures not limited to the political confrontation which we have expected, but measures of confrontation associated with repressive measures. Believe me, comrades, that in that case we will have sufficient determination with respect to

the counterrevolution, in order to defend socialism, the socialist position, in Poland.

Todor Živkov:

Dear Comrades! In consideration of the nature of our meeting, I would like to address some key questions and explain the views of our Party with regard to the situation in Poland. [...]

What is our estimate of the situation in Poland, our general estimate? For five months now, events have been shaking Poland, which causes us great concern. We all understand that what is happening there is above all a Polish question and concerns the development of socialism in Poland. But we also understand quite well that it is not solely a Polish question. The developments in Poland concern all socialist countries, the entire socialist community. [...]

The general estimate of the situation has two aspects, I think. The first one concerns the question of what is actually happening in Poland, of the character of the processes are which are taking place there, what the causes are, and what forces are behind these events.

A second aspect is the answer to the question of what the situation in this country actually is, what the reality of the situation is, what the main danger is.

It is important, for example, if we take the first, and we have no chance and time to analyze this very thoroughly, we will be able to do that later, to give the first estimate now. This is even more important given that other political forces are actively trying to force their estimate on the public. The Eurocommunists, for example, talk about the historical events in Poland and about the necessity for all socialist countries to go through this development. Yugoslavia is massively spreading its own interpretation of the Polish events, as if they were new evidence of the correctness of the Yugoslav way and the Yugoslav brand of socialism. Not to mention the Western countries which attentively and actively watch and react to the Polish events. They are spreading the opinion that the Polish events have proved again that the political and economic system of socialism is not viable.

Our general opinion is that we are dealing with a very serious political and economic crisis in Poland which on the one hand was caused by flaws in the policy under the current leadership of the Polish Party and Government, on the other hand by the plans and activities of anti-socialist forces which without doubt have for quite some time been active inside and outside of Poland.

What concerns us is that there is no clear and reasonable estimate, and there is no program for a way out of the situation that has developed. Our opinion is that the lack of such a program is one of the reasons why change is only occurring very slowly here. Up to this point, there has now not been a mobilization of forces to the fullest extent possible. It is lacking! The defensive actions are continued. There are even certain steps back from the

political plan.

We understand the necessity for compromises but one should clearly look ahead and consider for what purpose one makes these compromises and where they might lead. As long as no major changes occur, until the party does not seize the initiative, we can not speak at all of a turn of events.

What is our opinion on the ways out of this situation? We think that the solution has to be found in the People's Republic of Poland itself. One should work out various options which are appropriate for the situation, and our Polish comrades should be ready to apply these options in the country by means of the Polish United Workers' Party and the People's Republic of Poland. Our estimate is that such possibilities exist at this very moment.

Secondly, in our opinion, the Polish Party should try and consistently pursue going on the offensive. Of course, the Polish comrades know best which possibilities and ways exist for such an offensive. But some aspects should also be viewed from our point of view. There is, for example, a certain degree of fatigue in view of the events of the last five months, which, of course, affects the social situation of the people. There is the prospect that the economic situation and the situation of the workers will further deteriorate. One should state very clearly who is to blame for this and who creates obstacles [to improvement]. One cannot strike endlessly, one cannot live endlessly on credit, and one cannot demand a better life without improving production. This should be stated quite clearly.

There are healthy forces-the army, security forces, and the larger part of Party and population. These are forces that the Party and the state organs can rely on. While it is indeed necessary in today's situation to be flexible, too, it is also right to defend the socialist position in the current situation with greater certainty and greater vigor. [...] I would like to address briefly the question of strategic goals the class enemy is pursuing and the eminently important strategic dangers which result from the events in Poland.

It seems that the West now hardly harbors any illusions of changing the social order in Poland in such a way that Poland would leave the Warsaw Pact and pull back to the extent that it would change the political landscape. Of course, the enemy has done and is doing everything to effect a change of the social system, the economic system in our countries, among them Poland. But now the strategic plan of the West is clearly to put a different system into practice in Poland which diverges from real socialism and heads into the direction of liberal socialism, a model which then could pose as an example and provoke changes in the social order in other countries of the socialist community.

Imperialism pursues its policy of interference in internal Polish affairs, and is accompanied by the massive propaganda drums about an alleged intervention by the Soviet Union and the other countries. Nationalist feelings

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