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getting ships at the cost of reparations. He is a clumsy and not very flexible man. The whole time Stalin thought that we will receive ships as an advance on the 15% of the onethird of the trophy German navy. [Stalin said] In Potsdam I promised to give [it] to you for free, but 15% of the navy ships is more than I had promised. It has been taken from the enemy, after all, and Bierut got angry with me that I am not giving things away for free. Such lack of trust spoils relations. In the meantime, Stalin called Wyszyñski and Kuznetsov concerning this matter. He came back after the phone conversation and declared that the matter stood worse than he thought, and that the Soviet bureaucrats really wanted to cheat you [Poles] and count twenty-three ships as reparations and you are agreeing to it. It is all coming from Bulganin. If you think there are no stupid generals, you are wrong. Later Stalin declared that they will have to give us those ships for free. In the meantime, another phone call came from Moscow. It became clear that the 15% mentioned in the Polish-Soviet agreement refers to the commercial fleet, not the navy, and that apparently an agreement was reached in Moscow with a Polish delegation that the twenty-three ships are to be counted in exchange for the shipwrecks which the Soviet navy will raise from the bottom of the Polish sea and take. Stalin asked that the copy of the agreement be sent to him. He agreed to it unwillingly, as if it were a fait accompli.

The army. Concerning officers of the Red Army in the Polish Army taking Polish citizenship-many of them do not want to take it because they are afraid that the leadership will change. We don't want to force them. You should Polonize the army all the way through. You can let go of the Red Army generals and officers whenever you want, as soon as possible. If you need a released soldier's help, they should help you, but as an instructor. If it upsets Bulganin, that means he doesn't understand anything. You keep doing your thing and don't pay attention to that. Why did you approach Bulganin and not a military attaché in Poland? When he found out about the issue involving Rear-Admiral Abramov,22 he pointed out that we should not put Soviet people in uncomfortable positions, that is, inviting them to certain posts [only to] release them later.

The Red Army in Poland. There are no international circumstances that would require keeping large troops of the Red Army in Poland. Only small troops guarding the transit railroad line could be left. The only question is your domestic situation. The point is that they would not kill you. The situation is similar in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They don't want us to leave before the election either. The number of Red Army soldiers in Poland is steadily diminishing and will continue to diminish. We will soon pull the last soldier out of Czechoslovakia under the condition that the Americans pull out as well. He [Stalin] generally spoke for localization but make no concrete promises concerning that matter. He stated that after the war plundering instincts were awakened among the Red Army soldiers.

In Berlin alone they took two hundred thousand watches. One of the reasons is that the command of the Red Army allowed the released soldiers to take some amount of spoils home. When the demobilization is over, marauding will end as well.

Grain for sowing. He was embarrassed when he found out that Molotov refused to lend [Poland] fifty thousand tons of grain for sowing. He was urging us to take thirty thousand although he wasn't sure whether it could still be done. He called Rokossovskii [and told him] to give the thirty thousand tons as a loan. He confirmed that order to Molotov by phone.

Zaolzie [Silesia]. You have coking coal, so economically your problem is solved. Nobody but us would support your claims. We would be risking defeat if we supported your claims. Why should you or we compromise ourselves? You should solve this situation by resettling the population. You need to organize some kind of Polish-Czech conference. We can help you with it if you want us to. It is no good that all the Slavic countries unite but two of them are arguing.

Yugoslavia. The picture of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia was not as pretty as it seemed from afar. During the take over of Białogród [Belgrade] Tito was in Moscow. The partisans could not keep up an open battle with the Germans at all. However, Tito was much more ruthless towards the enemy than you. Of thirty-four thousand of Pavelicz's23 captives [POW's-trans.] he had fourteen thousand shot. The English demanded that we influence Tito in order to postpone the election once Szubaszic2 left the government. We answered that Tito's government is the only legally valid and universally recognized government of Yugoslavia and only that government can decide about the election. The English have already been silent for two weeks concerning this matter. The English were the ones who forced Szubaszic to leave the government.

Revkom.25 Stalin was on the front line at the time. Dzierzynski dreamed of a Soviet Poland. Lenin unwillingly agreed to Revkom. We very quickly realized that creating Revkom was a mistake. In a country such as Poland, which for so many years was under foreign rule, choosing Soviet rule was a mistake. Lenin tried to explain it as prodding Poland with a bayonet just to see. But of course that is not a sufficient explanation.

XXX

1. Letter of a Swedish sailor-Communist to the Soviet Government concerning anti-Soviet agitation in Gdańsk and Gdynia.

2. The delay in the invitation was caused by the unexpected arrival of [U.S. Ambassador Averell] Harriman at Sochi. 3. Truman removed [former senior Roosevelt aide Harry] Hopkins.

4. Freedom of the press-Lenin treated like a German spy by the bourgeois press.

5. Associated Press and Timoshenko26-Stalin in Teheran and forcing the correspondent to publish a denial which was dictated to him under threat of expulsion from the Soviet Union.

6. Good-naturedly calling us "tolstoyniks” during dinner. 7. Benefits from power-Georgian deputy who bought oxen and built two houses.

[Source: Gomułka papers, in possession of Gomułka Family, translated by Anna Elliot-Zielinska.]

Document No. 2

Conversation of J.V. Stalin with W. Gomułka and G. Mintz regarding the situation in Poland

Distributed to V. Molotov, L. Beria, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoian, and A. Vyshinskii.

Moscow

14 November 1945

SECRET

To Com. MOLOTOV for chetverka [apparently, Stalin's inner circle of four,27 which probably consisted of the persons listed above except for Vyshinskii].

The discussion was not being transcribed (the Poles deemed it unnecessary to make a record of conversation), thus I am sending you the contents of the discussion in the form of questions and answers.

QUESTION FROM POLES. Has there been a change in the Soviet leaders' attitude toward Poland and, in particular, toward [the] Polish Communists?

ANSWER FROM COM. STALIN. It has not changed and could not change. Our attitude toward Poles and Polish Communists is as friendly as before.

QUESTION. Should we adopt a law for nationalizing large industry and banks?

ANSWER. Following [Czechoslovak President Eduard] Beneš' adoption of such a law, the time has come when such a law should be adopted in Poland as well. QUESTION. Should we allow foreign capital to be brought to Poland in the form of concessions or in some other form? ANSWER. This matter is very serious, and it must be carefully examined by the Poles themselves.

Note: The Poles have not said that they have rejected the Soviet proposal for joint enterprises. I have the impression that the Poles would not mind making concessions to foreign capital in this area as well.

QUESTION. Should we adopt the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] proposal for repealing grain procurement and announcing a free market without price regulations? ANSWER. However regrettable it may be, sooner or later the Poles will have to take this step, since, under a nonSoviet system and in the absence of war, it is not possible to maintain for long a system of grain procurement and price regulations.

QUESTION. Would I object if the Poles accepted a loan from the Americans or the English, and would I allow this loan to be accepted under the conditions that would more or less limit Poland's utilization of the loan? ANSWER. The loan can be accepted, but without any types of conditions that would limit Poland's rights in the utilization of the loan.

QUESTION. Can we conclude a pact of mutual assistance with France?

ANSWER. You can, but it must fully conform to the spirit of the mutual assistance pact concluded between Poland and the USSR.

QUESTION. Should we pursue further the question of Těšín [Cieszyn] and can the USSR support Poland in the negotiations on Těšín with Czechoslovakia? ANSWER. I don't advise you to pursue this question further, since, after receiving Silesian coking coal, Poland no longer has an argument for the transfer of Těšín to the Poles, in light of which the USSR cannot support the Poles in this matter. It would be better to eliminate quickly this contentious issue with Czechoslovakia, limit the matter to the resettlement of Těšín Poles in Poland, and re-establish good relations with Czechoslovakia. On the question of resettling Těšín Poles in Poland, the USSR can support the Poles in the negotiations with Czechoslovakia. QUESTION. Should representatives of the VKP(b) [AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks] be invited to the PPR [Polish Workers Party] Congress that will be taking place in the near future?

ANSWER. It would be better not to invite them, so that opponents would not be able to say that the PPR Congress is taking place under the control of the VKP(b). QUESTION. Can we announce at the PPR Congress that the PPR is a successor of the line and tradition of the Polish Communist Party, which had been liquidated even prior to the war?

ANSWER. This should not be done because the Polish Communist Party has in actuality become agents of Piłsudchiks, even though opponents have painted it as agents of the VKP(b). It would be better to announce at the PPR Congress that the PPR is a new party and that it is not tied to the line and traditions of the Polish Communist Party. QUESTION. Are we correct in thinking that it would be expedient to postpone general elections in Poland for another year?

ANSWER. I think that it would be better to hold elections no later than spring of 1946, since further postponement of elections would be very difficult both due to internal and international reasons.

QUESTION. Osóbka-Morawski is acting badly. If he does not improve in the near future, we would like to replace him prior to the organization of the elections with Mr. Lange (the current Polish ambassador to the USA, a moderate PPS-ist, and well disposed, in the Poles' opinion, toward Communists). What can you suggest?

ANSWER. If you have no other option and if it is impossible at present to put forth the candidacy of Bierut

(the Poles believe this combination to be inexpedient), then you can make an attempt with Lange, with the goal of using Lange to dismantle the PPS. Consult with Wanda Lvovna, who is closely familiar with Lange.

The rest of the discussion dealt with questions regarding the shipment of 30 tons of seed grain from the Rokossowski reserves and fulfilling the Poles' request for railroad transport. But you already know about these matters.

STALIN

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond 45, opis 1, delo 355, listy 8-11; published in Vostochnaia Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov [Eastern Europe in the Documents of the Russian Archives 1944-1953], vol. 1 (1944-48), ed. T.V. Volokitina et. al., (Moscow: Siberian Chronograph, 1997), pp. 301-303; translated by Daniel Rozas]

Andrzej Werblan is Professor Emeritus of History at the Silesian University in Katowice, former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, and Deputy Speaker of the Polish Parliament.

1 Władysław Gomułka (1905-1966): pseudonym "Wieslaw"; Polish Communist leader; General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, 1943-1948; First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, 1956-1970.

2 Władysław Gomułka, Diaries, edited by Andrzej Werblan (Warsaw, 1994), vol. II, p. 516.

3 Krysztof Persak: Junior research fellow at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. His current project deals with the Polish Communist Party Central Committee's organization and functioning as well as Polish Communist elite after 1944.

* Krzysztof Persak, "Polish Sources On Stalin's Foreign Policy," Paper presented at the CWIHP workshop "European Archival Evidence on Stalin and the Cold War," Budapest, 3-4 October 1997.

" Vostochnaia Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944-53 gg.[Eastern Europe in the documents of the Russian Archives], vol. I. 1944-48 (Moscow-Novosibirsk: “Siberian Chronograph," 1997).

"Hilary Minc (1905-1974): Communist politician; member of the PWP/PUWP Politburo, 1944-1956; deputy Prime Minister, responsible for the economy. At the time a member of the Politburo of the KCPPR and Minister of Industry in the TRJN. 7 Stanisław Mikołajczyk (1902-1966): Peasants' Party leader; Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, 1943-44; leader of the opposition Polish Peasants' Party and deputy Prime Minister, 1945-47; 1947 emigration to the U.S.

8 Words "third quarter of 1945" added in hand on the original.

9 Edward Osóbka-Morawski, TRJN premier.

10 Maurice Thorez, General Secretary of the Communist Party of France.

11 Oskar Lange, a well-known economist, active in the PPS and PUWP, was a professor at the University of Chicago during the war.

12 Wanda Wasilewska (1905-1964): Socialist and Communist politician and writer; leader of the Polish communist emigration in the Soviet Union during World War II-President of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR; Stalin's protegeé. Did not return to Poland after 1945.

13 Marshall Józef Pilsudski (1867-1935): Polish national leader, architect of Polish independence in 1918, President 19181922 and Premier 1926-27, 1930.

14 Jan Sosnowski, active in SDKPIL, lived in the USSR after 1917. He died in the purges of 1937-38.

15 Feliks Dzierzynski (1877-1926): Polish and Russian communist politician; founder and President of the Cheka, 19171926; held various posts in the Soviet Government (Sovnarkom). 16 Tomasz Dabal, one of the leaders of the KPP, died in the purges in 1938.

17 General Władysław Sikorski (1881-1943): eminent Polish military leader and statesman; Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1943; died in air crash in Gibraltar. 18 Józef Unszlicht, active in SDKPiL, lived in the USSR after 1917, died in purges in 1937-38.

19 The Lend-Lease Act of 1941, on the basis of which the USSR received from the United States equipment and supplies worth US $11 billion during the war.

20 State-run farms.

21 Viktor Lebedev, USSR Ambassador in Warsaw, 1945-52. 22 Nikolai Abramov, rear-admiral, a Russian officer who for five months (August-December 1945) was Chief of Staff of the Polish navy.

23 Ante Pavelić, a Croatian politican and soldier who collaborated with the Germans during World War II.

24 Ivan Šubašić, premier of the Yugoslavian emigration government in London in 1944. In 1945, after an agreement with Josip Broz Tito, he became a Minister of Internal Affairs in Tito's government. He resigned from that post after several months.

25 The Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland, which was to become the Polish Soviet Government in case the Red Army won in 1920. It existed for a short period of time in the summer of 1920 on the territory seized by the Red Army. Julian Marchlewski was the Chairman; other members were Feliks Dzierżyński, Feliks Kon, Edward Próchniak and Józef Unszlicht. 26 Semyon Timoshenko, a USSR marshal.

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The Polish Contribution to the Victory of the "Prague Coup" in February 1948

By Andrzej Paczkowski

I

n the last phase of World War II, and during the first years after the war, Polish-Czechoslovak relations were, to use the euphemistic language of diplomacy, cool and sometimes even tense. The source of this tension was a conflict which had started in 1918 over part of Těšín (Cieszyn), Silesia (also known as Zaolzie) as well as the newly born territorial dispute over the division of German Lower Silesia, which eventually had fallen to Poland. The Polish and Czechoslovak Communists also became involved in these conflicts. Although both sides declared their internationalism, the communist parties were most unyielding in presenting their territorial demands; in part because of the necessity to strengthen their legitimacy as the defenders of national (or state) interests and in part to show themselves to be as good defenders as other political parties. This was particularly obvious in the case of the Polish Communists, who came to power by force. The Czechoslovak Communists, who traditionally had been quite influential, however, also had to avoid being outmatched by the "Benešniks." In the end, under pressure from Stalin, a compromise was reached and a treaty of "friendship and cooperation" was signed in March 1947.

Cool relations between the two countries did not mean that relations between the Communist parties were equally bad. Perhaps they lacked the spontaneous cordiality with which, for example, Yugoslav leader Josip Tito was treated in Poland, but Poles sincerely worried that Prague was "lagging behind” the rest of Central Europe in its march towards "people's democracy." They, of course, avoided public criticism of their Czech and Slovak comrades, but growing Polish impatience was expressed by some of the more orthodox activists in some internal documents. For example, the Polish consul in Moravská Ostrava stated with regret in a 1947 report that "the superstition of formal democracy is still deeply rooted in the heart of the [Czechoslovak] com-party [Communist Party]." However, he consoled himself by saying that "the growing consciousness and combative spirit of the working masses is producing more healthy trends." The fact that it was only in Czechoslovakia that the Communists had not yet gained full control over the situation was inconvenient for everybody, including Moscow. However, Warsaw probably felt most directly what was happening on the other side of the Poland's southern border. Among other reasons, this was because Czechoslovakia under President Eduard Beneš did not constitute a tight enough barrier between Poland and the West. Moreover, Polish Communists, who were more and more determined to achieve “organic unification" with, or,

1

in fact, absorption of, the Socialists, were concerned with the "bad example" given by the Czechoslovak Social Democrats to their Polish counterparts. Particularly after the Brno congress of November 1947, activists who preferred to collaborate with non-Communist partners and President Beneš, rather than with Communist premier, Klement Gottwald, played an important role in the party leadership. In addition, Bohumil Laušman, the newly elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party, was allegedly a "centrist." These trends could potentially have mobilized those Polish Socialists who were hesitant to fall into the open arms of Communist leaders Bolesław Bierut and Władysław Gomułka.

It is therefore not surprising that Warsaw was intensely interested in the elections planned in Czechoslovakia for May 1948. At the end of January 1948, during one of the meetings of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) Politburo, "it was decided to propose to the CPCz [Czechoslovak Communist Party] a meeting during the coming two weeks to discuss the question of the election." On February 11, that is, when the government crisis in Prague began, the same body decided on the "guidelines" for talks with the Czechoslovak Communists. These concerned "a) [the question of] taking a tougher stance against reactionary and collaborationist forces; b) the question of the approach to the Social Democrats and tactics towards the Socialist Left in Czechoslovakia; and c) the question of potential political aid in organizational and technical spheres [in the election campaign]." On February 14, after the meeting, Gomułka presented a report to members of the Politburo. The recorder did not mention whether he had raised the question of "taking a tougher stance against reactionary forces," but the topic must have been discussed. One way or another, the Polish Communists intended to offer help. On February 13, as the situation in Prague intensified, the embassy sent a coded message suggesting that "due to the projected internal and political changes... [it would be] desirable for a delegation from Poland to participate in the Congress of Trade Unions [which was to take place] on February 22." Three days later, however, Warsaw received a telegram saying that Gottwald "decided not to invite the delegation," since "questions of internal politics will be discussed" during the Congress, "and the presence of foreigners could be interpreted as interfering in Czechoslovak internal affairs." (As is well known, the Congress of Trade Unions became one of the main instruments of pressure on Beneš.)

Although the Czechoslovak Communists completely controlled the situation in the trade unions, the Social Democrats were still their "weak point." A lot depended on

their stance, since it was only together with the Social Democrats that the CPCz had a majority in the Parliament. Without the collaboration of the Social Democrats, not just Zdeněk Fierlinger's "Left," but above all Laušman's "center," the chances for a quick and "peaceful" elimination of political opponents were close to zero. In this matter Polish comrades could help, since the leadership of the Polish Socialist Party consisted of conformists who were ready to go quite far in order to show their loyalty in the fight for the "unity of the workers' movement," and some of them were simply too dependent on the Communists. After receiving the news that Laušman was inclined to cooperate with Gottwald's opponents, Gomułka immediately conducted the necessary dialogue with Józef Cyrankiewicz,' the premier and unquestioned leader of the compliant Polish Socialists. On the evening of the same day, February 20, the PPS leadership decided to send a party delegation to Prague. Their goal was to "potentially influence" Czechoslovak colleagues "in the spirit of leftist-Socialist and revolutionary politics." Also on February 20, the Polish Foreign Ministry ordered Aleksander Krajewski, chargé d'affaires in Prague, to "immediately go to Gottwald" and inform him about the planned departure for Prague of the four PPS delegates at noon the next day. An "immediate answer" was requested as to whether the "CPCz had any reservations with respect to this initiative, and the CPCz was asked to provide guidelines for talks with the Social Democrats." " This time, the answer from Prague was completely positive. Gottwald asked the Poles to meet with the Social Democrats (“particularly the left ones") and to press "them and Laušman not to leave the government under any circumstances or to align with the reactionary forces."10

In the late afternoon of February 21, four Polish politicians arrived in Prague. They belonged to the very top PPS leadership, although Cyrankiewicz, the "Number One" man, was not among them. It could have been impossible for Cyrankiewicz to come to Prague, since the arrival of the premier in office would give the delegation an official and government-level character. All the delegates were members of the Central Executive Committee (Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, hereafter CKW), which was the highest executive organ of the party, corresponding more or less to the Politburo in Communist parties. Kazimierz Rusinek, head of the CKW (formally the Number Two man in the PPS), led the delegation. He was accompanied by Adam Rapacki, a member of the Political Commission of the CKW and Minister of Navigation in Cyrankiewicz's government, who later became famous on the international scene as Poland's foreign minister from 1956-1968. The other two members of the delegation were CKW members Stefan Arski and Henryk Jabłoński. There is no need to discuss their actions, since the extensive report published below relates it in great detail. It seems to be reliable, although it is noted that in Czechoslovak sources known to me, there

is no mention of the Poles' stay in Prague or of the many talks they conducted with the Social Democrats as well as with the Communists.

After returning to Warsaw the delegation submitted the following report, copies of which are found in Polish Workers' Party records as well as in those of the Foreign Ministry. Cyrankiewicz passed one copy to the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, and Ambassador Viktor Lebedev sent a shortened version to Moscow." In the memo accompanying the note, Ambassador Lebedev "ironically pointed out that the PPS delegates strikingly (javno) overestimated the importance of their mission."2 I am not able to judge whether and to what degree the ambassador was right, but I hope the historians investigating the 1948 "Prague coup" will do that in time. It is beyond question, however, that the Poles genuinely wanted to help Gottwald and their Socialist comrades in the efficient elimination of the "reactionary forces." It is also possible that it was important to Cyrankiewicz to present the report to the Soviet representative in Warsaw, since this was a way for the PPS to stress its loyalty to Stalin (and Communists in general) and prove that it could be useful. At the same time, the observation of the mechanics of the "Prague coup," the ruthlessness and effectiveness of Gottwald's actions, definitely influenced the way in which the Polish Socialists assessed their chances to resist the "unification" plan pushed by Gomułka. The PPS leadership realized that if they did not give up "willingly" they would be forced to surrender under worse conditions. Less than two weeks after the victory of the Czechoslovak Communists, Roman Zambrowski, one of the PPR leaders, said that, "new [developments] in Socialist parties in the West and in the countries of People's Democracy... were the reason that we entered a new stage of relations between the PPR and PPS. We consider this period to be a period of accelerated ripening of organic unity. The international situation has changed so much in the last few days that in order not to be left behind [the events] we need to start moving faster as well."3 Gomułka sent congratulations to Gottwald, and Cyrankiewicz and Rusinek sent a congratulatory letter to Laušman, expressing "a particular joy about the closing of the unified ranks of the Czechoslovak working class and consolidating the Social Democratic Party along the leftist-socialist, revolutionary political line." By helping Gottwald and Fierlinger they were adding a brick to the Sovietization of Poland and signing the death sentence for their own party.

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