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Article 82

Every one citizen who has the right to vote is eligible for the election to the People's Councils25, and to the Sejm - after having reached the age of twenty-one.

Article 86

Candidates are nominated by political and social organizations, uniting working people citizens of town and country.

[Source: AAN (Archive of Modern Records), KC PZPR, 2774, pp. 1-27. Obtained and translated by Krzysztof Persak.]

Krzysztof Persak is a doctoral student and Junior Fellow at the Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences. In the Spring of 1999, he will spend several months on research in the U.S. as a CWIHP Fellow.

Fortunately, Russian sources have started emerging in recent years. Among the most important documentary collections on Polish-Soviet relations in the Stalin years are: Polska - ZSRR: struktury podleglosci. Dokumenty KC WKP(b) 1944-1949 [Poland-USSR: The Structures of Subjection. Documents of VKP(b), 1944-1949], edited by Giennadii A. Bordiugov, Aleksander Kochanski, Adam Koseski, Giennadii F. Matveev and Andrzej Paczkowski (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995. A Russian edition of this volume, published in Moscow, exists as well): NKVD i polskoe podpol'e 1944-1945 (Po “osobiim papkam” I. V. Stalina), ed. A. F. Noskova et al. (Moscow: Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1994); Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944-1953 gg., Vol. 1: 1944-1948, ed. G. P. Murashko et al. (Moscow-Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1997).

2 The first known official transcript of Polish-Soviet talks of the post-war period, prepared by the Polish side, is one of Gomulka's visit to Moscow in November 1956. A selection of Polish documents on Polish-Soviet relations in the years 19561970 which includes minutes of Gomulka's meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev has been just published: Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PRL-ZSRR, 1956-1970, ed. Andrzej Paczkowski (London: Aneks Publishers, 1998).

3 So far, I have been able to locate 17 sets of such published and unpublished notes, 13 of them are Bierut's notes. The remainder were taken by Gomułka, Jakub Berman and Edward

SWMP.S

F.si.edu

Osobká-Morawski. The results of my survey were presented in the paper "Polish Sources on Stalin's Foreign Policy” at the CWIHP workshop "European Archival Evidence on Stalin and the Cold War" in Budapest on 3-4 October 1997. The Hungarian language version of this paper is scheduled for publication in the yearbook of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

4 See: AAN [Archive of Modern Records], KC PZPR, 2774, pp. 1-27.

5 The two first countries of the Soviet bloc to adopt new "socialist" constitutions were Yugoslavia (31 January 1946) and Albania (14 March 1946). They were followed by the constitutions of Bulgaria (4 December 1947), Romania (13 April 1948), Czechoslovakia (9 May 1948), Hungary (20 August 1949), GDR (7 October 1949), another constitution by Albania (4 July 1950), and finally of Poland (22 July 1952). Shortly afterwards the new constitution of Romania was passed (27 September 1952).

"The course of the 1949-1952 constitutional works was most fully analyzed by Marian Rybicki, "Geneza i tryb przygotowania Konstytucji PRL z 1952 r.", in: Konstytucje Polski, Vol. 2, ed. Marian Kallas (Warsaw: PWN, 1990).

AAN, KC PZPR, 2609, p. 288. The note is not dated but from Bierut's other notes it can be inferred that this conversation took place on 3 November 1950.

8 Ibid., p. 288.

9 AAN, KC PZPR, 1636, p. 14. “Protokol nr 44 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 16 listopada 1950 r."

10 Rybicki, op. cit., p. 333.

"The questions of friendship with the USSR and PUWP's leading role in society would be introduced to the Polish constitution in 1976. This would become one of the impulses for the rise of democratic opposition in Poland.

12 In Polish both republika and rzeczpospolita mean "republic" but only the Old Polish word rzeczpospolita is traditionally reserved to be used with regard to the name of the Polish state. Thus although in 1952 the Polish Republic became “People's”, it still remained rzeczpospolita, not republika.

13

14

AAN, KC PZPR, 2772, pp. 82-90.

These explanations were usually very unconvincing. For example, an eminent Polish lawyer, Jan Wasilkowski, in conclusion of an article in which he discussed the new legislation on property contradicted all his previous argumentation and wrote that avoiding the term "private property" in the constitution was only a matter of style and the essence of “individual" and "private" property of means of production remained the same. (See Jan Wasilkowski, “Typy i formy wlasnosci w projekcie konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," Panstwo i Prawo, 3, 1952, p. 436-437).

15 See: AAN, KC PZPR, 2737, p. 151, “Zestawienie tresci istotniejszych poprawek zgłoszonych do Projektu Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej."

16 Teresa Toranska, Oni (London: Aneks Publishers, 1985), pp. 314-315. For the English edition see: Toranska, Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets, trans. by Agnieszka Kolakowska (London: Collins, Harvill, 1987).

17 Andrzej Garlicki, "Zatwierdzenie Konstytucji PRL," Polityka 28 (1990). Reprinted in Garlicki's book: Z tajnych archiwow (Warsaw: BGW, 1993), pp. 187-194.

18 The provinces of Lower Silesia, Pomerania and a part of East Prussia, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, were handed over to Poland, concurrently with the Russian acquisition of Eastern Poland.

19 The Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation was treated as the founding deed of the new

communist authority in Poland, and the day of its proclamation,
July 22, was celebrated as the national holiday until 1989.
20 Sejm is the proper name of Polish Parliament. The
Legislative Sejm was elected in January 1947, and its main
purpose was to establish the new constitution of People's Poland.
21 Until the adoption of this constitution, the official name of
the state was the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska).
22 Originally, in the Russian copy of the draft, Stalin replaced
the word "private" with "personal" but Bierut translated it as
"individual".

23 This amendment was not introduced by Stalin directly into the text of the constitution. He wrote the suggestion "Healthcare free?" on the margin of the draft, and the word "free" was added to the text of the constitution by Bierut when he re-wrote Stalin's corrections.

24 Like in article 60, this correction probably was not introduced directly by Stalin. He underlined the word “adult” and wrote the question "How many years?" above it. The words "who has reached the age of eighteen" were written in Russian, most probably with Bierut's hand.

25 People's Councils were organs of local government (equivalent to Soviets in the Soviet Union).

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New Evidence on the Sino-American Opening

"All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos"

Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American
Rapprochement, 1968-69

155

Introduction and annotation by Chen Jian and David L. Wilson

I

n retrospect, the years 1968-1969 witnessed profound changes in both the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) external relations and the international history of the Cold War. In August 1968, the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. In the months following the invasion, long-accumulated tensions between China and the Soviet Union evolved into open confrontation. In March 1969, a bloody border conflict erupted between the two Communist giants, bringing them to the brink of a general war (Soviet leaders even reportedly considered using nuclear weapons).

With Sino-Soviet relations in deep crisis, Beijing's policy toward the United States began to change subtly. After two decades of total confrontation, the first signs of Beijing's changing attitude toward the United States came in autumn 1968, when the Chinese responded positively and with unprecedented speed to a U.S. proposal to resume the stagnant Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, and in early 1969, when, in a highly unusual manner, Mao Zedong ordered the publication of newlyelected U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's inaugural address in all major Chinese newspapers (see Document 3). Three years later, Nixon would visit China and meet face to face with Mao in Beijing.

The Sino-Soviet border confrontation and SinoAmerican rapprochement represented two of the most important events in the international history of the Cold War. The great Sino-Soviet ideological and, now, military rivalry further drained both material and spiritual resources from international communism. Beijing's emergence as a dangerous enemy forced Moscow into an ever-worsening overextension of power. In the meantime, the Sino-American opening enormously enhanced Washington's strategic position in its global competition with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War did not occur until the late 1980s and early 1990s when both the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc collapsed, but one of the most crucial roots of that collapse certainly can be traced to 1968-1969.

Why did the Sino-Soviet border conflict erupt in March 1969? Did the border clashes relate to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? Did the clash relate to

Beijing's changing attitude toward Washington—and if so, how? To answer these questions, we need to dig into Chinese documentation. The fifteen documents and extracts translated in the following pages do not offer complete answers to these questions. But they provide useful clues to help us understand the motive of Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular.

As shown in Mao's wide-ranging discussions with Albanian defense minister Bauir Balluku and Australian Communist Party leader E. F. Hill, in October and November 1968, respectively, Mao was deeply concerned by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet action confirmed Mao's long-existing suspicions. about Soviet expansionist ambitions, the Chinese leader tried hard to comprehend the meanings of Soviet behavior on deeper levels. Most importantly, he wondered out loud if the Soviet invasion should be interpreted as the prelude to a more general war, which, he believed, might trigger "revolution" and could only be prevented by "revolution." In any case, China had to be prepared.

Against this background, Mao in January 1969 ordered the publication of Nixon's inaugural address, in which the American president implied a willingness to improve relations with all countries in the world. When the Sino-Soviet border battles erupted in March, Mao further instructed four marshals (all of whom had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution but had long enjoyed reputations as being experienced in practical policymaking) to discuss the changing international situation and present proposals on how China should deal with new circumstances. The four marshals produced two insightful reports, providing powerful strategic justification for Beijing to improve relations with the United States (see Documents No. 9 and 11). The escalation of the Sino-Soviet confrontation did not provide a complete explanation for Beijing's rapprochement with Washington, but it represented one of the most important factors underlying the decision.

Reading Mao's talks, a striking feature is his sense of space. Several times Mao used the expression “all under the heaven is (was) great chaos" to describe China's domestic and international settings as he perceived them.

This important concept dominated Mao's vision. The chairman was China's single most important policymaker (much more so during the 1968-69 period), but he was also a philosopher. (Mao's desire to be regarded as such is clearly demonstrated in his discussion with Hill.) In his conceptual world, China's domestic and international policies were closely interrelated. This explains why in his various talks he freely jumped between domestic and international topics. But his vision certainly was Chinacentric. When Mao stated that the languages of the world should be unified one day, one must ask, what language would the human race then use? The answer is clear: it should be the language that the chairman speaks. That, of course, is Chinese, with terms and expressions incorporated from other languages, such as the chairman. occasionally did during his talks with Hill.

All documents have been translated by Chen Jian from Chinese to English, with Li Di, a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Southern Illinois University, contributing to the translation of Documents No. 9 and 11. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words. The notes include explanatory information to place key individuals and events in context or to provide additional background on the material being discussed.

Document No. 1

Conversation between Mao Zedong and Beqir Balluku,2 1 October 1968

Mao Zedong: We have not seen each other for quite a while. When did we meet the last time? Did Liu Shaoqi3 and Deng Xiaoping also attend one of our meetings?

Balluku: That was in 1964. The last time I met with you was in February 1967, that is, twenty months ago. I came together with Comrade Kapo.5

Mao Zedong: Oh, yes. At that time, all under the heaven was great chaos, and the working class had just been mobilized.

Balluku: Now you have realized your own strategic plans. At that time, you told me and Kapo that the Cultural Revolution was facing two possibilities, success or failure, and that the problem concerning which path [socialism or capitalism] would overwhelm the other had not been solved. But now this great revolution has achieved great victory.

Mao Zedong: Now the working class dominates everything in the major cities. In most areas in the countryside, the peasants occupy a dominant position too. In the past, until the first half of this year, the students were the vanguards of the revolutionary movement, but now they have lagged behind.

Balluku: Yesterday, our delegation visited the Beijing Textile Knitting Plant. There a cadre who had committed mistakes in the past used his personal experience to give us a vivid introduction, which for me was a good lesson of

class education. He had committed mistakes, and originally was not convinced by the criticism of the masses. But later he not only accepted the criticism of the masses, but also recognized and corrected his mistakes. Mao Zedong: How is he now?

Balluku: He has been elected vice chairman of the factory's Revolutionary Committee. The revolutionary masses helped him with Marxist-Leninist patience. In our country, a Revolutionization Movement is now under way. We should educate our cadres and expose the bad elements. Some traitors and rich peasants have penetrated our state agencies. A revolutionization movement like this one will provide good education to the youth.

Mao Zedong: Many young people have not lived a bitter life. (Mao pointed to the interpreter) The Foreign Ministry has been divided into two factions. The one headed by Wang Zhongqi is an ultra-leftist faction, and has been strongly influenced by anarchism. (Pointing to the interpreter) He stood at the middle at that time and did not stand on the side of Wang Zhongqi's ultra-leftist faction. Even among that faction, ultra-leftists were only a small minority, and the majority can be won over to the correct side. The Foreign Ministry is a big department, with more than 3,000 people working there. Intellectuals are piled up there.

Balluku: The ministry should be downsized in the

future.

Mao Zedong: Downsize it by ninety percent. Balluku: In the Soviet Union there emerged the Khrushchev revisionism. This is a bad thing, but revolutionary communists in various countries have learned a lesson from it.

Mao Zedong: In a historical sense this is only a temporary phenomenon.

Balluku: During such turmoil, it is surprising that no significant [anti-revisionist] activities exist within the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong: There are some small organizations, and they are secret organizations. It is true that the Soviet Union is bad, but it can still provide material supplies [to its people]. For example, it does not have enough food, but it can buy from abroad. Unless a famine erupts there, the people there will not rebel. Another example is France, a capitalist and imperialist country. Although a big rebellion movement emerged there in May this year, it did not stop providing material supplies to the people. It is difficult to try to overthrow a government under such circumstances. Balluku: Will your Party soon convene a national congress?

Mao Zedong: Yes. We need to sum up our work and elect a new central leadership.

Balluku: The comrades at the Textile Knitting Plant also introduced us to the problem of rectifying the Party organizations.

Mao Zedong: All factories must go through reforms. All people's communes, schools, and party and government organs must go through reforms. We should

mobilize the masses. For a department as large as the Foreign Ministry, with 3,000 people working there, nothing can be done without mobilizing the masses. Among the ambassadors we dispatched to your country, two are bad. We did not know this in the past. One issued an anti-Communist statement in the newspaper, and the other, though no evidence to show that he had issued such a statement, surrendered to the enemy. They have not just committed mistakes; their problems belong to the category of the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. Balluku: As far as those who have committed mistakes are concerned, as you have taught us, we should save them by curing their disease. "Cure the disease and save the person." But we certainly should not do the same thing toward the enemy. When the masses have been mobilized, everything is easy to handle. This is your genius teaching: We must trust the masses.

Mao Zedong: We have no other choice. Because they will not listen to us, but they will have to listen to the masses. The Bulgarian news agency, in negating so-called "rumors," claimed that no [Soviet] foreign troops were stationed on Bulgarian territory. But our embassy has learned that foreign troops are there.

Balluku: We have intelligence reports to prove that Soviet troops are stationed on Bulgarian territory. The Italian ambassador to Bulgaria revealed to us that the Soviet Union has nine to ten airborne divisions in Bulgaria.

Mao: That many?

Balluku: Yes. Because these are airborne divisions, each with 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, the total number of soldiers is between 35,000-40,000. They also have missile units stationed on Bulgaria's naval and air bases. The Soviet troops are wearing Bulgarian uniforms.

Mao Zedong: For what purposes does the Soviet Union send troops to Bulgaria?

Balluku: First, the situation in Bulgaria is not stable, and great chaos exists in Bulgaria. The Soviets know that Zhivkov is without authority. They thus are afraid that he will collapse, and that the leftists will take the power. They are also afraid that a pro-Western, Dubček-style revisionist may seize power. Second, they claim that they are there to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from attacking Bulgaria. But now there is no sign for such an attack, and no such possibility exists.

Mao Zedong: Even Tito" becomes quite nervous. Yugoslavia thus becomes our indirect ally. It has problems with the Soviet Union, and we must utilize the contradiction between them. If we include the Romanians and Dubček, East European countries are now divided into two groups. The Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia by using force, and many in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany are not satisfied with it. They do not support the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Balluku: Yes. Even among the [Soviet] occupation forces there are many problems. Between the commanding

officers and the soldiers there are problems. Now the Soviet Union sends soldiers from such Soviet republics as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who do not speak Russian to Czechoslovakia to take over defenses there. At present Yugoslavia is strengthening its border defense against Bulgaria, preventing the Soviet troops from attacking the territory of Yugoslavia from Macedonia.

[Source: Chinese Communist Party Central Archives (hereafter CCA).]

Document No. 2

Conversation between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill,1o 28 November 1968

Mao Zedong: Did you visit China last year also at this time? Hill: Yes, I came here last year around this time.

Mao Zedong: At that time, the working class in Beijing was not so united, and bad elements were stirring up trouble among the workers and dividing them into two factions in many factories.

Hill: Now the situation has improved tremendously. Mao Zedong: Yes. When the bad elements have been exposed, things become better. Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: We have never cleaned up the factories in the past. Our schools had been dominated by bourgeois intellectuals. A large portion of the countryside had been controlled by bad elements. It seems to me that it is not so difficult for revisionism to prevail.

Hill: Indeed, it is not.

Mao Zedong: For example, in a People's Commune, some brigades have been composed of several hundred households, some have been composed of several thousand households. Let's say, 2000 households and 10,000 people, and they are under the leadership of a party branch committee. If the branch secretary is not a good person, the whole brigade will be in trouble. Have you visited two factories in Beijing?

Hill: Yes, I did.

Mao Zedong: Are the party secretaries at the factories bad elements?

Hill: I cannot remember exactly what they told me. But the leadership of the factories has been changed. Mao Zedong: (Turning to Yao Wenyuan") Have you been to the Xinhua Printing Plant?

Yao: Yes. Neither the plant manager nor the party secretary were good persons.

Mao Zedong: This plant has 3,000 workers. Together with family members, almost 10,000. It printed money during the Qing times, and served the Beiyang warlords during the Beiyang period. 12 When the Japanese took over, it served the Japanese. When the Guomindang took over, it served the Guomindang. During the ten-odd years since we took over the plant, it has served us. Many

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