NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1981 13 Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak, who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi, pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December 1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would implement it if martial law collapsed. See "Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 54-56. 24 "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," P. 56. 25 "Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsięwziec wykonanych w Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia stanu wojennego," 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.) 1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See Paczkowski's own brief but illuminating discussion in O Stanie Wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152. ne ostavit v bede Pol'shu), a formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu Pol'shu—that is, "the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland."). On 9 December, Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev's rather vague statement of the previous day had been viewed-at least temporarily—as a sufficient basis on which to act. See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387394; and the entries for 8 and 9 December 1981 in “Rabochaya tetrad"" No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I. Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and cited at greater length below.) 36 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 7. 26 "Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrzych," | Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZAattachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, “Ocena Potsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54. aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.," 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn. 228/1B, L. 19. 27 Comments by Miroslaw Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs, transcribed in "Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej," 12 June 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV. 28 Gribkov, "Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80kh godov," pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is available in "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau," GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/ Special Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32641, Bl. 313-316. 29 See "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1— Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten wurde" and "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 2-Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde," 3 December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to Hoffmann's report cited in the previous note. 30 "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau." See also Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 50-51. 31 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 378-379. See also the comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.," 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 19801981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568. 32 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 379. 33 " "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added). 34 Ibid. On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that "the Soviet Union will not leave Poland in the lurch" (Sovetskii Soyuz 37 Ibid., Ll. 8-9. 38 Each "working notebook" (rabochaya tetrad') that Anoshkin kept was given a number, reflecting the chronological order of a particular theme. The relevant notebook for December 1981 and early 1982 was No. 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in the next ten paragraphs are from that notebook. 39 This entry for 10 December is not translated below because Anoshkin did not permit me to photocopy the relevant page. However, he did permit me to take brief notes of what appeared there. The final decision on martial law was prefigured at meetings of the PUWP Politburo on 5 December and of the Polish Council of Ministers on 7 December, but the actual decision was adopted by the top military command, not by the PUWP Politburo. The session of the PUWP Politburo on 5 December (No. 18) was the last one before the imposition of martial law. In his adjourning comments at the meeting, Jaruzelski affirmed that “at today's session of the Politburo we will not make any final decision." See "Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 568. The meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers two days later also left the final decision to be approved by the military High Command on 9 December. When Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev on the evening of 7 December, he acknowledged that “a final decision has not yet been adopted." See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387388, as well as Jaruzelski's first-hand account of the meeting on 9 December in ibid., pp. 391-394. See also the entries in Anoshkin's notebook for 7-10 December. Interestingly enough, after Jaruzelski informed Soviet leaders on 10 December about the "final decision," they mistakenly inferred that it had been approved by the PUWP Politburo. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 5-7. 40 This same statement is recorded, word for word, in Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 55. 41 Conversation in Jachranka, Poland, 10 November 1997, between Kania and Thomas S. Blanton of the National Security Archive. No doubt, one of the reasons for Jaruzelski's lack of confidence was his concern about the impact of Colonel Kuklinski's defection. According to Gribkov, Kuklinski's departure "forced the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to set about hurriedly reworking some aspects of the plans for martial law" ("Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80kh godov," p. 49), but even after these changes were made, Jaruzelski feared that Solidarity would be fully tipped off about the details and timing of the operation, and would be ready to put up armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of Jaruzelski's concerns, but they believed that the martial law operation could still succeed if it were implemented forcefully enough. As it turned out, the concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were largely unfounded. Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information to Solidarity, the timetable of the operation was not finalized until 9 December 1981, five weeks after Kuklinski left. 42Comments by Nikolai Baibakov, Andrei Gromyko, and Dmitrii Ustinov, recorded in “Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4, 10, 12. 43 Ibid., L. 6. 44 See, in particular, Gribkov, "Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 55-56. 45 For intriguing excerpts from the opening rounds of testimony by Jaruzelski and other former officials, see Anna Karas, ed., Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego: Oskarzenia/wyjasnienia/ obrona-przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). On the parliament's extension of a pardon, see "Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszośc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later. Preface to the Translation of the Anoshkin Notebook By Mark Kramer few comments are in order about the provenance and translation of these pages from General It had been known for some time that Anoshkin was present during Marshal Kulikov's meetings with General Jaruzelski in Poland in 1980-81. In a book published in 1995, another Soviet general who took part in some of the meetings described a typical scene: The leader of Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski, would come to the Helenow castle just south of Warsaw, where Kulikov, after receiving periodic instructions from Moscow, would hold arduous conversations with the clever Pole. General V. Anoshkin and I would sit on either side of the marshal.' What had not been known until very recently, however, is that Anoshkin kept notebooks with records of Kulikov's meetings, phone calls, and conversations in 1981. The existence of these notebooks was first disclosed at the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," which was co-organized in Jachranka, Poland on 8-10 November 1997 by the Cold War International History Project, the National Security Archive, and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kulikov and Anoshkin were among the participants. At one point during the conference, Kulikov referred in passing to Anoshkin's notebooks. As soon as the session ended, I went over to Anoshkin and asked him whether I could see the notebook that Kulikov had mentioned. Anoshkin took a red, hardbound volume out of his briefcase and turned to the page with notes of events that Kulikov had been discussing. Anoshkin pointed out the significance of a few phrases and explained when particular entries had been recorded. He answered. questions I had about the different types of ink and different handwriting. When I asked Anoshkin for permission to photocopy the notebook, he initially demurred, but we then spoke with Marshal Kulikov, who gave his consent. I am grateful to Anoshkin and Kulikov for allowing me to photocopy pages from the notebook. I am also grateful to them for allowing me to publish the translation of those pages. Unfortunately, the aging photocopy machine at the Jachranka facility was too slow for me to copy all the pages, but I was able to look through the entire notebook and ask Anoshkin questions about it. I asked him a few additional questions about it when I was in Moscow in March 1998. Both in Jachranka and after returning to the United States, I went carefully over the notebook (including the pages I was unable to photocopy) to ensure that it was authentic. I cross-checked the entries with other newly declassified materials, and I asked Anoshkin several questions about specific points in the notes. In no case did I find even the slightest reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. Based on my scrutiny of the notebook and Anoshkin's extreme reluctance to let me photocopy it, I am fully confident that the document is precisely what it purports to be, namely a record of Kulikov's dealings in Poland in December 1981. Anoshkin's notebook was very difficult to translate because of the frequent illegibility of his handwriting, the idiosyncratic abbreviations he used, and the enigmatic quality of some of his transliterations of Polish surnames and place names. At times I was forced to spend many hours poring over a few lines. Even after I became accustomed to Anoshkin's handwriting, the translation was onerous work. The finished product below is the result of more than ten preliminary drafts, which I extensively revised and smoothed out. I have tried to replicate the style and flavor of the original as best as possible, but for clarity's sake I have used full words to translate a few Russian abbreviations and acronyms that would be incomprehensible in English. I also have included annotations to point out certain features of the text and to identify or comment on events that Anoshkin discusses. In addition, I have compiled a list (printed below) of people mentioned in the notebook, indicating the main positions they held in December 1981. The list omits a few individuals of minor importance, but all key Polish and Soviet officials are identified there. Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the Key Individuals Mentioned In The Anoshkin Notebook Positions listed are those held in December 1981 The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981 Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer [dotted line indicates new page in Notebook] [...] WORKING NOTEBOOK Lieutenant-General V. I. ANOSHKIN Embassy of the USSR in Poland KGB Station in Poland Cde. Vitalii Georgevich Pavlov CONTENTS: (1981-1982) (1) Trip to Poland (7-17.12.1981) during the introduction of "Martial Law” (2) Trip to the CSSR for the "Druzhba-82" Exercises (Czechoslovak People's Army, Central Group of Forces, and the Hungarian People's Army), 25-30.1.82 Meeting with Cdes. Husak and Dzur and the Armed Forces of the Central Group of Forces 3. Trip to Other Warsaw Pact Countries' (Up to 20.3.82) |