Poland, the Soviet Bloc and the Berlin Crisis

Khrushchev had clearly not consulted in advance with the other socialist states about his offer of increased economic assistance. Even while Ulbricht and Khrushchev discussed economic preparations for a peace treaty in July 1961, Poland rejected an East German request for additional aid. It would not grant the GDR an additional 150,000 tons of coal in 1961 unless it received raw materials in return. It also refused to lower the price of coal or to forego an increase in transit costs between the GDR and the Soviet Union. Not only Poland, but also Czechoslovakia and Romania were apparently resisting the GDR's economic demands. 10 The growing opposition to the GDR's beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies most likely played a role in the somewhat cryptic report to Ulbricht on July 15 that despite his ongoing talks with Khrushchev, he should be prepared to discuss "politicaleconomic" and military issues at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow from 3-5 August 1961."

Hope Harrison's analysis suggests that Khrushchev, under pressure from Ulbricht, agreed to the construction of the Berlin Wall by early July 1961.12 New evidence from the Polish archives confirms that Ulbricht was pushing for a wall and Khrushchev was hesitating. Also pushing for the construction of a wall was Poland's Communist leader, Władysław Gomułka. The Polish leader later complained on at least two different occasions about Khrushchev's failure to act quickly. The flood of refugees through Berlin was creating a drain not only on the East German economy, but also on the economies of its allies, which felt compelled to assist the GDR (see Document # 1). In a speech before the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) on 22 November 1961, Gomułka justified the Soviet bloc's Berlin policy and the construction of the Wall: "Looking at things realistically, what was decisive for us in putting forth the matter of a peace treaty and Berlin, what was the deciding factor? Decisive was the fact was that they [the West] have been continually creating diversions in the German Democratic Republic for years, that they were continually drawing people out of Berlin and doing whatever they wanted to do. By the way, we were saying among ourselves here long before the Moscow meeting [of the Warsaw Pact in August]... why not put an end to it? Close off, wall off Berlin. And later we made such a decision in Moscow."13 Gomułka's call for speed in establishing "border controls" in Berlin at the August meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow was thus not part of an orchestrated campaign of support for the GDR.14 Rather, it was an expression of concern that Khrushchev might continue to hesitate on constructing a wall.

The same economic concerns that made Gomułka into an early supporter of the Berlin Wall also led him to oppose the idea of increased assistance for the GDR at the Moscow meeting. He agreed that the other socialist states needed to support the GDR's campaign to free itself from dependence on West Germany (Störfreimachung), but the

GDR, he warned, should achieve its goal through closer economic cooperation with its allies, rather than through demands for increased assistance. If the West decided to institute an embargo, Gomułka argued, it would be an embargo against the entire socialist bloc, not just the GDR. (Indeed, representatives of the Western powers and the FRG had agreed only one day before the Warsaw Pact meeting to institute an economic embargo against the entire Eastern Bloc if the Soviets or East Germans cut off Western Berlin.15) The other socialist states, he concluded, could assist the GDR, but not at the expense of their own economic development. Antonín Novotný of Czechoslovakia and Janos Kádar of Hungary supported Gomulka's arguments. Thirty percent of Hungary's trade, Kádar pointed out, was with the West; and of that trade, 25% was with West Germany. In general, the other socialist states were willing to sign a separate peace treaty, but were opposed to bankrupting themselves in order to assist the GDR.16

Khrushchev was taken aback by the attitudes of Gomułka and the other leaders. He criticized the socialist states for having so many economic contacts with the West. All socialist states, he declared, had a responsibility to support the GDR. If the GDR did not receive additional assistance, he warned, it would be overrun by West Germany; then, the Bundeswehr would be sitting on the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Unless the GDR's standard of living were stabilized, he said, Ulbricht would fall from power.'

17

Despite Khrushchev's admonitions, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania continued to refuse the GDR the level of assistance that it was demanding. On 12 September 1961, the SED Politburo complained— somewhat hypocritically-that the GDR could "no longer accept the one-sided character of its economic relations" with Poland. 18

Khrushchev's Flip-Flop on a Separate Peace Treaty After the construction of the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev despite his earlier criticisms-increasingly adopted the arguments of Gomułka and the other socialist leaders. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in October 1961, he retracted the December 31 deadline for concluding a separate peace treaty, contingent upon progress in negotiations with the West on the German question. Although Ulbricht was visibly disappointed-his applause at the party congress died down after Khrushchev's announcement1-he had apparently been informed of Khrushchev's decision a month before. On September 23, Ulbricht had written a letter to Gomułka inviting him to attend the GDR's 12th anniversary celebrations at the beginning of October. "The participation of representative party and state delegations from the socialist states," the East German leader wrote, “will underline their determination to conclude a German peace treaty sometime yet in this century [my emphasis]."20

In contrast to Ulbricht, Gomułka voiced his full support at the CPSU party congress for Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the December 31 deadline.21 This most likely reflected his own concerns about the effects of an economic embargo on Poland. During his stay in Moscow, Gomułka met with Khrushchev and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to discuss developments since August 13. Gromyko summarized Moscow's talks with the West since mid-August, and Khrushchev drew his own conclusions. The United States, Gromyko reported, had voiced a willingness "to recognize the borders of Germany de facto and de jure (the border on the Oder-Neisse)" and "the border between the GDR and West Germany de facto." U.S. Secretary of State Rusk, Khrushchev added, had suggested that the U.S. might also support a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO-a staple of Khrushchev's diplomacy-and, more importantly, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to both German states. Khrushchev justified his decision to postpone a peace treaty by pointing, on the one hand, to the potential concessions that could be won by continuing talks with the West and, on the other hand, to the potential damage that an economic embargo might cause to Poland, the GDR, and the other socialist states. He told Gomułka: "The situation is favorable to us... The USA requested that we not force the issue of a peace treaty with Germany, that we wait 4-6 weeks so that it can work out its own position... There will not be a war, but signing a peace treaty with the GDR might exacerbate the situation... We must continue our game... What will we gain and what will we lose by concluding a separate peace treaty with the GDR [?] We will lose: The Americans, the English, the French might declare an economic blockade against the USSR and the socialist countries. Regarding the USSR, these are empty platitudes, but the other countries—the GDR, Poland, Hungary and to a lesser extent, Romania-might suffer if they do that. We should wait for 4-6 weeks, like they [the Americans] asked, to conclude a treaty... We should not pass any resolutions. The game continues, we must keep applying pressure. We should coordinate our position with Comrade Ulbricht. We should carry on salami tactics with regard to the rights of the Western countries... We have to pick our way through, divide them, exploit all the possibilities."

Based on the U.S. documents declassified to date, Khrushchev and Gromyko-at best-exaggerated Rusk's expressed willingness to make concessions. To the consternation of the West Germans, Rusk had suggested to Gromyko that the U.S. would be willing to negotiate about issues relating to "European security" as soon as the Western powers' right to access to West Berlin were insured and reaffirmed by the Soviet Union (i.e., the U.S. was unwilling to enter into negotiations with the GDR). The U.S. Secretary of State had mentioned specifically a reduction of armaments in Central Europe (but no "disengagement"), the establishment of safeguards against surprise attacks, and an exchange of "assurances" between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact "that they could live peacefully." He had also declared that it was in the interest of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to prevent the "spread of national nuclear weapons." Rusk did not, however, ask the Soviets for "4-6 weeks" to formulate a position, as Khrushchev implied to Gomułka, nor did he suggest that the U.S. was prepared to recognize Germany's borders-let alone the inner-German demarcation line-de facto or de jure. It was Gromyko, not Rusk, who kept bringing up in their talks Western recognition of the existing borders and of the "sovereignty" of the GDR.22

Although Khrushchev and Gromyko embellished Rusk's comments, they were not lying to Gomułka to the extent that there were serious differences among the Western powers and the FRG regarding European Security and a Berlin settlement. Privately, the U.S. State Department was contemplating broader negotiations with the USSR over Berlin—a fact reflected in Rusk's guarded comments to Gromyko. Specifically, the State Department was considering a more general settlement in Central Europe: a four-power declaration (U.S., USSR, Great Britain, and France) calling for the establishment of mixed commissions between the two German states to discuss personal, economic, and cultural exchange; a four power commitment to recognize the existing borders of Germany in any peace settlement (i.e. de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line); a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; a four power declaration on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to third states; and a reaffirmation by Bonn of its 1954 commitment not to produce nuclear, chemical, of biological weapons.23 When Adenauer visited Washington in November 1961, Kennedy probed him with regard to all three matters: inter-German commissions; recognition of the existing frontiers, especially the Oder-Neisse Line; and a renewed West German commitment forswearing weapons of mass destruction. Adenauer was opposed to concessions in all three areas. A renewed declaration on weapons of mass destruction would "discriminate" against the FRG; the Oder-Neisse Line remained at the very least a bargaining chip in any future peace settlement; and inter-German commissions would have to be limited to ad hoc discussion of technical matters, lest they lead to de facto recognition of the GDR.24 The divisions within NATO between the U.S. and Great Britain, on the one hand, which were willing to discuss matters beyond a Berlin settlement with the Soviet Union, and France and the FRG, on the other hand, which opposed any linkage between Berlin and other issues, seemed to provide an ideal opportunity for Moscow to play the Western allies against each other.25 This explains in part Khrushchev's optimism—and embellishments-during his talks with Gomułka.

Although Khrushchev justified his decision to Gomułka only in terms of the West's alleged willingness to make concessions and a possible economic embargo

against the socialist bloc, one should not discount the role of other factors in his decision. Moscow's worsening relations with China or a fear of Ulbricht's growing influence might still have played a key role; Khrushchev would not have necessarily informed Gomułka about such extraneous motives.26 The concerns that he expressed about an embargo, which openly contradicted his earlier statements on the subject, were clearly meant to appeal to the Polish leader's own interests and gain his support. Nevertheless, Khrushchev would use a possible embargo as an excuse for avoiding a peace treaty once again, during Ulbricht's visit to Moscow at the end of February 1962.

Ulbricht's Visit to Moscow, February 1962

By the time of Ulbricht's visit to Moscow in February 1962, the talks between Gromyko and the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Llewellyn S. Thompson, had reached an impasse. The West had quickly retreated on the issue of recognizing Germany's borders-specially the inter-German border-and was focusing first and foremost on guaranteeing access to West Berlin (see documents #34 below). Nevertheless, Khrushchev had clearly decided by this point to abandon a separate peace treaty with the GDR, while Ulbricht still wanted to force the issue.

Ulbricht brought up the issue of a separate peace treaty during his first session with Khrushchev on February 26. The failure to conclude such an agreement, he told Khrushchev, had undermined the authority of the SED and the Soviet Union inside the GDR. "In wide circles of the population," he said, "the opinion has arisen that the Soviet Union and the GDR have overreached themselves in the struggle for a peace treaty." Ulbricht pleaded with Khrushchev to conclude a separate peace treaty by the end of the summer. It would assist the SED in the upcoming election campaign to the East German parliament, the Volkskammer, and help restore the party's tarnished image. The conclusion of a peace treaty, he suggested, need not exacerbate relations with the West; the GDR was willing to sign a peace treaty that left open matters relating to transit to West Berlin. If the West proved recalcitrant, the Soviet bloc could still use access to West Berlin as a lever to compel the Western powers' acceptance of the separate agreement.

Khrushchev rejected Ulbricht's plea. Although the Thompson-Gromyko talks were a "step back" from the West's earlier statements, the Warsaw Pact could not afford to exacerbate the situation by signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR—at least for the time being. Khrushchev cited two major reasons. First, there was a possibility of war with the West if the Soviet Union turned over control of the access routes to West Berlin to the GDR. Second, there was the threat of an embargo against the socialist bloc. He explained:

One must see things the way they are. We are disturbing the USA's air traffic [to and from Berlin]. It has to defend itself. The imperialist forces will always

be against us. One must see that West Berlin is not in Adenauer's hands. On August 13, we achieved the maximum of what was possible [my emphasis]. I have the same impression as before that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR need not lead to war. But one must consider the situation realistically. You want to give your signature, and we are supposed to give economically, because one must see the possibility that after the conclusion of a peace treaty, there will be an economic boycott. Adenauer will carry out an economic boycott, and we will have to give [the GDR] everything that is lacking....

The signing of a peace treaty would lead to a normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The main question, however, is not the peace treaty, but a consolidation of the economic situation [in the GDR]. That is what we have to concentrate on. I say once again with regard to a peace treaty, that I believe there would be no war, but who can guarantee that? What is pushing us to a peace treaty? Nothing. Until August 13, we were racking our brains over how to move forward. Now the borders are closed. One must always proceed from the idea that the conclusion of a peace treaty must serve us, that we will conclude it when we need it.... We support the GDR's measures, but we do not agree that it is absolutely necessary to use the peace treaty as a slogan for the elections to the Volkskammer.

Khrushchev even expressed understanding for Kennedy's position. He openly voiced his concern— already posited by Hope Harrison-about what Ulbricht might do if the Soviet Union granted him control over the access routes to West Berlin.27 "The Thompson-Gromyko talks are a step backwards in comparison to the earlier talks. The USA wants to raise its price. We have said openly that these are no foundations for negotiations. Previously, [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy presented his viewpoint on the borders of Poland and the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Of course he cannot ratify the German border between the GDR and West Germany. One cannot expect that of him. He is trying to reach an agreement-for example, on an international [border] control. In one interview, he posed the question himself of what one can do and to whom once can turn if, for example, Ulbricht infringes upon the [existing] order regarding access routes to Berlin. To whom can one turn in such a situation?" In case Ulbricht was hoping for assistance from the Chinese, Khrushchev dispelled his illusions. "The Albanians and the Chinese," he said, “are criticizing us with regard to the peace treaty and West Berlin. What are they doing themselves? (Portuguese colonies in India, Hong Kong, etc.)."

In effect, Khrushchev ordered Ulbricht to give up his campaign for a separate peace treaty and to focus instead on strengthening the GDR's economy, seriously weakened by the crisis over Berlin. The Soviet leader remained committed to granting the GDR more assistance than his planning chief, Alexei Kosygin, thought was wise. (“In

response to an objection by Comrade Kosygin," the report on the February 26 meeting reads, "Comrade Khrushchev replied that we cannot act like petty traders.") Nevertheless, in contrast to the meeting with Ulbricht in November 1960,28 he now gave Kosygin free rein to criticize the GDR's economic policies. Khrushchev himself chided Ulbricht for importing potatoes from Poland-a particularly pointed comment, given Ulbricht's frequent criticisms of Poland's failure to collectivize agriculture29-and Kosygin noted that the GDR, a former exporter of sugar, was now importing it. The East Germans, Khrushchev and Kosygin argued, were devoting great resources to building modern city centers when they needed to invest more in agriculture. In a final blow, the Soviets ordered Ulbricht to "activate trade with Bonn to the maximum extent" in order to help overcome the GDR's economic difficulties. The subtext was clear: neither the GDR nor its allies could economically afford a separate peace treaty. Although the Soviet bloc, Khrushchev told Ulbricht on February 27, would "aggressively pursue" a campaign for a separate peace treaty, "we [the Soviet Union] will decide at what point to conclude it." The Soviet Union, of course, never found the right moment to conclude such an agreement.

Conclusions

Khrushchev's decision to provoke the Berlin Crisis in November 1958 was the product of economic, as well as military-political, miscalculation. The Soviet leader overestimated not only the potential of the changing strategic balance to squeeze concessions out of the West, but also the economic ability of the GDR and the entire Soviet bloc to withstand the economic pressures-both potential and real-arising from a prolonged conflict with the West over Berlin and the German question. By 1961, East Germany's socialist-bloc allies were no longer willing to sacrifice their own economic development for the sake of the GDR. Even if their fears of a Western economic embargo were not the deciding factor in Khrushchev's decision to renege on a separate peace treaty with the GDR, they did provide him with a useful excuse to justify his decision. The irritation of the GDR's allies-including the Soviet Union-with Ulbricht's never-ending economic demands was quite apparent in 1961-62.

The economic weaknesses revealed during the Berlin Crisis would help spark a flurry of reform proposals in Eastern Europe during the early 1960's: Khrushchev's plans to reform the Comecon and institute a "socialist division of labor"; Gomułka's project for closer economic cooperation within the "northern triangle" of Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia; and Ulbricht's "New Economic System" for the GDR. Of the three initiatives, only the New Economic System would make it to the implementation stage.30 Conflicts would continue between the GDR and its allies over economic questions. Khrushchev grew increasingly critical of the GDR's failings in agriculture-in particular, Ulbricht's rejection of

his pet project of introducing corn to East European agriculture.31 Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, editor-in-chief of Izvestiya, vocally criticized Ulbricht at a gathering of Soviet-bloc journalists in May 1962. In his interview with the East German leader, Adzhubei declared, Ulbricht had not expressed "a single fresh thought." He was still blaming all the GDR's economic difficulties on “militarism in the FRG." "We got the impression,” Adzhubei continued, "that Ulbricht is unable to deal with the fundamental question: how to achieve results in agriculture-they should work on it. Phrases cannot replace potatoes, which the GDR does not have."32 Adzhubei, of course, would make even harsher remarks about Ulbricht during his "mission" to Bonn in July-August 1964.33 The tensions between Ulbricht and Khrushchev in 1964, the recently-declassified documents make clear, had their origins in the differences of 1961-62 over the East German economy and a separate peace treaty.

Document No. 1 (Excerpt)

Transcript of a meeting between the delegations of the PZPR and the SED in Moscow, 2 December 1969

[Polish Premier Józef] Cyrankiewicz: Earlier you spoke about closing the border [to West Berlin]; I would like to remind you of how many times the Poles [i.e., the Polish communists] proposed that it be closed.

Gomułka: And how much earlier!

Ulbricht: We know about this and have not forgotten. We were always of the same opinion as you. Even then, when something was hurting us—I have in mind the matter of the open border.

Gomułka: I would have shut it far earlier. How many times I told Khrushchev about it!

Ulbricht: We know about that, but Khrushchev believed after all that he could conclude a treaty with the FRG modeled after Rapallo....

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 16.]

Document No. 2

Rough Notes from a Conversation (Gromyko, Khrushchev, and Gomulka) on the International Situation, n.d. [October 1961]

Comrade Gromyko: In talks with [U.S. Secretary of State Dean] Rusk, [U.K. Foreign Minister Lord Alec] Home, [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy and [U.K. Prime Minister Harold] Macmillan, it struck me above all else how they conducted them in a friendly tone, which has not always been the case. We concluded that they are trying to find ways to achieve an understanding on the question of Germany and West Berlin. During the exchange of views, every major issue was touched upon. Nevertheless, it was stressed in the conversations that this is only a preliminary exchange of views before official talks.