closer the peace, of course, the lower the share. Absolute peace entails the abolition of the material and technological base for war, and thus also of the base for the military interests and needs.

In view of Czechoslovakia's current foreign and military policy predicament, our main task is the formulation and constitution of its military interests and needs pertinent to the situations referred to in points 4.2 through 4.5.

If the formulation of Czechoslovak military doctrine is to be more scientific, the main question is that of choosing the right approach and avoiding the wrong ones.

5. Systems Analysis and the Use of Modern Research Methods

5.1. In constituting a Czechoslovak military doctrine, the most dangerous and precarious approach is the onesided use of simple logic and old-fashioned working habits.

If Czechoslovakia is to be preserved as an entity, giving absolute priority to the possibility of a general war in Europe that involves the massive use of nuclear weapons makes no sense, for this entails a high probability of our country's physical liquidation regardless of how much money and resources are spent on its armed forces and regardless even of the final outcome of the war.

5.2. For each of the variants under 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, systems analysis and other modern methods of research allow us to determine the correlation between, on the one hand, the material, financial, and personnel expenditures on the armed forces (assuming perfect rationality of their development) and, on the other hand, the degree of risk of the state's physical destruction and the loss of its sovereignty, while taking into account the chances of a further advance of socialism, or even the elimination of the threat of war.

At issue is the attainment of pragmatic stability in national defense and army development, corresponding to political needs and related to foreign policy by striving to avert war by increasing the risks for the potential adversary while preserving the sovereign existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, thus giving substance to its contribution to the coalition in fulfillment of its internationalist duty.

Managing the development of our armed forces solely on the basis of simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy, perhaps solely in the interest of the coalition without regard to one's own sovereign interests, is in its final effect inappropriate and contradicts the coalition's interests.

Besides the reconciliation of our own and the coalition's interests in our military doctrine, we consider it necessary to utilize systems analysis and all other available methods of scientific prognosis, including model-building. Thus the preparedness of our armed forces in different variants can be assessed and related to the evolving political needs and economic possibilities. This concerns

not so much tactical, operational, and organizational issues as the confrontation of political and doctrinal problems with the reality.

We regard systems analysis as the new quality that can raise the effectiveness of our armed forces above the current level.

5.3. At the most general level, we can see two possible ways of managing our army's development: -The first way is proceeding from the recognition of the personnel, technological, and financial limitations imposed by society upon the armed forces toward the evaluation of the risks resulting from the failure to achieve desirable political goals under the different variants of European development described in the preceding section. The decision about the extent of acceptable risk must be made by the supreme political organ of the state. -The second way is proceeding from the recognition of the acceptable risk as set by the political leadership toward the provision of the necessary personnel, technological, and financial means corresponding to the different variants of European development.

Either of these ways presupposes elaboration of less than optimal models of army development for each of the variants, applying the requirements of national defense regardless of the existing structure of the system. Confrontation of the model with the available resources should then determine the specific measures to be taken in managing the development of the armed forces and their components.

The proposed procedure would not make sense if we were to keep the non-systemic, compartmentalized approach to building our armed forces without being able to prove to the political leadership that the available personnel, financial, and technological means are being used with maximum effectiveness to prepare our armed forces for any of the different variants of European development rather than merely show their apparent preparedness at parades and exercises organized according to a prepared scenario.

5.4. Increasingly strategic thought has been shifting away from seeking the overall destruction of all enemy assets to the disruption of the enemy defense system by destroying its selected elements, thus leading to its collapse. In some cases, such as in the Israeli-Arab war, the theory proved its superiority in practice as well. Its application in developing our army, elaborating our strategy, and designing our operational plans can result not only in substantial military savings but also increased effectiveness of our defense system. In case of a relative (but scientifically arrived at and justified) decrease of those expenditures, it may help limit the consequences of the exponential growth of the prices of the new combat and management technology. Most importantly, it may help impress on the armed forces command and the political leadership the best way of discharging their responsibilities toward both the state and the coalition.

5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state's scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.

[Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968) [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 19671970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 137-44. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

Dr. Vojtech Mastny is currently a Senior Research Scholar with CWIHP. As NATO's first Manfred Woerner Fellow and a Research Fellow with the Institute for Advanced Studies in Essen (Germany), Dr. Mastny is engaged in a larger research project on the history of the Warsaw Pact.

'Matthew Evangelista, "Why Keep Such an Army?:" Khrushchev's Troop Reductions, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 19 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1997).

2 Vojtech Mastny, "The Origins of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Quest for Security," in Shugo Minagawa and Osamu Ieda, eds., Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Changes in the SlavicEurasian World (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1996), pp. 355-84.

3 Draft of mutual defense treaty by Gromyko, Zorin, and Semenov, 31 December 1954, Sekretariat Ministra/14/12/1/1-6, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation], Moscow [AVP RF].

4

* Decision by CPSU Central Committee, 1 April 1955, Sekretariat Ministra 14/54/4/39, AVP RF.

" Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 2 May 1955, J IV 2/202/-244 Bd 1, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin [SAPMO].

"Stenographical record of meeting, 12 May 1955, Varshavskoe soveshchanie 1/1/1, AVP RF. The creation of the Warsaw Pact under Khrushchev was thus even more tightly controlled than the creation of the Cominform in 1948 had been under Stalin. At that time, the participants had not been told in advance what to expect, prompting some of them to express

opinions of their own. See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 32, and Giuliano Procacci, ed., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

7 "Protokoll über die Schaffung eines Vereinigten Kommandos der bewaffneten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten am Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitige Hilfe," 14 May 1955, AZN 32437, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg. 8 Tadeusz Pióro, Armia ze skazą: W Wojsku Polskim 19451968 (wspomnienia i refleksje) [The Defective Army: In the Polish Army, 1945-1968 (Memories and Reflections)] (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1994), pp. 210-13; copy of the minutes provided by Gen. Pióro.

9 Khrushchev to Bierut, 7 September 1955, KC PZPR, 2661/2, 16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Modern Records Archives], Warsaw [AAN].

10 Records of the meeting, 26-28 January 1956, A 14696, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin.

"Robert Spencer, "Alliance Perceptions of the Soviet Threat, 1950-1988," in Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, ed., The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 9-48, at p. 19.

12 Declaration of 30 October 1956, J.P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact (London: Asia Publishing House, 1973), pp. 168-71.

13 Arkadii Sobolev at the UN Security Council meeting, 4 November 1956, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. 25, p. 388.

14

Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” paper presented at the conference "The Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War," Beijing, 22-25 October 1997, pp. 7-9.

15 “Uwagi i propozycje odnośnie dokumentu p.n. `Polozhenie ob obedinennom komandovanii vooruzhennymi silami gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora" " [Reflections and Proposals Concerning the Document Entitled "Statute of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty"], and “Analiza strony prawnej dokumentu p.n. `Protokol soveshchaniia po planu razvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Polskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na 1955-65 gg.' oraz następnych protokółów wnoszących do niego zmiany" [Analysis of the Legal Aspects of the Document Entitled, "Protocol on the Consultation about the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic in 1955-65" and Its Subsequent Amendments], 3 November 1956, microfilm (0) 96/ 6398, reel W-15, Library of Congress, Washington [LC].

16 Vice Minister of Defense Bordziłowski to Gomułka, 7 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/53, AAN; "Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL" [Memorandum Concerning the Warsaw Treaty and the Plan for the Development of Poland's Armed Forces], microfilm (0) 96/6398, reel W-25, LC.

17 Cf. Drzewiecki, "Wykaz zagadnień wojskowych wymagających omówienia i uregulowania na nowych zasadach" [An Outline of Military Problems Requiring Discussion and Regulation according to New Principles], 8 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/137-38, AAN.

18 Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," Journal of Contemporary History 33 (1998), p. 203.

19 Commentary by Drzewiecki, undated (November-December 1956), KC PZPR 2661/124, AAN.

20 Pióro, Armia ze skazą, pp. 277-80.

21 Ibid., pp. 280-82.

22 Marginal note on Document No. 2.

23 Brezhnev to Ulbricht, 7 January 1966, J IV 2/202-248, SAPMO.

24 Memorandum by Rapacki, 21 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/48-53, AAN.

25 Memorandum by Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/27-36, AAN.

26 Memorandum by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, 31 May 1966, KC PZPR 2948/54-57, AAN.

27 Record of the Berlin meeting of deputy foreign ministers, 10-12 February 1966, J IV 2/202-257 Bd 9, SAPMO; report by Naszkowski, 17 February 1966, KC PZPR 2948/64-69, AAN.

28

2663/366-80, AAN.

40 Speech by Ceauşescu and rejoinder by Gomułka at the Sofia meeting, 7 March 1968, KC PZPR 2663/389-411, AAN; Soviet party central committee to Romanian party central committee, undated (early 1968), KC PZPR 2663/359-61, AAN.

41 Information by the international department of the Czechoslovak party central committee, 22 February 1968, in Jitka Vondrová, Jaromír Navrátil et al., eds., Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967-1970: Prosinec 1967červenec 1968 [International Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1967-1970: December 1967-July 1968] (Brno: Doplněk, 1995), pp. 54-61, pp. 59-60.

42

Report for cabinet meeting, 12 March 1968, MNO/sekr. min. 1968/10, VHA.

Speech by Dzúr in Bratislava, 9-11 July 1968, and Dzúr to Dubček, 2 August 1968, in Benčík, Vojenské otázky, pp. 202-27 and 249.

34 Lidová armáda, 2 July 1968.

35 The comical hero of Jaroslav Hašek's antiwar novel of 1920.

36 John D. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 151-93.

37 Michael McGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 381-405; Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 58-92.

38 The assertion in the 6 March 1968 commentary on Prague radio by Luboš Dobrovský (later minister of defense in postcommunist Czechoslovakia), according to which a Czechoslovak delegate at the Sofia meeting joined Romania in expressing doubts about the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe and alluded approvingly to De Gaulle's decision to leave NATO's integrated command because of his similar doubts about U.S. protection (cited in Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970], p. 489), cannot be substantiated from the records of the Sofia meeting in Polish, Czech, and former East German archives: KC PZPR 2663/381411, AAN; MNO/sekr. min., 1968/boxes 4 and 5, Vojenský historický archív [Military Historical Archives], Prague, [VHA]; JIV 2/202-263 Bd 15, SAPMO.

39 "Notatka o wynikach narady szefów sztabów generalnych armii państw-członków Układu Warszawskiego" [Note about the Results of the Consultation of the Chiefs of Staffs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty], n.d. [March 1968], KC PZPR

44 Ibid., p. 125.

45 Antonín Benčík, Operace “Dunaj”: Vojáci a Prańské jaro 1968 [Operation Danube: The Military and the Prague Spring of 1968] (Prague: Institute for Contemporary History, 1994), p. 38. 46 Iakubovskii to Dubček, 18 July 1968, in Benčík, et al., eds., Vojenské otázky, pp. 236-37.

47 Anatoli Gribkow, Der Warschauer Pakt: Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses (Berlin: Edition Q, 1995), p. 153.

48 Statement by ČTK press agency, July 28, and “Stanovisko vojenské rady ministra národní obrany" [The Position of the Military Council of the Minister of Defense], 13 August 1968, in Benčík, et al., eds., Vojenské otázky, pp. 241-43, 253-56.

49 "Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present, the Basic Ways to Resolve Them," July 1968, in Jaromír Navrátil et al., ed., The Prague Spring '68: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 268-76, at p. 275.

50 Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 95-97. 51 Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 640-42. 52 Milan Ždímal, Memorandum: 1968-1990 (Bratislava: Vysoká pedagogická škola, katedra politológie, 1992), pp. 3-5. The author was one of the signatories of the memorandum. 53 Successive drafts of the appeal for the convocation of European security conference, 17 March 1969, J IV 2/202-264 Bd 16, SAPMO.

54 Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Non-invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 23 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998).

By Raymond L. Garthoff

y colleagues Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have advanced new information and new

Linsights in their CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March

1998) article on "The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons." Based on two Soviet Defense Ministry documents from September 1962, it is an interesting and provocative account, building on their important earlier study "One Hell of a Gamble." These documents are among others related to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Volkogonov Papers, a collection gathered by the late Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov and now held by the Library of Congress. Partial translations of these two documents are appended to their article.

Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban missile crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones. It is clear from these materials (and some others earlier addressed in “One Hell of a Gamble") that Khrushchev made certain adjustments in Operation Anadyr, his plan for military deployments in Cuba, in September 1962, evidently in reaction to President Kennedy's public warning of September 4. It is less certain, much less certain, that Khrushchev saw Kennedy's warning as a “signal" that he knew about the planned deployment of missiles, as suggested by Fursenko and Naftali. Khrushchev may simply have become less confident that the deployment could be kept secret. It is also not clear that Khrushchev had, in any meaningful sense, "a chance to stop the operation" on September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's warning. True, as the authors state, on that date “there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba." But the first missiles were already en route. Khrushchev theoretically could have "terminated the deployment" at that time, but in practical (and political) terms he could hardly have done so. Instead, these documents show, he sought to expedite the dispatch of weaponry already underway, and also to send some additional tactical nuclear weapons (six bombs for an additional squadron of nine specially fitted IL-28 bombers, and 12 warheads for 12 Luna (FROG) short-range tactical

rockets). According to Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's warning was thus "to rachet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture."

Although it is true that Khrushchev sought to expedite the remaining planned shipments, and on September 7 added the Lunas and nuclear-equipped IL-28s, he also rejected a Ministry of Defense proposal to add a brigade of 18 R-11M nuclear-armed missiles-the SCUD B (SS-1c) missile with an 80 mile range (for nuclear delivery). And the augmentation did not "introduce" tactical nuclear weapons; the original General Staff Anadyr plan of 24 May 1962, finally approved by Khrushchev and the Presidium on June 10, had provided for 80 nuclear-armed tactical cruise missiles (with 16 launchers), with a range of 90 miles. Moreover, not mentioned by Fursenko and Naftali in their article, although noted in their book, two weeks later, on September 25, Khrushchev canceled the planned deployment to Cuba of the major part of the Soviet Navy surface and submarine fleet previously planned for deployment. This included canceling the planned deployment of seven missile-launching submarines, as well as two cruisers, two missile-armed destroyers, and two conventionally armed destroyers.

In sum, in September Khrushchev added six IL-28 nuclear bombs and 12 short-range Luna tactical nuclear rockets to the 80 tactical cruise missile warheads previously authorized, but rejected addition of 18 longerrange tactical ballistic missiles. And he canceled most of the Navy deployment, including seven missile-launching submarines with 21 nuclear ballistic missiles. In short, I do not believe it is correct to conclude, as do the authors, that Khrushchev “chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons."

In their article, Fursenko and Naftali have misread the second document, reporting that Khrushchev approved an order to arm Soviet attack submarines with nuclear torpedoes to be prepared, upon receipt of specific orders from Moscow, "to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on U.S.

coastal targets," the list of targets being appended to the revised mission statement (but regrettably missing from the copy available in the Volkogonov Papers). As the authors had previously reported in their book, the four Soviet Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarines sent on patrol to the area in October were each equipped with one nucleararmed torpedo in addition to conventionally armed torpedoes. These nuclear torpedoes were, however, as we know from other sources, intended for use against U.S. Navy ships, in particular aircraft carriers, in case of confirmed U.S. Navy attacks on the submarines.4 The submarine-launched nuclear attacks against "the most important coastal targets in the USA" mentioned in the September 8 document were explicitly identified as strikes by "nuclear-missile equipped submarines," still scheduled for deployment to Cuba until that deployment was canceled on September 25. Incidentally, the seven missile submarines planned for deployment in Cuba until September 25 were the diesel-powered Golf-class, not the nuclear-powered Hotel-class (as misidentified in "One Hell of a Gamble"), and they each carried three relatively shortrange ballistic missiles (325 mile R-13, SS-N-4, missiles), not "intermediate-range" missiles."

I agree fully with the conclusion by Fursenko and Naftali that "Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the [potential] battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war." I am less certain that an "inescapable" further conclusion is that "Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent." That may well be, but I do not believe it is that clear that the Soviet leadership necessarily "intended to use" the nuclear weapons in Cuba, although it clearly did deploy the weapons for possible use against an invading force. In all, I believe it goes too far to see Khrushchev's decision on dispatch of additional tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba as "embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962." We know that as the crisis arose in October Khrushchev clearly reiterated that no use of any nuclear weapons was authorized without explicit approval from Moscow, that is, by himself.

I do, however, agree with what I believe to be the main thrust of the argument by Fursenko and Naftali, that Khrushchev had no conception of the risks of escalation in any use of tactical nuclear weapons against a U.S. invading force. Moreover, the fact that the maximum range of some systems meant they conceivably could have been fired at southern Florida (the IL-28s and the FKR-1 cruise missiles), even though their designated role was to attack an invasion force on or around Cuba, was unnecessarily dangerous. The fact that the four F-class diesel attack submarines each carried a nuclear torpedo for use against attacking U.S. Navy ships on the high seas was particularly provocative, inasmuch as their use would not only have escalated to nuclear warfare but also geographically extended beyond Cuba to war at sea. These are the submarines that the U.S. Navy repeatedly

forced to surface during the crisis, sometimes by dropping small depth charges!

Perhaps additional documents will be found that further clarify these issues.

It is very helpful to have the texts of key documents made available in translation, as the Cold War International History Project has sought to do in connection with the article by Fursenko and Naftali. In this case, however, there are extensive unacknowledged omissions and errors in the translations. In the September 6 document, several paragraphs have been omitted with no ellipses or other indication of that fact. And the second, September 8, document should probably be identified as "Extracts," inasmuch as over half the document has been omitted, again without indication. Moreover, while much of the omitted material may be of little interest to most readers, it does include such things as unit identifications and a number of other new data. One interesting disclosure in the September 8 document, not included in the translated extracts, is the fact that one of the nucleararmed cruise missile regiments had as its designated target the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.

It is also of interest that the full text of the September 8 guidance to the Soviet commander in Cuba gives as a mission for the four Army ground force regiments not only protection of other Soviet forces and assistance to the Cuban armed forces in combating invading forces, but also assistance in liquidating "counterrevolutionary groups" in Cuba.

Another interesting fact not noted in the article or included in the translated extracts is that the separate IL-28 squadron for nuclear bomb delivery (comprising nine aircraft) was a Soviet Air Force unit and was located at Holguin airbase in eastern Cuba (at the time of the September 8 document it was postulated as "10-12 aircraft," and was designated for Santa Clara airfield). The IL-28 regiment originally assigned under Anadyr in May-June was a Navy unit (comprising 30 light torpedo bombers and 3 training aircraft) and was located in the far west of Cuba at San Julian airfield. After the climax of the missile crisis on October 28, it was observed that uncrating of IL-28s at San Julian continued in early November while the issue of withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers was thrashed out in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations (and between Mikoyan and Castro in Havana). At that time, observers in Washington were perplexed by the fact that IL-28s at San Julian continued to be uncrated and assembled, while no effort was made to uncrate or assemble the nine crated IL-28s at Holguin. In retrospect, it seems clear that the Soviet command in Cuba was uncertain about the future of the nuclear-armed bomber squadron, but assumed the conventionally armed coastal defense torpedo-bomber regiment would remain. Thus one minor mystery of the crisis denouement is clarified by these details in the September 8 document. It also is clear that the failure during the crisis even to begin the assembly of the nuclearcapable IL-28s shows that these tactical nuclear systems