the supposed readiness expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies that any such considerations took place. After all one of the key conditions for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed, was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity). I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the workday. It was never considered, not even for a moment. Such an entry completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of the person who wrote such a thing in the said "notebook," or passed such information to their political superiors.

On page 5 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this Bulletin-ed.] of Mr. Kramer's article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii Gribkov "played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81." It is not my intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact. Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in 1992 by Istoricheskii Zhurnal are almost literally identical with some phrases from Anoshkin's “notebook." It looks as though many roads lead to that very same "source."

The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer's article is strangely one-sided. Why does he not mention Gen. Siwicki's polemical response to the above-mentioned article by Gribkov, which was published in Polska Zbrojna on 22 December 1992? Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about the "sergeant's widow who whipped herself."

On page [6] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly constitutes "powerful" evidence. He means Anoshkin's "notebook." Treating the

"notebook" in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds. After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there— claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid-were not presented by the "Russian side" during the Jachranka conference. This made it impossible for the [Polish] "government side" to take a stance concerning them and to directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be published. As a result, the "notebook"-which, as it turns out, is being prepared for publication as a separate brochure-has become an independent fact, removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.

I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues. Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records, particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [gryf] or marked by page numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts with Kulikov's arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10 during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what is peculiar is that there is not even one word in Baibakov's report about the Polish side waiting for military help. Maybe that is the reason why there is no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin's notebook.

As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16 about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion, which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish. person he talked to? Was he the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded and interpreted?

I am sorry to say that regardless of what might

generously be described as the "defects" of the notebook, Mr. Kramer's interpretations sometimes go well beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: "This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on -now everything has disappeared." [In his introduction on page 9], Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, "What is Jaruzelski's situation now?!" But these words make it obvious that somebody else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer's intentions become obvious. He says: "Jaruzelski's comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. (my emphasis - W.J.)." Thus this carefully prepared quotation, in fact "robbed" of the element clearly indicating that it was not me who said those words, becomes to the author more important “than all other documents." This is scandalous manipulation.

Besides, what does the talk of "a year-and-a-half of chattering" mean when my reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski's report in an interview for the Paris Kultura, April 1987) and many public statements, as well as statements [made] during the topsecret meetings when I talked about the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing that he judged the situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin's dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call me "general-liberal."

On page [6] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev's are also quoted. Mr. Kramer writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave several interviews to Polish journalists. [. . .] The focus is on an interview for the Warsaw newspaper Rzeczpospolita [The

Republic]. Mr. Kramer, who usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev, chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly "meant." Since I do not have the said interview in Rzeczpospolita handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm [Parliament] of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. [...] The Soviet leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been used in extreme circumstances.

Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej Płażyński, the Speaker of the Sejm (published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 5 December 1997). And all this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet

leadership, but also a member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover, according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any pressure put on Poland ("davleniia ne bylo"). However, other Soviet politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned before).

On page [6] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]). I read the Polish edition carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that Suslov "refused." Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or Pavlov's book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December 1981. I quote:

JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure and, for us a way to check their inclinations for

intervention. In a way, it was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they were keeping some cards hidden.

(Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czeslaw Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki, and Michal Janiszewski.)

JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we [would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, “And what is the guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?" With the generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone. He wasn't very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick. I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He said, "Yes." "And if the situation becomes more complicated?" I asked (I remembered the words

Brezhnev never took back: 'Esli bud'et uslozhniatsia, veid'em' [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in] as well as the constantly repeated 'my Pol'shi ne ostavim v b'ede' [We will not leave Poland in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov's answer was, "But you have always said that you can manage by yourselves." That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August 1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome facts and signals.

In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov "confirmed then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put Jaruzelski at ease." In saying that it "put me at ease," Pavlov admits that there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.

On page [6] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book carefully. There is no mention there of "sending a message." However, there is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically. I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact confirms by not mentioning it in his book.

On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September] 1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code name of “Kraj-73” (“Country-73"). The

intensification and concretization of work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by thenpremier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed a document called "The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law." There is also a protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September 1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to the "imposition of martial law" (four times), I always preceded it with the word "potential" [ewentualne]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my statement, it says that "he pointed out the particular importance and necessity of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic support from neighboring socialist countries." So where does "Jaruzelski's demand" come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified exclusively in myself necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in forming ad hominem attacks.

Moreover, on page [7], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own forces may not be enough to impose martial law "and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed." Then follows a statement that does not accord well with the previous one: "Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania... both realized that 'direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries' would 'set back the development of socialism by decades' and 'would be exploited by the imperialist forces." Therefore "they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision." Such hesitation resulted in "a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to 'prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."" Again, if we are to talk about strict historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee's statement made? On September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of 1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would "set back the development of socialism by decades," and three months later "he desperately hoped for it." What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in September.

On page [7] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania "under Soviet auspices." I regret that Mr. Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka

conference, makes such a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document (acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October 18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I agreed only as a result of the insistence of Polish comrades. Prof. Jerzy Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the "good" Polish comrades who mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that Andropov said, "Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo." Finally, does the word "auspices" not sound offensive with respect to the CC PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my candidacy, but 179 supported me in a secret ballot. Were they all "agents of the Kremlin"?

On page [7] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October 29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, "the Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries." But which leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following statement: "I don't believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything constructive. I think he is not bold enough." But Mr. Kramer does not notice any of that. Following the words "Polish leaders," just a few lines below he deduces that it was Jaruzelski who "was requesting military intervention from the Soviet Union." It seems that there is a great need to put me in the worst possible light. But it should have been done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural "Polish leaders" immediately change into the name "Jaruzelski?"

On page [8] we find the following quotation from Andropov's statement of December 10: "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer ... military assistance." I must here confirm a very unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual statement went exactly as follows: "Jaruzelski states economic demands strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question of military aid." Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to is Miroslaw Milewski. What he says conflicts with what

Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned, Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in Polska Zbrojna.

On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie. I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure phone?" [...] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states that this is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are references to my alleged opinions and assessments stated during the meeting of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone on December 7, does not say anything about that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for military aid.

It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union, asked for help, and they did not give me any." At the same time, the Poles are clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle. But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a de facto accusatory statement against me is being concluded.

On page [7] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [...] can be carried out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance." On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone

courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.