41

units locate the best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gestures, Kania and Jaruzelski had never been enthusiastic about the maneuvers, and they decided that they had to make their views clear after two senior Polish officers, Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of the Polish General Staff, and Col. Franciszek Puchala, a deputy head of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, traveled to Moscow on 1 December to receive "instructions" from the Soviet High Command. The information that Hupalowski and Puchala brought back to Poland, which indicated that an immediate, fullscale crackdown was an integral part of the scenario, was enough to spur Kania and Jaruzelski to warn Soviet leaders that any attempt to bring Warsaw Pact forces into Poland would greatly exacerbate the situation and risk widespread violence. They promised that if they were given a bit more time, they would be able to resolve the crisis on their own.

Kania's and Jaruzelski's wariness about Soyuz-80 was determined mainly by three factors: first, their awareness that preparations for an internal crackdown were still too rudimentary to give any assurance of success without the risk of large-scale bloodshed; second, their belief that the use of any Warsaw Pact troops for policing functions in Poland would stir widespread public outrage and resistance; and third, their specific concern (for obvious historical reasons) about the proposed use of East German troops. This last point was something on which almost all Polish officials, including most of the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners), could agree. Even some of the hardline Polish military officers who were secretly encouraging the Soviet Union to send troops to crush Solidarity were averse to any notion that East German divisions should take part as well. In a typical case, a Polish army officer told Soviet officials in early December 1980 that "Poland can now be saved only by the introduction of Soviet troops," but he then warned that he himself "would be the first to take up arms against [East] German or Czech troops if they are sent in. They merely wish us harm and secretly revel in all our misfortunes. Only your [Soviet] troops should be

involved in this.'

43

Once Kania and Jaruzelski had made clear that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Poland would risk a "bloody confrontation that would roil the whole socialist world," and once they had pledged to take "decisive action" against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" elements in the near future, Soviet leaders were willing to defer the provision of outside military assistance, at least for the time being. Although Kania and Jaruzelski both claim in their memoirs that Brezhnev agreed to call off the entry of Warsaw Pact troops only after the hastily arranged meeting of East-bloc leaders in Moscow on 5 December, newly declassified documents undercut that assertion. Numerous documents, including the top-secret transcript of the 5 December meeting (which was unavailable when Kania and Jaruzelski compiled their memoirs), indicate

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that the decision to leave troops out of the Soyuz-80 exercises must have been approved well before the Moscow meeting, perhaps as early as 2 December." (A speech that Kania delivered at a PUWP Central Committee plenum on 2 December suggests that he already had been assured that Warsaw Pact forces would not be moving into Poland on the 8th.) Although Kania faced serious criticism in Moscow on 5 December, the transcript of the meeting leaves little doubt that he and the other participants already knew that the Soviet Union would give the Polish leaders more time to take care of the crisis "with their own forces."46 Kania himself emphasized this point the following day (on 6 December) when he gave the PUWP Politburo an overview of the Moscow meeting. Among other things, he reported that all the participating states had expressed confidence that the Polish authorities could "manage the situation on their own" (ze sytuacje opanujemy wlasnymi silami).

47

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Thus, Kuklinski's dispatch outlined a scenario that, by the time it was reviewed by U.S. officials, had already been put on hold. Soyuz-80 secretly began on 8 December, but only as a command-staff exercise (CPX), rather than as full-fledged troop maneuvers. The CPX continued rather aimlessly for several weeks, long after its value had been exhausted. Although the four Soviet divisions, one East German division, and two Czechoslovak divisions remained at full alert until late December 1980, the prospect of bringing them into Poland had been postponed indefinitely.

Document No. 1

VERY URGENT!

At a meeting with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in accordance with orders from Gen. Jaruzelski's Defense Ministry, Gen. Hupalowski and Col. Puchala endorsed a plan to admit into Poland (under the pretext of maneuvers) the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA). Documents and reproduced portions of the plans [for joint intervention] were presented to show that the following forces are to be sent into Poland: three armies comprising 15 SA divisions, one army comprising two CLA divisions, and the staff of one army and one division from the NVA. In total, the intervening group initially will consist of 18 divisions. (A state of readiness to cross the Polish borders was set for 8 December.) At present, representatives from the "fraternal armies," dressed in civilian clothing, are undertaking reconnaissance of invasion routes as well as the distances and terrain for future operations. The scenario of operations for the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish Army bases to conduct maneuvers with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be sealed off.

According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army will remain within its permanent units while its “allies" are regrouping on Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5th and 2nd Tank Divisions and the 4th and 12th Mechanized Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point.

Finally, I very much regret to say that although everyone who has seen the plans (a very restricted group of people) is very depressed and crestfallen, no one is even contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact action. There are even those (Jasinski, Puchala) who say that the very presence of such enormous military forces on the territory of Poland may calm the nation.

JACK STRONG

REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981 A "Hopeless" Situation

49a

This next report, addressed to Kuklinski's closest contact at the CIA, who used the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.

The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw Pact's Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end on 31 March, had been extended to 7 April at the request of the Polish authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania also had secretly urged that the exercises be continued after 7 April so that the PUWP leaders could "strengthen their position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., orthodox Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR [Committee for the Defense of Workers] realize that the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to provide help of all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert pressure on the leaders of Solidarity." Soviet military commanders turned down the request, arguing that it was merely "further proof that the Polish leaders believe others should do their work for them."51

While the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, Kania and Jaruzelski had met secretly in Brest on the Polish-Soviet border with Andropov and Ustinov on 3-4 April. The two Polish leaders were extremely apprehensive before the meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that they would be given more time to resolve the crisis on their own. A week after the Brest talks, Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and

Jaruzelski to get them to sign the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set a date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the meeting and then told Kulikov on 13 April that they would have to wait before signing the documents. For the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a further respite.

Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to ease up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev summed up this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on 16 April when he affirmed that "we shouldn't badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them so nervous that they simply throw up their hands in despair." When Suslov and another key member of the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited Warsaw on 23-24 April, they "attacked the [Polish leaders'] indecisiveness" and "sharply criticized their actions," but also sought to "support and encourage them" and to ensure that "they will have a distinct degree of trust in us." Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that "the current lull is only a temporary henomenon" and although they were determined to "exert constant pressure" on Kania and Jaruzelski, the Soviet leaders were also convinced that “we must now maintain a more equable tone in our relations with our [Polish] friends."

,,53

Thus, the pessimistic outlook of Kuklinski's message on 26 April was not so much a reflection of the immediate political climate as it was a venting of frustration about two things:

First, the Warsaw Pact states were continuing to exert enormous pressure on the Polish army. In his report, Kuklinski indicated that he and other General Staff officers had recently returned from Bulgaria, where they had been attending a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council on 21-23 April. Marshal Kulikov, his chief deputy, Army-Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, and other Warsaw Pact military leaders reemphasized at this session that they were as determined as ever to keep Poland and the Polish army fully within the socialist commonwealth.

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Poland, a situation that, from the military point of view, is hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the most committed officers openly said that Poland had to undertake far-reaching political reforms. Gen. XXX bitterly accused "the Americans [of having] sold us out to Russia. Without the Americans' silent assent, the 'comrades' would not dare to act this way." We are now very desperate, but we have not lost hope that Gen. XXX is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of information he is sending to you.

We Poles realize that we must fight for our own freedom, if necessary making the ultimate sacrifice. I remained convinced that the support your country has been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will bring us closer to our goal.

Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.

With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV

REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981Plans for Martial Law

This third message recounts a landmark meeting of Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK consisted of high-ranking military and political officials and was chaired by Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the KOK took on a supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead with the martial law operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be determined. The great importance of this secret meeting was first revealed by Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and it was then briefly discussed by Kania in his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two volumes of memoirs. Kuklinski's report says that notetaking was forbidden at the KOK meeting, but that is not quite true. One of the participants, Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for taking notes of the session. His eight pages of handwritten notes, classified top-secret, were released from the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in Warsaw in 1997.

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Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he was briefed about it immediately afterwards. Although Tuczapski's notes (which are not a verbatim record, but merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak's agitated comments about the leak of the martial law plans to Solidarity, all evidence suggests that Kiszczak did in fact deal with that issue at length in his opening speech, as Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been

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known that the Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated campaign under way to infiltrate Solidarity. The aim was not only to compromise the organization and discredit its leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and activities. Kuklinski himself has recently described the infiltration programs about which he knew first-hand in 1980 and 1981.62 These programs were aimed mainly at recruiting informers and agents provocateurs in Solidarity. Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security was tightened within the General Staff's martial law planning unit, and an investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small group of suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid doing anything that might arouse suspicion. It is interesting, however, that even at this perilous juncture, he showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he regarded his work there as too crucial to abandon.

At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski was surprised by the CIA's decision to transfer this highly sensitive information to Solidarity at a moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of secret codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to be a rather short-sighted step that might undermine his whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the planning for martial law, but he knew that the receipt of highly detailed information, especially codenames, would be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by infiltrators within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be hoping that the CIA would be more discreet in the future, at least until a more precise timetable for martial law had been set.

WARSAW

Document No. 3

2030, 15 September 1981

At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, which Kania attended for the first time, no final decision was made about the imposition of martial law. Almost all of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of the meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not question that such a development was inevitable, he reportedly said, in these precise words, that "a confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This involves first a struggle using political means, but if that should fail, repression may be adopted." Note-taking was forbidden at the session. During the KOK's meeting, Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our plans, including Operation "Wiosna" and its secret codename. I should emphasize that this is a codename— the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword needed to put it into effect. The officials responsible for implementing the plans don't know the codename; hence, it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The

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MSW 4

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was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer visited Szklarski and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future leaks. At present, Jasinski has taken command of planning at the national level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC official," with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski from MSW, on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television. Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made about "improving the deployment of armies,” that is, redeploying entire divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of Warsaw.

Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

Long live free Poland!

Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

JACK STRONG

Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University.

'Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist) officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story. For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, “Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego," Przeglad Tygodniowy (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception, to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully vetted for its accuracy.

2For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica smierc Leona Dubickiego," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.

See "Komenda Stoleczna: Plany przedsięwziec dotyczacych drugiego etapu akcji ‘Jodla',” October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom (T.) IV.

4See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December 1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.

"In "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski, claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain. "See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp. 13-14.

"The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980 to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.

Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October 1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the program "Trojka pod Ksiezycem," which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okecie airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

"These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in "Trojka pod Ksiezycem."

10His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at sea in early January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident during the 4th of July weekend. II"Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” pp. 3-55. 12Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War Plans," Washington Post 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A Question of Loyalty," Washington Post Magazine, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-29. 13Maciej Lukasiewicz, ed., Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawa pulkownika Kuklinskiego (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona Jurczenko, Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pulkowniku Ryszardie Kuklinskim (Warsaw: KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., Pulkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie, Dokumenty (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see especially the interview cited above, “Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,” pp. 1, 12-14.

14The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in "Rewizje nadzwyczajna," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17. 15" Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December 1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior officials charged with the massacres. See "Proces-Grudzien '70, krotka: Rozpoczal sie proces oskarzonych ws. Grudnia '70," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 16 June 1998, p. 2.

16"Umorzono sledztwo przeciw plk. Kuklinskiemu,” Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23 September 1997, p. 1. "Jerzy Sadecki, “Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy Obywatel Stolecznego Krolewskiego Miasta Krakowa," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 29 April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykly zolnierz Rzeczypospolitej," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.

18" Juz nie chce stad wyjezdzac: Uratowal przed rozlewem krwi oswiadczyl premier," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.

19 Adam Michnik, "Pulapka politycznej beatyfikacji," Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw), 10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.

20" Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzezen," Rzcezpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2. 21Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw: CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.

22 For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter administration, in “White House Diary, 1980,” Orbis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.

23 At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that "the situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially with the railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This

would also be a great blow to the economic interests of other socialist states. Let me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the transportation system. An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish] army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities and the main lines of communication [in Poland], and this plan must be implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the railroads." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.

24See, among many examples, "Unuberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen Feind," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; "Walesa uber Zusammenarbeit mit KOR,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p. 5; Jan Lipavsky, "Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; “V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy zeme," Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and “Strana se upevnuje v akcji,” Rude Pravo, 1 December 1980, p. 6.

25 Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev had held. See "Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewurdigt: Herzliche Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.

26The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the western USSR were on full alert. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the Polish Crisis, November-December 1980," Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), January 1981, pp. 2-5. 27See Brzezinski, "White House Diary, 1980," p. 45. 28 Ibid., 29 Ibid., pp. 40-41.

pp.

37-39.

30The emphasis here is on the word "preparing." It is unclear whether Soviet leaders were actually intending to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point below.

31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. See also "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 712. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).