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'Anlage Nr. 2,❞ 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in "The Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military Intervention," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), p. 124.

37 "Werter Genosse Honecker!" letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November 1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/ 40593, Bl. 4-5.

38 "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers fur Nationale Verteidigung uber die Vorbereitung und Durchführung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmassnahme der der Vereinten Streitkrafte vom 06.12.1980," Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-37; "Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes zur Gewahrleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenubung vom 06.12.1980," No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Haupstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef Verwaltung Aufklarung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", pp. 197-208.

39 No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, the commander-inchief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation. The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, Soviet Theaters, High Commands and Commanders (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service, 1986); Michael J.

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42

"O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TSK PORP i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyatelei stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V. D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kyiv, Fond (F.) 1, Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.

43 The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December, "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” p. 143. 44 Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-241; and Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-93.

"Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” pp. 140-196. Ibid.

46

47 "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980 r.,” 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 189.

48

Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 1980-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.

49 This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were not going to oppose the Soviet Union.

49a Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law, as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.

50 "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung ‘SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.

51 Ibid.

52 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TSK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation [TsKhSD], F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.

53 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP," in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 42, Ll. 2-4.

54 "V Ob'edinennykh vooruzhenykh silakh gosudarstvuchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 24 April 1981, p. 1.

55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), "Centralny plan dzialania organow politycznych władzy i administracji panstwowej na wypadek koniecznosci wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), "Ramowy plan dzialania sil zbrojnych," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), "Ramowy plan przedsięwziec gospodarczych," 2 April 1981 (Top Secret), all in Centralne Archywum Wojskore [CAW], Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/IV.

56 Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski's main contact at the CIA.

57 A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council was held in Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.

58 Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.

59 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 32-34; Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge, pp. 384-385; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-271.

60 "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.," 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me a copy of these notes.

61 See "Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe voevodstvo PNR," Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I. Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU's Yaroslavl oblast committee, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and "Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", p. 105.

62 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," p. 26.

63 "Wiosna" (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and dissident intellectuals.

64 The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

65

Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was Kuklinski's commanding officer.

66 Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law planning.

67 Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other officers on the Polish General Staff. He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation.

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Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Florian Siwicki, and Stanislaw Kania at the November 1997 Jachranka Conference. Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

The Czechoslovak Communist Regime and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981

By Oldřich Tůma

O

ne of the best books on the history of

1

communism, written by Martin Malia, is devoted to Poland's Solidarity movement, "which began the task of dismantling communism in 1980." In looking at the formation and actions of Poland's Solidarity as beginning a process that finally led to the end of communism in Czechoslovakia as well, it is necessary to consider the reaction of the Czechoslovak regime to the Polish events of 1980-1981. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) viewed the developments in Poland as a direct threat, paid extraordinary attention to them, and made considerable efforts to influence them.

We should say at the outset, however, that it is only possible to reconstruct in part the Czechoslovak Communist regime's reaction to the developments in Poland of that time as the relevant archival sources have not yet been sorted and filed and are still not wholly accessible. I have been able to use some documents from the archive of the CPCz Central Committee (CC), primarily materials from meetings of the Presidium. While the minutes of individual meetings are missing, basic documentation, e.g., various memoranda, notes of meetings with delegations from other communist parties are preserved. Documents of the Ministry of the Interior and materials from the Ministry of National Defense or the Czechoslovak Army are only partially available. For this reason, the military measures had to be reconstructed not only from primary documents, but from other sourcesspecifically oral history, and some documents produced after 1992 within the framework of the parliamentary commission that investigated abuses by the Czechoslovak Army during the Communist period, inter alia in relation to Poland in the years 1980-1981.

The CPCz and its leadership closely monitored the developments in Poland from the very beginning of the strike movement. Documents from the file of General Secretary Gustáv Husák contain a wide variety of detailed material about the situation in Poland (several analyses, reports about individual events, programs of opposition groups, and news about workers' activities). The digests of selected information put together by the CC apparatus and designated for the highest CPCz functionaries also devoted continuous attention to events in Poland. Beginning in August 1980, when the bulletins first reported rumors circulating especially in northern Moravia of impending Polish price rises, until 1982, these internal party information bulletins contained a section of information devoted to Polish developments and their reverberations in Czechoslovakia. Citizens' reactions to

the rumors and events as documented in the bulletins were not positive for the Czechslovak regime. The information spoke of fears about a decline in living standards, tales of imminent military actions against Poland that would include the Czechoslovak army, and the concerns of parents whose sons were serving in the military (especially in December 1980).3 The information also refered to the appearance of graffiti slogans such as "Solidarity with Solidarity," and "Wałęsa is a hero," etc. By the end of August 1980, the organs of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior recommended certain preventive measures even before the signing of the Gdańsk agreement. The Czechoslovak media monitored Polish events very closely, although they reported them, of course, in a decidedly distorted and negative manner.

Noteworthy, for instance, are the pages of the CPCz daily Rudé právo which, in the second half of 1980 and throughout 1981, printed material about Poland practically every day, often running more than one story. A mere perusal of the headlines indicates very clearly in what direction the regime's propaganda attempted to orient Czechoslovak public opinion. The headlines were full of negative terms such as violence, disruption, provocation, vandalism, and hooliganism, suggesting to readers dangerous and risky developments. Other headlines reflected the regime's attempts to characterize Solidarity's progress as the result of foreign manipulation: "Together with the BND [West German Intelligence Service] against Poland," "Who does the White House applaud?," "Who does Wall Street applaud?," "With the blessing of the Vatican," "The directives come from Paris," "The CIA pays for Wałęsa's union." Other articles documented the regime's not entirely unsuccessful attempts to call to mind the catastrophic economic situation in Poland, to link it to the actions of Solidarity, and, against this background, to emphasize the relatively tolerable economic situation at home.7

It is also possible to reconstruct fairly accurately the attitude of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership towards events in Poland. Its attitude is reflected in a whole range of documents-in the speeches delivered at the sessions of the CPCz CC where evaluations of the Polish developments were presented, mainly by the leader of the Central Committee's International Relations Department, Vasil Bilak; in talks which leading CPCz functionaries conducted with their Polish counterparts and with representatives of other communist parties. Especially important are the two extensive presentations of Gustáv Husák at the joint meetings of the leaders of East European Communist parties in Moscow in November

1980 and May 19818 and the letter addressed by the CC CPCz to the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) CC in June 1981.9

The CPCz leadership evaluated the situation in Poland as a counterrevolution prepared and controlled by international imperialist centers and by secret counterrevolutionary centers in the country itself. They believed that these centers were exploiting the severe economic situation, the workers' dissatisfaction and—as was heavily emphasized-the serious mistakes of the Polish leadership. This evaluation may be illustrated by a few key sentences from Bilak's speeches. According to him, the anti-socialist plan began with the election of a Pole as Pope:

"The choice of Krakow bishop [Karol] Wojtyła for Pope was not an accident, nor was it due to the fact that he had been endowed with supernatural qualities. It was part of a plan worked out by the United States with the aim of attacking another socialist country... It is necessary to realize that on the basis of the defeat of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, the centers of international imperialism advanced to the view that they could only hope for success if they managed to take advantage of the mass dissatisfaction of the workers, focusing their plans in practice on factories and plants... The current representatives of the antisocialist forces who stand before the public, such as Lech Wałęsa for example, are not the main organizers. There exists in the background a driving center which so far cannot be revealed."10 "What is happening in Poland is a great crime being committed against socialism and the Polish people. The blame lies both with the forces of counter-revolution and in those who have made it possible for imperialism to turn Poland into a detonator of socialist society.""

Above all, Czechoslovak representatives accused the Polish leadership of pursuing an incorrect economic policy, which had led to a high debt with the West; and of acting irresolutely in the resulting crisis, of being willing to compromise too much, and of being unable to regain the initiative. Such critical judgements were not leveled equally at all members of the Polish leadership. Full trust was still placed in PUWP Politburo members Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski. While Stanisław Kania was severely criticized, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski earned respect only when he declared martial law in December 1981.

The CPCz leaders constantly compared the developments in Poland with the unfolding of the 19681969 Czechoslovak crisis. They sought and found analogies, and tried to apply their own experience in renewing control over Czechoslovak society to the Polish situation. Repeated reminders of "Lessons from the Critical Development in the Party and in Society" (a basic Party document issued by the leaders of the CPCz at the end of 1970, which evaluated and interpreted the Czechoslovak crisis, which the CPCz adhered to like

gospel up to 1989) were obligatory in all meetings with Polish colleagues, with the main emphasis on the recommendation to act decisively, not to fear the risks, and to overthrow the counterrevolution. The resolute and violent repression of public protests on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1969 was often held up as a model. 12 Husák himself based his whole presentation at the Moscow meeting on 5 December 1980 on the exposition of the Czechoslovak crisis, and sought a parallel with the unfolding developments in Poland.

It is interesting that the Czechoslovak Communists sometimes spoke of their comrades in the PUWP leadership with a certain disrespect. It was not simply a matter of repeatedly stressing their disagreement with PUWP policies; in materials prepared for meetings of the CPCz CC Presidium there were a number of unflattering comments aimed at individual PUWP functionaries. It is extraordinary to see such material in the records of meetings with representatives of other Communist parties and in internal Party documents. For example, in the notes of a meeting of a Czechoslovak delegation led by CPCz CC Presidium member Karel Hoffmann in Warsaw in March 1981,13 we find the following comments on Stanisław Kania: "During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat while his facial expressions betrayed his disagreement and dissatisfaction." According to the report, "the exposition and certain further statements by Comrade Kania bear witness to the fact that he idealizes the situation and [they] also contain claims which are simply in conflict with reality."

14

Representatives of other Communist parties in the Soviet bloc spoke similarly about the Polish leaders in conversations with Czechoslovak representatives.15 In the Czechoslovak case however, the fact that the situation of 1968, which the CPCz representatives still remembered, now seemed to be reversed, played an important role. The events of 1968 had evidently lowered the prestige and worsened the standing of the CPCz inside the Soviet bloc.16 Now it was as if that dishonor had at last been erased. The Czechoslovak leaders now advised, instructed, made their own experience available, and offered their help. Revenge for 1968, malicious joy, and appeal to antiPolish sentiments was also an unspoken, unconscious part of the regime's propaganda with a view of rallying support among Czechoslovak society. That Czechoslovaks should turn against Solidarity and the Poles because the Polish Army had taken part in the intervention of August 1968 certainly was a very perverse logic. Nevertheless the regime tried to imbue this idea in the units assembled for possible deployment on Polish territory at the end of 1980. The Czechoslovak leadership also tried to influence Polish developments and to aid the PUWP in its struggle against the opposition. Economic, propaganda, military and security measures were taken primarily within the framework of closer cooperation and coordination with

other countries of the Eastern bloc; above all with those countries most affected by the Polish events-the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

17

Given the growing economic crisis in the country, the Polish leadership turned to their allies with requests for extraordinary aid. The greater part of such aid came from the Soviet Union, but Czechoslovakia also contributed. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the crisis the CPCz leadership was much less inclined to accede to Polish requests than they were later on. As early as the end of August 1980, the Poles had requested emergency assistance. The Czechoslovak leadership complied, but only on a significantly reduced scale: instead of the requested 20 thousand tons of meat they promised to provide 2 thousand tons; instead of 8 thousand tons of butter they offered 1 to 1.5 thousand tons in exchange for an equivalent quantity of cheese; instead of the requested 20 tons of sugar, they offered to lend 5 thousand tons; and instead of 3 thousand tons of newsprint paper they agreed to lend 500 to 800 tons.18 In November 1980, the CPCz CC Presidium agreed to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's suggestion of a temporary reduction of Soviet deliveries of oil to Czechoslovakia.19 But only after the declaration of martial law, "as an expression of the attempt to help the normalization of life in the country," was much larger-scale assistance offered: goods valued at more than 800 million Czechoslovak crowns, partly as a gift, the rest not to be accounted for until after 1982.20

The CPCz also tried to influence Polish developments through political contacts and propaganda. The exchange of delegations was intensified at various levels as were partnerships between towns, districts and regions. Every day Czechoslovak radio broadcast several hours of programs in Polish across the border (which were supposed to, according to Husák "comment on Polish events from our point of view"). Posters and leaflets, printed on Czechoslovak territory, "were directed against Solidarity." This activity had, however, as Husák himself admitted, "relatively little effect."23 The regime also prepared far more direct measures-as seen for instance in the frequently repeated instructions to find Czechoslovak citizens with Polish language skills, especially journalists and broadcasters.24

The most important measures taken in response to the Polish crisis were of a military nature. Code-named "Exercise Krkonoše" [Krkonoše or Giant mountains— are the frontier mountains between Poland and Czechoslovakia], these military measures reached their peak at the beginning of December 1980, when according to all indications, military intervention in Poland-with the Czechoslovak Army participating-seemed imminent. A lack of primary documents25 permits only cautious assumptions about these events. In general, rather than talking about certainties, we can only talk about great probabilities, based on indirect evidence. On the other hand there are widely preserved and published East German documents, 26 which allow us to place

Czechoslovak events in a wider context, and to interpret them fairly confidently.

On 1 December 1980, the Chief of the Czechoslovak Army's General Staff, General Colonel Miloslav Blahník, participated in a quickly convened meeting in Moscow, in which the commanding officers of the East German and Polish Armies took part as well. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, acquainted them with the disposition of forces for a tactical and operational exercise. The ensuing preparations and actions were officially presented at least as far as the Czechoslovak Army was concerned-as part of this common exercise. It is, however, probable, that the Poles (as well as the Czechoslovaks and East Germans) were not informed about the entire plan of operation, only aquainted with those parts which concerned them. After Blahník returned from Moscow, a meeting of the leading ministerial and Army functionaries took place on December 2, as a result of which plans were speedily prepared for the proposed exercise.

The ČSSR would provide two Czechoslovak tank divisions-the 1st and 9th-reinforced by two motor rifle regiments and other units, under the command of the officers and staff of the Western Military District. The 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces stationed in Czechoslovakia would also participate. According to the plan, these divisions would at first move up to the Polish border in Northern and Eastern Bohemia and later, in the second part of the exercise, move into Poland. The signal to cross the border was to be given by the General Staff of the Soviet Army. At this point the exercises were to continue, supposedly with the participation of Polish Army units. The target area for the movement of the 1st tank division was the territory north of Opole; the 9th division would advance to the space south of Katowice; and the 31st tank division of the Soviet Army to east of Cracow. The commencement of the exercise was set for 3 p.m. on December 6. In preparation, a special group led by General Major Jaroslav Gottwald, the deputy commander of the Western Military District, carried out a reconnaissance mission on Polish territory.27 On December 6 at 5 p.m., “Exercise Krkonoše❞ commenced with the announcement of a military alert. During the night of December 6-7 troop movement began. It was completed in the evening (instead of the morning as originally planned) of December 8. The 1st division. moved to its exercise ground in North Bohemia and the 9th division was moved into the area of the towns of Jaromer, Kolín, Cáslav and Pardubice and prepared for a further movement to Náchod, on the Polish border. On December 9, Minister of National Defense Martin Dzúr suddenly terminated the exercise, and ordered all the formations to return to their peace-time positions. By December 11, all troops had returned to their barracks. It is only possible to speculate about what this unfinished operation could mean. It is certain, however, that it was not a normal tactical-operational exercise

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