although the responsible ministerial and army functionaries of that time might have said otherwise. Moreover, the documents of the time do not speak of an "exercise", but of an "action," "operation," or of "Special Task Krkonoše." No exercises of such scale were ever prepared or planned in the short period of a few days. Much larger quantities of munitions, fuel, spare parts, and other supplies were made available than would have been necessary for the declared purpose of an exercise lasting a few days. Moreover, the assembled forces were fully warcapable and prepared to fulfill tasks in a tactical and operational depth covering the territory of Poland. Additionally, exceptional political and counter-intelligence measures were linked to "Exercise Krkonoše." The political apparatus and the military counter-intelligence departments of participating units were brought up to wartime numbers. Soldiers with assumed "negative" political attitudes were removed from their units and left behind on their home bases. It is also noteworthy that units used in "Exercise Krkonoše" belonged to front-line units of the Czechoslovak Army, which formed more than one third of the border defense between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. Their sudden displacement to the North and the East left the Western border of Czechoslovakia, and therefore part of the Warsaw Pact, temporarily undefended. This too points to the unusual character of the whole operation.

Constituting a special chapter in this story are the activities of a group of Czechoslovak Army officers on Polish territory on December 4-5. A similar group of East German Army officers was operating in the northwestern part of Poland during this same time period.28 These welldocumented reconnaisance missions by the Czechoslovak and East German armies cast strong doubts on the claims by the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, General Anatoly Gribkov, that in December 1980 no plans existed for “allied" troops to enter Polish territory and that in no instance did a single foreign soldier cross the Polish frontier.29 The official task of the group was to reconnoiter for the needs of the units on exercise, and to provide liaison with the Polish units meant to be participating in the exercise. In reality, however, its tasks were mainly of a military-political character. They reported on the professional and political character of selected officers in the Silesian military district of the Polish Army, as well as on their views about a resolution to the political crisis in Poland. Units of the Silesian military district supposed to be preparing for the joint exercises did not show up. The commander of the district, General Rapaczewicz, issued no instructions for bilateral meetings and his deputy, General Wilczynski, who waited to meet the Czechoslovak group at the border on December 4, was not informed as to the purpose of their visit.30

That this was not just an ordinary exercise is also evident from the concurrently implemented measures by the Ministry of the Interior, which explicitly referred to "the events in Polish People's Republic" or the possible

"critical deterioration of the situation in Poland."32 These "extraordinary security measures of the third level" were managed by the Federal Minister of the Interior [Jaromír Obzina], from December 5 at 4 p.m., and extended on December 8 to 6 a.m. On December 9, however, they were down-graded, and on December 16 called off.33 Lieutenant Colonel Šobán reported on December 11 at a meeting of the operational staff at the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava: "The advance of the Warsaw Pact against Poland reached a halt; time was given for the PUWP CC to realize the conclusions of the 7th Plenium.”34

It is clear that "Operation Krkonoše❞ could not have been a normal exercise. Whether it was the preparation for an intervention, an act of pressure on the Polish leadership, or an attempt to provide the Polish leadership with the means for sudden action against the opposition is not possible to say for certain without access to Soviet documents. The number of units described in the Czechoslovak (and also East German)35 documents-5-6 Soviet divisions, 2 reinforced Czechoslovak divisions, and 1 reinforced East German division-would certainly not have been sufficient for the first alternative. In that case, however, it is possible that the main tasks could have been carried out by troops of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts of the Soviet Army,36 and that state leaders and army commanders (who would have played only a partial role) were not provided with complete information. In any case, the military operation was terminated before it was fully developed—and it was terminated from the place that the orders had come, that is, the military and political leadership of the USSR. The course and dynamics of the military and security operation in Czechoslovakia in December 1980 seem to indicate, however, that the principal decision to terminate the operation did not come on December 5, immediately after the summit in Moscow, as Gen. Jaruzelski,37 or Stanisław Kania,38 for example, have argued, but apparently some time later. 39

It is not easy to reconstruct precisely the position of the CPCz leadership in December 1980 regarding the possibility of military intervention. In the records of the CPCz CC Presidium, no material has survived concerning a debate on this problem. On December 2 it was decided to send a delegation to Moscow for a key meeting per rollam, without convening a session of the Presidium. The corresponding decision, included in the minutes of a meeting of the Presidium on December 8, only states the make-up of the Czechoslovak delegation.40 The Presidium certainly discussed the Polish situation and the Czechoslovak point of view at the forthcoming summit; only indirect information, however, is contained in the record of conversation between East German Premier Willy Stoph, who was in Prague December 2 and 3, and Gustáv Husák.41 According to the SED minutes, Husák informed Stoph that the CPCz CC Presidium had discussed Poland and reached the same conclusions as the

SED Politburo. The December 2 SED Politburo meeting's conclusions sounded ominous, however: they authorized Erich Honecker to agree to whatever measures the situation called for. In other words, Honecker received a blank check to consent to anything, including eventual intervention.42 One can speculate only to a limited extent as to the position of the CPCz leadership. All things considered, however, it seems the CPCz leadership was less active and less decisive than that of the SED. It could also be significant that the Czechoslovak delegation at the Moscow meeting was comprised of only political functionaries-in contrast to the East German delegation, which also included the ministers of national defense and state security. Husák's speech in Moscow43 was not as pointed as Honecker's.44 Husák did not speak openly of a military solution (neither did anyone else). Nevertheless, according to the testimony of Stanisław Kania,45 his awareness of the gravity of the situation even brought tears to Husák's eyes at one point in his speech. As the military and police measures carried out indicate, the CPCz leadership evidently would have complied with and was prepared to take part in an eventual decision to intervene. The plans for implementing "Operation Krkonoše," remained valid beyond December 1980, and the units assembled to carry it out were kept in a state of readiness until 1982.

The operations of the security apparatus were less striking, but just as long-term and important as the military operations. They were aimed not just at Poland, but also at the Czechoslovak population with the goal of eliminating potential public sympathies for the Polish developments. As early as 29 August 1980, the regional police commands had received circulars warning them that U.S. and West German special services were trying to encourage Czechoslovaks to act in solidarity with the striking workers in Poland. In the following days and weeks, frequent monitoring and analysis of the situation in Poland showed an attempt to evaluate the exact nature of the situation there. For example, on 3 September 1980 Czechoslovak police received instruction on how to secure contacts with agents of the State Security service in the event that they found themselves in a situation comparable to that of their Polish counterparts in which Polish agents were isolated in striking plants and had lost contact with their directing organs.* 46 Other measures were concerned with: increasing the security of state borders; controlling opposition figures; controlling Czechoslovak citizens of Polish nationality, and Polish citizens working in Czechoslovakia; and limiting travel and tourism in Poland. Particularly intense activity by the security units occurred twice during the "extraordinary third level security alert:" first, from the 5 to 6 December 1980; and second, during the period of martial law, specifically from 13 December 1981 to 4 January 1982, which the Czechoslovak security organs were informed of beforehand.47 At that time various other measures were taken. High functionaries of the state security and the

police were "on call," special public order units were in operation, control of state borders increased (as did the control of Poles on Czechoslovak territory), movements of foreign diplomats were followed more intensely, and counter-intelligence provided protection for the Polish consulate in Ostrava. Special attention was paid in December 1980 to securing communication channels in connection with the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border. In December 1981, Czechoslovak Security forces attempted to prevent any utterances of solidarity with Solidarity or the Polish opposition. The chief of the operational staff, Deputy Interior Minister Major General Hrušecky, emphasized, "pay attention to the activities of unfriendly persons (especially Chartists [members of Charter 77] and members of VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted]). Do not permit any kind of protest against the measures taken by the state organs of the Polish People's Republic to neutralize the counterrevolution. Immediately arrest anybody attempting to protest, or preparing to do so."48 He also talked about "sending picked secret collaborators to Poland" and again about preparing linguistically qualified members of the Interior Ministry for deployment in Poland. All these measures were actually implemented, and further actions were also planned in the event the situation in Poland should worsen.

The Czechoslovak regime could not, however, completely obstruct acts of solidarity with Solidarity and the Polish opposition. Charter 77 reacted to developments in Poland by publishing a wide range of documents, which expressed solidarity with the Polish striking workers, criticized Czechoslovak media coverage of Polish events, raised concerns about the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border, and protested against the imposition of martial law.49

The wider public followed developments in Poland with interest and visible sympathy. It speaks to the success of the regime, however, that no important public manifestations of solidarity with the Polish opposition took place in Czechoslovakia in 1980-1981. Gustáv Husák was essentially right, when in talks in Moscow on 16 May 1981 he proudly declared that "there exists no danger that the masses [in Czechoslovakia] would support it [i.e. the Solidarity movement in Poland]... We are not

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afraid that the Polish events could have any influence in our country." In the long-term view, however, Soviet Premier Nicolav Tikhonov demonstrated greater foresight, when he interrupted Husák with the observation that this situation could still change.50

Selected Documents

As we have discussed, there are considerable gaps in the preserved (and now accessible) documents in the Czech archives regarding the Polish developments of 1980-1981. For example, no record has survived of the debates on the Polish situation in the leading CPCz bodies. It is therefore difficult to choose the one or two most important documents that would reflect this perspective in its entirety. In any case, most of the preceding text devoted to the reconstruction of the CPCz leadership's position on the Polish developments and the Solidarity phenomenon has been drawn from a range of documents. The opinions of Czechoslovak representatives have been captured by two presentations delivered by Gustáv Husák in Moscow in December 1980 and May 1981, and in a CC CPCz letter to the Polish communist party from June 1981. Most appropriate for publication seems to be the record of the Warsaw meeting in March 1981 (Document No. 3) between Stanisław Kania and Karel Hoffmann, the matador of the post-invasion Czechoslovak regime. This record presents the opinions of the Czechoslovak leadership in perhaps the most complete and most pointed form, while at the same time reflecting both the acquiescent as well as polemical arguments of the Polish leadership.

51

The report of Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, to the Minster of National Defense Martin Dzúr (Document No. 2) sums up the plan for the common Warsaw Pact army "exercises" on Polish territory in December 1980, or rather, that which the Soviet Army Command considered necessary to tell their Czechoslovak “allies." Among other evidence, a comparison of this document with its East German equivalent confirms that the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks received from the Soviets only the information and directives directly concerning them, and were not necessarily fully aware of Soviet intentions.52 In the German document there is no mention of the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces which was to operate on the Olomouc-Cracow route. Part of Blahnik's report is a map marked with the anticipated movements of "exercise" units in southern and western Poland.

The Czech archives also contain a whole series of documents which illustrate the positions and opinions of other East European leaderships. Though they do not provide any new information, they do confirm and supplement our knowledge. This can be said particularly with regard to two documents which outline the position of the Soviet leadership in the spring and fall of 1981. The first of these is a private speech given by Brezhnev while

in Prague for the CPCz's 16th Congress53 in April 1981 (Document No. 4), and the second, of slightly unclear origin, is located in a folder marked "Poland" in the yet un-archived materials of Gustáv Husák (Document No. 6). The record of the meeting between Husák and János Kádár in November 1980 nicely reflects the Hungarian position (Document No. 1). Although it does contain sharp criticism of the Polish leadership, Kádár also attempted to keep a certain distance-neither directly interfere in the Polish developments nor participate in economic assistance. In contrast, the interpretation given in the fall of 1981 by Günther Sieber, the head of the SED CC International Relations Department, is characteristic of the East German leadership's approach, which apparently felt most threatened by the developments in Poland (Document No. 5). It is a systematic, comprehensive analysis comprising well thought-out, enterprising approaches to the problem.

Document No. 1

Record of a Meeting between CPCz CC General Secretary Gustáv Husák and HSWP CC First Secretary János Kádár in Bratislava, 12 November 1980 (excerpt from Kádár)

25 November 1980.

[...] Comrade Kádár laid out the position of the HPR [Hungarian People's Republic] on the developments in Poland. A serious, dangerous situation has emerged here, one which represents a serious problem. It concerns a socialist state which is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Its geographic location places it in a zone of great importance.

[Kádár continued:] One of the sources of this crisis is the economic situation. Our Polish Comrades have themselves spoken of the excessive tempo of economic development. Lacking the necessary base they set an economic tempo which they could not maintain, a statement which also holds true with regard to the increases in wages and debt. The steep rise in wages was impossible to cover with goods, and the rapidly rising level of indebtedness was not covered either by corresponding production nor, particularly, by funds from exports. The poorly resolved agricultural issue is also a serious problem.

The second source of this crisis can be found in the mistakes of the leadership. The information [we have] received is almost unbelievable to us. A serious situation already existed in the PPR [Polish People's Republic] in 1956. Serious tremors occurred in 1970, 1976, and now once again. It is not our role to evaluate the level of their work. The present leadership says that they had drawn apart from the masses and from reality. In our opinion there also was a large degree of carelessness on the part of the leadership. I [Kádár] spoke with Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev in the summer, at the end of July in the Crimea, just before the arrival of Polish party leader Comrade Edward Gierek.54 Comrade Brezhnev was disturbed by the strikes taking place in Poland. I mentioned that Poland reminded me of a drunk who staggers from side to side, but thanks to the grip of his guardian angel doesn't actually fall. It seemed to me that the Polish leaders were thinking in a similar manner. They were very careless. Comrade Gierek arrived in the Crimea and in his discussions understated the seriousness of the situation. It was noted by our Hungarian comrades, on holiday in the USSR at the time, that the Polish leadership was calmly continuing their holidays while the situation in Poland was developing along very unfavorable lines.

In conversations with our Polish comrades we [Hungarians] pointed out the need to consider that neither the West, nor the Church nor any other anti-socialist force had yet decided on a full overthrow of the socialist system, but that if they wished, there was indeed an opportunity to do so. We regard the situation in Poland as very serious; the crisis is still a long way from being over.

Comrade Kádár recently spoke of the developments in Poland during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary [Lord Carrington], whom he cautioned that the situation had not yet climaxed, and warned that it would not be in the interest of Great Britain to attempt a reversal of relations. Responding to the Foreign Secretary's question, Comrade Kádár had stated that an attempt of that sort would be a threat to the entire policy of détente. He spoke of the Polish situation during his discussions with Yugoslav representatives as well. In answer to their question about the possibility of external assistance to Poland, Kádár responded that Yugoslavia would also have to help to prevent such assistance from becoming necessary.

The situation in Poland is exceptionally important, not just for the Polish People's Republic and the socialist community, but for all European states. The Hungarian People's Republic does not have any special concerns about these developments as there have not yet been any noticeable effects of the Polish events on Hungarian political life. The HPR long ago solved the problems which have led to the Polish crisis. They do not fully understand the situation in Poland and are disturbed by various reports that workers and in some places even "free elections" are implementing things which are taken for granted in the HPR.

They do not understand the approach of the Polish leadership in increasing prices in 1976. This serious action was taken without any preparations, and even the members of the Central Committee and the Government Presidium were not informed. In this situation it is obvious that Communists could not defend the implementation of the policy. The consequences of this step were not fully thought through and the whole approach was very lightly and carelessly conceived.

The opinions of the HPR were explained in detail to Comrade Demichev on his recent visit to Hungary. Comrade Emil Wojtaszek," who has kept the Hungarian leadership informed of the Polish situation. expressed thanks for the help provided by the HPR to the Polish leadership. I [Kádár] told him that there was no need to mention solidarity, as we regard it as a given. We are also prepared to give immediate assistance. They do not have great means, but are prepared to give everything which is available. They can rush some deliveries etc. At the same time, I cautioned them that if these were ongoing deliveries within the framework of economic cooperation then it is necessary for both sides to act as partners for if the PPR does not deliver coal, honey, sulfur, etc. as agreed upon then we can not produce. Then, understandably, we cannot help you.

The HPR does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. They [the Hungarian leaders] have, however, pointed out in conversations that as long as the leadership is not united it cannot handle the situation. To achieve unity one condition must be met: a clear, concrete platform must be developed. So long as such a platform

does not exist it is impossible to speak of unity among the leadership or within the party itself. Were Hungary to find itself in such a situation we would not count the number of party members. We would attempt to set forward a clear platform and then count the number of people who could support that platform. There is not much point in talking about 3 million Communists if you do not know how they will react in a particular conflict situation. It is more important to have perhaps fewer people, but know that they will act resolutely for a commonly-accepted platform. We have clearly told our Polish comrades that the basic condition is to clarify the situation and develop a clear, concrete platform for resolving it in a socialist manner and on a socialist basis. In this manner a basis can be built for effective solidarity and assistance from the states of the socialist community.

In a conversation with Comrade Brezhnev three days before Comrade Gierek stepped down, I [János Kádár] stated that the situation was so unclear that from the outside it was impossible to reasonably suggest an appropriate solution. As long as positive forces act reasonably then the HPR will support them in full. However, in the midst of a critical situation the Polish leadership let a man fall whom the Hungarian party believed to be a reliable and strong worker. In such a situation it is difficult from the outside to take a firm position. The basic assumption is that the Polish leadership must develop a clear platform.

It is necessary to ask where these developments may lead. During the meeting between representatives of these [Hungarian and Polish] Ministries of the Interior, the Polish representative informed the meeting that the Politburo had long since decided that there was no longer anywhere to retreat to, and that it was thus necessary to take things firmly in hand and, if necessary, use administrative restrictions. This is indeed the correct position and was discussed at an internal meeting. They should, however, say so openly, including in the Central Committee. In that forum it needs to be firmly said that things can progress only within definite limits. At the present time it seems that there is complete confusion in Poland. Many people reject contemporary politics, yet many Poles support socialism. There are many wholesome forces who are aware of how serious and dangerous a situation has been created. [...]

[Source: Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/1980, 25 November 1980; translated by Oldňch Tůma.]

Document No. 2

Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, to Minister of National Defense Army General Martin Dzúr, 3 December 1980

3 December 1980.

Respected Comrade,

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, with the participation of General Colonel ABOLINS, Vice-Chief of the General Staff and General Colonel TIERESHCHENKO, First Vice-Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, provided clarification of the planned exercise. Present were General Colonel [Horst] ŠTECHBART,56 Commander of the NVA [National People's Army] Land Forces of the GDR, and Armed Forces General [Tadreusz] CHUPALOVSKI,57 First ViceChief of the General Staff of the PPA [Polish People's Army]. The plans assume carrying out two exercises. The first is a divisional tactical exercise independently carried out on each division's home territory and on the territory of the Polish People's Republic [PPR] over a period of 5-6 days. The second is a command and control field exercise with communication equipment and partly-deployed forces on PPR territory. 4 to 5 divisions of the Soviet Army (of the Baltic, Belarussian and Carpathian Military District and the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces) will take part in both exercises. From the other armies: one division from the NVA of the GDR, four divisions of the PPA and two tank divisions of the CSPA [Czechoslovak People's Army].

Divisional tactical exercises will be carried out in two phases. The first phase will be carried out independently on each division's home territory over two to three days (see map). Following the completion of the divisional tactical exercises, both tank divisions of the CSPA shall gather together near the border with the Polish People's Republic.

An order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces will set the date and time for crossing the state border into the territory of the PPR (the 1st tank division along one axis the 9th tank division along two axes—see map [not printed]).

The issuing of this order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces initiates the second phase of the tactical exercise. The CSPA in coordination with one division of the PPA (the 11th tank division) will operate in the Zagan exercise area, where both exercises will take place, under the control of the CSPA and in coordination with the Wrocław Military Circle's operational group.

Following the realization of the tactical exercise the CSPA and PPA divisions will move to the allotted places on the territory of the PPR (see map [not printed]). Following a short rest (1 day), the second exercise will begin a command and control field exercise with