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Soviet Union should be in the front line of the fight against the enemies of socialism in Poland. The Soviet Ambassador Aristov visited Kania and protested against the sharp anti-Sovietism in Poland. Kania asked for this to be given to him in writing. This request was met. All of this has led to the realization that Kania's concern is to be able to show concrete proof that he is only doing what he has been forced to do by the Soviet Union.

According to our Soviet comrades, 1968 will not repeat itself in Poland. Polish comrades cannot simply acquire power by means of Soviet tanks. They must fight for that power on their own. Our Soviet comrades state that they did not choose Kania and thus they themselves cannot remove him. That must be done by the Poles.

The idea of calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee should be discussed. We should not let ourselves to be influenced by Polish statements about the possibility of a general strike, a civil war or the like. The Polish leadership is using this to threaten and blackmail the USSR. The counterrevolution is horrible everywhere. Its street activity too is equally awful everywhere. It is necessary to remain calm and even more necessary to avoid losing patience.

The SED suggested to our Soviet [comrades] that due to the serious situation, closer contact should be maintained between the USSR, GDR, and the ČSSR. Rusakov expressed however, that this was too early, even though they do not rule the possibility out for the future. It is only necessary to coordinate on a bilateral basis.

The SED CC feels that our Soviet comrades are having difficulty determining an effective approach towards Poland. In addition to wanting to continue with the present mechanisms, they lack a concept. Their present evaluation of the Polish situation is one hundred percent identical to the evaluation of the SED, unlike their evaluation following the last PUWP Congress. Following the Congress our Soviet comrades acted upon an illusory hope of a possible consolidation of the situation in Poland. The SED very critically evaluated the course and results of the Congress, as Comrade Honecker told Comrade Brezhnev in the Crimea.

Comrade Sieber asked that the CPCz CC inform them about the assistance they were giving Poland, as the SED would like to share in some of the activities. For historical reasons Poles do not like to cooperate with Russians and Germans. This mostly concerns printers, paper and the like. [...]

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents; translated by Oldřich Tůma.]

Document No. 6

Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding the Polish Situation [n.d., late fall 1981]

Regarding the Polish crisis and our viewpoint

(Information)

For a long time developments in Poland have caused anxiety and concern in our country and in other countries of the socialist community.

The evaluation of events in Poland was presented by L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

The CPSU CC has always kept the party and its friends informed of the situation in Poland, of our steps and of help in stabilizing the situation.

In October and November this year the situation heated up further. The "Solidarity" congress revealed counterrevolutionary intentions to seize power to change the basis of socialism in Poland by:

-transforming socialist public ownership into group and gradually private ownership;

- gaining political power by taking over the Sejm; weakening Poland's ties to the countries of the socialist community with an appeal to the peoples of Eastern European countries.

In reality, "Solidarity" has been changing into a political party.

In Poland:

1) The leading role of the party has been weakened. 2) Deformation of economic and political life is continuing.

3) The take-over of plants and distribution of production by "Solidarity" is continuing.

In fact, two actual governments exist. The disruption of the economy is evident in the reduction of the volume of industrial production by 15%, of coal output by 40 million tons and in great inflation.

4) Continuing attacks on the PUWP and as a result of that the disintegration and gradual extinction of the party. The causes of the crisis have their roots in the past: long-standing disquiet in the country, created by the strong position of the Church, where more than 85 % are believers.

-the reality of 74% of agricultural land in individual ownership;

- the influence of petit-bourgeois ideology through the opening of opportunities for the infliction of all contagions of petit-bourgeois ideology;

- voluntarism in economic policy-efforts to achieve a "great leap" in the economy of the country at the price of Western loans;

in these circumstances a stream of bourgeois ideology arose, especially from the 12 million Poles living in Western countries;

underestimation of the growth of consumer petitbourgeois views among the people and members of the PUWP;

severing of the party from the masses:

- violation of Lenin's principles of building the party. Quick acceptance [of new members] into the party in an effort to reach 3 million party members-they drew in everyone;

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Polish leadership and many times made them aware of them, including at the 7th Congress of the PUWP.

But the Polish comrades failed to take measures. Nationalist smugness predominated. Many things were kept from us, particularly the economic relations with the West.

Nationalist forces joined with internal reactionresulting in "Solidarity."

The leadership of the party and state showed itself to be unprepared and unresponsive. Regarding the international situation, great circumspection is necessary.

After Kania took office we advised him (in September 1980) and emphasized that, with the legalization of the counterrevolutionary forces, it was necessary under the circumstances:

- to strengthen the party and its connection to the

masses;

-to strengthen the army and security organs;

to launch an open and decisive attack on counterrevolution.

Kania agreed with our recommendations but [only] in words, but pursued a policy of compromise with counterrevolution. This occurred out of unwillingness or disinterest. Instead of an attack-defensive tactics and retreat.

30 October 1980 meeting with Kania in Moscow. He agreed with our recommendations and criticisms, made promises but his deeds didn't follow.

5 December 1980 meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow, where all participants made the Polish leaders aware of their responsibilities. They also agreed and made promises, but in reality they made concessions.

4 March 1981 meeting with a PUWP delegation after

the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

April 1981 Comrades Andropov and Ustinov hold discussions in Warsaw.

May 1981 meeting between Comrades Suslov and Rusakov and Polish representatives.

June 1981 meeting between Comrades Gromyko and Kania.

5 June 1981 letter from the CC CPSU to Polish Communists, which caused a clear delineation between the compromisers and the healthy forces in the CC of the PUWP and in the party.

Telephone conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and Kania before the congress, informing [the latter] of the necessity to defend the healthy forces and revolutionary line, the work of comrades [Politburo member Victor Vasil'evich] Grishin and [Politburo member Arvid Yanovich] Pel'she during the congress.

The letter prevented the destruction of the party, but the leadership continued on its original path.

At the meeting in Crimea in August L.I. Brezhnev again underscored that the PUWP was continuing to make concessions. But even despite this, further concessions were made to "Solidarity." The path of "renewal" through

compromise: "We Poles will come to an understanding."

During that time 37 of 49 county council secretaries had to give up their leadership positions. Kania was the main hindrance in the struggle for socialism. The question arose of restoring the leadership to a sound footing. The Poles put forward Jaruzelski. The army and security forces stand behind him. The healthy forces supported this. Change in the leadership is a positive fact, assuming that the results of the 4th plenum of the PUWP CC61 are followed up on.

The difficulties in the PUWP as well as in the country remain, the situation is difficult.

Further developments will depend on how consistently the new leadership will work and struggle against Kania's course without Kania.

A conversation took place between Jaruzelski and L.I. Brezhnev62 in which it was stressed that

choosing reliable co-workers was the most important thing;

it was time to take decisive measures against counterrevolution.

The PUWP CC, the Sejm and the PPR government are taking some measures, but so far the outcome of this has somehow not been clearly apparent. So far they are relying on discussions. They are considering solving [the situation] by means of a National Unity Front.

We are pointing out the possibility that the party may lose its leading role in a coalition with "Solidarity" and the church.

We are securing the supplies of goods in their original volumes and also in the future. But hereafter everything will depend on the character of the internal political situation in Poland. The support of the healthy forcesone of our tasks.

Overall our course lies in:

-preserving the PUWP as the leading force; -preserving the Polish People's Republic as an ally; saving socialism in the PPR.

The danger has not been eliminated, the struggle will continue.

Lessons from the crisis in Poland.

1. The successful building of socialism is [only] possible under conditions when general principles are consistently implemented in the building of a new society. Deviation from these [principles] leads to crises.

2. Maintaining high political vigilance. To see not only successes, but also errors and failures in time to analyze and eliminate [them].

3. We attach great importance to strengthening the party's leading role and of the party's connection to the masses, to the strengthening and development of socialist democracy, to internationalist education in the socialist spirit, to intensifying of the ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

4. The present international situation has become worse and the enemies would like to "feather their own nest" provoking us to become involved in Polish affairs,

hoping that our nerves will fail.

In this situation a special vigilance and self-control is essential so it will not lead to their [the enemies'] coming in the other countries, to the isolation of the socialist community and to an increasing danger of military conflict.

5. We are looking for ways to find a political solution. There is still a possibility to prevent disaster. The PUWP must find ways to alter developments.

The tasks facing our party:

1) To strengthen the connection with the working class, to lead a decisive struggle against failures.

2) To increase awareness, not to permit deviations from the policy of the party.

3) Our line towards Poland is correct. The support of the healthy forces and working with the leadership of the PUWP and the country.

4) The USSR will make use of its influence in the international arena so as not to allow an escalation of Polish events in other countries.

The plenary session of the CC fully approved the political line and the practical action of the Politburo of the CC CPSU relating to the crisis situation in Poland.

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents, box "Poland;” translated by Oldřich Tůma.]

Dr. Oldřich Tůma is the Director of the Institute of Contemporary History (Prague).

1 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994).

2 Státní ústrední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 10, VI 23 (12 August 1980), p. 10.

3 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 30 (12 December 1980), p. 3 and 31 (9 January 1981), p.

4.

4 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 31 (9 January 1981), p. 5 and VI 36 (1 April 1981), p. 6. One piece of data from November 1980 might perhaps, find a honorable place in any textbook of history of the labor movement: “... under the influence of events in the PRP [People's Republic of Poland] demands are appearing among the miners in the Sokolov mines in West Bohemia for new safety aids, because the old ones are worn out." SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 29 (26 November 1980), p. 3.

"E.g. Rudé právo, 22 and 28 October 1980; 5, 25, 28 and 29 November 1980; 2 and 15 December 1980; 3 and 29 January 1981; 9 February 1981; 10, 13, and 23 March 1981; 12 May 1981, and many others.

"Rudé právo, 4 November 1980; 13, 27, and 31 January 1981; 17 March 1981. This type of interpretation is represented also in some subsequently published brochures, e.g., Milan Matouš, Spiknutí proti Polsku (Praha, 1982), and J. Kobr, Vývoj Nemeché demokratické republiky a Polské lidové republiky v letech 19441984 (Praha: Svoboda, 1985), esp. pp. 137-221.

7 "The Problems of Polish Market”, “Unfortunate Consequences of Strikes", "Conflicts That Will Not Multiply Bread", Rudé právo, 5 January, 18 February, 6 March 1981. 8 Preserved only in the archive of the SED in German, published in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds. “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen.” Die SED contra Polen 1980/ 81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung, (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), pp. 178-187 and 280-282.

9 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 12/1981, 19 June 1981.

10 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, record of 18th session of the CC CPCz, 7 to 9 October 1980, p. 55.

11 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, record of 4th session of the CC CPCz, 28 and 29 October 1981, p. 33.

12 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80, 19 September 1980Husák's speech in Moscow, Hart und kompromisslos, pp. 186187; Husák argued in a similar way in an interview with Stefan Olszowski in Prague, 15 September 1980 (SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80, 19 September 1980).

13 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below.

14 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below

15 For example János Kádár in an interview with Husák, 25 November 1980 (SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/80, 28 November 1980) or Günther Sieber during a meeting with Bilak, 8 October 1981 (SÚA, A ÚV KSC, unsorted materials file Husák) Doc. 1 and 5 below - the records of which are deposited in the CC CPCz archive.

see

16 General Jaruzelski also remembers awkward situations when his Czechoslovak comrades during the 70s always felt obliged to express their thanks for the “fraternal help” of 1968. Cf. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dla czego... (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), p. 110.

17 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 147/80, 12 September 1980-letter of the chairman of the government of the PPR, Józef Pinkowsky, to Lubomir Strougal.

18 Ibid. According to the same document the leaders of the GDR behaved in a similar way. The Hungarian leaders, on the other hand, answered very evasively and promised no extraordinary aid.

19 The suggestion was for a reduction of 600 thousand tons in 1981. SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 154/80, 14 November 1980. See also Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny, p. 34.

20 SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 28/1982, 8 January 1982.

21 Wilke/Kubina, eds., Hart und kompromisslos, p. 281. 22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24

E.g. A MV, Kanice, 0, 1-1, Fund KS SNB Ostrava, Internal political situation in Poland, box 24, inventory unit 8.

25 The bulk of the original documents concerning "Krkonoše❞ were liquidated in 1982!

26 See Wilke/Kubina, eds., Hart und kompromisslos, esp. doc. nos. 19-30.

27 One member of this was also the later first post-November 1989 Minister of Defense, Gen. Miroslav Vacek.

28 Wilke/Kubina, eds., Hart und kompromisslos, p. 207. 29 Anatoli Gribkow, Der Warschauer Pakt. Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses (Berlin: edition 9 1995), pp. 181-5.

30 This account of “Operation Krkonoše” is drawn from copies of some original documents assembled during the activities of the investigation commission of the House of Representatives of

the Czech Republic (notably the report of General Blahnik on the meeting in Moscow - see doc. 2 below, the order of Minister of National Defense Dzúr to conduct the "Krkonoše❞ exercise from December 5, the report of Gen. Gottwald on the reconnaisance mission to Poland, the minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Council of the Minister of National Defense on December 8), from expert reports for the use of the same commission (notably the report prepared by Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz) and from several interviews conducted by the author in 1997 (with Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz, Lieut. Col. Jirí Horák, and Gen. Stanislav Procházka).

31 A MV, Praha, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/80 pronouncing the extraordinary security alert of the third level (5 December 1980).

32 A MV, Kanice, 0 1-1, inventory unit 8, fund KS SNB Ostrava, Operational plan of the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava in relation to the third level extraordinary security measures in response to the development of the situation in Poland, 1980. Emergency security measures were declared in various situations, if there were an imminent danger of so-called "mass anti-socialist behaviors." In accordance with Decree no. 1/79 of the Minister of the Interior (A MV, Praha), a uniform system was set up of such measures that had earlier been declared on an ad hoc basis. The system included seven levels of emergency security measures. Levels five to seven presupposed an impending disturbance or one already in progress on a large scale and was never declared. Level four was declared only once, in January 1989 in anticipation of protests on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Jan Palach's death by self-immolation. Level three (and the measures corresponding to it before the decree was issued in 1979) was declared in more than a dozen instances between 1970 and 1989, although prior to 1988 in the main as prevention. The third level involved a rather extensive activation of the security apparatus: the setting up of central and regional or local operational staffs, an emergency alert and the Availability of on duty members of the police force and of the Interior Ministry troops, the setting apart of special order units, etc., etc. 33 A MV, Praha, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/ 80, his decision from 9 December and order no. 49/80 (16 December 1980).

34 A MV, Kanice, 0 1-1, box 24, inventory unit 8, minutes of the operational staff. The CC PUWP held its 7th Plenum on 1-3 December 1980.

35 Wilke/Kubina, eds., Hart und kompromisslos, pp. 136-137. 36 Contemporaneous Western sources spoke about 15 or even 30 divisions; see Wojciech Jaruzelski Mein Leben für Polen (Munchen-Zürich: Piper, 1993), p. 235 and/or Strategic Survey 1980-1981, p. 74.

37 Jaruzelski, Mein Leben für Polen, p. 239.

38 Stanisław Kania, Zatrzymacac konfrontacje (Wrocław: BGW: 1991), p. 91.

39 On the general discussion concerning the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland in 1980 see, e.g., Mark Kramer, "Soviet

Policy during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126.

Trying to reach CWIHP by Email?

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45 Kania, Zatrzymacac konfrontacje, pp. 88-89.

46 A MV, Kanice, fund KS SNB Hradec Králové, bundle 15, Security situation in Poland.

47 A MV, Praha, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 29/81. 48 A MV, Kanice, 0 1-1, fund KS SNB Ostrava, box 24, inventory unit 8. - Telegram from the Ministry of Interior from 31 December 1981.

49 Documents from 8 August 1980, 14 December 1980, 10 January 1981, 7 and 30 January 1982. See V. Prečan, ed., Charta 77 1977-1989 (Bratislava: Cs. stredisko nezaviste literatury: Archa, 1990), pp. 403-408.

50 Wilke/Kubina, eds., Hart und kompromisslos, pp. 282-283. 51 He played an important role in safeguarding the intervention in August 1968, was a CPCz CC Presidium member from 1971 to 1989, and was head of the Czechoslovak trade unions from 1971 to 1989.

52 Ibid., pp. 136-138.

53 Held 6 to 10 April 1981.

54 Gierek, since late 1970 PUWP First Secretary, resigned in August 1980.

55 Polish foreign minister from 1976 to August 1980, then CC Secretary. As CC emissary, he informed the Hungarian leadership on the Gdansk Agreement on 12 September 1980. 56 Correctly Stechbarth.

57 Correctly Hupalowski.

58

During Kania's visit to Prague, 15 February 1981. For the minutes see SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 162/1981, 19 February 1981. 59 Editor's note: Following the expulsion of Solidarity and other union leaders from the provincial assembly building in Bydgoszcz, beatings of Solidarity members by police and the security service occurred. Tensions between the regime and Solidarity rose dramatically.

60Editor's note: In July 1981 Porembski became a member of the PUWP Politburo.

61 The 4th Plenum of the CC PUWP was held 16-18 October 1981.

62 Telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, 19 October 1981.

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The Hungarian Party Leadership and the Polish Crisis of

By János Tischler

T

1980-1981

The beginning of the 1980-1981 crisis in Poland coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Kádár regime in Hungary. János Kádár-who had come to power with the backing of Moscow by quelling the Hungarian Revolution in 1956-had long tried to preserve social law and order and to establish political legitimacy for himself, following the bloody repression after the revolution, by not interfering with people's private lives, by providing greater freedom within the framework of the existing political regime, and most importantly, by guaranteeing a constant increase in the living standard, thus creating an atmosphere of safety. From 1979 on, the Kádár regime subordinated other priorities to this latter aspect. Hoarding decreased to a minimum level and virtually all foreign loans served as subsidies of consumer prices and of unprofitable companies (which ensured full employment in return). However, an ever-growing part of the budget had to be spent on the repayment of loans and their interest.

While publicly emphasizing the solidarity of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) with Polish Communists and assuring Poland all possible economic and political assistance, Kádár believed from the very outset of the Polish crisis that the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) had to overcome its difficulties by political means and in a “socialist way.” This latter phrase implied that Poland was expected to remain a socialist country and a member-state of the Warsaw Pact. In Kádár's opinion, the use of so-called "administrative means," that is, the deployment of the armed forces, would be acceptable only if no peaceful solution could be found or if the Communist regime itself were threatened. In this case, the challenge would have affected the whole socialist bloc and could have seriously endangered his (Kádár's) personal power as well. Nevertheless, he implied that even in such a case the crisis would best be dealt with by using internal Polish forces such as the state security organizations, the army, or the police. In Kádár's view, even in the event of a Soviet intervention as a final resort, Polish Communists would have to orchestrate the so-called "consolidation," that is, to "sort out all political and social difficulties," just as he and his Hungarian comrades had done after 1956. He knew all too well from his own experience how troublesome, or rather how much more troublesome, it was to seize power against the wishes of a nation, following a Soviet intervention.

Unlike other socialist countries which relentlessly attacked the PUWP and its leaders for their "opportunism," their chronic inability to act, and their backsliding, the HSWP tried to support its Polish counterpart by not interfering (either publicly or through

"inter-party channels") with any of the steps taken by the Polish leadership. After all, Kádár considered the Polish crisis to be a "family affair" relating exclusively to Sovietbloc countries, a view he consistently upheld in the course of negotiations with various Western parties and politicians.

From the point of view of Hungarian internal affairs, events in Poland put Budapest in a simultaneously awkward and favorable position. Budapest could overtly claim how much better the situation was in Hungary compared with that in Poland, in terms of public order and the system of supplies. The efficacy of Kádár's policy could thus be neatly demonstrated, which was, in fact, what the HSWP leaders and the State-run media did. Besides approaching the 25th anniversary of the "counterrevolution," it was the "Polish affair" that offered Kádár an excellent opportunity to render a positive verdict on the HSWP's performance since 1956. He took pride in saying that he and his comrades had successfully avoided mistakes that were, alas, continuously and repeatedly being committed by the Polish leaders.

At the same time, the events in Poland evoked unease among the members of the HSWP leadership, for they constituted a kind of operational malfunction within the socialist bloc which later turned out to be a challenge to the internal state of affairs of other Soviet-bloc countries as well. Although Kádár publicly declared in September 1980 that HSWP policy would not get any stricter due to the events in Poland, the Hungarian party worried seriously about the Polish crisis even as it proclaimed the opposite. The HSWP asserted that the Polish example was not attractive to Hungarians since they had achieved a decent standard of living that they wished to preserve rather than imperil by allowing unrest comparable to that in Poland. (Nevertheless, the party leadership conceded that "there were-insignificantly few-people who supported 'Solidarity' and would gladly have seen the Polish example spread in Hungary.")

Hungarian government and party propaganda strongly condemned Solidarity and the strikes it organized. This propaganda emphasized that the mere existence of a free and independent trade union contradicted and undermined the power of the working class, furthermore, that strikes. endangered the standard of living and socialist achievements. From the summer of 1981 on, this kind of propaganda expanded into a general anti-Polish campaign-lest the "Polish disease" spread to Hungary— and disseminated news about the alleged work-shyness, worthlessness, and parasitism of the Polish people. The Hungarian mass media used the fact that, when the living standard in Hungary first stagnated, then slowly began to decrease, a minor part of society was truly frightened

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