網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

interrupt its activity, to paralyze its propaganda campaign and sometimes even to expose it. In practice, however, the several-million-strong base of the organization still exists. Solidarity is a unique organization in the world and it has demonstrated an indescribable destructive power both within the economy and the affairs of the state. It is a fact, that this organization has become a symbol of dynamism in the eyes of several million well-meaning workers. The real aspirations of the extremist counterrevolutionary leaders of Solidarity will have to be revealed by steadfast work, but this struggle is going to be hard one, for it is in fact a fight against myths.

Furthermore, an aggravating factor is that the majority of Solidarity supporters and the source of its dynamism are the youth, who joined Solidarity in order to knock down the obstacles that thwart and frustrate their aspirations for intellectual and material well-being. Their attitude may be characterized as nothing less than pro-Western and antiSoviet. All that goes hand in hand with the intoxicating feeling of their hitherto often successful political fight against the authorities. Therefore they have to be offered attractive goals and suitable conditions in a political and economic situation which is by far the worse than ever.

The other main character of the Solidarity movement is clericalism. The Polish Catholic Church, unlike the Hungarian [Catholic Church], did not get exposed in the course of events. What is more, it has gained ground within Solidarity and reinforced its social position through it. While remaining realistic, the Polish leadership is still looking for possibilities of coexistence between the State and the Church. They are maintaining relations with the Church and trying to keep them from deteriorating beyond a minimum level.

Comrade Jaruzelski pointed out that in the fields of ideological work, propaganda and mass communication they are employing administrative measures first of all. Though there is a strict censorship they believe, based on Hungarian experience, that in the course of time they will be able to use more flexible and more efficient means in this field too.

Presently, the poor condition of the national economy is a major burden. Even without the destruction of the last 15 months the situation would be grave, but now economic conditions have become catastrophic. There is a general shortage of supplies, prices and wages are unrealistic, the supply of energy and raw materials for industrial plants keeps breaking down. To make things worse, the USA has just imposed an economic blockade, thus badly affecting the economy which has developed a cooperative dependence on the economies of capitalist countries over the past 10 years. In spite of the extraordinary circumstances, economic reform is going to be implemented in a limited form at the beginning of the year. Poland is in great need of the economic assistance from the socialist countries and Comrade Jaruzelski repeatedly expressed his thanks for the prompt Hungarian economic aid. He also added that it was clear to them that

this kind of assistance could be only provisional as the real solution, in the long run, is undoubtedly the transformation of the Polish economy into a viable economy.

As a summary of his comments, Comrade Jaruzelski underlined that the tasks ahead were huge and that there is presently no organized force in Poland, beyond the armed forces, which could provide reliable support. Only the multilateral assistance of the allied socialist countries could bring real support and clean sources. They wish to pursue the line they took when they introduced martial law; they are aware that they must pull back but have to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the exceptional circumstances.

II.

Our experience and impressions of intensive formal and informal discussions held with members of the Polish leadership can be summarized as follows:

1. The activity of the Military Council for National Defense is very well-organized, the armed forces and police authorities are carrying out their historic duties with commendable discipline. Their actions have stabilized the government institutions, eliminated open and organized resistance and apparently restored public law and order. The indispensable primary conditions thus are in place for socialist consolidation.

2. The favorable conditions created by the introduction of martial law and the stability attained so far are in danger mainly due to the lack of political power or rather its disintegration.

3. The Party is invariably divided and has become less active. Party leaders regard the situation created by the army's actions, that is, the so-called "conditions of artificial defense," as natural and this is delaying the development of the political offensive. Within the party there are heated debates amongst the various trends and tendencies and no determined political platform until now. It would seem that there is a mutual understanding that the Party must not return either to the position before August 1980, nor to the one preceding 13 December 1981. Consequently, there has to be concordance between the general principles of building socialism and Polish national characteristics. However, in practice, differences of opinion are emerging even in the process of setting the specific tasks and direct objectives. According to representatives of one of the main trends, national characteristics-the role of the Catholic Church, the degree of Polish national consciousness, the situation of the agriculture and so forth-have to be given a decisive role, furthermore the past 35 years of the construction of socialism has to be fundamentally revised and reassessed. According to the other trend, which is less perceptible now amongst the topmost circles of the Party, due to the

[blocks in formation]

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE AWARD OF CWIHP
FELLOWSHIPS FOR THE 1998-1999 ACADEMIC YEAR TO

MRS. LI DANHUI (doctoral candidate, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing), “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Vietnam War"

MR. KRZYSZTOF PERSAK (PhD candidate and junior fellow at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences), "The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland"

DR. JORDAN BAEV (Senior Fellow at the Institute of Military History, Sofia), “The Cold War and the Build-up of Militry-Political Alliances in the Balkans, 1945-1990.”

Moscow's Man in the SED Politburo

and the Crisis in Poland in Autumn of 1980

By Michael Kubina'

y the late 1970s, Soviet-East German relations had become tense due to East German leader

Erich Honecker's Westpolitik and the increasing economic dependence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Evidence of these strains can be found in minutes recorded by Gerhard Schürer, head of planning for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), of a March 1979 conversation during the 24th convention of the GDR/ USSR Parity Government Commission. According to Schürer's account, USSR Council of Ministers chairman N. A. Tikhonov, a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, complained about the GDR's increasing co-operation with the West at Soviet expense. Schürer wrote: "Comrade Tikhonov had a fivepage long document, which he under no circumstances was willing to hand over to me. I answered [sic] as follows: The material you are using was obviously created by someone who doesn't know anything about the cooperation between the GDR and the USSR or was onesidedly searching for negative facts or unfounded insinuations."2

It remains unclear from whom Tikhonov had received his material. Moscow however, was not only informed through official channels about what was going on within the SED's most senior decision-making body, but had its own informants in the East German party politburo itself. One of them was Werner Krolikowski,3 a postwar cadre of the SED, who from 1973 to 1976 displaced Günter Mittag as the SED Central Committee (CC) secretary for economic affairs. Krolikowski became a personal enemy of Mittag and Honecker when Honecker in 1977 once again reinstalled Mittag in his former position. Krolikowski in turn became first deputy to the head of the government, prime minister Willi Stoph, with responsibility for economic matters.

In the first half of the 1970's Krolikowski began to inform Moscow regularly about developments within the SED politburo which in any way could jeopardize Moscow's position in East Germany. As an ideological puritan, loyalty to Moscow was his first priority. Both ideological purity and the close alliance with Moscow were in Krolikowski's view-being increasingly jeopardized by Honecker's and Mittag's policy towards Bonn.

Until the GDR's demise, Krolikowski remained a reliable informant for Moscow. His behavior in the SED politburo did not reflect his sharp criticism of Honecker and Mittag in his communications with Moscow. But he frequently warned the Soviets of the potentially disastrous

results Honecker's policy could have for Moscow's position in Germany. In 1984, for example, he urgently warned the Soviets about Honecker's cadre policy: "The cadre-political changes within the politburo carried out by the 8th CC Plenum of the SED,4 following the proposal and suggestion of EH [Erich Honecker]"-so the title of a report for Moscow dated 4 June 1984-served only "to strengthen the personal power of EH." One could count on the fact that, at Honecker's behest, all "comrades, [who were] old warriors and attached to the Soviet Union, will be systematically neutralized, dismissed from the politburo and replaced by other persons." Two years later Krolikowski tried in vain to win Moscow's support for Honecker's removal."

Krolikowski kept detailed notes, which I utilize in this paper. They are often grammatically incorrect, and his handwritten corrections appear on many of the typewritten pages. His handwritten comments preceding each date are blotted out or indecipherable. These dates seem to indicate the date on which they were handed over to the Soviets rather than the day on which they were written. Erich Honecker and Günter Mittag are mentioned only by their initials (EH and GM)."

Krolikowski's reports provide new evidence on the question of whether Honecker really pressed for a Soviet invasion of Poland in autumn 1980. This issue, as well as the question of whether and when a serious military invasion by the Soviets might have occurred, is still a matter of controversy. There are good reasons to believe that the danger of a military invasion was rather small, at least after the Moscow summit on 5 December 1980.8 But one should not assume that, in the autumn 1980, Honecker was not convinced of the necessity of an invasion, and that the Soviet preparations for it were not to be taken seriously. Similar arguments have already been made in detail elsewhere and do not need to be restated here." Since some scholars still argue11 that some "interpretational doubts"12 remain, new evidence that seems to corroborate the thesis stated above is provided below.

10

Honecker's annual meeting with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1980 turned out to be a rather unpleasant experience for him. At this meeting Brezhnev sharply criticized Günter Mittag. Former Soviet diplomat Yuli Kvizinskij remembers Brezhnev at the airport telling Honecker straight to his face that "he had no trust in Günter Mittag. But Honecker ignored the remark."13 Immediately after Honecker's return from the Crimea, the strikes in Poland escalated to crisis proportions all over the country. Beginning on 12 August

1980, one day after the Crimea meeting, the SED

leadership began receiving several telegrams per day from
Warsaw on developments in Poland. On August 18, the
State Security Ministry (MfS), began producing regular
reports on the public mood within East Germany regarding
the Polish events. 14 At the same time the Intelligence
Department (Verwaltung Aufklärung) of the East German
National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee - NVA)
began issuing regular reports on the situation in Poland.
On August 19, for example it was reported that the
situation would probably escalate further. The report also
warned that the aim of the counterrevolutionary forces was
the "elimination of the socialist state order", and that the
intervention of "armed counterrevolutionary forces"
should be reckoned with.15 Reports to the SED and NVA
leadership usually revolved around the key question as to
whether or not the Polish comrades were willing and able
to destroy the strike movement using their own force on
their own—and gave a rather skeptical appraisal.

Though the SED leadership feared the Polish
developments and their possible effects on the GDR,"7
the crisis temporarily provided Honecker with an
opportunity to divert attention from internal problems. He
skillfully tried to deflect Brezhnev's criticism that the SED
lacked ideological steadfastness and loyalty to the
Kremlin. Krolikowski later complained to Moscow that
Honecker did not inform the Politburo about Brezhnev's
harsh critique of Mittag's economic course and that he
tried to "brush CPSU criticism of EH made at the Crimea
by L.I. Brezhnev under the table."'18

In light of what had happened, Krolikowski saw a chance to settle accounts with Honecker and Mittag and their "political mistakes." Before the 13th SED CC

Plenum19 in December 1980, he drew up a working paper
in preparation of the forthcoming 10th SED Party
Congress in spring 1981, claiming "to deal frankly and
critically with the condemnable practice of ideological co-
existence in the policy by EH and GM toward the
imperialistic FRG. They are pursuing a policy of
ideological appeasement [Burgfrieden] toward the FRG
and the USA for stinking money."20 Of course,
Krolikowski did not put forth such demands, neither at the
13th CC Plenum nor at the 10th Party Congress. He only
talked about them within a small group of Honecker
critics, especially with Willi Stoph and with contacts in
Moscow. Often informed of important decisions only
afterwards and lacking clear signals from Moscow where
nobody was interested in provoking another leadership
crisis within the empire, no one within the SED Politburo
was willing to attack Honecker. Honecker instead had
made an ally in Mittag, who, according to Krolikowski,
was ready "to be at Honecker's command in any mess.'

921

Honecker's "extremist" attitude towards Poland, as Krolokowski put it, served to divert attention from his own problems. In particular, Honecker wanted to prevent any parallels being drawn between himself and the ousted Polish party chief, Edward Gierek. Both had started a decade before as "reformers," and both had led their countries into tremendous indebtedness towards the West. Krolikowski complained to his Soviet comrades, "[h]e did everything entirely on his own, without [the] PB [Politburo], and then only after the fact cynically informed his dummies in the PB [...]. Every week EH and GM go hunting together-discussing and planning their further political doings."22

While Honecker was on a state visit to Austria in

More Documents and Information on the Polish Crisis

Mark Kramer, Top-Secret Documents on Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981. Special Working Paper No. 1 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999).

Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War. CWIHP Working Paper No. 23 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998).

Institute of Political Studies (ed.), “Zeszyt roboczy❞ generala Anoszkina 9-16 grudnia 1981 r. (Warsaw: IPS, 1998)
Andrzej Paczkowskki and Andrzej Werblan, On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two
Historians Report to the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland." CWIHP Working Paper
No. 21 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998).

Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann (eds.), Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International
Dimensions. A compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events (Washington, DC: National Security
Archive, 1997).

Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database (REEAD), sponsored by CWIHP and the National
Security Archive (contact The National Security Archive at nsarchiv@gwu.edu or by phone: 202-994-7000).
Cold War International History Project's website at cwihp.si.edu.

Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (eds.), "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." Die SED contra Polen 1980/81.
Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1995).

"Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis. Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp 116-117, 129-139.

November 1980, Stoph and MfS chief Erich Mielke had a brief conversation about which Stoph informed Krolikowski, who then made a note of it. Mielke was reported to have declared his determined opposition to Honecker's "unilateral actions."23 Stoph said he had asked Mielke to "change his tactics," adding that "it was not sufficient to inform only EH. Whenever it was possible he was to inform the other PB members as well. Mielke said that this was quite difficult, since EH specified who was to be informed and who was not. [...] He plotted only with GM. He usually hunted only with GM. Mielke was only invited when [Soviet Ambassador P.A.] Abrasimov24 was invited as well."25 Concerning Poland, Mielke reportedly stated: "When EH makes super-demanding claims on the FRG, it is not due to Brezhnev's criticism at the Crimea, but rather because EH got frightened to the bones by the events in Poland. He fears that he could have similar problems in the GDR, and he is afraid of FRG influence!"26 Mielke, best informed within the SED leadership about Honecker's intentions second only to Mittag, had no doubts "that EH reckoned on the Soviets marching into Poland." Mielke himself, he said, had "always pointed out the strong anti-Sovietism in Poland to the Soviet friends," which made it difficult, "to achieve the necessary changes."27

The fact that Honecker, right before the December 1980 Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow-which had been initiated by him-wanted the SED Politburo to give him a blank check for a decision to intervene, is also confirmed by another politburo member, the head of the so-called Free Trade Union Federation (FDGB) of East Germany, Harry Tisch. After the collapse of SED rule, but before the party's documents became accessible, Tisch recalled the crucial "extraordinary politburo session" in Strausberg, the site of the GDR Defense Ministry near Berlin: "I believe that Honecker at that time had the idea to prevent Poland from breaking out militarily, meaning among other things, possibly intervening ... I know that today nobody wants to remember. But I remember that there was a politburo session in Strausberg-it was, I think, the Day of the People's Army-when we talked about the situation in Poland and Honecker asked for the authority to take all [necessary] steps so that nothing could happen and he wouldn't need to ask the Politburo again. 28 And he got the agreement. So he got the right to take all steps, including military steps.

29

When Egon Krenz, Honecker's short-time successor as SED General Secretary (18 October-3 December 1989), was asked about the special session in Strausberg, he professed to memory gaps: "I can't remember such a secret session of the politburo in Strausberg. And it would have been strange that we should have gone to Strausberg in order to have a politburo session there. In Strausberg the sessions of the National Defense Council, not those of the politburo, usually took place. Well, there was strong interest in resolving the situation in Poland, but I know of no case in which the GDR ever called for aggression

toward Poland. Who told you that joke?"30 But, according to Politburo minutes No. 48/80, Krenz, as a candidate of the Politburo, did in fact join the "extraordinary session of the Politburo" on the 28 November 1980, in Strausberg. 31 It is quite astonishing that Krenz could not remember this session, because it was indeed "strange" that a politburo session took place in Strausberg.

The reason, however, for transferring the session to Strausberg was not, as Tisch remembered, because it was the Day of the People's Army.32 The location for the session rather indicated that it was due to the growing military crisis. The only topic under discussion was what possible action might be taken toward Poland. After Brezhnev had given his long-awaited approval for a summit of Warsaw Pact leaders, the SED politburo authorized (even if only ex post facto!) Honecker's letter to Brezhnev of 26 November 1980. In his letter, Honecker had emphasized his urgent proposal "that we meet together in Moscow for a day right after the 7th Plenum of the PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party] CC [on 1-2 December 1980], the decisions of which, in our view, will not be able to change the course of events in Poland in any fundamental way." The summit should devise "measures of collective assistance for the Polish friends to permit them to overcome the crisis."33 In Strausberg, Honecker was given authorization by his Politburo "to take necessary measures in agreement with the CC of the CPSU." 9934

Today, even high-ranking NVA personnel assume that Honecker "recommended an intervention as a last way 'to stabilize socialism' in Poland."35 As is evident from the documents, for Honecker, the crucial point had already been reached in the fall of 1980.36 However, the summit on December 5 in Moscow gave the Polish leadership one more "chance." Honecker, after realizing that there was little likelihood of a military intervention, deleted the sharpest phrases from his speech manuscript.37 But nevertheless, he was the only party chief who refrained from saying anything about the possible impact a military intervention could have on the process of détente.38 Only the Romanian state and party chief, Nikolaie Ceausescu, dared to use the word "intervention," seriously warning of its consequences.

39

Back in Berlin, Honecker tried to sell his defeat in Moscow as a success. Krolikowski announced to Moscow, "EH's and GM's attitude towards Moscow is still bad, hypocritical and demagogic. EH learned nothing from the Crimea meeting. He takes the events in Poland as confirmation [handwritten: for the correctness of his policy and proof] for the mistakes of L.I. Brezhnev and the CPSU PB according to the evaluation of EH and GM [handwritten: during the Crimea meeting]. Cleverly, he tries to capitalize on the events in Poland. [...] EH and GM assume that the CPSU leadership, facing the crisis in Poland, highly value each positive word which EH utters about the Soviet Union and that their criticism at the Crimea meeting will be forgotten."40 Hermann Axen,

« 上一頁繼續 »