SED CC secretary for international relations and member of the GDR delegation, briefed the SED politburo about the meeting in Moscow on December 9,11 emphasizing, "of primary importance: that the meeting occurred. Due to several initiatives of Comrade E. Honecker." Axen's report made clear what Honecker's intentions in Moscow had been: "Impressive was the argumentation by [Czechoslovak] comrade [Gustáv] Husák on the basis of the CPCz [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] experience of 1968. Comrade Ceausescu repeated the Romanian objection against a military relief campaign." Axen also stressed the SED's skepticism with regard to an "inner Polish" solution. The "assistance" provided to the PUWP leadership in Moscow, he underlined, "will only be effective if (I stress 'if') it is used the way it has to be and was meant." According to Axen, Polish party leader Stanisław Kania had indeed announced that "measures for introduction of the 'martial law' were in preparation. But [Kania's] speech shows that no clear concept and program of action exists." The meeting therefore told the "PUWP and the public: Up to here and no further! Sort things out, otherwise extreme measures must be taken! [...] However, nothing has been decided yet."

To conclude, Krolikowski's notes corroborate the thesis that SED leader Erich Honecker indeed sought a hardline-military-solution in the fall/winter of 1980 and—for one—very likely took initial Soviet preparations for an intervention seriously.

Document

Werner Krolikowski, “Comment on the Report of the PB to the 13th Plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Günther Mittag,” handwritten, 5 December 1980 [excerpt]

[... ]

4. While a principled argument with FRG imperialism is missing, the assessment of the situation in the People's Republic of Poland lasts for 20 pages. Indeed, the comrades and many workers watch the developments in Poland with great concern. They also expect a response by the party leadership, its assessment of the situation and of what is to be done in order to change the situation in favor of socialism.

However, it simply cannot be true that patronizing statements are made before the Plenum of the CC of our party, about what the PUWP must and must not do in order to smash the counterrevolution and guarantee the continued socialist development of Poland. Fraternal assistance and even advice for the solution of the extremely complicated crisis situation in Poland are necessary. There is no doubt about that. But the way this has been discussed on the CC Plenum, based on the report

measures to prevent further indebtedness of the GDR [to the West];

- overcoming the gaps between purchasing power and production.

These extremely important questions, however, are not mentioned in the report at all, much less treated in a profound way. The opposite is the case. The internal situation of the GDR is represented as if there are no difficulties, although changes are necessary and are ever more forcefully demanded within and outside of the party. [...]

[Addition to point 4 - page 5]

What are the crucial motives behind EH's and GM's use of the events in Poland for their plans in such an extraordinary manner?

1. They use them in order to make others forget the CPSU critique, ventured at EH by L.I. Brezhnev in the Crimea; they pretend to be super-revolutionaries, the initiators of the current consultation among the General Secretaries and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in Moscow. At the same time, they think, they are countering the unsatisfactory Soviet incapacity to act in the Polish question.

Their extraordinary handling of the Polish events pursues the domestic goal of defeating all attempts to draw parallels between EH and Gierek.

2. EH and GM use the Polish events to allow GDR achievements to appear still more beautiful and brighter, as an example of the almost sole intact socialist system in the world.

3. Their extreme condemnation of the events in Poland strike at the Soviet Union, and in an indirect way, accuse the Soviet Union of being unable to keep the socialist states in its realm, unable any longer to strengthen their unity and unanimity.

[Source: Personal papers; document obtained by Michael Kubina and translated by Bernhard Streitwieser.]

Michael Kubina, is a research fellow with the Forschungsverbund SED-Staat at the Free University of

Berlin since 1992. He is co-editor of "Hart und Kompromiẞlos durchgreifen" SED contra Polen 1980/81 (1995). His research interests include the 1980/81 Polish crisis and the SED party apparatus.

The author would like to thank Bernhard Streitwieser for assistance with the translation.

Information on an internal talk between Comrade Tichonov and Comrade Schürer. Recorded by Schürer for Honecker's attention: 21.3.1979, Bundesarchiv Berlin [BArch-Bln] DE 1-56257.

3 Not to be mistaken for his brother, Herbert Krolikowski, who at that time was serving as Undersecretary and First Deputy of the GDR Foreign Minister, as well as General Secretary of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries.

4 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR (München: dtv, 1985), pp. 475 ff.

6

5 "The cadre-political changes handwritten, 4 June 1984. See "Schmeichelei und Unterwürfigkeit," Interview mit Sowjetbotschafter Wjatscheslaw Kotschemassow, in Der Spiegel 47 (16 November 1992), pp. 148-149; Vjaczeslav Koczemasov, Meine letzte Mission. Botschafter der UdSSR in der DDR von 1983 bis 1990 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994), pp. 56 ff., 69 ff. For legal reasons the source of these notes cannot be disclosed. Some of Krolikowski's notes, also without their source specified, have already been published; however, in these publications no differentiation was made between typewritten and handwritten sections. See Peter Przybylski: Tatort Politbüro (vol. 1): Die Akte Honecker (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991) and (vol. 2): Honecker, Mittag, Schalck-Golodkowski (Berlin, Rowohlt, 1992). Przybylski served for 25 years as press spokesman of the GDR, chief public prosecutor, and as such presented the educational crime film series, "The public prosecutor takes the floor," on GDR TV. It is interesting to note that after reunification, Przybylski was accused of plagiarism by former co-workers at the "Institute for Marxism-Leninism" at the SED CC. To avoid criticism of the book before its publication, Przybylski's publisher decided to advertise the book under an anonymous author. Immediately after its publication, Hans Modrow, the last SED Prime Minister of the GDR, vainly tried to take legal action against the circulation of the book. Erich

Honecker, Zu dramatischen Ereignissen (Hamburg n.d.: Runge, 1992), pp. 65 ff. The Krolikowski notes, both those published by Przybylski as well as those quoted here, appear authentic.

See the introduction in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen.” Die SED contra Polen 1980/81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), esp. pp. 24 ff.; Jerzy Holzer, “Drohte Polen 1980/81 eine sowjetische Intervention? Zur Verkündung des Kriegsrechts in Polen am 13.12.1981," Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 1(1997), pp. 197-230; see also the outstanding contemporary analysis by Richard D. Anderson, "Soviet decision-making and Poland,” Problems of Communism 2:25 (1982) pp. 22-36; and Mark Kramer, “Poland 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-139.

9

See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 229232.

12

Jerzy Holzer, "Stan wojenny: dla Polski czy dla socjalizmu?" in Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 June 1994, pp. 19-21, here p. 20. Holzer's argument here, among other things, is based on a falsely dated document, which, he quotes without marking his omissions. He incorrectly dates minutes of two talks between the CC Secretaries, Joachim Herrmann and M.V. Zimyanin, respectively, at the end of November, as occurring immediately before the crisis summit in Moscow on 5 December 1980, when in fact the talks took place at the end of October, a whole month earlier. See the discussion in Kubina and Wilke, SED contra Polen, p. 96 ff.

13

Julij A. Kvicinskij, Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten. (o.O. [Berlin] Siedler, o.J. [1993]), p. 262. Günter Mittag, Um jeden Preis. Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991), pp. 35 ff.

14

See Monika Tantzscher, "Was in Polen geschieht, ist für die DDR eine Lebensfrage!'-Das MfS und die polnische Krise 1980/81," Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland" (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), Deutscher Bundestag, vol. V/3: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos,1995), pp. 2601-2760, here p. 2616 ff. "Information on the Situation in Poland," Militärisches Zwischenarchiv im Bundesarchiv (MZA-BArch) Strb AZN 28895, II. 5-10. These files of the former Military Archive in Potsdam are now available in the Military Archive in Freiburg/ Br. See, e.g. "Information on the Situation in Poland," 20 August 1980, MZA Strb AZN 28895, II. 11-14.

15

16 For an analysis of the attitude of GDR workers toward the events in Poland see Burkhard Olschowsky, Die Haltung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und der

DDR-Gesellschaft gegenüber den Ereignissen in Polen in den Jahren 1980-1983 Magisterarbeit (Ms.), Berlin, April 1997, pp. 53 ff.; and Olschowsky, “Die Haltung der Berliner Arbeitnehmer zu den Ereignissen in Polen 1980/81," in Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat, No. 6, to be published in Summer 1998.

Krolikowski, “On the relationship between EH und GM,” handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

23 On the attitude of Stoph and Mielke toward Honecker see, "Byl li Chonekker igrushkoy v rukach Moskvy," interview by Sergej Guky with Yury Andropov, Izvestia, 11 August 1992, p. 6; "Wir wechselten zum Du," Der Spiegel, 17, August 1992, pp. 20-22. According to Abrasimov, Mielke in Moscow often "dumped on him," whereby Honecker is to have been completely unsuspecting of Mielke's double role.

P.A. Abrasimov was Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin from 1975 until 1983.

25 See "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich

Mielke on 13th November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

26 Mielke is talking here about Honecker's so-called "Gera Demands." After the SPD-FDP coalition in West Germany had won the elections, Honecker demanded that the FRG clear up some fundamental questions with the GDR before talks could resume on "humanitarian improvements." For further information, see the literature cited in Kubina and Wilke, SED contra Polen, p. 11 (fn. 10).

27 "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13 November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980,

29

Interview with Harry Tisch for the TV documentary That was the GDR—a history of the other Germany, broadcast on 3 October 1993 by German television (ARD). The quoted passage can be found in the book which was published under the same title by Wolfgang Kenntemich, Manfred Durniok, and Thomas Karlan (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993). The omission in the quotation is in the source. Despite permission from the broadcasting corporation, MDR, to see the complete interview with Harry Tisch, Manfred Durniok, whose film company produced the documentary on behalf of the MDR, rejected the author's request to view the entire interview, "because we made the interviews with the contemporary witnesses only for the MDR." Letter to the author, 29 August 1996.

30

40

Ibid., pp. 171-178.

"Commentary," handwritten, 16 December 80, also in Przybylski, vol. 1, pp. 340-344.

See politburo minutes No. 50/80 of the session of 9 December 1980, in Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin G. Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, und Hans-Peter Mueller, eds., SED-Politbüro und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbüros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR, vol. I: 1980, Berlin, January 1993 (Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat No. 3/1993), p. 533.

Bulgaria and the Prague Spring

In the fall 1993 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, Mark Kramer presented hypotheses on the role Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov played in the suppression of the "Prague Spring." The documents kept in the former BCP Central Committee (CC) archive clarify this matter unambiguously and definitely discredit the statements made by Živkov in his memoirs thirty years later, claiming that he had opposed the August 1968 Soviet invasion and had been sympathetic to the reform efforts.3 We now also have at our disposal clear evidence of the Bulgarian leadership's attitude toward the Polish crisis of 1980/1981, which was presented at the Jachranka conference on "Poland 198082: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions" (in November 1997). Less information is available, however, concerning the Bulgarian society's reaction to the political crises in the two East-European countries as well as to Bulgarian military participation in the Warsaw Pact "Danube '68" operation against Czechoslovakia.

In February 1968, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the February 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact leaders met in Prague. In the speeches delivered by the attending heads-of-state there was no hint whatsoever of any discord. The Bulgarian leader, Zhivkov, declared "full unity" with the "expert and wise" leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) and stated: "Between us there have never been and there are not any matters of difference." A session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee took place ten days later, on 6-7 March 1968, in Sofia. The official communiqué regarding the "open exchange of opinions" did not even mention Czechoslovakia. Nor did it appear in the text of the declaration made at the joint session of the BCP CC and the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) Council of Ministers which heard a report by first Deputy Prime Minister Živko about the PCC session in Sofia. In another, confidential report however, Živkov said: "During the session of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the Warsaw Pact we decided to share with the Soviet comrades our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia... We categorically declared to Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev and Comrade [Alexei] Kosygin that we had to be prepared to

put our armies in action." The statement of Zhivkov is indirectly confirmed by documents from the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) archives in Moscow. At a CPSU CC Plenum on 21 March 1968 dedicated to the situation in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev remarked: "In Sofia and afterwards Com[rades] Živkov, [Polish Leader Władysław] Gomułka, [and Hungarian leader János] Kádár addressed us with requests to undertake some steps for regulation of the situation in Czechoslovakia." Consequently, it was decided to convene a meeting of Soviet, East German, Polish, and Hungarian representatives with the Czechoslovak leadership in Dresden [on 23 March 1968]. At Živkov's explicit insistence, a Bulgarian delegation was invited to take part in the meeting, too. Expressions such as the following are typical of those delivered to the BCP CC Politburo regarding the Dresden discussions: "The attention of the Czechoslovak comrades has been drawn to the necessity of looking more closely at their people, at those whose heads are not quite in order... so that the incipient counter-revolution will be cut down..." Should the Czechoslovak leadership fail to undertake the necessary measures for "smashing counterrevolutionary acts," the remaining Warsaw Pact countries would not be able "to remain indifferent since they have bonds of unity with Czechoslovakia as well as common interests, and they cannot permit a counterrevolution in the heart of Europe." At a special BCP CC Plenum on 29 March 1968, CC Secretary Stanko Todorov, delivered a detailed report (55 pages) on the Dresden meeting which lasted for 11 hours."

The line marked out in BCP CC Politburo's decision gives a perfectly clear idea of the direction which the reports of the Bulgarian Embassy in Prague were to follow and the way in which the Bulgarian mass media portrayed the Czechoslovak events. While previous reports of Rayko Nikolov, Political Counselor at the Bulgarian Embassy, attempted to analyze the “interesting processes” taking place in Czechoslovakia, the reports of Ambassador Stoyan Nedelchev after March 1968 put forward the idea of a "creeping counterrevolution" which was in full harmony with Sofia's views. On June 30, Nedelchev sent a report couched in dark terms stating that the internal political crisis in Czechoslovakia could develop into an irrevocable process which would bring about important consequences unfavorable to "socialism" if "sound forces" in the CPCz did not immediately intervene. Todor Živkov headed the Bulgarian delegation at the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Bulgaria, East

8

Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-15 July 1968 in Warsaw. Several influential BCP Politburo membersStanko Todorov, Boris Velchev, and Pencho Kubadinsky -also attended. In the letter to the CPCz CC adopted by the five parties at the meeting, the Brezhnev Doctrine's postulates of "limited sovereignty" of members of the Socialist Commonwealth were outlined.

After the Bulgarian delegation returned from Warsaw the BCP CC Politburo discussed the situation on July 16.9 At a special Party Plenum, Stanko Todorov delivered a detailed informational report on the results of the Warsaw meeting. Its content completely undermines later claims made in the West10 that Bulgaria took a special position against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. In compliance with the plenum's resolutions the Bulgarian press opened a "campaign of clarification" of the situation. in Czechoslovakia in the spirit of the five Warsaw Pact Parties' letter. This activity provoked an official protest on the Czechoslovak side, expressed at the meeting of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiři Hájek with the Bulgarian Ambassador Nedelchev on 27 July 1968.11

At 1 a.m. on August 21 the armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact countries taking part in Operation "Danube '68" entered Czechoslovak territory. Bulgarian participation consisted of military formations of two regiments of the Third Army numbering 2,164 troops. (The size of the Bulgarian contingent, compared with that of other Warsaw Pact forces sent into Czechoslovakia, shows that Bulgarian participation in the operation was mainly symbolic.) As early as mid-July the Bulgarian forces that were to take part in the Warsaw Pact military action were installed in field camps and started intensive military and psychological preparation. They trained in strict isolation from the civil population in order to preserve military secrecy. After a written battle order for "participation in a military exercise" on Soviet territory, on July 21 the formations of 12th "Elhovsky" regiment under the command of Col. Alexander Genchev were transported to USSR by sea, where, according to the order, they came under the command of the Commander-inChief of the Odessa Military District. From there, they were transferred in mid-August to a location near Uzhgorod, close to the Soviet-Slovak border. On August 21 in accelerated battle march, the Elhovo regiment formations reached (via Košice) their assigned regions of Slovakia (Banska Bistrica, Zvolen, Brezno). Formations of the 22nd Harmanli regiment under the command of Col. Ivan Chavdarov were transported by air to Prague, in order to guard Czechoslovakia's primary airport, Ruzině.

During their stay in Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian military units did not participate directly in any military actions. The entire time they were on Czechoslovak territory (August 21-October 23) they were under direct Soviet command. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian soldiers also felt the hostility of Czechoslovak citizens who opposed the foreign military intervention on their territory. The field diaries of the Bulgarian military formations reported a

number of incidents during their two-month stay on Czechoslovak territory. In the only existing Bulgarian study on this matter, Maj. Gen. Dimiter Naidenov mentioned some of the armed incidents: “On August 22nd at 01.55 A.M. positions of two of our formations were fired on. Around 02.40 A.M. two shots were [fired] over the company of Captain Gochkov, and around 02.44 A.M. there was shooting at the battle row of Captain Valkov's company originating from nearby buildings. On August 24th by 01.07 A.M. an intensive round of firing from automatic guns towards Officer Sabi Dimitrov's formation was noted." At the end of August the Bulgarian newspapers published an account entitled, “A sentry at Ruzině," in which it was stated: “On the night of August 26th to 27th shots were fired toward the position of Warrant-Officer Vassilev from the near-by houses...."12

There is no information on the participation of Bulgarian soldiers in military actions against Czechoslovak citizens, and Bulgarian military units in Czechoslovakia suffered only one casuality. On the evening of 9 September 1968, in a Prague suburb, JuniorSergeant Nikolay Nikolov was kidnapped and shot with three bullets from a 7.65 mm gun.

During the "Prague Spring" and after the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, there were isolated acts of protest among Bulgarian intellectuals. Three History Department students at the University of Sofia were arrested and sentenced to varying prison terms; several of their professors were expelled from the Communist Party.13 The State Security services carefully observed any reactions among Czechoslovak youth vacationing in the Bulgarian Black Sea resorts at the time of the invasion.

The Bulgarian Embassy in Prague and General Consulate in Bratislava documented numerous protests of different strata of Czechoslovak society against the armed intervention. In the various reports from Czechoslovakia, opinions were quoted regarding the "great mistake" made by the Warsaw Pact countries, who with their action, had "hurt the feelings of national dignity of Czechs and Slovaks." Prior to the invasion, Gen. Koday, Commandant of the East Czechoslovak Military District, had supported a hard-line position, often stating that more decisive actions were required against the “anti-socialist forces." Yet, early in November 1968, Gen. Koday admitted to Stefan Velikov, Bulgarian General Consul in Bratislava: "The shock was too great." He told about the offense he suffered on the night of August 21st: "He was nearly arrested, his headquarters were surrounded and machinegunners rushed into his office." The Czechoslovak military leader underlined several times during the confidential talks there had been no need to send Warsaw Pact regiments. The Commander of the Bratislava Garrison backed this opinion, saying that "our countries have lost a lot with the invasion."'14

The Bulgarian authorities, however, were explicit and unanimous in their statements concerning the necessity of