This failure was not due to anything inherent in the attitude of the people of Korea themselves, but was a reflection of those wider and more fundamental differences of outlook and policy which have become so marked a feature of the international scene.

This artificial division was consolidated by the exclusion from North Korea of the United Nations Temporary Commission, which had been charged by the General Assembly to observe the holding of elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. In the circumstances, it was decided to hold such elections in South Korea alone.

Had internationally-supervised elections been allowed to take place in the whole of Korea, and had a unified and independent Korea thereby come into existence, the present conflict could never have arisen.

C. Prospects of unification

The Korean people, one in race, language and culture, fervently desire to live in a unified and independent Korea. Unification can be the only aim regarding Korea. It did, however, appear to the Commission, before the aggression took place, that unification through negotiation was unlikely to be achieved if such negotiation involved the holding of internationally-supervised elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. Experience suggested that the North Korean authorities would never agree to such elections.

It was hoped that, at some stage, it might be possible to break down the economic and social barriers between the two political entities as a step toward unification. That too proved illusory, as the North Korean authorities persisted in their policy of aiming at the overthrow of the Republic of Korea.

After the consolidation of the division of Korea, propaganda and hostile activities on the part of the North Korean authorities accentuated tension which, in turn, stiffened the attitude of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea, and even further prejudiced such possibility of unification by negotiation as might have remained. Notwithstanding the continued efforts of the Commission, it appeared on the eve of the aggression that the Korean peninsula would remain divided indefinitely, or at least until international tension had slackened.

D. Development of representative government in the Republic of Korea

The necessity to safeguard the stability and security of the Republic of Korea from the threat from the North gradually became a controlling factor in all the major activities of the administration of the Republic, and absorbed energies and resources which were needed to

develop the new form of representative government and to carry out the economic and social reconstruction programme.

The first two years of the new National Assembly reflected clearly the difficulties which it would be normal to expect in a body dealing with a new and unfamiliar political structure. It had become clear, long before the act of aggression occurred, that the Legislature was making good progress in its efforts to exert parliamentary control over all departments of government, and would not rest content until its relations with the Executive had been satisfactorily adjusted. The growing civic responsibility shown by the Legislature augured well for the future of representative government in Korea.

At the election of 30 May 1950, the people showed very considerable enthusiasm, and the electoral machinery functioned well. Among the cases of interference with candidates which occurred, some were explainable in the light of the stringent precautions which the Government found it necessary to take in order to safeguard the stability and security of the State against the threat from the North. Although there appeared to be little justification for interference in some other cases, the results of the elections, in which many candidates critical of the Administration were returned, showed that the voters were in fact able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice among candidates, and had cast their votes accordingly. The results also showed popular support of the Republic, and a determination to improve the Administration by constitutional means.

The division of Korea added to the economic difficulties that had arisen at the end of the Japanese domination, and made it most difficult for the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting. Funds which might have been expended for the execution of the social and economic programme of the Republic were consumed by heavy defence expenditures. Nevertheless, when the aggression occurred, substantial progress was being made with that programme.

E. Korean needs and aspirations

Serious problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, particularly the grave refugee problem, already confront the country. To these problems will be added problems of yet greater magnitude when the military conflict comes to an end. It will be quite beyond the capacity of the country to provide from its own resources means for rehabilitation. A healthy and viable democracy in Korea cannot come into being unless very considerable aid and assistance are provided from outside Korea.

Finally, as the division of the country and the resulting antagonisms were artificial, the Commission believes that, when the conditions

under which they arose disappear, it will be possible for the Korean people of both North and South to come again together, to live in peace and to build the strong foundations of a free, democratic Korea.

DONE in a single copy in the English language at House No. 328 at Camp Hialeah, Pusan, Korea, this fourth day of September in the year nineteen hundred and fifty.

(Signed)

Anup SINGH (Chairman) (India)

A. B. JAMIESON (Rapporteur) (Australia)

LIU Yu-Wan (China)

Angel Gochez MARIAN (El Salvador)
Henri BRIONVAL (France)

Bernabe AFRICA (The Philippines)
Kamil IDIL (Turkey)

Bertil A. RENBORG (Principal Secretary)

Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly Recommending Measures for Korean Unification and Establishing the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, October 7, 19501

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112 (II)), of 12 December 1948 (195 (III)) and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)), Having received and considered the report 2 of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully acomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Com

1 For text, see General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 9-10.

'Dated Sept. 4, 1950 (ante).

Communiqué by Commander-in-Chief General Douglas MacArthur, United Nations Command, Regarding Communist Chinese Intervention in Korea, November 6, 19501

The military position of the United Nations forces in the western sector of North Korea is now sufficiently stabilized and information on enemy unit identifications adequately evaluated to permit me to put the situation growing out of the last few days' operations in proper perspective.

The Korean war was brought to a practical end with the closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and seizure of the east coastal area, resulting in raising the number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over 135,000, which, with other losses amounting to over 200,000, brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair estimate of North Korean total military strength.

The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies was thereby decisive. In the face of this victory of United Nations arms, the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border.

A possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid, calculated to encompass the destruction of the United Nations forces engaged in restoring order and the processes of civil government in the North Korean border area.

This potential danger was avoided with minimum losses only by the timely detection and skillful maneuvering of the United Nations commander responsible for that sector who, with great perspicacity and skill, completely revised the movement of his forces in order to achieve the greater integration of tactical power necessitated by the new situation, and avert any possibility of a great military reverse. The present situation, therefore, is this:

While the North Korean forces with which we were initially engaged have been destroyed or rendered impotent for military action, a new and fresh army now faces us, backed up by a possibility of large alien reserves, and adequate supply within easy reach to the enemy but beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action.

1Text from Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1950, p. 763.

Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the gravest international significance.

Our present mission is limited to the destruction of those forces now arrayed against us in North Korea, with a view to achieving the United Nations' objective to bring unity and peace to the Korean nation and people.

Draft Resolution Regarding Retention of the KoreanChinese Frontier Submitted to the U.N. Security Council, November 10, 19501

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution of 25 June 1950, determining that the North Korean forces had committed a breach of the peace and calling upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which sets forth the policies of the United Nations in respect to Korea,

Having noted from the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea dated 5 November 1950 2 that Chinese communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,

Affirming that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of stability throughout Korea and the establishment of a unified independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea, as set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly dated 7 October 1950,

Insistent that no action be taken which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security,

1 Text from General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/1873), "Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly" p. 24. This draft resolution, submitted jointly by Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, received a vote of 9-1 in favor at the Security Council meeting of Nov. 30, 1950, but it failed of adoption because of the negative yote cast by the Soviet Union.

2 Not printed here.