and ambitions of Peiping, confusing the world as to what the issues really are and complicating a situation which is in fact a very simple

one.

If particular members wish to address further appeals to Peiping, they are at entire liberty to do so. My Government would raise no objections. If these members receive any replies which reflect the possibility of a reasonable settlement or the adoption by Peiping of an acceptable course of conduct, of course, my Government will be ready to consider them. But I would point out to my colleagues that this is not merely a problem of finding a formula acceptable to Peiping. The result must also be acceptable to the United Nations and in conformity with the Charter. The United Nations has called on its members for great sacrifices on behalf of collective security. It has gone to great lengths to leave the way open for a peaceful settlement of a situation brought about by flagrant aggression. In the conduct of military operations, its forces have used the greatest restraint under extreme provocation in order to localize the conflict in Korea. But the United Nations must not be taken for granted.

I ask my colleagues to give some thought to the issue of collective security. Collective security is not merely a phrase. The views of the people of the United States on this matter were developed through a generation of vigorous debate and are linked with the sacrifices of the peoples of the world in World War II which had to be made because the world had not been able to establish a system of collective security to meet Nazi aggression. We do recognize that there are honest differences on the question before us on the points of view of the Governments represented around this table. Some are remote from the scene of conflict and hope somehow to avoid involvement. Some are concerned lest the strength of the United Nations be so commited in Korea as not to be available for their own defense. Others take differing views about the nature of developments in the Far East and what these mean to the rest of the world. But on one point we are all agreed. If any one of us is attacked, each of us would in that situation desperately ask the United Nations to provide the unified support of every other Government in the world to meet the attack. How can we bring that about for our own countries? Only by a determination to take united action to support each other faithfully and vigorously when an act of aggression occurs.

Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly Naming the Communist Chinese as Aggressors in Korea, February 1, 1951 1

1

(Resolution adopted on the report of the First Committee) The General Assembly,

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea,

2

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there,

1. Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

2. Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3. Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

6. Requests a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

1

1 Text from General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775, Add.1), p. 1.

2 For text of the first of these proposals, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/643, in General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 76, pp. 6-10. The second proposal, dated Jan. 11, 1951, is printed ante.

7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly Calling for the Application of a Strategic Embargo Against Communist China and North Korea, May 18, 1951 1

The General Assembly,

1

Noting the report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,2

Recalling its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951,

Nothing [Noting] that:

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,

(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of states have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,

(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contributions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,3

1. Recommends that every State:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war;

1Text from General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 A (A/1775/Add. 1), p. 2.

2U.N. doc. A/1799 (not printed here).

3 See General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, First Committee, 443d Meeting.

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo; (c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution;

(b) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within thirty days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution;

2. Requests the Additional Measures Committee:

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;

(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

3. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

Statement by Jacob A. Malik, Soviet Representative to the United Nations, Regarding the Possibility of an Armistice in Korea, June 23, 19511

[Extract]

The Soviet peoples. . . believe that the most acute problem of the present day-the problem of the armed conflict in Korea could be settled.

This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the part of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

1 Text from the New York Times, June 24, 1958, p. 4.

Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.

I think that, surely, is not too great a price to pay in order to achieve peace in Korea.

Statement by the Department of State on the Views Expressed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Respecting a Korean Armistice, June 28, 1951

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The United States has sought in New York and in Moscow a clarification on certain aspects of the statement made by Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, on June 23.

Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States Ambassador in Moscow on June 27. In discussing Mr. Malik's statement, Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic Command, on the one hand, and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units," on the other, to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters; the military representatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption of hostilities.

Beyond the conclusion of an armistice, the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent special arrangements would have to be made for a political and territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement.

The implications of Mr. Gromyko's observations are being studied. The Department of State is consulting with the representatives of other countries having armed forces in Korea under the Unified Command.

1

1 Text from Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 45.