finally adopted. The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops was rejected as beyond the scope of military negotiations. Delay was also occasioned by Communist violations of the neutrality of the conference area and failure to provide equal treatment to both delegations as originally promised. Fabricated charges by the Communists that the United Nations Command had violated the neutrality of the conference area led to suspension of the talks for two months from August to October 1951. (2) Arrangements for implementing the armistice The armistice, of course, had to contain provisions for putting an end to the fighting. The United Nations Command delegation also sought arrangements which would make renewal of the hostilities less likely. The negotiations on these matters were extended and painstaking. The United Nations Command delegation wanted the broadest possible access to all parts of Korea for a supervisory body to ensure against violations of the armistice. It was quite willing to have such inspection behind its own lines. The Communists, however, for some time resisted all proposals for inspection and finally agreed to it only on a limited scale. At one point, the United Nations Command proposed inspection of the implementation of the armistice by joint teams to operate throughout Korea. Following Communist rejection of this proposal, agreement was reached on arrangements for inspection by observers drawn from countries not participating in the Korean action and acceptable to both sides. But the Communists further delayed the negotiations by nominating the Soviet Union as a “neutral”; this was of course unacceptable to the United Nations Command. The United Nations Command proposed a ban, applicable to both sides, on the construction of new military airfields and a ceiling on the number of civilian airfields that could be rehabilitated. Such a prohibition would have made resumption of the aggression more difficult and less likely. The Communists adamantly refused to agree to such a limitation. (3) Prisoners of war The issue that, in appearance at least, contributed most to the delay in achieving an armistice involved the repatriation of prisoners of war. From the outset the United Nations Command made it clear that, while it was prepared to repatriate all the prisoners of war in its custody, it would not agree to use force against prisoners resisting return to the Communists. The Communists stubbornly insisted, however, that all prisoners of war must be returned, by force if necessary. 1 In an extraordinary effort to break the long continuing deadlock on this issue the United Nations Command, on 28 April 1952, offered a "package proposal" 1 providing that (a) there shall not be forced repatriation of prisoners of war; (b) that the United Nations Command will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields; and (c) the United Nations Command agrees to accept Poland and Czechoslovakia as members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission if the Communists agree to accept Sweden and Switzerland (thus withdrawing their demand for the inclusion of the Soviet Union). The United Nations Command made it clear that this proposal must be accepted as a unit. The Communists, however, purported to accept the second and third points only, remaining adamant on prisoners of war. As a result of their rejection, the armistice was delayed and the fighting continued for fifteen additional months. They persisted in this inhumane attitude for many months, contrary to international law and in the face of preponderant world opinion, even after the principle of non-forcible repatriation was approved by fifty-four Members of the United Nations who supported the General Assembly resolution of 3 December 1952. Communist intransigence, and Communist failure to bargain in good faith on this issue, compelled the United Nations Command to recess the plenary negotiations on 8 October 1952. They were not resumed until 26 April 1953, when the Communists finally indicated that they were prepared to consider a solution for the prisoner of war question consistent with humanitarian principles and the principles of the General Assembly resolution. C. The agreements finally reached All the agreements between the United Nations Command Delegation and the Communist Delegation are set forth in the attached Armistice Agreement and the Prisoner of War Agreement with the Supplementary Agreement of 27 July attached to it.2 In some cases, as the record of the negotiations indicates, the United Nations Command recorded its understanding as to the meaning of phrases in the Armistice Agreement that might otherwise be ambiguous. 1 1 Not printed here. For the text of General Ridgeway's statement in connection with this executive (closed) session, see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, pp. 786-787. 2 Not printed here. (1) The Military Demarcation Line The Communists delayed negotiations for some time by insisting that the demarcation line between both sides should be the 38th parallel. Finally, however, they recognized the merit of the United Nations Command position that the line should be determined strictly on military grounds and should correspond to the actual line of contact between the opposing forces. The objective of the United Nations Command in insisting on such a line was to provide maximum defensive safeguards against a possible renewal of the aggression. The line of demarcation was first marked out on 27 November 1951, on the basis of the line of contact as of that time. It was then agreed that this should be the final demarcation line, provided an armistice was achieved within thirty days; otherwise the line should be redrawn on the basis of the line of contact at the time of the armistice. In fact, tentative agreement was reached on a new line in June 1953, when it seemed that an armistice could be signed within a very few days, but the Communists insisted that it be redrawn again to take account of the results of the offensive they launched on 13-14 July 1953. The Demarcation Line was finally agreed on the basis indicated in the map attached to the Armistice Agreement. The Demilitarized Zone was established in accordance with the agreement, each side withdrawing its forces two kilometres north and south of the Demarcation Line respectively. (2) Arrangements for implementing the armistice With the exception of the continuing disagreement on the rehabilitation of airfields, the arrangements for implementing the armistice were virtually completed by March 1952. The United Nations Command finally gave up its insistence on the limitation of airfields when it signed the armistice. The agreements on this subject may be summarized as follows: 1. There will be a cease-fire within twelve hours of the signing of an armistice. 2. Both sides will withdraw their forces from the Demilitarized Zone within seventy-two hours after the signing of an armistice. 3. All military forces will be withdrawn from rear areas and the coastal islands and waters of Korea within five days after the signing of an armistice. 4. Both sides shall cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel. However, the rotation of 35,000 military personnel a month shall be permitted. Rotated personnel shall enter Korea only through designated ports of entry, under the super vision and inspection of the teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 5. Both sides shall cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition. However, the replacement of destroyed, damaged, worn-out or used up equipment on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type is permitted. Such replacement shall take place only through designated ports of entry, under the supervision and inspection of teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 6. A Military Armistice Commission, with headquarters at Panmunjom composed of military officers of the United Nations Command and the Communist forces and aided by Joint Observer Teams will: (a) Supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement; (c) Report all violations of the Armistice Agreement to the Com- 7. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, with headquarters in proximity to those of the Military Armistice Commission, composed of four senior officers, two of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the United Nations Command and two of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers will supervise, observe, inspect, and investigate adherence to the terms of the armistice agreement relative to the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel and equipment. At the request of the Military Armistice Commission or senior member of either side, it can conduct special observation and inspection at places outside the demilitarized zone where violations have been reported. Twenty inspection teams, ten of which will be located at the designated ports of entry, five in North Korea and five in South Korea, with ten mobile teams in reserve, will assist the Commission. (3) The political conference following an armistice In order to counter the constant efforts of the Communists to inject political questions into the Korean armistice negotiations, and to prevent such extraneous issues from delaying armistice negotiations, the United Nations Command agreed to dispose of political questions by recommending their consideration at a political conference following an armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation accepted a revised Communist proposal now contained in article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, which provides: In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. (4) Prisoners of war The background of this question, and the position of the United Nations Command was outlined in the Special Unified Command report of 18 October 1952 (A/2228). As indicated at that time, the only issue preventing agreement was Communist insistence that all prisoners of war must be repatriated, even if the use of force should be necessary to effect their return, and United Nations Command refusal to use force against such unwilling prisoners. When the Communists insisted that there were in fact no prisoners who refused to be repatriated, but that the United Nations Command was detaining them against their will, the United Nations Command made numerous proposals for impartial determination of the true attitudes of the prisoners of war. The Communists refused to submit this question to the test and thus further delayed achievement of an armistice. On 8 October 1952, the United Nations Command Delegation recessed the negotiations. In doing so, it made clear that the numerous proposals which it had made for an honourable solution of the prisoner question remained open. Whenever the Communists were prepared to negotiate in good faith, to accept any one of the United Nations Command proposals, or to make a constructive proposal of their own on the prisoner issue, the United Nations Command Delegation would be prepared to meet again. At this juncture the Korean question came before the General Assembly, and the United States Government, as the Unified Command, reported on the state of the negotiations. It urged the Assembly to approve the principle of nonforcible repatriation and to call upon the Communists to accept an armistice on this basis. A definite plan for the solution of the prisoner-of-war question was proposed by India and discussed in the hope of gaining Communist approval, and on 3 December 1952, by a majority of 54 votes in favour, with only the Soviet bloc in opposition, the General Assembly |