adopted resolution 610 (VII). This resolution specified that force should not be used against prisoners to prevent or effect their return, and it set forth a detailed series of proposals which the Assembly believed would form a just and reasonable basis for an agreement on the prisoner issue. The Communists rejected this plan, and hopes for an armistice in the foreseeable future appeared dim.

Nevertheless, the Unified Command continued to examine every possibility for solving the prisoner question. Seizing the opportunity offered by a resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on 13 December 1952, which appealed to the parties, as a gesture of good will, to implement the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded prisoners of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, on 22 February 1953, addressed a letter 1 to the Communist commanders stating that the United Nations Command still remained ready to implement, immediately, the repatriation of the sick and wounded, and asking if the Communists were prepared to proceed with the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners in their custody. The United Nations Command had made this same proposal to the Communists on a number of previous occasions during the armistice negotiations, but they had failed to respond. It was hoped that the Communists would at least agree to such an exchange, that it would bring about the return of at least some of the United Nations Command prisoners of war, and that this first step might pave the way for the solution of the prisoner issue as a whole. The hopes of the United Nations Command in this regard proved not unwarranted. On 28 March the Communists agreed to the principle of the exchange of sick and wounded, which they stated "should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war", and arrangements for the exchange were initiated through the respective liaison officers on 6 April.

The Communist acceptance was followed on 30 March by a statement by Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Communist People's Government of the People's Republic of China, subsequently endorsed by the Prime Minister of the North Korean regime, indicating a desire to resume negotiations on the entire prisoner question and a readiness to take a more constructive and humane attitude on the question of forcible repatriation.

Sick and wounded prisoners of war were in fact exchanged between 20 April and 3 May 1953 pursuant to an agreement reached on 11 April 1953.2

1 See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, vol. II, pp. 2654-2655. 'Ibid., pp. 2655-2658.

Negotiations by the plenary armistice delegations on the prisoner-ofwar question as a whole resumed on 26 April. At the outset, the Communists submitted a proposal for sending all prisoners not directly repatriated to an agreed neutral State where for six months after their arrival representatives of the States to which they belonged would "explain" to them matters related to their return; if after this period any non-repatriates remained, their disposition would be referred to the political conference. Discussion subsequently centered upon the questions of what neutral State should be nominated, of whether non-repatriates should be removed from Korea, and how long the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody.

On 7 May, the Communists put forward a new proposal providing for establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to be composed of the four States already nominated for membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, namely, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, and India as agreed upon by both sides. This Commission was to take custody of the prisoners in Korea. The United Nations Command on 13 May presented a counter-proposal shortening the period of time in which the non-repatriates would remain in neutral custody, providing for release of Korean non-repatriates immediately after the armistice, and proposing that only Indian forces take actual custody of the non-repatriates. The Communists rejected this proposal.

On 25 May, the United Nations Command, in another effort to obtain Communist agreement on an equitable solution of the prisoner issue, submitted a new proposal providing for the transfer of both Korean and Chinese non-repatriates to neutral custody and for consideration of the disposition of any remaining non-repatriates by the political conference for a limited period, after which they might either be released to civilian status or the question of their disposition referred to the General Assembly. On 4 June, the Communists offered a counter-proposal in effect based upon the mechanics of General Assembly resolution 610 (VII), also closely parallelling the United Nations Command 25 May proposal, but vague on the basic principle of nonforcible repatriation. The United Nations Command succeeded in reaching agreement with the Communists on elaboration of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission's terms of reference to insure that there could be no abuse and that the principle approved by the General Assembly that force should not be used to compel or to prevent repatriation of any prisoner of war would be fully observed.

On 8 June, the Senior Delegates for the United Nations Command and for the Communists signed the Prisoner-of-War Agreement which is attached to and incorporated by reference in the Armistice Agree

ment. The delegations then proceeded to the final arrangements looking toward an early signature of the armistice.

As a result of discussions with the Republic of Korea, described in the succeeding section, a Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of War was signed on 27 July 1953, which permits the United Nations Command, (and the Communists if applicable), to transport the nonrepatriates to the Demilitarized Zone where the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission will take custody of them.

D. The Attitude of the Republic of Korea

On 18 June an incident occurred which further delayed the achievement of an armistice at a time when the conclusion of hostilities seemed imminent. On that date, officials of the Republic of Korea brought about a break-out from prisoner-of-war camps of some 27,000 Korean prisoners of war who had previously indicated they would resist repatriation to North Korea. This action by the Republic of Korea was inconsistent with the 8 June Agreement on Prisoners of War which the United Nations Command had entered into on behalf of all the forces under its command. The United Nations Command at once protested the action of the Republic of Korea Government. It immediately informed the Communists of the event and told them that, while efforts would be made to recover as many of the escapees as possible, there was not much hope that many of these could be recaptured since they had melted into the South Korean population.

This incident led to immediate discussions with the Republic of Korea by representatives of the Unified Command. After prolonged conversations, the Republic of Korea gave assurances that it would not obstruct the implementation of the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

The incident, however, gave the Communists an excuse for delaying still further the conclusion of the armistice. They demanded assurances that the United Nations Command would live up to the Armistice Agreement, that the Republic of Korea and its forces would also abide by it, and that the released prisoners would be recaptured. The United Nations Command reply to the Communists stressed that the armistice was a military agreement between military commanders and that it was being entered into by the United Nations Command, as Commander of all the forces under its command, including those of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command Delegation also told the Communists that so far as recovering the released prisoners of war, as they had already been informed, this would be impossible; they were assured, however, that the remaining nonrepatriate prisoners would be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, as provided by the agreement on prisoners

of war. The Communists were assured that the United Nations Command forces (including those of the Republic of Korea) would observe the armistice. The United Nations Command informed the Communists, however, that it would not undertake to use force against the Republic of Korea forces to ensure compliance with the armistice by the Republic of Korea.

Despite these comprehensive assurances by the United Nations Command, the Communists continued to delay negotiations and in the meanwhile launched the biggest offensive in more than two years, an offensive which obviously took much planning and preparation and caused heavy casualties. Finally, however, on 19 July, the Communists stated their readiness to proceed with the final work on the Armistice Agreement leading to its signature.

The armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953, at 10 a.m. Korean time.

IV. CONCLUSION

The fighting and bloodshed in Korea have been halted. After having caused millions of casualties, untold civilian suffering and death, economic devastation and destruction of property, the Communist aggressors have been driven back to and beyond the point from which they started their initial attack. The heavy price of their aggression is evident.

As a result of prompt and sustained collective action of the United Nations against aggression, an armistice has been effected on a basis that promises to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Korea against further aggression and that constitutes a major step toward the establishment of peace and security for that war-torn country. These achievements have been made possible by the heroic sacrifices of the troops of the United Nations and of the Republic of Korea.

The United States stands ready to participate and co-operate fully in political discussions leading to an enduring solution of the Korean problem on the basis of the objectives of the United Nations-the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. If the Communists abide by the armistice and negotiate in good faith, a true and lasting peace may yet come to the brave and long suffering people of Korea.

566379-60- -11

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Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly Paying Tribute to U.N. Forces in Korea, August 28, 19531

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 25 June, 27 June and 7 July 1950 and the resolutions of the General Assembly of 7 October 1950, 1 December 1950, 1 February 1951, 18 May 1951 and 3 December 1952.

Having received the report of the Unified Command dated 7 August 1953,

Noting with profound satisfaction that fighting has now ceased in Korea on the basis of an honourable armistice,

1. Salutes the heroic soldiers of the Republic of Korea and of all those countries which sent armed forces to its assistance;

2. Pays tribute to all those who died in resisting aggression and thus in upholding the cause of freedom and peace;

3. Expresses its satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful, and expresses its firm conviction that this proof of the effectiveness of collective security under the United Nations Charter will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on the Convening of a Political Conference on Korea Pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, August 28, 1953 1

A

1

IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 60 OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The General Assembly:

1. Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

1

1 Text from General Assembly Official Records: Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20B (A/2361/Add. 2), p. 2.