free atmosphere by the elimination of pressure by foreign interference, by local authorities and by terror groups. The Commission should further take the necessary measures for guaranteeing freedom of assembly and of the press for the Korean people, and freedom for all citizens in the country to propose candidates for the legislative organ irrespective of their political views, sex, religion or race;

(d) In order to assist the economic reconstruction of Korea, which is the first important step for the creation of the conditions neces sary for realizing the national unification of Korea and with a view to promoting the material well-being of the Korean people and to maintaining and developing the culture of the people, the AllKorean Commission should immediately take measures to establish and develop economic and cultural relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, in such matters as commerce, finance, transport, frontier relations, free movement across the frontier, freedom of correspondence, scientific and cultural exchanges and all other relations.

2. The necessity should be recognized of the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korean territory within six months.

3. The necessity should be recognized for all those countries most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to guarantee the peaceful development of Korea, thus creating the conditions likely to contribute to a swift conclusion of the task of unifying Korea by peaceful means as a united, independent, democratic State.

Geneva Conference: Statement by the United States Representative (John Foster Dulles), April 28, 19541

We are here to establish a united and independent Korea. It may be given us to write a new page in what has been a tragic history. The people of Korea for centuries lived together as one nation, and together they have long endured foreign subjugation and aggression. They have sought to be united in freedom and independence. This is a right which no nation or group of nations can legitimately deny them.

The United States has come here with the Republic of Korea and with the other governments whose armed forces came to Korea's assistance in a renewed and determined effort to aid the Korean people to realize their reasonable and rightful aspirations.

Why does Korea remain divided? The 1943 Declaration of Cairo

1Text from Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1954, pp. 704–707.

promised that victory over Japan would be used to make Korea “free and independent." But that has not happened.

The present phase of Korea's martyrdom goes back to August 1945. Then the United States, which had for 4 years borne the burden of the Japanese war, agreed that the Soviet Union might move into Manchuria and Korea north of the 38th parallel to accept there the surrender of the Japanese. But the Soviets, having gotten into North Korea for one purpose, stayed on for another purpose. Their goal has been, directly or through puppets, to turn North Korea into a satellite state and, if possible, to extend their rule throughout all Korea. In so doing, they have consistently defied agreements with their former allies and also the collective will represented by the United Nations.

It is important that we should constantly bear in mind that what is here at stake is not merely Korea, important as that is; it is the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations assumed primary responsibility for establishing Korea as a free and independent nation. It helped to create the Republic of Korea and nurtured it. When aggressors threatened the Republic of Korea with extinction, it was the United Nations which called on its members to go to Korea's defense.

Korea provides the first example in history of a collective security organization in actual operation. If this Conference is disloyal to the United Nations and its decisions, then each of us will bear a share of responsibility for destroying what protects us all.

Yesterday the delegates of the Republic of Korea and of Colombia told eloquently of the mission which the United Nations had assumed in relation to Korea. It is a story that bears repetition.

The United Nations first took jurisdiction of the Korean problem in 1947. It then created a Temporary Commission for Korea to help organize a Government of Korea and to observe the initial elections. The Soviet Union refused to permit the United Nations Commission to have access to North Korea. Elsewhere the Commission functioned as the United Nations had intended.

In December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly received the report of its Temporary Commission and adopted, by a vote of 48 to 6, with 1 abstention, a resolution declaring:

That there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.1

The United States, trusting to the moral authority of the United Nations and the charter undertakings of its members, withdrew its own armed forces from South Korea. That left South Korea with only local forces suitable for maintenance of internal order. In contrast, the Soviet Union rapidly built up the war power of the Communist regime it had installed in North Korea. On June 25, 1950, these forces launched a full-scale attack, implemented with many Russian-made tanks and planes.

The United Nations Temporary Commission, which was present on the spot and the membership of which included India, instantly and unanimously found that this was armed aggression and so reported to the United Nations Security Council. That Council in turn, by a vote of 9 to 0, with 1 absence and 1 abstention, certified to the fact of aggression and called on the members of the United Nations to help to resist the aggression. Sixteen nations responded with military contributions, and over 40 responded with either military or material aid.

Aggressors Routed

The small and lightly armed forces of the Republic of Korea were initially overpowered by the assault. The Communist aggressors quickly occupied all of Korea except a small beachhead at Pusan. But the forces of the Republic of Korea quickly rallied; the United Nations members gave increasing support. A brilliant military operation, involving a bold landing at Inchon, caught the aggressors off balance and enabled the United Nations Command to break out of the Pusan beachhead. The aggressors were routed and destroyed as an effective force.

It seemed that the United Nations could now complete its earlier action to unify Korea. Accordingly, on October 7, 1950, the General Assembly set up a new body, known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), to complete the task of the previous commissions. The new Commission proceeded to Korea.

But the long-sought unification and freedom of Korea was not yet to be. Another Communist aggression intervened. In November 1950 the Communist Chinese regime sent masses of its armed forces into northern Korea. The United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 44 to 7, with 9 abstentions, adjudged this intervention to be aggression.

The United Nations Command was forced to withdraw again to the south of Korea. But again they fought their way back to a point

where the aggressors held less territory than when they had committed the initial aggression from the 38th parallel.

On July 27, 1953, an armistice was concluded with the United Nations Command. This was no free-will gift of peace by the Communists. It came only after fanatical efforts to break the line of the United Nations Command had failed with ghastly losses to the attackers. And it came only after the Communists realized that, unless there was a quick armistice, the battle area would be enlarged so as to endanger the sources of aggression in Manchuria. Then and only then did the Communist rulers judge that it would be expedient to sign the armistice.

1

The armistice contemplated that there should be a Political Conference with reference to Korea within 3 months. But the Communists found it inexpedient to live up to that agreed recommendation. They desired first to consolidate their position in North Korea. Only now does the Korean Political Conference meet, after long haggling over the composition and place of meeting.. The composition and the place of the Conference are precisely those which the United Nations side proposed 6 months ago.

This fact enables one to judge where lies the responsibility for the delay.

The 7-year story I have summarized is a story of persistent attack against the forces of international law and order represented by the United Nations. Whether this attack will still prevail may be determined by this Conference.

During the same 7-year period of 1947 to date, the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States have been working with the Soviet Union to bring about a unification of Germany and liberation of Austria. There have been hundreds of meetings of the Foreign Ministers or their aides on these subjects. Nothing has been accomplished. But something has been learned. This Conference can usefully have that in mind as we judge the proposals which come before us here.

Communist Fear of Freedom

Soviet Communist conduct seems to have been largely influenced by fear of freedom.

The Communist ruling class believes that a society is most peaceful and most productive if its members conform to a pattern which is prescribed by rulers possessed of absolute power. This inherently involves a suppression of freedom, for freedom implies diversity, not conformity.

But it is not enough that freedom be suppressed within what is now the Soviet orbit. Freedom is contagious. Accordingly, freedom outside that orbit cannot be acquiesced in. The area of suppression must be constantly expanded in order to preserve the existing area of suppression.

Thus, the Soviet Communist rulers seem to have been driven by their own doctrine, by their own fears, to seek constantly in one way or another to extend their control until there is finally achieved the goal which Lenin referred to as "the amalgamation of all nations" and which Stalin referred to as "the amalgamation of the masses into a single state union."

It may be said that Lenin and Stalin are dead. So they are. But their doctrine is not dead. It continues to be taught to Communists throughout the world, and they continue to practice it throughout the world.

As the record stands to this date, the Communist rulers have at no time, at no place, voluntarily relaxed their grasp on what they had. This is so even though, as in the case of Eastern Germany, Austria, and North Korea, they had promised that the grasp was only temporary. Also, in every non-Communist nation of the world the agents of international communism work to achieve the amalgamation of the nation and its people into the system of Communist dictatorship.

The problem which we face here at Geneva is the same problem that has been faced elsewhere. It is the problem of achieving "peace" and "democracy" in the historic meaning of those words. These are alluring words, rich in their traditional meaning. Communist propaganda has adopted them as lures to trap the unwary. It must be remembered that when the Communists speak of "peace" they mean a society of conformity under a single directing will. When they speak of "democracy," they mean a "dictatorship" of the proletariat.

The sum of the matter is this:

When we negotiate with the Soviet Communists and their satellites, we are confronted with something far more formidable than individual or national lust for glory. We are confronted with a vast monolithic system which, despite its power, believes that it cannot survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human freedom.

I do not present this analysis in a mood of pessimism, but rather in a mood of realism. Communist doctrine authorizes accommodation when the opposition is strong. It is our task here to show such strength of honorable and nonaggressive purpose that the Communists will find it acceptable to grant unity and freedom to Korea. Yesterday three proposals were made for the solution of the problem

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