of Korea. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Colombia advocated a solution giving vitality to the resolutions of the United Nations with reference to the establishment of a united and free Korea.

The proposal of the North Korean Communist regime was, however, something different. It did not so much as mention the United Nations or its resolutions. These, it seems, are to be treated as nullities.

Similarity to Scheme for Germany

The Communist proposal is in essence the same as that made in June 1950 as a prelude to the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. Also, it is strikingly similar to the scheme which the Soviet Union presented at Berlin last February for the unification of Germany.1 Conformity, you see, is the Communist rule.

The present Communist proposal on Korea provides that the freely elected Government of the Republic of Korea, representing at least three-quarters of the Korean people, would be forced into combination, on a basis of equality, with the Communist regime ruling a small minority of the people in the North.

General elections are proposed by the Communists under a law the terms of which would be subject to veto by the Communist regime. The proposal stipulates that the election conditions should exclude all "foreign interference." Presumably this is intended to exclude United Nations supervision.

The scheme is designed to destroy the authority of the existing Government and to replace it by a Communist puppet regime.

The North Korean Communist proposal likewise requires that all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korean territory within 6 months. The United Nations forces would have a long way to go. The Chinese Communist forces would have only a few miles to go. They could quickly return.

The United States does not desire its troops to remain indefinitely in Korea. But we remember that once before we had our troops in Korea and withdrew them, as it turned out, prematurely. We do not want that history to repeat itself.

This then is the North Korean proposal. The United States must reject that proposal because it does not meet the requirements of a free, unified, and independent Korea, for which so much blood has been expended and suffering endured.

1 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 15, 1954, p. 228.

Peace is always easy to achieve by surrender. Unity is also easy to achieve-by surrender. The hard task, the task that confronts us, is to combine peace and unity with freedom.

The people of the Republic of Korea know freedom, and they have fought and suffered as have few others to preserve their freedom.

I have myself seen the freedom of the Republic of Korea.

I have been to the University of Seoul and seen the young men and women of Korea eagerly acquiring knowledge in a free, liberal educational institution.

I have attended sessions of the Korean Assembly and seen the functioning of this body, whose members had been chosen by freely contested elections observed by a United Nations Commission.

I have met in a vast auditorium with thousands of Christian refugees who had recently fled from North Korea into the Republic of Korea to escape the religious persecution of the Communist North and to gain the freedom of religion which prevailed in the Republic of Korea.

The Republic of Korea, which fought so valiantly for freedom, will never accept unity at the price of thinly disguised annexation by the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. The United States sent over 1 million of their youth to fight in Korea to save Korea from violent annexation by aggressors. Of them, over 140,000 became casualties. Certainly we are not disposed, here at the council table, to give away what our sons battled so bravely to preserve.

It is basic that whatever program is adopted here for the unification of Korea must in fact also be a program which will assure the freedom in Korea.

Workable Program at Hand

A workable program for unifying Korea does not have to be invented by us. It is already at hand. It was laid down by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950. That is the resolution, to which I have already referred, which established a Commission to complete the unification of Korea by observing elections in that part of Korea where observed elections have not yet been held.

That United Nations Commission (UNCURK) is at this moment waiting in Korea ready to fulfill its clear and precise mandate from the United Nations.

Accomplishment of that mandate would complete the unification and freedom of Korea, which was interrupted first by Soviet obstruction in 1948, then by North Korean Communist aggression in June 1950, and then by the Chinese Communist aggression of November 1950. Now that aggression has been thwarted, the interrupted work of the Commission should proceed. That is our proposal.

It would require the Chinese Communist regime to withdraw their forces of aggression and occupation from North Korea so that the United Nations can complete its task in an atmosphere free of menace.

It is important to think of freedom not only in terms of freedom of individuals but also in terms of national freedom. Korea is a peninsula of such strategic value that it has for many years been the subject of big-power politics. Russia, Japan, and China have successively sought to use Korea to serve their own policies of aggrandizement. For a long time the Koreans have not been the masters of their own destiny. That should be ended.

The United States seeks no advantages in Korea. We are in the process of concluding a mutual security treaty with the Republic of Korea. But that treaty implies no aggressive purpose, and the United States does not seek thereby to gain a forward position which could menace anyone.

Japan is no longer an aggressive force and has loyally undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country.

The Republic of Korea has itself no ambitions which extend beyond its natural borders.

Are Soviet Russia and Communist China willing to renounce ambitions which would be served by control of Korea? If so, it will be possible to give Korea that national independence which the United Nations has been seeking for Korea and which the Koreans want for themselves.

Such a Korea should, of course, be a member of the United Nations and enjoy the added dignity and protection which membership may give. It may be recalled that the Republic of Korea applied for membership in the United Nations in 1949. It was prevented only by a Soviet Union veto in the Security Council. That is another of the wrongs which we should agree here to remedy.

There are those who feel that past experience and cold reason combine to show the futility of the task which we here undertake. I do not underestimate the difficulty of that task. But I still feel that we need not be discouraged and that it is not a waste of our time to seek resourcefully to achieve our allotted goal.

We properly recall the failures of the past, so that we may profit by experience. But we also can remember that the future is never a mere repetition of the past.

We need not let cold logic chill our hopes. We know that those who live by faith prevail in the end over those who live by calculation. It is right that Korea should be united and should be a free and independent nation able to realize a destiny which conforms to the peaceful aspirations of its people.

It is right that the United Nations should be sustained as an authority to which all peoples, for all time, may turn to save them from the scourge of war and to assure the dignity and worth and equal rights of nations large and small.

Our duty is to pursue these goals with dedication and with a purity of purpose which admits of no self-aggrandizement. Then we shall have done our part in serving principles of moral order, which impose themselves on men and nations.

Geneva Conference: Statement by the North Korean Representative (Nam II), May 3, 19541

[Extracts]

Having heard here the statements made in connection with the proposals submitted by our Delegation, we deem it necessary to reply to some statements that were made and questions that were put, as well as to give additional clarification on separate paragraphs of our proposals which are of importance in the preparation of decisions on a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

We deem it necessary to state here once again that we consider references to any UN decisions on the Korean problem adopted in our absence to be unacceptable and absolutely unfounded.

Considering that the stationing of foreign troops in Korea inevitably leads to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea, we in our proposal [of April 27] provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within six months. If other proposals concerning the time limit for their withdrawal are submitted, this question could, of course, be reconsidered.

The representatives of the USA and some other countries which participated in the armed intervention in, and the devastation of our country spoke against the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Korea. Such intentions cannot but hinder the peaceful unification of Korea and are evidence of the existence of schemes to use Korea as a springboard for imperialist aggression against the Chinese People's Republic. In this connection they have put forward here a false argument that withdrawal of the American troops might alleg

1 Text from The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954, pp. 61-63.

edly lead to the renewal of hostilities in Korea. The Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deems it especially necessary to refer to this matter later.

As another reason for their refusal to withdraw their troops from Korea the US representative put forward another unfounded-to say the least of it-argument that United States troops would have a long way to travel to return to Korea. We can reply to this in the following way: the Korean people are only anxious for a quick withdrawal of the occupying troops, but not for their return.

Today we are highly satisfied that our proposals have been supported by the Delegations of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

At the same time we canot [sic] but point out that the representative of the United States of America and certain other delegations have already hastened to reject our proposals. The US representative has actually declared that the USA will be ready to settle the Korean problem only on the conditions that they have dictated.

Mr. Dulles has objected to granting the Korean people their inherent right to settle their internal affairs for themselves. The US Delegate has proposed that elections should be held in North Korea only, from the territory of which units of Chinese people's volunteers must be withdrawn, while these elections are to be held under the supervision of the UN and the South Korean Government.

However, even the Australian representative speaking here had to admit the justice of our proposal to hold the elections to an all-Korean People's Assembly in North as well as in South Korea.

It is not difficult to understand that the intention of the American proposals is to extend to North Korea also the anti-popular regime established in South Korea by the Americans which is profitable to them.

What arguments have been put forward here against our proposal to hold the all-Korean elections without supervision and control by foreign commissions?

The American delegate, the South Korean representative and certain other delegates, pretending that free elections have already been held in South Korea, oppose the holding of all-Korean elections, saying that this would undermine the prestige of the United Nations and of the South Korean Government. It is quite evident that they not concerned with the interests of the Korean people but are anxious not to undermine the "prestige" of the interventionists and their henchmen.