The American, South Korean and certain other delegations have attempted here to relieve the USA and the South Korean regime of responsibility for the war in Korea and for the military intervention started by the US Government in June, 1950 before the UN took any decision on this question. Nevertheless these attempts cannot be justified.

The discussion in the United Nations on this question and the documents from the archives of the South Korean Government already published in the press and presented at the time to the United Nations have convincingly shown that the war was imposed upon the Korean people from outside and that the United States of America bear a special responsibility for this.

Here we deem it necessary to call your attention to the fact that the US armed interventionists carried on warfare against the Korean people with barbarian, inhuman methods.

Even after the cessation of hostilities which as it is known brought about the frustration of Syngman Rhee's aggressive designs on the North of the country, Syngman Rhee and his clique day after day call for a new march against the North declaring that they would again try to impose their regime on North Korea by force. But one cannot doubt that if the Syngman Rhee clique dare to again unleash war, the Korean people will deliver an even more decisive counterblow to the aggressors.

To-day the South Korean delegate made false statements which are not even worth while refuting. With various falsehoods he tried to conceal the dark sides of South Korea. The South Korean delegate tried to falsify the anti-popular nature of the South Korean regime with such deceptive actions but he cannot conceal it with such deceptions. We cannot but point out that such desperate statements can never be conducive to a settlement of the Korean question by peaceful means on a democratic basis.

The delegate of Australia has in his statement declared that he would like to receive clarification on certain questions connected with our proposal to organize an all-Korean mixed Commission. He is particularly interested in the number of the members of the proposed Commission who would be elected in South and North Korea respectively.

We believe that the question of the number of the members of the Mixed Commission cannot be a complicated one since we have in mind the organisation of a bilateral Commission whose decisions, it goes without saying, should be adopted by mutual agreement.

As to the organizational, procedural and other questions, they should in our opinion be solved by mutual agreement.

The delegate of Australia has expressed his apprehension that this Commission would meet with great difficulties in its work.

We certainly do not exclude the possibility of considerable difficulties in the future.

However we hold that these difficulties can be satisfactorily surmounted. If the settlement of the Korean question is left to the Koreans themselves and foreign interference in our internal affairs is eliminated one cannot doubt that the Korean people will find in themselves sufficient strength and determination to surmount all difficulties and establish a united, independent, democratic state.

Geneva Conference: Statement by the Canadian Representative (Lester B. Pearson), May 4, 19541

[Extract]

While, Mr. Chairman, the questions I have been raising are all important, our primary concern at this Conference is a peace settlement for Korea. On that subject the leader of the North Korean delegation has presented a number of proposals which have been endorsed by the delegations of the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. Those proposals have not, however, been adequately defined or explained. My delegation is not alone in its suspicion that they include words and phrases designed to camouflage a scheme which would bring to Korea the reverse of freedom and independence.

The first point concerns the method of selection and operation of the proposed All-Korean Commission. The question on this point which I had intended to ask was answered yesterday by the leader of the delegation from North Korea. He said that his proposed AllKorean Commission must be simple in its organization and function in all matters, procedural and otherwise, by agreement on "both sides". This resolves any ambiguity arising out of the scope of representation of North and South Korea, and over how decisions should be reached. It is now clear that even if North Korea had only ten representatives in a Commission of 100, they would have a veto over the activities and decisions of that Commission which is to be given such far-reaching responsibilities. We know from long and bitter experience what this means. It means that the All-Korean Commission

would operate as the Communist members wished, or not at all. This device of "agreement on both sides", irrespective of the number of members or the number of people represented, would make, if nothing else made, the All-Korean Commission completely unworkable, unfair and inacceptable; and that Commission seems to be a central and vital part of the North Korean proposals.

There are one or two other questions about these proposals that occur to one.

What is meant by "the largest democratic social organizations in South and North Korea"? Does the word "democratic" exclude anticommunist or non-communist organizations?

How would the representatives of these "democratic social organizations" be chosen for the All-Korean Commission, and would there be an equal number from North and South Korea?

Does the phrase "terror groups" mean anti-communist political parties?

Furthermore, if no United Nations or other impartial international supervision of Korean elections to ensure that they will be free is permissible, as Mr. Nam Il states, how can this freedom be guaranteed in districts where bitter animosities and fears and local tyrannies would make impartial Korean supervision quite impossible?

If the Government of the Republic of Korea is really guilty, as charged yesterday by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of tyrannical and savage repression of freedom in elections, how can he expect us to take seriously his proposal for elections which he says will be free because they will be conducted under arrangements which must be agreed to by the representatives of this government which he so viciously attacks? Does Mr. Nam II really wish us to believe that representatives of North Korea feel that they can work amicably and constructively on the All-Korean Commission with the representatives of what he contemptuously calls the "Syngman Rhee clique"?

It is clear, Mr. Chairman, that the most superficial examination of the North Korean proposals, with its veto provisions for the AllKorean Commission, with its rejection of free elections, guaranteed by impartial and effective outside international supervision, with the voters in North Korea, for instance, left to the tender mercies of the communist governmental machinery in expressing their views, it is clear that such an examination of these proposals shows that they provide no hope for bringing about a free, united and democratic Korea.

Such hope lies in the acceptance by this conference of the principles laid down by United Nations resolutions for the solution of this

problem; principles accepted by the vast majority of the nations of the world. These provide for a union of all the Korean people, under a government chosen by those people.

This united Korea will need some international guarantee against aggression. It will also require, and be entitled to, economic assistance from other countries to repair the cruel devastation and destruction of war.

Along these lines, a solution can be found for the problem with which we are faced."

Geneva Conference: Statement by the United Kingdom Representative (Anthony Eden), May 13, 19541

[Extract]

My criticism of the North Korean Delegate's proposals, which he put forward in his speech on April 27, is that they could never, in practice, lead to the result which we all desire, namely the establishment of a single, independent and democratic government of all Korea. The establishment of such a government, in his view, would have to await the formation of an all-Korean Commission.

The two parts of Korea are, it seems, to be equally represented on this Commission. This plan ignores the great numerical disparity between the two populations. But more serious still, it overlooks the wide and bitter differences which divide them. Does anyone who has listened to this debate in this room sincerely believe that there is likely to be agreement between the two sides? And if they differ, what happens? There is no provision for outside help of any kindnot even for a neutral chairman or for a tribunal to arbitrate between them and resolve their conflicts. One can foresee only too clearly the complete deadlock which must result. Meanwhile, under this plan, the foreign forces would have been withdrawn, including those of the United Nations, leaving behind them a country still divided, still without a single government and with no early hope of obtaining one. Where could this lead but to chaos or fresh hostilities?

As the delegate of the United States pointed out on April 28, the proposals of the North Korean representative are in fact a significant echo of those tabled for Germany by the representative of the Soviet Union on February 4 in Berlin.2 Nor is the similarity only to be

1 For complete text, see ibid., pp. 113-116.

*See Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954 (Department of State publication 5399, March 1954), pp. 90-100.

found in the wording, though in some places this is identical. There is also a deeper note of resemblance. Each proposal purports to be concerned with free elections. I say "purports" because it is clear that under these proposals the elections either would never happen at all or would not be free. As in the Soviet proposals for Germany, so in the North Korean proposals for Korea, the holding of elections is not the first step, though it is put first on the paper. These proposals impose conditions which would enable the elections to be held only after a long and complicated series of delays. They make no provision for international supervision; they contemplate a packed and nominated commission, not a genuinely elected and representative assembly. In other words, elections come first on paper, but last in practice. They would be free in name but rigged in fact.

Geneva Conference: Proposal by the Communist Chinese Representative (Chou En-lai), May 22, 19541

Add the following paragraph to Article 1 of the proposal by the Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: 2

(e) In order to assist the All-Korean Commission to hold the allKorean elections in accordance with the All-Korean Electoral Law and under free conditions precluding foreign intervention, a neutral nations supervisory commission should be established to supervise the all-Korean elections.

Geneva Conference: Statement by the North Korean Representative (Nam II), May 22, 19543

[Extracts]

Certain delegates have alleged here that by democratic social organizations we mean only Communist organizations. That is a distortion

1Text from The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954, p. 117.

2 Nam Il's proposal of Apr. 27, (ante).

'Text from The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26–June 15, 1954, pp. 121–122.