pines, Australia, and New Zealand. He also said that U.S. economic aid to the Republic of Korea would be continued.

The policy laid down by President Eisenhower was promptly implemented. At the end of June Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson visited Seoul to confer with President Rhee. In a joint statement of July 11, they said that the political, economic, and defense collaboration between the United States and the Republic of Korea would continue during the postwar period and that negotiations for a mutual defense treaty were already underway. The treaty was initialed by President Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles at Seoul on August 8. A joint Rhee-Dulles statement of that date declared that the U.N. Command and the Republic of Korea would automatically react to a Communist attack in Korea. The goal of the United States and the Republic of Korea at the political conference was stated to be the "peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and independent nation." The statement also announced that a 3 to 4 years' program had been projected for the rehabilitation of the wartorn Korean economy, calling for the expenditure of approximately $1 billion by the United States.

U.S.-KOREAN MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

The mutual defense treaty was signed at Washington on October 1, 1953. Under article III of the treaty each nation recognized that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and declared that "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

During discussion of the treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, concern was expressed over the possibility that this article might commit the United States to give aid if the Republic of Korea tried to extend its control over north Korea by military or other unlawful means. The Committee therefore recommended, and the Senate approved, a statement declaring that it was the understanding of the United States that the obligations of this article applied only in event of external armed attack and that the treaty should not be construed as requiring American assistance "except in the event of armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea." The treaty, subject to this understanding, entered into force November 17, 1954.

VIII. The Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference, April-June 1954

On August 28, 1953, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement and welcoming the holding of a political conference as recommended in paragraph 60 of the agreement. One part of the resolution designated, as participants for the side of the unified command in Korea, the Republic of Korea and the 16 U.N. members contributing armed forces to the military action in Korea who desired to be represented. Another part of the resolution recommended that the Soviet Union "participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it."

Following the failure of an initial U.S. attempt to arrange for the convening of a political conference through discussions with Communist representatives at Panmunjom, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, in the course of the Berlin Conference on German and Austrian problems, agreed on February 18, 1954, to hold a conference at Geneva beginning April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It was also agreed at Berlin that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina should be discussed at Geneva.

The Conference convened at Geneva on April 26 and devoted itself to the consideration of the Korean problem until June 15. Participating in the Conference on the Allied side were delegations from the Republic of Korea and from all the countries except the Union of South Africa that had contributed military forces to the unified command; the Communist side was represented by delegations from Communist China, north Korea, and the Soviet Union.

POSITION OF THE ALLIED DELEGATIONS

The Allied delegations shared a common viewpoint with regard to the indispensable requirements for a reasonable Korean settlement. They were (a) that the authority and competence of the United Nations to deal with Korea must be recognized and that the United Nations should have a primary role in bringing about a settlement; (b) that genuinely free Korean elections, with proportionate representation for north and south Korea, should be held; and (c) that U.N. forces should remain in Korea until the mission of the United Nations had been accomplished by the creation of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. These basic requirements were in line

with the principles which had been repeatedly upheld by the United Nations since 1947.

ALLIED PROPOSALS

The Republic of Korea at first took the position that elections should be held in north Korea only, stressing the fact that elections had already taken place in south Korea to the satisfaction of the United Nations. The Communists promptly indicated that they would not accept the principle of elections in north Korea only. After a number of Allied delegations had expressed the hope that the Republic of Korea would agree to elections throughout Korea if this were necessary in the interests of a final settlement, Foreign Minister Y. T. Pyun of the Republic of Korea presented on May 22 a comprehensive 14-point proposal for the unification of Korea with the following main points:

(1) The holding of free elections in both north and south Korea under U.N. supervision within 6 months on the basis of a secret ballot and universal adult suffrage.1

(2) The taking of a census under U.N. supervision with a view to apportioning the number of representatives in a new National Assembly in exact proportion to the population in the election areas.

(3) Complete freedom of movement and speech for U.N. supervisory personnel and for election candidates.

(4) Maintenance in force of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea subject to amendment by the all-Korea legislature to be convened in Seoul immediately after the elections.

(5) Completion of the withdrawal of Communist Chinese troops 1 month in advance of the election date.

(6) Commencement of withdrawal of U.N. forces, which would be completed when complete control had been achieved throughout Korea by the unified government and certified by the United Nations.

1 Following the failure of the Geneva Conference to reach agreement on Korean unification, the Government of the Republic of Korea on several occasions repeated its original stand that U.N.-supervised elections should be held only in north Korea, with elections in south Korea to be held in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea. Also former Korean President Syngman Rhee frequently expressed the opinion that Korea could only be unified through military means. Since the April 1960 revolution in Korea, however, the interim Government of the Republic of Korea under Acting President Huh Chung and the new President of the Republic, Yun Po Sun, has renounced the use of force and affirmed its support of U.N. principles for the unification of Korea.

(7) A guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of a unified Korea by the United Nations.

Support of this proposal was expressed at the plenary sessions of the Conference on May 28 and June 5 by representatives of Australia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, New Zealand, and the United States.

In the course of the Conference the Allied delegations emphasized the importance of effective supervision of Korean elections, with many delegates expressing the view that such supervision should be carried out by the U.N. There was general agreement on the Allied side (a) that Communist Chinese forces must be withdrawn before the elections and (b) that some U.N. forces should remain in Korea until unification was achieved. The Allied delegations repeatedly asserted the authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean problem and opposed Communist efforts to discredit the world organization and to deny it any role in a settlement.

COMMUNIST POSITION AT THE CONFERENCE

The Communists rejected any role whatsoever for the United Nations in a Korean settlement. In a statement on May 11 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov denounced the U.N intervention in Korea as a series of "illegitimate actions" designed only "to cover up American aggression." He declared that by reason of these actions the world organization had transformed itself into a "belligerent" without "capacity to act as an impartial international body” and could "no longer carry out objective functions in the settlement of the Korean problem.” This uncompromising rejection of the authority and competence of the United Nations was reiterated by the Communist Chinese and north Korean representatives.

The only formula to which the Communists indicated they would agree was one in which they would be able to exercise a veto over the unification process. Although their proposals employed such phrases as "free elections," "proportional representation," and "impartial supervision of elections," they insisted on arrangements which would have enabled them to prevent free elections from ever taking place. In particular, in proposing an "all-Korean Commission" to arrange for elections, they demanded that there be equal representation from north and south Korea on the Commission and that decisions in the Commission be made only on the basis of "mutual agreement." This would have permitted the north Korean delegates, representing an undemocratic regime exercising control over less than one third of

the Korean population, to veto decisions of the non-Communist majority.

Throughout the Conference, the Communist delegations attempted to divert the discussions from the central problem of reunifying Korea to peripheral subjects such as the repatriation of prisoners of war, observance of the armistice terms, the origins of the Korean war, and the foreign policy of the United States. The Allied delegations consistently strove to concentrate the discussions on the problem of Korean unification.

INITIAL COMMUNIST PROPOSALS

The Communist point of view was first outlined by the north Korean representative Nam Il when he presented a proposal on April 27 calling for the following measures:

(1) The formation of an all-Korean commission composed of representatives of north and south Korea to be elected by their respective assemblies and including representatives of the "largest democratic social organizations" in each area.

(2) The drafting by this commission of an electoral law preparatory to the holding of all-Korean elections for a National Assembly to form a united Korean government.

(3) Measures by the commission to develop economic and cultural ties between north and south Korea.

(4) The withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korean territory within 6 months.

(5) A guarantee of "the peaceful development of Korea" by "those countries most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East."

The Nam Il proposal, which was promptly supported by the Communist Chinese and north Korean delegations, contained no mention of the United Nations and provided no role for that organization in arriving at a Korean settlement.

Nam Il indicated on May 3 that the proposed all-Korean commission would make decisions "by mutual agreement on both sides." Commenting on this key point, the head of the Canadian delegation, Lester B. Pearson, stated on May 4 that it was clear that "even if North Korea had only 10 representatives in a Commission of 100, they would have a veto over the activities and decisions of that Commission which is to be given such far-reaching responsibilities." This device of "agreement on both sides," irrespective of the number of members or the number of people represented, would, he maintained,