make the proposed commission "completely unworkable, unfair and unacceptable.'

At the plenary session on May 13 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden appraised the north Korean proposals in these terms:

These proposals impose conditions which would enable the elections to be held only after a long and complicated series of delays. They make no provision for international supervision; they contemplate a packed and nominated commission, not a genuinely elected and representative assembly. In other words, elections come first on paper, but last in practice. They would be free in name but rigged in fact

On May 22 Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai proposed as an additional item to be included in the north Korean proposals a paragraph providing for the establishment of a "neutral nations supervisory commission" to supervise the all-Korean elections. On the same day Nam Il clarified his proposal for the allKorean commission. He stated that "social organizations of various political trends in both North and South Korea should be widely represented" on the commission, and denied that there was any intention to limit such representation to Communist organizations. While rejecting the suggestions of some Allied delegations that the number of members from each side in the all-Korean commission should be in proportion to their respective populations and that the commission's decisions should be taken by majority vote, he declared that the principle of distributing seats in proportion to population would be observed in the elections for an all-Korean National Assembly.

These "clarifications" as well as the additional proposal for a "neutral nations supervisory commission" to supervise the elections were not acceptable to the Allied delegations, whose attitude toward them could be summed up in the statement of an Australian delegate, A. S. Watt, on May 28 that "on the basis of the North Korean plan, we fail to see any guarantee that there would ever be agreement to hold elections except on Communist terms." In these circumstances, Mr. Watt expressed the view that the question of how the elections were to be supervised was academic and that the proposal of a neutral commission did not, therefore, reflect any significant advance toward agreement.

COMMUNIST PROPOSALS OF JUNE 5

On June 5 the north Korean and Communist Chinese delegates categorically rejected the Republic of Korea's 14-point proposal, objecting specifically to granting the United Nations a role in super

vising the all-Korean elections. This was in line with the attacks by the Communists against the United Nations earlier in the Conference their charges that the United Nations itself had been a belligerent in the Korean war, that the U.N. resolutions on Korea in 1950 lacked validity, that U.N. supervision in Korea would constitute "foreign intervention," and that the Geneva Conference had nothing to do with the United Nations and was not committed to accept any decision of the General Assembly.

The Allies had made vigorous replies to these efforts to malign and push aside the United Nations. The Colombian delegate, replying to the charge that the resolutions of 1950 were without validity, had pointed out that unilateral Communist rejection of these decisions did not alter the fact that they had the force of law unless and until the U.N. Security Council or General Assembly revoked them.

At the June 5 meeting, in rejecting U.N. supervision, Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai again presented a proposal which he had first made on May 22 and which Nam Il had supported, that a neutral nations supervisory commission be established to observe all-Korean elections. The commission would have consisted of an equal number of Communist and non-Communist governments and could function only on the basis of unanimity—that is, it would have been subject to a Communist veto.

The Soviet delegate summed up and restated the Communist position at this June 5 meeting through the introduction of a draft resolution. The first point superficially looked promising, but was contingent upon succeeding points which were left for later discussion and which therefore were open to unlimited obstruction.

The Soviet resolution called for (a) "free elections" throughout Korea within 6 months after the conclusion of the present agreement, based on a secret ballot and universal suffrage, with representation in the all-Korean legislature in proportion to the population of Korea; (b) setting up an all-Korean body composed of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Republic of Korea, the composition and duties of this body to be the subject of further examination; (c) withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea within periods to be specified, the phasing of such withdrawal prior to the holding of "free all-Korean elections" to be examined further; (d) setting up an appropriate international commission to supervise the holding of the elections, the composition of this commission to be examined further; and (e) assigning to the powers most directly concerned in the maintenance of peace in the Far East obligations to insure Korea's peaceful development, the question of which powers

were to assume such obligations to be the subject of further examination.1

DEBATE ON JUNE 5 PROPOSALS

Since the Communist proposals excluded the United Nations from a supervisory role in the all-Korean elections and assigned this function to a neutral nations supervisory commission, the U.S. delegation pointed out that there already existed a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in connection with the military armistice in Korea, and that the functions of the Commission had been constantly obstructed by the virtual veto power exercised by the two Communist members. The U.S. representative, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, contended that, although the newly proposed supervisory commission would supposedly provide international supervision, “as a matter of fact, such a body could do absolutely nothing, so long as the control of the central election procedure was in the all-Korean Commission, in which the Communists have their . . . built-in veto."

The American delegate also made clear that the Communists would have a double veto-one in the proposed neutral nations supervisory commission and another in the proposed all-Korean commission, since in each case decisions could be reached only through concurrence by both sides.

Speaking at the session of June 11, Foreign Secretary Eden said there were two fundamental issues before the Conference, namely, the authority and competence of the United Nations to deal impartially with the problem of Korean unification and the principle of free elections. He saw nothing in the Soviet proposal that helped to bridge the differences on these two issues and concluded that if no way could be found to resolve them, it would have to be admitted that the Conference had been unable to complete its task.

On June 15, at the final Korean session of the Geneva Conference, the Communist leaders made a concerted effort to prolong the discussions and blur the issues by introducing proposals which avoided the central unification problem and did not depart from the basic Communist stand. The Allied delegations saw immediately that these proposals did not offer any basis for agreement.

DECLARATION BY THE ALLIED POWERS

After nearly 2 months of discussion and debate there was no indication that the Communist side had any intention of seeking to resolve

1 Italics added in each case.

in good faith the differences on the two main issues of the authority of the United Nations and the principle of free elections. Therefore, following a brief recess, the delegate of Thailand (Prince Wan) introduced a "Declaration by the Sixteen," signed by the Allied delegations, which restated the principles they had consistently supported at the Conference, pointed out that the Communist delegations had refused to accept these principles and were persisting in the same attitudes which had "frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947," and declared that it was better "to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement when there is none."

Because of the Communist rejection of the fundamental principles considered indispensable by the United Nations Allies, the Declaration concluded that "further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose," and that in accordance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of August 28, 1953, the member states which were parties to the Declaration would inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings of the Conference.

Thus the Korean political conference at Geneva ended when it became clearly evident that the Communist delegations were determined to stand uncompromisingly on positions incompatible with the basic principles of the powers that were defending U.N. principles and seeking the unity and security of Korea on the basis of genuine self-determination by the Korean people. The Allies refused to compromise at Geneva the principles for which they had fought on the battlefields of Korea.

IX. The Korean Unification Issue, 1954–1960

In the 6 years which have elapsed since the Geneva Conference, members of the United Nations have taken all possible measures to rehabilitate and strengthen the war-torn economy of the Republic of Korea, and the General Assembly has repeatedly urged by overwhelming votes that negotiations on the unification question be resumed on the basis of established U.N. principles. The Communists, for their part, have continued by their words and deeds to prevent any progress toward the peaceful reunification of Korea on a basis consistent with U.N. objectives. While persisting in their inflexible attitude on unification, they have, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, built up the armed forces of north Korea to the point where the U.N. Com

mand has been compelled to take counter-measures to maintain the military balance. The major developments during this period in connection with unification and related problems are reviewed below.

RETURN OF KOREAN PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS

With the end of the Geneva discussions on Korea, the primary responsibility for the Korean problem automatically reverted to the United Nations. The negative results of the Geneva Conference were reported to the U.N. Secretary-General on November 11, 1954, by the participating U.N. members. This report was approved by a General Assembly resolution of December 11, which reaffirmed that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea continued to be the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.

In the absence of any change in the approach of the north Korean authorities or the Communist Chinese regime to the question of Korean unification, the work of the United Nations in Korea in the period since 1954 has been concentrated largely on efforts to assist the Republic of Korea in rebuilding its war-torn economy, developing the nation's resources and economic potential, and strengthening its democratic institutions. At the same time the United Nations has continued to explore all possibilities for an eventual settlement of the unification problem on terms consistent with its established principles. In its resolution of November 29, 1955, the U.N. General Assembly reaffirmed its intention to continue the search for a solution of the Korean question in accordance with U.N. objectives. Similar resolutions were approved by large majorities on January 11 and November 29, 1957, November 14, 1958, and December 9, 1959.

THE WORK OF UNCURK AND UNKRA

In carrying out its mission in the Republic of Korea the United Nations has relied on the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) established by the U.N. General Assembly resolutions of October 7 and December 1, 1950, respectively. Besides furnishing annual reports to the General Assembly concerning developments bearing on the question of unification, the operation of the Armistice Agreement, and the progress of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNCURK has assisted in the development of representative government in the Republic of Korea through the observation of national and local elections. Since January 1956 the functions and responsibilities of UNCURK have been exercised by a