Korea and to agree to genuinely free elections under the principles endorsed by the General Assembly.

Finally, in a note of March 4, 1959, delivered also on behalf of the north Korean authorities, the Communist Chinese restated their demands for the withdrawal of U.N. forces from south Korea and contended that "the United Nations has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean war and lost all competence and authority to deal fairly with the Korean question," and that therefore any resolution adopted by the United Nations on this question was "null and void." In view of this defiant and inflexible response, the governments concerned decided that no purpose would be secured by continuing the exchanges.

U.S. VIEWS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION

In a statement made on November 23, 1959, before the Political and Security Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, Walter S. Robertson, a member of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, reviewed the history of the Korean question, citing the successive phases of noncooperation, armed aggression, and intransigent obstruction by which the Communist side had sought to prevent the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, in accordance with the principles established by the United Nations. He concluded from the record that the Communists had no desire to settle the Korean problem on any terms short of surrender by the United Nations.

The U.S. representative justified this conclusion by examining the principal Communist demands, which he listed as follows:

(1) The withdrawal of all U.N. Command troops from Korea as a prior condition for agreement on the terms of methods of unification. (2) Rejection of any role for the United Nations in a Korean settlement on the ground that "the United Nations has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean War and lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly with the Korean question."

(3) The holding of all-Korea elections, after the U.N. troops have been withdrawn from Korea, under the supervision of a "neutral nations organization."

In analyzing the implications of these demands, Mr. Robertson made the following observations:

(1) To withdraw the protection of U.N. troops from the Republic of Korea, before the Korean question has been solved in accordance with U.N. principles, would leave Korea once again exposed to the threat of renewed Communist aggression. The north Korean forces were once again large and heavily armed—this time in gross violation

of the Armistice Agreement-and they continued to have the advantage of a Communist hinterland just beyond the Yalu River, across which supplies and reinforcements could be sent to support a new aggression. The U.S. representative recalled the pledge of Chou En-lai, the Communist Chinese Premier, upon announcing the withdrawal of his "volunteers" from north Korea in 1958, that this withdrawal did not mean that the Chinese people "have forsaken their international duty to the Korean people."

U.N. troops in Korea had been greatly reduced since the Armistice and now consisted of two U.S. divisions, a Turkish company, a Thai company, and small liaison groups from other countries. The Communists had been told many times that U.N. members were prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea when conditions for a lasting settlement had been fulfilled. Withdrawal under existing conditions could lead only to Communist conquest.

(2) If the Communist denial of any role for the United Nations in a Korean settlement were to be accepted, this would amount to the abandonment of the fundamental principles on which the U.N. Charter is based and repudiation of the collective effort to repel aggression in which hundreds of thousands of deaths and wounds had been suffered by U.N. troops in Korea.

The only feasible rejoinder to this Communist contention was to reassert the principle repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly :

The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

(3) The Communist proposal for the supervision of all-Korea elections by a "neutral nations organization" recalled the experience which the U.N. Command had already had with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, in which the two Communist members were anything but neutral, with the result that the Commission was unable to fulfill the role intended by the Armistice Agreement. On the basis of this experience there was no reason to believe that the Communist proposal would offer any guarantee of genuinely free elections, and it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the authorities in north Korea were afraid to let the people there express their true feelings in an honest vote.

The U.S. representative expressed the view of his Government that, in the absence of any indication that the Communist side was willing to seek a reasonable solution, the wise course for the United Nations was to stand fast on the principles which it had supported from the beginning for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Korean unification, namely:

(1) The right of the United Nations to seek a just settlement of the Korean question in harmony with the principles of the United Nations Charter and to extend its good offices for that purpose; and

(2) The requirement of genuinely free elections throughout Korea, to be held under United Nations supervision, and the election of a National Assembly in which representation would be directly proportionate to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea.

REAFFIRMATION OF U.N. STAND ON KOREAN UNIFICATION

By a vote of 54 to 9, with 17 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly approved on December 9, 1959, a resolution once again reaffirming the established U.N. objectives in Korea and calling upon the Communist authorities to accept these objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth on behalf of the United Nations at the Geneva Conference of 1954 and since repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly. Thus the Communist side was once more apprised of the steadfast determination of the world organization to stand by its principles for the establishment of a united, free, and democratic Korea.

DOCUMENTS

Statement Released After the Cairo Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, December 1, 1943

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

1Text from White House news release, as printed in Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1943, p. 393.

The Potsdam Proclamation Defining Terms for the Surrender of Japan, July 26, 1945

[Extracts]

1

(1) We-the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration 2 shall be carried out.

Declaration of War by the Soviet Union Against Japan, August 8, 1945 3

3

On August 8, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Molotov received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Sato, and gave him, on behalf of the Soviet Government, the following for transmisson to the Japanese Government:

After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.

The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, on July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis.

Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of

1 For the full text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1945, pp. 137-138; issued by President Truman, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill.

2

Supra.

3 Text from World Peace Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. VIII, 1945-46, pp. 848-849.