caused great suffering and loss of life and treasure. It continues to divide families and separate friends. It enforces the maintenance of two large and costly military establishments by a people who have always desired peace and have never sought expansion or military conquest. It retards Korea's economic and political development and prevents the nation from taking its rightful place in the community of nations. The United Nations continues to offer the means and the opportunity for a peaceful, equitable, and democratic solution to this problem. The United States joins the Korean people in the hope that this solution may speedily come to pass.

I. Historical Background Prior to World War II

The tradition of the Korean people traces their national origin back over four thousand years, and it is a matter of historical record that Korea has existed as a single political and social entity, with one race, language, and culture, since the unification of the Three Kingdoms approximately thirteen hundred years ago. For many centuries, the Kingdom of Korea was closely connected with the loose imperial system of China; these connections, which were primarily cultural and economic, left the Koreans entirely free and independent in respect to their own affairs.

The impact of the West, first upon China and Japan, was soon felt in Korea. The awakened Japanese were the first to sign a modern treaty with the Koreans in 1876. The United States concluded a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Korea in 1882, thus becoming the first Western Power to do so. Approved by the Senate the following January, this treaty was proclaimed by President Arthur on June 4, 1883. Treaties were subsequently concluded with Korea by Germany and Great Britain in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884, France in 1886, and Austria in 1892.

Because of Korea's traditional relationship with China, the Chinese Government, at the time of the treaty negotiations with the United States, desired the inclusion of the phrase, "Chosen [Korea] being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire." The American negotiator would not accept this phrase, but finally agreed as a compromise to transmit to the President of the United States a letter from the King of Korea stating that the treaty had been made with the consent of the Chinese Government.

In instructions to the first American Minister to Korea, Secretary

of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen wrote: "As far as we are concerned Corea is an independent sovereign power, with all the rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities; in her relations to China we have no desire to interfere unless action should be taken prejudicial to the rights of the United States. . . ." This same position was later taken by Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard in an instruction to the American Minister in 1888: "Therefore as the United States have no privity with the inter-relations of China and Corea, we shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by their respective and independent agents."

As a result of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, China and Japan signed the treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, by which China recognized Korean independence. The United States accepted Japan's assurances regarding the maintenance of Korean independence but did not admit that Korean independence dated only from the treaty of Shimonoseki. Acting Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee, in an instruction to the American Minister in July 1895, stated that "the position assumed by this government towards Korea since contracting a treaty with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events. Korea's treaty independence since then has been for us an established and accepted fact."

Korea, though independent of China, soon became subject to "assistance" and "direction" from Japan, while Russia took the place of China in competition with Japan for the control of Korea. In 1905 the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War compelled Russia to recognize Japan's paramount interests in Korea and led to the Japanese-Korean treaty of November 17, 1905, by which Japan assumed control of Korea's foreign relations.

In 1907 Korea attempted to present a protest to the Second Hague Peace Conference against Japan's intervention in Korean affairs. The Emperor of Korea was thereupon compelled by the Japanese to abdicate, and his son, the new Emperor, entered into an agreement which turned over practically the whole machinery of the Korean Government to the Japanese. In August 1910 Korean sovereignty was formally transferred to Japan by treaty and Korea became a dependency of the Japanese Empire.

Korean exiles attempted to introduce Korea's case at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and again at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 but were unsuccessful. On March 1, 1919, Korean patriots braved the occupation authorities to proclaim a Declaration of Independence, and nonviolent demonstrations supporting this action swept the country until they were suppressed by force.

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II. The Wartime Agreements

THE CAIRO AND POTSDAM DECLARATIONS

With the outbreak of World War II the question of Korea's status was revived. Korean exiles in the United States and China, who had maintained a provisional government of Korea following the 1919 independence movement, began to publicize the case for Korean independence and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China declared that "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea" they were determined "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, which was subscribed to by the Soviet Union in its declaration of war against Japan in August 1945.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 38TH PARALLEL LINE

Immediately following the Japanese surrender offer of August 10, the U.S. Government decided on the basis of military considerations that Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea should surrender to Soviet forces and those south of this parallel to U.S. forces. This decision was incorporated in General Order No. 1, which defined areas of responsibility for accepting the surrender of all Japanese military forces. The text of this order was communicated to Premier Stalin and to the British Government prior to its issuance to the Japanese Government on September 2, 1945, by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. By September 8, the date on which U.S. troops entered Korea, Soviet forces had occupied Korea down to the 38th parallel. On September 9 U.S. troops accepted in a formal ceremony the surrender of Japanese forces south of that line.

III. U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Korean Unification, 1945-1947

THE DIVISION OF KOREA

The directive governing the surrender did not contemplate a political division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel, but the Soviet commander's interpretation of his authority over the northern zone soon converted the surrender line into a frontier between north and south, which not only disrupted normal Korean social and administrative relationships, but, by separating the predominantly agricultural south

from the more industrial north, deeply and adversely affected the economy of the country. The American commander, in an effort to overcome this situation, initiated negotiations with the Soviet commander at an early date. Finding, however, that all efforts to bring about a unification of the economy and administration of Korea by direct military negotiation were unavailing, the American commander finally recommended that the difficulties caused by the Soviet attitude in regard to the nature of the division of the country at the 38th parallel be taken up at the governmental level.

THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 21, 1945

At discussions which took place in Moscow in December 1945 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union reached an agreement, later adhered to by China, for the establishment of a provisional all-Korean government under procedures which, it was believed, would eliminate the previous difficulties in the way of creation of a unified Korea.

Under this agreement two Soviet-American joint bodies were to be established. A U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Conference, made up of representatives of the United States and Soviet commands, was to meet in Korea within 2 weeks (i.e., before January 10, 1946) to consider urgent problems affecting both parts of the country and to elaborate measures for the establishment of permanent coordination in administrative and economic matters between the two commands. A U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission was to consider long-range political and economic problems, including the making of recommendations on the formation of a provisional Korean government for all of Korea and on the negotiation of a four-power (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., and China) trusteeship agreement for the purpose of guiding Korea toward full independence.1

THE JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. CONFERENCE

The Joint Conference actually met for the first time on January 16, 1946, and held 15 formal sessions, the last being on February 5, 1946. It soon became apparent that the two delegations approached the solution of Korea's economic and administrative problems from entirely different points of view. The American representatives desired to integrate the two parts of the country, but the Soviet delega

1 A proposal for an international trusteeship for Korea was advanced by President Roosevelt in discussions with Premier Stalin at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Yalta and Malta, 1945 (Department of State publication 6199, p. 770)).

tion viewed the problem as merely one of exchange and coordination between two entirely separate zones of administration. Given this divergency of view, the Conference was able to reach agreement only on such minor matters as the exchange of mail, allocation of radio frequencies, and military liaison.

THE JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMISSION-FIRST SESSION

The Joint Commission established by the Moscow Agreement to take steps for the formation of a provisional democratic Korean government held its first meeting on March 20, 1946. In the meantime widespread opposition to the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow agreement had been manifested by the Korean people, who tended to associate this provision with the Japanese protectorate preceding the annexation of 1910. (One such manifestation was a December 1945 street demonstration in Seoul, in the middle of which the Communist participants, apparently on orders, switched their stand from opposition to support of trusteeship.)

The Soviet delegation took the position that in proceeding to the formation of a provisional government only those Korean parties and social organizations should be consulted which had fully supported all provisions of the Moscow agreement. This would have excluded a large majority of the Korean people and would have placed in a predominant position in the consultations a Communist minority which had refrained from openly opposing trusteeship. The United States was of the opinion that the Korean people were entitled to express their views on the agreement and that acceptance of the Soviet position would violate the principles of free speech and democratic procedure. As a result of this fundamental disagreement on a question of principle, the first session of the Commission was adjourned on May 8, 1946.

SECOND SESSION OF JOINT COMMISSION

In the months following the adjournment of the Commission the American commander, in a series of letters to the Soviet commander, endeavored without success to establish a basis for renewed meetings of the Commission. When in Moscow in April 1947 for the 4th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Secretary of State George C. Marshall took up the question of Korea once more with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and after a series of letters had been exchanged agreement was reached that the Commission should be reconvened.

The 2d session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission opened on May 21, 1947. At first it seemed that success was about to be achieved as the