For about two years the United States Government has been trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Government, through the Joint Commission and otherwise, on methods of implementing the Moscow agreement and thus bringing about the independence of Korea. The United States representatives have insisted that any settlement of the Korean problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom of opinion. That is still the position of my Government. Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel with Soviet forces in the industrial north and United States forces in the agricultural south. There is little or no exchange of goods or services between the two zones. Korea's economy is thus crippled.

The Korean people, not former enemies, but a people liberated from 40 years of Japanese oppression, are still not free. This situation. must not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In an effort to make progress the United States Government recently made certain proposals designed to achieve the purposes of the Moscow agreement and requested the powers adhering to that agreement to join in discussion of these proposals. China and the United Kingdom agreed to this procedure. The Soviet Government did not. Furthermore, the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Joint Commission have not even been able to agree on a joint report on the status of their deliberations. It appears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea.

It is therefore the intention of the United States Government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly. Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions as to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be effected, we believe that this is a matter which now requires the impartial judgment of the other members. We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence.

Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, October 9, 19471

DEAR MR. MARSHALL:

The position taken by the U.S. Delegation in the Joint SovietAmerican Commission at Seoul provides evidence that the U.S.A. Delegation does not wish to continue the work of the Joint Commission with a view to reaching, on the basis of an exact observance of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, agreed decisions on questions connected with the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government.

In violation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and the understanding reached between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in May 19472 concerning the conditions for resuming the work of the Joint Commission, the U.S.A. Delegation insists that not only democratic parties and groups in northern and southern Korea which have signed the declaration of support for the aims of the Moscow Agreement and are loyally carrying out the conditions of this declaration, but also such reactionary groups which, having signed this agreement, are carrying on a struggle against the Moscow Agreement and are continuing to comprise the so-called "Anti-trusteeship Committee", which contradicts the above-mentioned understanding between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., shall take part in the formation of the Korean Government. The Soviet Delegation, consistently defending the principles of the Moscow Agreement, obviously cannot agree with this.

The position of the U.S.A. Delegation has made impossible the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, which hinders the re-establishment of Korea as a united democratic state.

In view of the situation which had been created the Government of the U.S.S.R. instructed the Soviet Delegation to introduce in the Joint Commission at Seoul a new proposal, namely: To give to the Koreans the possibility of forming a government themselves, without aid and participation on the part of the United States of America

1 Text from Korea, 1945 to 1948 (Department of State publication 3305, October 1948), pp. 48-49.

2 For the exchange of letters between Marshall and Molotov which led to the resumption of the Joint Commission meetings, see Department of State Bulletin, May 11, May 18, and May 25, 1947, pp. 947, 995-996, and 1043, respectively.

and the Soviet Union, on condition that American and Soviet troops be withdrawn from Korea. If the Government of the U.S.A. should agree to the proposal for the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops at the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops would be ready to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

Notwithstanding the fact that this proposal was introduced by the Soviet Delegation at the session of the Joint Commission on September 26, the U.S.A. Delegation has unfortunately not replied to date, which cannot fail to delay the solution of the Korean question.

With reference to the consideration of the Korean question at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, which was proposed in Mr. Lovett's letter of September 17, the position of the Soviet Government on this question, as you know, has already been set forth by the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly.1

Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China.

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

Letter From Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, October 18, 1947 2

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV:

In your letter of October 9, 1947, you state that the position taken by the United States Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul has delayed a decision on the Korean question and you refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation in Seoul on September 26, 1947, for the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of the United States-Soviet occupation forces to which you state no reply has been received.

1

1 On September 23, Andre Vyshinsky, in a statement to the General Assembly, objected to the inclusion of the question of Korea on the agenda of the second session. See U.N. General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Sept. 16-Nov. 29, 1947, vol. I, pp. 275–276.

2

'Text from Korea, 1945 to 1948 (Department of State publication 3305, October 1948), pp. 50-51.

The Secretary of State announced on September 17 that the problem of setting up an independent Government for a unified Korea would be presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations and on September 23 the General Assembly voted to place this question on its agenda.1 In the opinion of the United States Government the question of withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of that problem.

The United States Delegation to the General Assembly meeting in New York City has now had circulated to the various delegations for their consideration a proposed resolution which is designed to bring about the early establishment of an independent Korean Government representative of the will of the Korean people, and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupation forces. In submitting this proposal to the Secretary General, specific attention was called to the Soviet proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops with the statement of the United States' hope that having both proposals before it the General Assembly would be able to recommend a solution of the problem. A copy of the United States proposals was delivered to the Soviet Delegation in New York prior to its being communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the other delegations.

In view of the continued inability of the Soviet and United States Delegations in the Joint Commission to agree on how to proceed with their work and the refusal of the Soviet Government to participate in discussions on this problem with the other Governments adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea, the United States Government considers it is obligated to seek the assistance of the United Nations in order that, as the Secretary of State said on September 17, "the inability of two powers to reach agreement" should not further delay the early establishment of an independent, united Korea.

Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

1U.N. General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Sept. 16-Nov. 29, 1947, vol. I, p. 299. The vote was 41 to 6, with 7 abstentions.

Address by U.S. Representative John Foster Dulles Before

the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1947 1

1

There are two resolutions before the members, adopted by the First Committee. The first one was adopted by a vote of 41 to none, and the second by a vote of 46 to none. Those resolutions mean, in essence, that the United Nations is going to try to break the deadlock which has developed in Korea, and which, for two years now, has prevented the achievement of independence for Korea, which it was assumed would automatically come when Japan was defeated. That has not happened because, as part of the surrender terms, the Japanese in north Korea were told to surrender to the armies of the Soviet Union, and in south Korea, to the United States armies. Those armies thus came into occupation as a military convenience, and it has not been practicable to find a way to get them out and to restore independence to Korea.

The United States has always assumed that independence would quickly come to Korea upon the defeat of Japan. As soon as that defeat happened, we had a conference in Moscow 2 with the representatives of the Soviet Union, so as to clear up the situation resulting from the presence of our two sets of troops in Korea. That agreement did not work. The members have just heard from the Representative of the Soviet Union his interpretation of the reasons why it did not work. I could give you another set of interpretations, but I do not think it worthwhile to burden the General Assembly with a recount of the sad history of two years of bickering and dispute, where the Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union was unable to agree even to begin consultations with the Korean people, because we could not agree upon what was the proper definition of the word "democratic", which was used in the Moscow agreement. That deadlock occurred and has now gone on for two years. Because it was preventing 30 million people in Korea from getting the independence which all agreed was their right, the United States, after first trying to get a four-power conference, including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China which were also parties to agreement on the independence of Korea, and which four-power conference was rejected by the Soviet Union, finally brought the matter here to the General Assembly.

1Text from The United States and the United Nations: Second Annual Report

by the President to the Congress for the year 1947, pp. 261–267.