U.S. Security Interests and Policies in Southwest Asia: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate and Its Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Ninety-sixth Congress, Second Session, on U.S. Security Requirements in the Near East and South Asia, February 6, 7, 20, 27; March 4, 18, 1980U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 - 368 頁 |
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Admiral KIDD Afghanistan aircraft allies Ambassador KENNAN American Arab assessment barrels per day base capability capacity carrier CHAIRMAN China coal committee consumption continue countries day oil equivalent decline defense economic effort Egypt energy demand energy supply equipment exports facilities foreign going Government growth Gulf oil increase Indian Ocean interests Iran Japan logistic major Marine ment Middle East million b/d million barrels mmb/d move nations NATO naval nuclear OECD oil imports oil production OPEC Outlook output percent Persian Gulf Persian Gulf oil petroleum plans political potential pre-positioning President problems projected question Rapid Deployment Force region requirements reserves SALT II Saudi Arabia SAWHILL Secretary Senator BIDEN Senator JAVITS Senator PERCY ships situation SONNENFELDT South Korea South Yemen Southwest Asia Soviet Union statement strategic synthetics Thank threat tion troops U.S. forces United Western Europe world oil
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第 291 頁 - an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and as such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.
第 99 頁 - This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.
第 94 頁 - Now it lies in the nature o'f the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance...
第 95 頁 - It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and, therefore, to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor.
第 95 頁 - ... inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it. The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism.
第 100 頁 - But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.
第 93 頁 - From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the daemon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud.
第 99 頁 - Party : for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And If disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed In forms beyond description.
第 94 頁 - Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power. By the same...
第 97 頁 - In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.