their desire, there is no reason why they can't purchase energy from that area just the way that we do; and it would be much easier for them simply to go ahead and buy it, rather than to throw the whole area into a tremendous confusion and destruction by starting military conflict in that area.

As for the other things, and particularly the use that they might make of it if they could get control of the oil: Yes, if there were a world war on and if their conflict with us was a total one and their entire survival depended on the maximum damage they could do to our country and so forth, then this is a measure which might interest them. But otherwise, they have a great many other irons in the fire. It is my own belief that they decidedly do not want a world war, and that even those objectives which they have in the Middle East region which are in conflict to our own are ones that they intend to pursue as far as they can, but not to the point of risking a world war for their achievement.

There are many other considerations both internal and external to which they have to give attention, which would argue against anything so dramatic and so tremendously destabilizing in its effects as going down there, conquering the Persian Gulf, and cutting off the oil to all the rest of the industrialized world. I think this would cause such enormous upheaval, such tremendous disarray in economic life, that it would jeopardize the security of their whole empire as well as of the western countries.

As you say, it is the worst case possibility which we have to hold in mind, and for which we should undertake certain precautionary measures; but I think there are other more hopeful ways of tackling that problem than by straight military intervention.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. They have hard currency problems, they are getting worse, oil has been a major factor. They are probably unable to go down and buy oil at $40 a barrel as we do in any substantial amount without severely crippling a lot of the other things they are trying to do in the Soviet Union.

There are a number of parts of their economy that are hard pressed and tie in with what I see is going to be a chaotic situation if they don't do something about it soon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure and honor to meet you, having heard about you, so I welcome you.

I have been reading your presentation here and I have some questions to ask.

IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF FAULTS

First of all, you talk about:

What the Iranian authorities have done has been a grievous affront to international law, to diplomatic practice, and to the entire international community. To offer to forget it before there has been evidence of a clear readiness on the official Iranian side to recognize their fault, accompanied by satisfactory and reliable assurances against the repetition of such conduct, would not offer a promising basis for future relations with this regime.

Now in other words you are saying that unless they recognize their faults, you have no reliable basis on which to resume friendly relations with them. Khomeini's approval of the terrorists and all of them being totally intransigent and not admitting any fault whatsoever, from whom can we expect this recognition of their fault without an overthrow of the present government?

Ambassador KENNAN. Well, of course, there is no way to predict how long this present government is going to remain in power. Senator HAYAKAWA. Is it firmly in power? Is there any evidence that there is disaffection with it?

Ambassador KENNAN. It does not look to me as though they are very firmly in power. They are a dilettantish government which has not even begun to confront the real permanent problems of that country. When they do confront those problems, they will find themselves up against much greater strains than they have experienced to date. But if they do remain in power, and if they continue to take this present attitude, I would certainly not think that we should send any other official personnel there or have diplomatic relations with them at all.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

I am very happy with that answer.

You say, also, we should hold ourselves in readiness for conflict with the regime, not excluding military ones.

And of course that would be an ultimate choice. Now when I ask these questions about the military alternatives I am not arguing against them, you understand. What would it do to the fate of the hostages? Would we have a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. if we took that path? At the same time I am not disavowing such a path, still I would like to ask some questions about the dangers and prospects involved.

Ambassador KENNAN. Senator, my mind goes back, when you ask that question, to our own experiences during World War II. Some of us sat in the same way.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

Ambassador KENNAN. A number of times, since these people were locked up and since we began to hear the series of unprecedented insults and expressions of contempt for this country that we have heard from the ayatollah, I have wondered why we in our Government did not simply acknowledge the existence of a state of hostility brought about by the behavior of the Iranian Government, and, having done that, then regard ourselves as at war with that country. Having taken that step, then we could do the normal thing, which would be to ask a third power to represent our interests in Iran, in which case the hostages would become their immediate responsibility, not ours. We would then also intern the Iranian official personnel in this country, I hope humanely, not in the way that they have interned ours-because, after all, we have obligations to ourselves, too. But by doing this, we would put ourselves in a position, first of all, to offer the Iranians something to get them off the hook; namely, an exchange of their personnel, which might be helpful. But in any case, it would also put us in a position to make our own decisions about such military action that we might wish to take if it became necessary.

I don't think that it would be useful for me to speculate on the sort of things that we could do, because some of them might necessitate taking advantage of the element of surprise. But I can only say that if we do nothing and let those people sit there for years, I don't know how worthwhile it is going to be to save them from what one calls death. Things can happen to people that are almost as bad as death if they are put under abnormal conditions for a long enough time.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You are really an experienced diplomat. I shall quote you with or without attribution as I find it convenient.

May I ask you again, sir. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was the normal political practice. Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes. As we say in literary circles, minor authors plagiarize, major authors steal.

UNITED STATES-CHINESE HELP FOR AFGHAN REBELS

In your statement you say that if Moscow feels that the resistance on the part of the Afghans is inspired from the United States and China they are likely to hang on, and I see no reason why they could not succeed in doing this for a long time. Do you recommend then no help by us, let alone China, to the Afghan rebels? Or should that help be surreptitious?

Ambassador KENNAN. I would recommend no help. This is far from our shores. It is not really our quarrel. I don't know how much we really have in common with these Afghan resistance groups. There are several of them. They are not in agreement even with each other. Senator HAYAKAWA. I understand.

Ambassador KENNAN. Again, my old fashioned American isolationist instincts rise to the top at this point. I don't like to see us become involved with people that are very different from ourselves and share very few of our outlooks on life. I think that we better leave this situation alone, but accompany that by the effort to reach some understanding with the Soviet Union about the way that things are going to develop in the coming period.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Many of us, I think, have a very, very American desire to help the underdog in this situation.

Ambassador KENNAN. Yes, but I am afraid after

Senator HAYAKAWA. You make more trouble than it will cure. Ambassador KENNAN. Yes. I have developed a certain skepticism about the responses of people, when we try to befriend them and assist them in matters of their immediate regional or internal affairs.

SOVIET DESIRE FOR ACCESS TO INDIAN OCEAN

Senator HAYAKAWA. Another question. What is bothering me from the very beginning of the Afghanistan move is the well-known fact that even as far back as Peter the Great, Russia has wanted access to the Indian Ocean and when you say, "I personally see nothing in Soviet statements or behavior to suggest that the Soviets are contemplating further moves," do you really believe that they still don't have designs on Karachi and the Indian Ocean?

Ambassador KENNAN. We always have to make a distinction bereen what people would think was ideally desirable, on the one hand, ad things that enter into their immediate intentions today. I don't ink that the Soviet action in Afghanistan was motivated in any sigificant degree by the thought of going down through what is the ather horrible territory of Baluchistan, and trying to develop a port n the Indian Ocean. I think that presents many, many difficulties and omplications from their standpoint. I don't think it is a real objective f their policy.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I read so much Kipling that it remains on my nind.

Ambassador KENNAN. So much what, sir?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Kipling. Kipling wrote so much about Afghanstan and that part of British India and so on.

I have one final question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. We give the impression, some of us at least, that we regard armed conflict as inevitable, that we are placing all our attention and all our hopes on the military card and we have effectively abandoned serious efforts to arrive at nonmilitary solutions to the problems of the region.

Now what are the nonmilitary solutions that seem most attractive to you as an alternative to this tough line we are beginning to take; that is, we have already talked about suspending grain trade and international sports exchanges by withdrawing from the Olympics. We talked about withdrawal of scientific exchanges, technological exchanges of information and so on. Now these are all nonmilitary steps toward enhancing peaceful relations between nations. If we have given up all these, what else is there that we can do to arrive at nonmilitary solutions to the problems of the region?

Ambassador KENNAN. I would think that any nonmilitary arrangement to diminish the tensions in that region would probably involve our abandonment of certain of these steps in return for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and for the neutralization of that country. And it is not inconceivable to me that there might be some wider agreements, not just bilateral between ourselves and the Soviet Union, but between the whole group of major industrial powers which are dependent on Persian Gulf oil and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is one of them, because it also has a certain dependence on this oil, and will have, as Senator Glenn says, a greater need for it in the future. I could see us and I think this is a possibility that ought to be seriously explored-asking for the Soviet Union and Japan, the Western European countries and ourselves all to get together on some major international understanding on the complete neutraliaztion and protection of the Persian Gulf oil. It is important to everybody in the world. There is no reason why we alone should bear the burden of trying to make such an agreement with Russia. These are the outlines of the sort of solutions that I think are worth exploring.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I am very, very grateful for all you have said.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have another witness here that we must hear from and I am going to ask him, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, if he would come up and make his statement and then, Ambassador Kennan, if you would be good enough to remain at the table, Senators may wish in a second round to address questions to one or the other.

Ambassador KENNAN. I have an engagement at 1 o'clock which would be very embarrassing for me to break.

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. Whenever you need to take your leave, please feel free to do it because you have been taking questions all morning. So as soon as you need to go, that is perfectly all right.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt, I understand that you have no prepared statement. You have an article that you will submit for the record and then you will summarize.

STATEMENT OF HON. HELMUT SONNENFELDT, FORMER COUN

SELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing on this extraordinarily important and troublesome subject of the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the Persian Gulf area, but also in terms of our overall relations.

As you indicate, Mr. Chairman, I have submitted to you a statement that was prepared in another connection, and I apologize for that. The notice I had for the hearing was so short that I could not write a separate statement, but the statement that I have provided you is to appear in the NATO Review in Brussels, Belgium, in the next few days and this summarizes my views.

You are free to make it part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Without objection it will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to appears on p. 126.]

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Let me say very briefly, because time is short and I realize you may have additional questions to pose to Ambassador Kennan as well, that I have taken the events in Afghanistan very seriously indeed. I believe, as Senator Glenn has indicated in his remarks, that what happened there must be seen as part of a pattern of several years standing that involves the accumulation of massive military power on the part of the Soviet Union in all its dimensions as well as the uses of military and other instrumentalities to advance Soviet influence and presence in many parts of the world. That may not have been occurring in accordance with a fixed pattern or an original design, but it has happened frequently enough that a pattern has in fact emerged whether so intended or not.

That is something from which Afghanistan and the events there cannot be separated. Moreover, as has been pointed out, Afghanistan does represent the first overt use of Soviet organized combat units outside the perimeter that was established at the end of the Second World War. It involves an act of aggrandizement following upon the revolution in Afghanistan-it was really a coup and not a revolution in 1978 which the Soviets construed as an accession by Afghanistan to the socialist camp.