U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES

IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1980

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Stone (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Stone, Zorinsky, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs reconvenes its hearings on the Middle East situation. This is the second hearing on the question of American security requirements in the Near East and South Asia.

Yesterday we focused on the issue of whether actual military facilities are needed in the area in order to protect American interests and American allies in the region.

This distinguished panel of witnesses, public witnesses whom we heard yesterday, expressed its concern that Western economic and security interests, as well as the security interests of those in the region, could not be secured adequately without greater forward positioning of American military capabilities in the area.

In this morning's hearings, we will examine the present political conditions within the region as they relate to the potential for an increased American military presence there. We will explore this question today with public witnesses and as well with Mr. David Newsom, the Under Secretary of State.

The political advantages and the political problems of such an American increased military presence in the region will be examined. Yesterday we saw press reports that the Saudis are becoming more interested in an enhanced American military presence in the region. If this is the case, then it signals something of a shift in the position on the part of the Saudis. Egypt, Israel, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya all have been reported as having made favorable responses to the question of an enhanced American military presence in the region, and possibly on their territories. Whether such a move would be both possible and advantageous to both our interests and to the interests of those in the region is the subject of our discussion this morning.

2)

3)

We are very pleased to have with us the Honorable Joseph Sisco, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Dr. Ray Cline, director of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Mr. John Richardson of the National Association of Arab Americans.

At the conclusion of the public testimony, we will hear from Under Secretary of State Newsom in public session and then, at the appropriate time, at his request, in executive session.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your presence here this morning.

May we hear first from Mr. Sisco, going strictly on the basis of protocol.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH J. SISCO, CHANCELLOR, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Sisco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am grateful to be invited to this hearing and to say very explicitly and categorically at the outset that I strongly favor an enhanced military U.S. presence in the Gulf on the Arabian Peninsula-as the best way at this particular juncture to protect our overall interests in light of the major setback that we suffered in Iran and particularly in light of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

I would like to put this into a little broader context in just a few minutes. I have submitted my formal statement, Mr. Chairman, and only will emphasize several key points of that statement.

I believe we face three fundamental challenges in the 1980's. The first is the compelling need to reduce our dependency on this area for our energy resources. This is a domestic issue, an international issue, and is a common thread in all of these developments in this area.

Second, there is the challenge of an unabated, sustained, overall increase in Soviet strength, achieving parity with the United States, and a new projection of power into Third World areas and, specfically, into the gulf, into the area of the Arabian Peninsula, the vital artery of the United States, as long as we are dependent, at least for the next 10 or 15 years.

Third, we do face the volatility of indigenous developments, the volatility of Third World areas, rapid political, economic and social change, and certainly these are exemplified by what has happened in Iran.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome President Carter's recent state of the Union message. It represented a change in two significant ways. First, it was based on the assumption that we cannot rely on others to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union in the vital area of the gulf; and, it makes the further assumption that with the setback in Iran, our physical, military presence must fill the vacuum.

The second assumption is that it reverses what I believe was the approach of this administration at the outset, 3 years ago, that we need not be as preoccupied with the Soviet Union as in the past, elevating human rights and relations with the Third World relative to our preoccupation with the Soviet Union.

I welcome this message because I think these are the beginnings of the reversal of these two basic assumptions.

It is a framework. It is not yet a substantive policy, and much will lepend on what the decisions are of the administration in the future and, of course, what the Congress does about it. Above all, I believe it will require determination, resolve, will, and sacrifice by the American people.

We know that the application of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is the first example of the Brezhnev doctrine outside the Eastern European orbit. It not only is a threat to the United States, it is a threat to our Western European allies who are even more dependent on oil and on the area than we are. It is a threat to the Moslem world. Above all, if this principle were to become worldwide, it is a threat to every Third World country everywhere.

Whether Afghanistan ultimately will be used by the Russians as a springboard to further threaten our interests in the area, in the first instance, Mr. Chairman, I believe will depend upon the reaction of the United States. If we lead in this matter, our allies, the Moslem world, and other parts of the world will follow.

We are dealing here this morning with a matter that goes to the very heart of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and for anyone to have balanced assessment, the first suggestion I have is to eliminate the two terms, "détente" and "cold war." A more accurate portrayal of this relationship is that inherent in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship is the potential for mutual cooperation, for conflict, and for confrontation.

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, the Soviets did not miscalculate in Afghanistan. I am deeply skeptical of the view that the Soviet decision somehow or other resulted from an aging and ill Brezhnev being outvoted by a militant Politburo minority or majority. We know that almost all of the members of the Politburo have had and have similar views to Brezhnev, and there is no meaningful evidence to support the view that Brezhnev, regardless of his age, has lost control of the Politburo.

Neither do I accept the view that the Russians moved into Afghanistan because, after all, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations were marginal and they had very little to lose by doing this.

SALT II, the Olympics, grain, Western technology, credits, fish, the political isolation in the world community and in the Islamic countries in particular and, above all, the loss of the stability in the U.S.U.S.S.R. relationships are not inconsequential.

Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore that I find equally unconvincing the view that Soviet aggression in Afghanistan was only a defensive undertaking.

I accept the view that the toppling of the Amin regime which the Russians imposed on Afghanistan would have been a setback close to the Soviet borders and with some possible impact on the Moslems within the Soviet Union. But I know of no intelligence assessment in our Government or any other government that contends that the Afghan Moslems were anywhere near overturning the Amin regime. If the Soviets were fearful about their own Moslems, the aggression has brought about a broad Moslem reaction which can have long-range consequences for the Soviet Union. But, saying this, we should not be lulled to the myth that Afghanistan represents a Vietnam-type quagmire for them.

My view is simply this. The Soviets, pursuing a policy of tactical opportunism, assessed correctly that we and our allies could not prevent the direct aggression in Afghanistan, the direct takeover there, and that takeover would put them in a good position to exploit the instability that exists in the area and to exploit that instability to our disadvantage.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, the Soviets took advantage of a strategic opportunity.

This high risk policy, then, was undertaken in the knowledge, unlike the period of the Cuban missile crisis, that our nuclear strategic capability no longer is superior as a result of a decade of unrestrained growth in Soviet arms while spending in the West was going down. They knew that the United States had no meaningful military capac ity in the area. They had the advantage of proximity to Afghanistan, which provides logistic advantage. They knew that we were inhibited psychologically as a result of the scars of Vietnam. They knew that America was preoccupied in Iran and they also knew that Afghanistan, per se, is not of vital strategic importance to the United States. Our response to this fundamental challenge must be for the long haul, not a short-term ad hoc reaction. It is important that we relate our capacity, present and future, to the commitments and, above all, our response has to be measured, sober, firm, and credible.

Strengthening our overall military capacity in the Gulf and establishing on an urgent basis a significant American military presence is of major importance in protecting our overall interests in the area. It would be a meaningful signal to the Soviet Union. It will encourage and bulwark our friends in the area. It will reinforce the central role of the United States in resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. And, it offers the best hope that further Soviet advances toward the Straits of Hormuz can be deterred.

By the same token, it must be said that military assistance obviously is no panacea, for a number of states, such as the Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and others face internal instability, separatist movements, indigenous or Soviet inspired, and the threat of subversion. Nevertheless, because our friends, if we establish the kind of military presence as I hope we will, can see this kind of manifestation of American will and determination, while our military presence enhanced in that area obviously does not address directly the internal issues, nevertheless they will help to reassure the leaderships in dealing with those internal issues.

I therefore have several concrete recommendations, Mr. Chairman. The first is that we do shore up Pakistan with a long-term military and economic commitment, primarily to strengthen its capacity along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Our commitment to Pakistan should remain that contained in the 1959 treaty, which I helped write, which calls for consultations between us and the Pakistanis in the event of Communist aggression to consider appropriate measures in accordance with our constitutional processes. At the same time, we have to recognize that in Pakistan we are dealing with a very fragile internal situation which cannot go unattended, and we should press the leadership to deal more effectively with its internal political and economic problems and the separatist movements. Moreover, we should continue to do whatever we can to reassure India that we will monitor this