is a defensive move designed to keep the Communist puppet regime in Kabul from being overthrown by Islamic insurgents, or whether at was but one part of a general Soviet expansionist effort. Similarly, here were differences as to the relative priorities to be attached to checking Soviet expansionism and to preventing United States-Soviet relations from deteriorating to the point where there would be a serious danger of general war. Some witnesses stressed the implications of the growing Soviet military power that could be sent into the lands south of the U.S.S.R., while others pointed out the logistical difficulties the Soviets would encounter if they tried to move - mechanized forces through such rugged terrain.

Despite such differences in the views presented to the committee, several points are clear to me. Soviet control of the Persian Gulf would alter the worldwide geopolitical balance. It would place the Soviet Union astride key Western trade routes, improve their geopolitical position relative to other areas critical to the United States, and could reduce Western Europe and Japan to economic vassals of the U.S.S.R. even if the flow of oil were never cut off. Therefore, the United States cannot permit such a development to take place. We should heed the warning the committee heard from former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who said "We have come to know what aggression means. We have come to know that once it starts, it feeds upon itself. When aggression is perpetrated and it seems to have been successful, the temptation grows to grab for more." (page 10)

It is also clear to me that there is no basic conflict between U.S. policies designed to check Soviet expansionism in the Third World and policies aimed at developing a relationship with the U.S.S.R. which over time can promote arms control measures and reduce the dangers of war. Unless the West contains Soviet power, there is little chance that Soviet leaders will be interested in arms control agreements on any terms acceptable to the United States. When we demonstrate the strength and determination necessary to counter the U.S.S.R.'s ambitions, Soviet leaders will be more likely to accept the need for a relationship with the rest of the world that offers increased prospects for arms control and genuine peace.

Applying such considerations to Southwest Asia, the basic U.S. objective there should be to build a framework of security in concert with local and allied nations willing to cooperate in dealing with the dangers we all face. The United States must take the lead in this endeavor because it is the only nation which can offset Soviet power, but the responsibility for the area's security is not, and cannot be, ours alone.

During the course of the hearings, there was broad agreement among Administration and private witnesses that an enhanced U.S. military presence in the region would increase our ability to protect American interests there. The United States has already initiated, or plans to make, a large number of improvements to our force posture in the area. These include an enhanced permanent military presence, increased mobility so that additional forces can be sent into the area quickly in an emergency, improved access and transit rights, and periodic deployment exercises in the area.

The United States does need to increase its military capabilities in the region. However, I am troubled by the apparent lack of any clear

administration assessment of the specific threats our military buildup is designed to counter. Failure to arrive at a threat assessment agreed to by all parts of our Government creates the danger that each department will operate according to its own assessment-and its own bureaucratic interests.

A related concern is that the Administration is clearer about the specific actions it is undertaking to increase U.S. military strength in Southwest Asia than it is about the policies these actions are supposed to support. It is always easier, and thus tempting, to undertake a series of ad hoc measures rather than to concentrate first on the complex task of integrating the political, economic and military components of our policy. However, the military posture we adopt should support our foreign and security policies, not determine them. Laudable objectives and sound tactics are of limited benefit unless they are linked by a coherent and consistent strategy.

In our efforts to increase our military capabilities in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, we should not overlook the fact that an increased U.S. military presence may entail certain political liabilities for us and for the governments that cooperate with us. Recognition of this fact should not paralyze us, but rather lead us to anticipate such problems as are likely to arise so we are not forced to react in an unprepared and hasty manner when they occur. Nor should the emphasis the United States must place upon increased military capabilities lead us to neglect the search for political solutions to disputes that weaken the ability and willingness of countries in the region to cooperate in the face of the Soviet threat. The United States must also recognize that efforts to enhance the strength and security of the region will be a long-term task, and we must act in such a way that nations which feel threatened by the Soviet Union will be convinced that they can rely on us to stay the course.

We must also keep in mind that a purely military approach is not adequate to the challenges we face. As Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, told the committee "... there are those who call for ill-defined tough measures, sometimes to cure problems for which there is no real military solution, while at the same time deriding our military capabilities. On the other hand, different voices declare that we face no real problems except those created by our own over-reaction, and thus we need not be concerned about our military capabilities."

"Adopting either attitude as our Nation's policy would leave our security in great hazard. Lacking adequate capability or equally, telling the world we lack it when, in fact, we do not, would give a serious and dangerously wrong signal to the Soviet Union . . . and particularly to our friends in the area." (page 308)

These hearings did not, of course, provide all the answers to the challenges facing the United States in Southwest Asia. However, I am convinced that they made an important contribution to the consideration of appropriate policies toward this crucial area of the world.

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES

IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1980

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Glenn, Sarbanes, Javits, Percy, Helms, and Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The United States has been searching for a strategy to deal with Soviet power and influence in the lands from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian subcontinent for 30 years. American policy has gone through many stages since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine in 1947. This country helped create the Baghdad Pact, proclaimed the Eisenhower doctrine, and provided economic and military assistance to many countries in the region.

In the wake of the British withdrawal from east of Suez in the late 1960's, the United States enunciated the Nixon doctrine and came to rely upon the major powers of the region to protect the security of the area. The collapse of the Shah's rule in Iran, despite its vast oil revenues and huge arms purchases, revealed the weakness inherent in this approach.

Many of the problems that have hampered previous U.S. efforts to create a barrier to the expansion of Soviet power still exist in the area. Few countries have created effective political systems, and internal political conflicts of growing intensity are common. The wealthier states are subjected to the strains of rapid modernization, and the States without oil resources are hard pressed to cope with rising oil prices. Persistence of bitter regional quarrels pose continued obstacles to U.S. attempts to organize even an informal regional security system. The dependence of the Western World and Japan on Middle Eastern oil has grown at a time when Soviet military strength has expanded substantially.

There is, apparently, a spreading fear of the Soviet Union in the region following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, but few countries appear willing to cooperate openly with the United States in security matters.

In view of the complexities of the situation, it is imperative that the United States endeavor to develop a coherent strategy, taking into account such questions as these: What military forces are required to deter the Soviet Union from further aggressive moves in the area? What should be the respective political, economic, and military roles of the United States, our Western Allies and Japan, and the countries of Southwest Asia in meeting the Soviet challenge? What policies should the United States adopt regarding regional conflicts, such as the Indo-Pakistani dispute, in order to create the conditions necessary for cooperation between the United States and the nations of the area? We are fortunate this morning to have Clark Clifford with us to explore these and other crucial issues facing the United States in Southwest Asia. He has served as a Presidential adviser since the time of the Truman doctrine. He was the Secretary of Defense who had the judgment and courage to reverse our course in Vietnam.

We look forward to hearing your views on these important issues, Mr. Clifford. We also are anxious to learn the results of your recent trip as a Presidential emissary to the Government in India.

Í extend to you the most cordial welcome of the committee and thank you for appearing as a witness this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLARK CLIFFORD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND RECENT SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY TO INDIA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator Church.

I do not have a prepared statement. I have prepared an outline so that my remarks hopefully will have continuity. I will make my points as I proceed in the presentation of my outline.

It is necessary, I believe, in order for my suggestions to be meaningful, that I present a brief review of what has taken place. Also, I think such review is necessary because we have a tendency to give a great deal of attention to developments when they occur, such as the incursion into Afghanistan, and then after a while permit the significance of that move to diminish in importance.

I would like to review some of the background.

Also, I believe it is important that we recognize that the incursion into Afghanistan is not an isolated incident, and it must be looked at in the whole framework of what has been taking place in Southwest Asia.

First, I do not know why the Soviets for the last 20 years have been engaged in the enormous military buildup on which they have embarked. I wish I knew. I do not know anyone who has the specific

answer.

So, one will understand when we say that that it is not just an idle phrase, I wish briefly to refer to the Soviet buildup that has taken place.

I will read from a memorandum that was prepared for me at my request.

Soviet expenditures for defense, have steadily increased for the past 20 years. This level of expenditure is 10 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product. Relative to the United States, the Soviet defense effort now appears to be about

50 percent higher measured in dollars. Soviet investment in defense research, development, testing, evaluation, and military construction exceeds that of the United States by about 85 percent. The aggregate trends in expenditures tell only part of the story. More significant are the actual forces purchased over the past 15 years. During this time the Soviets have increased manpower by about 1 million; more than quintupled the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and expanded the number of weapons these vehicles can carry by a factor of 11; they have improved accuracy of their ICBM's by a factor of 5; they have added approximately 25 divisions to the ground forces, deployed new tanks, new self-propelled artillery, new attack helicopters, and 1,000 more first-line combat aircraft. They have improved the capabilities of their general purpose naval forces. They have seven new class cruisers.

I asked for the opinion of the Department that I served years ago, and this is their statement. Reading further:

The purposes of this buildup are not entirely clear, but the implications are. The Soviets are developing the capability to employ military force for purposes other than defense of their periphery, and they are demonstrating an increased capability and willingness to project power beyond their own borders. These trends are ominous and of great concern. While we acknowledge that the Soviets have vast frontiers to defend and that they started from a defense posture inferior to ours 20 years ago, their buildup today exceeds legitimate defensive requirements.

If you couple this extraordinary planning and developing of military force on their part with another activity, the situation becomes even more ominous.

It is substantially increased activity in the Arabian Sea and in the Indian Ocean. They are interested in Africa, Ethiopia, Yemen, and particularly the Horn of Africa. So we see that contemporaneously with the increase in their military force is an expansion into the Indian Ocean area, that area south of the Soviet Union.

A third factor enters in. For 35 years since the Soviet Union took over the Warsaw Pact countries and the Warsaw Pact area, they have followed the policy of using Soviet troops only in the Warsaw Pact area—until Afghanistan. This constituted a dramatic departure from a policy of 35 years. We cannot ignore it when a great nation follows a certain military strategic plan for 35 years, one that we have become accustomed to, and then suddenly changes that policy. It means that we must look with great concern upon the reasoning be hind such a dramatic change in the policy.

Why did the Soviets move into Afghanistan? I do not know for sure. I do not know anybody who knows the answer exactly-outside the Kremlin.

I know that the explanation the Soviets have given is not only cynical, but absurd. They say that the United States and China were engaging in such activities in Afghanistan that Afghanistan constituted a threat to the Soviet Union and they had no recourse other than to go in there and put a stop to the activity that was of a hostile nature toward them. They said that they were asked to come in by the then-head of the Afghanistan Government. That is one of the blackest jokes that we have heard for a long time because they claim they were asked by him to come in, but when they went in, they murdered him and the associates who were close to him.

So I have grave difficulty accepting the Soviet response as to why they went in.